Small Wars Journal

Book Review: Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State

Book Review: Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State

Edited by Maleeha Lodhi. 

Published by Columbia University Press, New York.  328 pages, 2011.

Reviewed by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein


Maleeha Lodhi was Pakistan’s Ambassador from 1993 to 1996 and again from 1999 to 2002, she also served as Pakistan’s Ambassador to the Court of Saint James from 2003 to 2008.  She has combined a career of public service to Pakistan and education of not only Pakistanis but Americans studying Pakistan and the region.  Her latest book collects seventeen Pakistani intellectuals, economists, political thinkers, and military affairs experts to discuss the future of their country.  The book is opportune, as relations between the United States and Pakistan remains tense after the killing of Usama Bin Laden in Abottabad, Pakistan.  Ayeha Jalal, who teaches at Tufts University, opens with a chapter on how Pakistan’s past influences the present, she begins by quoting a Washington Times article that referred to Pakistan and Paranoidistan, she then unpackages the perceptions of distrust and merges them with history and context.  She argues that Pakistanis cannot develop a historical consciousness without a credible history.  Jalal also discusses the devaluing of history for ideological reasons. 

Dr. Akbar Ahmed who teaches at American University in Washington D.C. wrote a thoughtful piece entitled, “Why Jinnah Matters,” it is time for more Americans to appreciate that there were two visions of Pakistan upon its founding in 1947, that Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founder, a secular nation that accommodates diverse Islamic and non-Islamic beliefs by not holding any religion above the state and those like Abu al-Al’a Al-Mawdudi who envision a Pakistan that lives up to Islamic values, and attempts to impose an interpretation of Islamic values on other Muslims and non-Muslims alike.  Ahmed distills Jinnah’s speeches and reminds readers of the course Pakistan may have taken if Jinnah had not died a year into Pakistan’s independence. 

Amb. Lodhi, who edited the book, has a chapter that is highly critical of Pakistan’s civil service and the need for reform as it is currently incapable of delivering governance.  She discusses how Pakistan’s different political parties represent dynastic families, such as the Pakistan’s People’s Party being the purview of the Bhutto dynasty, and Nawaz Sherief dominating the Muslim League.  You have politics of feudalism and clientelist politics in which tribes expect rewards for political support, and religious leaders expect to be compensated for their backing.  The book continues with chapters on the Pakistani Army by Shuja Nawaz and Saeed Shafqat, it is an army attempting to shift from conventional tactics to counter-insurgency, and the 2009 decision to confront the Talibinization of Pakistan as the country’s chief threat.  Chapters explore nuclear policy, economic reform to include the absolute need for balanced tax policies, and the challenge of education spending as a percentage of Gross National Product.  This is a thought provoking book for those interested in Pakistan specifically, and region generally.  It is the voice of experienced Pakistanis and those of Pakistani origin who have thought deeply of the national policies of Pakistan.  

Commander Aboul-Enein wishes to thank the Blackwell Library at Salisbury University for providing a quiet place to write this review.



Madhu (not verified)

Sun, 10/18/2015 - 9:54am

In reply to by Madhu (not verified)

Here is what I mean:

Titles of articles in the Washington Post, a "conduit" for the State Department and intelligency agencies views - in blogger Pundita's terminology.

Dec 24, 2010 - Pakistan textile exports: Call for wider lifting of U.S. tariffs intensifies

Jun 6, 2013 - U.S. should remove barriers to trade with Pakistan, India

Oct 9, 2013 - We still protect U.S. textile manufacturers like we actually have a lot of them left.

Most are written as if it's self evident and based on good "science" that we need to do these things, rather than a quid pro quo for a client state or because of pressure from highly paid lobbyists.

Madhu (not verified)

Sun, 10/18/2015 - 9:31am

<em>The Travels of a T-Shirt in the Global Economy</em>

Page 177

<blockquote>So, as the ruins of the World Trade Center still burned and America’s military was mobilized for the war in Afghanistan, the alphabet armies mobilized for another type of war. The American Textile Manufacturers Institute (ATMI), The American Yarn Spinners Association (AYSA), the National Retail Federation (NRF), the United States American Association of Importers of Textiles and Apparel (USA-ITA), and the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE) readied for a fight, bolstered on both sides by members of the U.S. Congress.

