A Very Short Review of an Important New Essay on the Vietnam War
By Colonel Gian P. Gentile
Historian Andrew J. Birtle has written a very important new essay in the current issue of the Journal of Military History* that I recommend as a must-read to Small Wars Journal readers, Council members and the greater reading public who pay attention to matters of history and current defense policy and actions. Of note the Journal of Military History is considered the flagship journal for American historians of military history. Its standards of scholarship are impeccable and it is a "peer-reviewed" scholarly journal; which means that anytime an essay is published in it the essay is anonymously reviewed by usually 3-4 other historians who are experts in a given field. Often times, proposed essays for the Journal that go through this peer-review process are rejected for publication if they do not meet standards of scholarship, originality, quality of argument, etc.
Andrew Birtle is one of the leading historians in the country on the history of American Army counterinsurgency doctrine and operations. He has two books out on the subject and his scholarly work has received very strong reviews by such noted counterinsurgency experts as Dr Conrad Crane (primary author of FM 3-24) and Army Lieutenant Colonel Robert Cassidy.
Birtle's essay, PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal is an in-depth historical analysis of the well known US report making recommendations for strategy and methods for the conduct of the Vietnam War written in 1966 titled A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam. But Birtle's essay is more than just a close historical analysis of the PROVN report. As Birtle's title hints the essay directly and rightly refutes the abuse of the PROVN report by historians over the last thirty years.
Essentially Birtle's essay demolishes a deeply flawed historical caricature of the Vietnam War that historians like Guenther Levy, Andrew Krepinevich, and Lewis Sorley (among others) have constructed over the years. The flawed historical caricature can be reduced to a simple set of sentences (remember, what follows is the flawed caricature and not truth):
1. The United States Army did not have a Coin doctrine prior to Vietnam and had no clue how to do Coin either.2. In 1965 General William Westmoreland did not understand classic counterinsurgency theory and was a knuckle dragging artilleryman who only wanted to fight the Normandy campaign again in the Central Highlands using search and destroy missions.
3. THE PROVN report proposed a radically different way that focused on Galula-style coin, but Westmoreland didn't "get it," dismissed it, and even covered PROVN up.
4. But then, after almost three long years under Westmoreland not getting it, the Coin Cavalry comes to the rescue under General Abrams who does get it, understands the secrets within PROVN, unlocks those secrets and deploys them.
5. Abrams, therefore, immediately brings about a radical change in approach and method from his predecessor Westmoreland by applying PROVN
6. Abrams was winning the war with his new approach and if the American people had not lost their will the war could have been won.
This, in its essence, is the FLAWED historical caricature that Birtle's essay finally and thankfully demolishes. What he convincingly shows in his essay is that Westmoreland's strategy was for the most part in line with the recommendations by PROVN; that PROVN acknowledged that before pacification could go forward the United States military in Vietnam had to continue its large scale conventional operations to defeat a real-world and substantial VC and NVA regular threat in South Vietnam. Westmoreland, in fact, agreed with most of PROVN's conclusions. The important point is that the in 65 Westmoreland and the US Army did understand classic counterinsurgency theory and practice and the strategy that Westmoreland came up with was a reasonable one.
Birtle also shows through meticulous historical research and documentation that when Abrams took over from Westmoreland in 68 he did not radically alter strategy at all; there was a shift in priority with Abrams toward pacification but that was primarily because Abrams could shift priorities after Tet in 68 when much of the South Vietnamese communist main force units were crushed. Arguably, if Westmoreland would have stayed in command through 1968 he would have done exactly what Abrams did.
Consider this quote from Birtle's essay that sums up quite well the essentials of his argument:
By putting PROVN in its proper historical context, we can better understand not just the document itself but the [Vietnam] war more generally. As we have seen, the assertion that there was fundamental difference between Westmoreland's strategy and that advocated by PROVN and implemented by Abrams is INCORRECT [caps mine]. Rather than representing antithetical concepts, Westmoreland's and Abrams's approaches to the conflict were cut of the same cloth, and we should not allow minor differences to mask this fundamental truth.
The truth about PROVN that Birtle brings out in his essay is especially important now as we try to understand the recent past of the Iraq War and where we are headed in the future. Since the flawed historical caricature of PROVN, Westmoreland, Abrams, and Vietnam is often deployed to argue as a juxtaposed historical case study of the purported extreme differences between the pre-Surge and Surge Army units in Iraq. The flawed caricature is deeply ingrained in the current Iraq War triumph-narrative. For example, Iraq War writer Tom Ricks has gone so far as to label a "pre-Surge" Army as a failure and a newly transformed "Surge" Army as successful in Iraq; just like the flawed caricature of Westmoreland being the "loser" and Abrams the savior in Vietnam.
So it is important now to decouple flawed understandings of the history of the Vietnam War from our current understanding of the Iraq War so that we can get at a more accurate assessment of what has happened in Iraq over the past 6 years to guide us into the future.
*The Journal of Military History does not offer open access to its articles on line; recommend those interested in reading it in is entirety go through a library source to get it.
Colonel Gian Gentile commanded 8-10 Cavalry armored reconnaissance squadron for three years until his posting to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. He commanded his squadron during a deployment to western Baghdad in 2006.