Ron Sorini, the chief textile negotiator under George H.W. Bush, represented Pakistan. Alongside him were Erik Autor of the National Retail Federation and other kindred spirits representing U.S. Importers. They argued that U.S. firms such as Wal-Mart would continue to purchase clothing from Pakistan only if the quotas were lifted and the tariffs rescinded. Wal-Mart did not have to stay in Pakistan, Autor argued. There were a dozen other poor countries willing to meet the T-shirt orders at the click of a mouse. If the factories were to stay open in Pakistan, then the United States had to loosen the noose on Pakistani apparel imports.

Not so fast, said the other letters of the alphabet.”</blockquote>

The Washington Post wrote about this but it translated it into a sort of dry IR political science-inflected Washington-ese that made it sound as if supporting the textile trade was rooted in a kind of scholarship when it was just a way to justify what a bunch of competing lobbies in DC wanted.

I used to buy this sort of thing because I didn't know what was behind the adoption of IR or political science language to camouflage intentions. This happens with military writing too, it seems, the jargon is cover even if many scholars are sincere. They are being used.

Madhu (not verified)

Sun, 10/18/2015 - 9:21am

Against my better judgement I bought <em>Relentless Strike</em> by Sean Naylor.

Who needs unnamed sources when the open source writing of many (in this case, Robert Grenier) gets you there?

Scroll down and look at some of my comments this thread:

<blockquote>A few weeks later Peter Blaber, on orders from Tommy Franks, and Spider from the CIA's Ground Branch, flew into Pakistan's capital city of Islamabad and met with Robert Grenier, the CIA's station chief. "There's no Al Qaeda here," Grenier told them. Amused by Grenier's refusal to acknowledge what was obvious, the pair later met with Pakistan's senior military leaders, who "literally belly-laughed" at their contention that Al Qaeda was regrouping in the tribal areas, according to a source familiar with the conversation.</blockquote> - page 378 <em>Relentless Strike</em> Sean Naylor

Grenier gets a lot of crap but I've always found this sort of thing interesting:

<em>Through Our Enemies Eyes</em>

“Anonymous” (Michael Scheuer)

<blockquote>With each of these steps, Musharraf struck at Islam – the core of Pakistan’s national identity and the glue that binds its multiethnic society – and he has not yet earned an even remotely acceptable return on his investment.

Can Musharraf make his changes stick, bring the country’s ardent, well-armed Islamists to heel, re-create an ally in Kabul, and avoid war with India?”</blockquote>

Perhaps I haven't been reading enough about political science theory, strategy, Star Wars or Lawrence of Arabia.

I once had a file of quotes on Musharraf by everyone under the sun (the early 2000's period, the Indians were surprisingly positive officially).

I appreciate Gary Hart's latest entry at The National Interest but I think he's missed something. Not that he isn't correct or that his commission wasn't right on the money.

Madhu (not verified)

Fri, 06/12/2015 - 12:49pm

In reply to by Madhu (not verified)

Remember, it's all a diad (India Pakistan), it all has to do with Partition, and it's all about fear.

National politics, militarization of national politics, money, desires to be regional hegemons, love of power, none of these things matter....because Galula! Kipling! Partition!

There is no need whatsoever to use plain old academic procedures to look at situations in a straightforward way. No, it's all about the mystery, never about intellectual hard work.

Eh, you're fine, Army. I keep yelling at you because I'm just a jerk but we have some work to do stateside. We have a lot of intellectual work and re-thinking to do about a lot of different things. In the end I think we'll be fine but it will be a rough go for a while, maybe.

Daniel Larison at The American Conservative asks why everyone is ignoring Yemen. We've always done that with our Sunni allies, even the traditional non-militarists in Left and Right, especially in good ole South Asia. Some conflicts matter, others never do. It's always been like that.

Madhu (not verified)

Fri, 06/12/2015 - 12:41pm

The back-and-forth coming out of so-called "South Asia" is really getting obnoxious. One day it's one thing from one side, another day it's from another side. And there are way more than two sides, it never was a diad:…

(Mega Eyeroll....; not necessarily at the author but the entire concept.)

The ticky tacky Nixon-ger NATOization of American thought (I've used that stupid phrase before.)

Why, if we take this country and that country we can have an alliance against another country!

And every country is somehow strategically vital for US interests. American foreign policy and military journals are filled with articles (especially during the Cold War) about how Pakistan was the key operationalizer for American Grand Strategy in the region.

No one country is key for anything in the larger sense. There are things called navies (well, if we'd actually fund one) and there are things called national economies with manufacturing (which we stupidly gave away) and there are things called nuclear weapons.

This silliness that many nations have about how they somehow have to play a Great Game.

Everyone looks like a loser in this game to me but you know how it is with d*&k waving chest-bumping nationalist hawks....

Madhu (not verified)

Thu, 02/05/2015 - 10:09am

I picked the wrong time to tease everyone over the whole "exoticism" thing, didn't I? I didn't even see the Washington Post 'CENTCOM emails' article when I wrote my previous comments.

At this point, I'm not sure I care all that much, mainly because it seems like there is some Beltway battle going on in the background that I can't quite understand.

The Dr. Lodhi articles I was mentioned earlier in the thread are in Caravan Daily:

"Coercive Diplomacy". Interesting concept.

PS: I read articles very differently today from how I used to in the past, whether by an Indian or Afghan or Pakistani or American scholar. It always seems as if there are multiple ways to "read" an article. I used to read things quite literally which is strange given my background. Who reads a scientific journal article without thinking about how properly to 'dissect' it, from data generation in materials and methods to the rest of it?

Madhu (not verified)

Wed, 02/04/2015 - 10:07am

In reply to by Madhu (not verified)

When reading a diplomatic or CIA or military memoir, I like to pay attention to the details that the author includes to show how the author is able to read people or situations. Sometimes it is just politeness, I understand that, the need to speak in a particular language of professionalism and courtesy. But some do it in ham handed ways, others more skillfully.

What do you think about this language? Am I going off the deep end again? This book is going to be quoted and cited for its passages on "how we didn't negotiate with the Taliban" in those early war fog filled days after 9-11 and how many will not pay attention to the history of multiple attempts at negotiating and the strange relationship between CIA and ISI?

That, my liberal blogger Pakistani friends, is a problem with your drone-love, I know survey data shows it is actually more popular than much of the public discussion allows, but details matter and one detail is how we know what we think we know.

There is still so much misinformation about what happened in the 80s in Afghanistan out there and this kind of stuff really affects the public understanding and how we go about things.

This book is like "Stingers won the war" part two, I'm betting. The CIA, or at least some of it's former members, have a history of doing this.

They are all like this, State, DOD, CIA: you shoulda listened to me, I had it right, I had the answer.

Madhu (not verified)

Wed, 02/04/2015 - 9:21am

In reply to by Madhu (not verified)

I get the same vibe from some analysts talking about Saudi Arabia, it seems very "old south asia analyst" to me, it's a little weird, a little clientele-y.

Madhu (not verified)

Wed, 02/04/2015 - 9:18am

In reply to by Madhu (not verified)

I wish I'd read some of the stuff Hy Rothstein* had written earlier on, it goes along with the writing on unconventional writing around here, the idea that even when trying to peel away Taliban or negotiate between various parties, you might still need a small but effective training and counter-unconventional warfare force to partner with the work that intelligence agencies are doing, hopefully, in parallel.

A lot of the targeting stuff around here talks about people and human networks, but it's materiel too, isn't it? Disrupting logistics and all that?

*Well, I started paying attention to his writing when I stumbled across him saying that a good outcome to the Kashmir conflict would come from internal domestic changes and reflect those positive changes, not from an external solution imposed by outsiders.

It was the first time I felt that I'd read sense from a military writer on this subject.

Madhu (not verified)

Wed, 02/04/2015 - 9:11am

In reply to by Madhu (not verified)

Okay, to be more serious (I know my comments are kinda weird but this stuff is EVERYWHERE, from 50's American military memoirs of the region to books today. Why is that? Is it just the sort of writing that is typical, that can't be avoided, or what?) you can look up Dr. Lodhi's articles at the Caravan. Pay particular attention to the language and see how American officials use almost the exact same language when discussing the region.

It's quite unsettling.

Madhu (not verified)

Wed, 02/04/2015 - 9:24am

In reply to by Madhu (not verified)

Do foreign policy expert and military dictionaries excise the words creativity or whimsy? Can't be creative without playing around with ideas or words or whatever. Just saying....