Comments
tequila, thanks for the link to this excellent article. For all those who think the Army is now on the cutting edge of COIN, and that the Army didn't get it in Vietnam should read this article. You'll see the same discussions we have been having since 9/11. Very little is new. I hope this article takes some of the wind out of "Eating Soup with a Knife". While I still enjoyed and learned from Nagl's book, especially his discussion on learning organizations, he excessively cherry picked from history, which in effect distorted the context of the overall conflict and effort there.
Bill:
<blockquote>"One of my dreams is to readdress the history of the Vietnam War (when time permits) to challenge some of the standing assumptions."</blockquote>I wish you well, that's a daunting task...
Agree with your comment. There were a lot of nuances at the time that have not been captured by any history I've read -- and I've read a good number of them.
This, in particular:<blockquote>"While critical assessments are a critical part of our organizational learning methodology, it is not helpful to make overly broad assumptions without explaining the context of the conflict."</blockquote>is quite important and I'd add that to selectively use history for parochial or political reasons is downright dangerous.
Ken,
One of my dreams is to readdress the history of the Vietnam War (when time permits) to challenge some of the standing assumptions. The problem with history, much like intelligence, is you can cherry pick information to support your agenda, thus the well known spin factor.
I quickly tire of senior officers telling their junior officers that the U.S. Army didn't understand COIN during the Vietnam War. There are many examples to support that argument, but there are also numerous examples of excellent COIN TTP and strategy that are now ignored because they are associated with the Vietnam War.
GEN Westmoreland had two fights, a conventional fight against the NVA regulars, and any attempt to use COIN strategy against them would have failed miserably. The other war was the insurgency. It created a dynamic of two strategies that were not mutually supporting. Then add all the other factors, such as a completely inept S. Vietnamese Executive Branch (initially), which made it damn near impossible to establish legitimacy, etc. You don't walk into a conflict with a perfect understanding of all the variables, but you quickly start learning once you have boots on the ground and you adjust, and hopefully continuing to adjust your strategy until you get it right.
Yes a lot of mistakes were made, but like most conflicts we have been involved in there were a lot of complexities to manage. While critical assessments are a critical part of our organizational learning methodology, it is not helpful to make overly broad assumptions without explaining the context of the conflict.
Correct, Ken. I would also contend that (yet again) what we're seeing here is the "either/or" disconnect that seems to be quite fashionable in a great deal of recent scholarship. The truth, alas, seldom makes it that easy.
COIN doctrine did exist prior to Vietnam, as Ken points out, but the fact that it existed does not necessarily mean that it was widely practiced or understood. By the same token, one cannot assume that said lack of practice means that doctrine does not exist. It's also dangerous to examine such situations without taking into account the historical context that created them. Westmoreland might have agreed with parts of PROVN, but there is little to show that he put many of their recommendations into practice. His emphasis tended to swing much more toward the big battles, and woe to the commander who failed to "get" that swing.
I tend to have little patience with attempts to link Vietnam and Iraq on the battlefield. I do, however, see many more similarities between the conflicts and the way that the U.S. military as an institution responded to them...right down to the verbal barbs and accusations. One can only hope that the post-conflict squabbles are less damaging this time around.
I must respectfully disagree with you and Andrew Birtle. Scholarship is all very well -- but it relies on memories and the written word and both those can be skewed to support agendas.
I too can rely on memory -- and having been in Viet Nam a couple of times in the Westmoreland years and at the turnover from Westmoreland to Abrams, I disagree with your characterizations above to an extent. Specifically:<blockquote>"1. The United States Army did not have a Coin doctrine prior to Vietnam and had no clue how to do Coin either.<br 2. In 1965 General William Westmoreland did not understand classic counterinsurgency theory and was a knuckle dragging artilleryman who only wanted to fight the Normandy campaign again in the Central Highlands using search and destroy missions.
3. THE PROVN report proposed a radically different way that focused on Galula-style coin, but Westmoreland didnt "get it," dismissed it, and even covered PROVN up.
4. But then, after almost three long years under Westmoreland not getting it, the Coin Cavalry comes to the rescue under General Abrams who does get it, understands the secrets within PROVN, unlocks those secrets and deploys them.
5. Abrams, therefore, immediately brings about a radical change in approach and method from his predecessor Westmoreland by applying PROVN
6. Abrams was winning the war with his new approach and if the American people had not lost their will the war could have been won.'</blockquote>Alternatively, I believe:
1. The Army in CONUS did understand COIN prior to Viet Nam and had specifically trained for it; the Army in Europe, logically, did not understand or train for it -- and that part of the Army provided the bulk of senior replacements in 1967-68. Westmoreland got it to an extent but elected an economy of force and a US-centric effort. Efforts to create major engagements an inflict 'crushing defeats' were wasted and the South Viet Namese forces were essentially disregarded and not used. Both those things were mistakes. Further, Westmoreland was not nearly the problem so much as his excessively large, protective and bureaucratic staff, particularly after the influx from USAREUR in late 1966.
3. Again, not Westmoreland but the MACV staff.
4. Actually, Bruce Palmer should get much credit for nudging both Westmoreland and Abrams into doing it right.
5. A combination of factors and people caused the shift; Abrams was not solely responsible.
6. Not the American people but the Congress.
You also say this:<blockquote>"So it is important now to decouple flawed understandings of the history of the Vietnam War from our current understanding of the Iraq War so that we can get at a more accurate assessment of what has happened in Iraq over the past 6 years to guide us into the future."</blockquote>I agree -- and suggest that we get the history right and not select the version that suits...