Madhu (not verified)

Wed, 02/04/2015 - 8:52am

In reply to by Madhu (not verified)

From <em>Madhu's Diary</em>, Chapter 25: From Sanity to Crazy, Studying the Washington Consensus:

"Note to self (of course, it's a <em>diary</em>):

1. When attending Global Council on Foreign Affairs (Whatever City), avoid wearing the Gap or Nordstrom Rack or carrying canvas book bag that says, "I like big books. I cannot lie."

2. Dig silk <em>duputta</em> out of back of closet and wear lots of black eyeliner so as to have an "exotic Kohl-like" look.

3. Affect "foreign" accent when asking questions, although have flat American accent of upper middle flyover.

4. When asking question of speaker, make sure to use the word narrative and to speak in a "mellifluous" voice as officials in Chapter 7 of Grenier's book.

PS: Look up meaning of "mellifluous." "

Madhu (not verified)

Wed, 02/04/2015 - 8:45am

From Robert L. Grenier's <em>88 Days to Kandahar: A CIA Diary</em>:

On Dr. Maleeha Lodhi in Chapter 7:

<blockquote>She was dressed in a traditional <em>shalwar kameez</em> in complementary shades of pastel green, with an offsetting <em>silk duputta</em>, or shawl, draped over her chest and back over her shoulders. Perfectly groomed, she seemed much younger than her long resume would imply, but it was impossible to say by how much. She exuded an aura of competence and command, combined with an almost girlish curiosity and, disarmingly, a hint of mischeivious fun.</blockquote>


<blockquote>My idea, adopted readily by Director Tenet and Jim Pavitt, who had now risen to be the agency's deputy director for operations, was that during the reciprocal visits by the two intelligence chiefs, we should distance ourselves from the US government, and appeal for ISI help based on the long cooperative relationship between our services, of which the <strong>spectacularly successful joint effort during the anti-Soviet <em>jihad</em>was the most prominent example.</strong></blockquote>

Do you think any of the people approvingly citing this book or it's author will pick out these quotes, especially the last?

It's as if there are only two ways to discuss any situation, those that parallel our political conversation, instead of the millions of intellectual permutations that are possible. If you want a small foot print (better for sure) or even wanted to raid and then leave, you still have to understand your strengths and weakness in working with others.

This is sometimes missing from the Cointra vs. Coindinista conversation, it's as if recognizing the weakness of the CIA requires a big military foot print. I don't believe those were the only options.

Madhu (not verified)

Sat, 12/20/2014 - 1:23pm

This article from the Arab News is interesting given the nature of the New York Times article:

<blockquote>Thirdly, Peshawar’s horror — that reminds us of Russia’s Beslan school siege in September 2004 that killed 385 — can also be blamed on the ugly political storm the country has been facing for three months.
Calls to paralyze main cities on pre-announced dates and protests led by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf’s Imran Khan have kept the country’s already thinned-out police overworked.
Alleged military “games” to “right-size” the Sharif government recently have given rise to, besides Khan, Pakistani-Canadian preacher Tahirul Qadri whose firebrand speeches were followed by senseless violence and deaths as a result of police action. Allegations and counter-allegations in the aftermath and threats to destroy peace by political parties have kept men in uniform on toes. While the 180-million-plus nation was busy enjoying lamentable political attacks in prime-time TV talk shows during the “lull” of terror, the war-trained Taleban were giving their blitz plans final touches. And what was the result? The darkest Tuesday in the history of Pakistani schools!</blockquote>

This too:

<blockquote>Democrat Hillary Clinton — who has been honest enough to admit that after creating the monster of the Taleban to counter the Soviets in Afghanistan, the US left Pakistan to fend for itself — owes Islamabad an irrevocable pledge that she would include this problem’s permanent solution in her election manifesto.</blockquote>

The US never left Pakistan to fend for itself, it continued support for proxies even after the Soviets left. It was a popular policy, hard to dismantle just like that, back in the late 80's. Most of the post 1990 attempts to help, routed around Congress policy and through the aid of allies and international institutions, have contributed to disorder so that is a paragraph that is misleading, to put it mildly. A message?

For the average American that doesn't really pay attention--the sort that thinks Musharraf sounds reasonable as he sounds off on CNN--the messaging that "the gloves are finally off" by the military works a treat so we won't know until more than the usual suspects are rounded up by the system if there is any real change. Doesn't look good so far.

Madhu (not verified)

Sat, 12/20/2014 - 12:46pm

As I've noted before in this thread, American military journals, particularly early in the Cold War, stressed the idea that the Pakistan Army--with its roots in the British Indian Army--represented a force for modernization particularly given the weakness of civilian institutions.

I'm sure the British pressed this language too, given their interest in cultivating the region and their immigrant populations. Tracing BBC news coverage on Kashmir over the years is particularly illuminating.

This language can be seen in official and doctrinal language from the Pakistani Army, even today. A force for modernization through the building of infrastructure, etc.

From the New York Times:

<blockquote>The Pakistani Taliban, who have claimed responsibility for the attack, targeted the school because it is where the sons of army personnel study. Six months ago, the Pakistani military shifted its strategy. After many years of supporting select Islamist groups to pursue certain strategic “needs” — propping up the mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the ’80s, nurturing jihadists fighting against India in the ’90s, and protecting the “good” Taliban following 9/11 — the army finally decided to dismantle the “bad” Taliban.</blockquote>…

Yet the remainder of the article is interesting in that the politicians are being blamed for not supporting the Army in its "new" strategy. Imran Khan too:

<blockquote>Pakistan’s mainstream politicians have intentionally promoted conspiracy theories in order to thwart the possibility of developing a national consensus against terrorism. Imran Khan, the cricket star turned opposition politician, has led this charge. Until the army launched its operation, Mr. Khan had popularized a toxic narrative about the need to “talk” with terrorists.</blockquote>

This article was widely shared on Twitter and I found it interesting, the Army doing its best and the politicians messing it up again. Yet the entire institutional framework of supporting proxies and armed jihad has to be torn up.

Is this playing favorites again, being subtly telegraphed, is this showing a break, or, is this a kind of feint? I'm not talking about the article or the author, just the curious, well, the curiousness of it all.

Once again, that article is all "the besieged and right doing Army vs. evil Politicians," and, yet, what of the reported connections between the security state and Imran Khan, between the security state and its pressing of civilians when they want to normalize relations with neighbors.

Madhu (not verified)

Mon, 10/27/2014 - 12:49pm

From the Raymond Moore article I have quoted in my comment below:

<blockquote>In the field of military welfare and rehabilitation, Pakistan has pioneered a number of projects which might well serve as models in other developing countries. Such programs as land resettlement and the PWSR industries program constitute nation-building of a high order.</blockquote> Military Review, 1969

Also from the article:

<blockquote>Under this program, unsettled land in the country, particularly in the Sind along the Indian border of West Pakistan, is brought under settlement and cultivation by being offered to veterans of the armed forces or to those soldiers within five years of retirement. The land is allocated on the basis of service, rank, or gallantry in action.</blockquote>

From the Christian Science Monitor, May 2013:

<blockquote>Homemade bombs are the weapon of choice for insurgents in Afghanistan. The Pentagon says there were 14,500 improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in 2012, up 56 percent from 2009. The bombs killed 868 Afghan civilians and 312 coalition soldiers last year. And many – if not most – of those were made using a chemical found in fertilizers.

By cracking down on fertilizer smuggling, the theory goes, one can also cut down the number of improvised explosive devices.</blockquote>…

And of course, there is a lot of smuggling and our system has a limited ability to deal with any of it, it's flailing to focus on land reform or smuggling versus looking at the larger picture.

Since our system is back in its traditional Gulfie "get Iran" and eastern NATO "get Russia" mode, where the needs of our nation is subordinate to the mental irritations of our interventionists and the so-called (some hawks, can't hunt for *&$%) hawkish class, there is talk of the US needing to understand counter-unconventional warfare.

I mean, various Eastern NATO and Ukrainian border forces were begging for help years ago, but offensive operations were preferred by their their military class, and our foreign policy class, because the desire to go at the Russians over-rode reasonable policies for counterunconventional warfare, including dealing intelligently with minorities.

The US is lousy at proxy warfare and at counter proxy or counterunconventional warfare because of the inability to speak honestly about the true nature of its problems and how it contributes to the disorder which allows proxies to flourish. Patrick Cockburn:

<blockquote>It is a persistent error by the United States, Britain and their allies in the West to underestimate the extent to which the Sunni-Shia confrontation determines what happens in the Middle East. This is particularly so in those countries in which the Shia, or sects demonised by Sunni governments as Shia, form a significant part of the population. The blindness of the western powers is to a degree self-serving and intentional: it makes it easier for them to ally themselves with the theocratic absolute monarchies of the Gulf without having to admit they have thereby plugged into a bigoted and sectarian agenda.</blockquote>…

There is disagreement in intellectual circles over the degree that this is the case; at any rate, the US, because it has sided with one side due to the desire to leverage that one side against Russia or Iran, cannot be honest about anything that it does, and, so, cannot be the subtle force it wishes.

Special Forces stiffening up the Kurdish forces battling IS? Sure, this we can do, but the strange dance with Syrian opposition forces? Here we will play all sides of the fence, all because we still will not study the proxy conflicts that matter in the ways that matter, and I wonder too if this is a because of institutional embarrassment and dislike at being shown up. Or simply that there is no price to be paid for being terribly, terribly wrong within our system.

The trends are still good for our nation, when taking the long view, but I think many young people in the military will simply have to have good patience and focus on what is in front of them. I wish you all the best, but somewhere, I hope some of you have time for your own study, and at least a part of that study should be to look at what I called the "mental irritations" of the DC class which is stuck in the past. Hopelessly stuck in a dream of the late Cold War and the 90s.

Madhu (not verified)

Fri, 10/24/2014 - 9:39am

<blockquote>Amb. Lodhi, who edited the book, has a chapter that is highly critical of Pakistan’s civil service and the need for reform as it is currently incapable of delivering governance. She discusses how Pakistan’s different political parties represent dynastic families, such as the Pakistan’s People’s Party being the purview of the Bhutto dynasty, and Nawaz Sherief dominating the Muslim League.</blockquote>

This language--of the military as a force for modernization of the society because civilian institutions are weak--is identical to the language of American military journals from the 50s and 60s, and contemporary language of many different armies today. No, really, think about it. Even within the American discourse.

I suspect members of the Bush administration and some so-called Coindinistas mirrored this thought process, and were as captured by it today as others were in the past, and, likely, unaware of its long term origins.

To be fair, neither American Right nor left is able to grasp this aspect of its attitudes toward the region.

The conception of the Army as the main modern force in society is an important motivator of action in addition to any regional fears.

As I wrote in another comments section:

"In the June 1969 volume of Military Review, there is an article that is fascinating to examine in both historical terms, and how it reflects on the steadiness of American attitudes toward the region.

The Pakistan Army and Nationbuilding, Raymond A. Moore, Jr. (page 35)

From the 1969 article from the American military journal, I find the following (the article views all of the Army programs as excellent, and the Pakistani Army as a model modernizing force):

<blockquote>Certainly, it is the largest and probably one of the three most important of the modernizing elite groups--the others are the civil service and the planning commission.</blockquote>"

Aqil Shah makes the same point (and has the same referenced article in the footnotes) in the books <em>The Pakistan Army and Democracy.</em>

Where I disagree with the some points made in the book is that I see outside attempts to modernize the country through civilian institutions to be similarly problematic.

But again, this is my eternal naiveté playing out, most of what happens intellectually within institutions is not true scholarly work but simply attempts to cherry pick information to fit pre-existing desires and wants.

I wonder if the American Army found this particularly pleasing because it views itself as a modernizing force abroad, and, so, each fed off the other.

PS: Above, I mean that the American left thinks in terms of outside aid as modernizers and so civilian and military modernizers are really all of a piece.

PPS: Oops, Aqil Shah's book is a true scholarly work, I was just thinking about think tank world in my comments above.

Why do we not do this for everything? Go through one major American military journal region by region and create an institutional narrative of how you have thought about things, how you have changed, and what seems to be the same?

Time and money, of course, so much is diverted to the contractor class and others looking for a quick buck or to make their careers, ideologues, etc.

I wonder, however, what the "Boston" zeitgeist was that contributed to Obama administration policy toward the region, all of the pet ideas of academics were attempted in South Asia, but, of course, hit the rocks because the real world is not some talk for the public at the Brattle.

You know your world, I know mine....