The cover story of yesterday's "New York Times Magazine" is the best reporting I've seen on Afghanistan, ever.
The story is about CPT Dan Kearney's B/2-503 IN. 2-503rd is commanded by myfriend LTC Bill Ostlund and is responsible for the Korengal River valley, the site of the toughest fighting now happening in Iraq or Afghanistan. The people in the Korengal River Valley don't support the coalition or the Afghan government; 2-503 has no one to drink tea with and nowhere near enough troops to provide security to the population.
The story illustrates clearly how many more troops we need in Afghanistan--NATO, Afghan, and US--and how hard counterinsurgency is when you don't have anyone to partner with; Battle Company soldiers are simply strangers in a strange land. If you don't have time to read it, at least look at the photos.
Once you see them--some of the best combat footage of any war, ever--you'llread the story.
God bless Dan Kearney, Battle Company, 2-503 IN, and the people of theKorengal River Valley.
Comments
All serious observers of Afghanistan--including the Secretary of Defense and, in his comments yesterday, the President--know that NATO is critically short troops in that country to provide security against a resurgent Taliban. As we have seen in Iraq, improvements in government performance trail, not precede, improvements in security.
The additional troops need not be American. There are now, in fact, Afghan security forces in the Korengal Valley, assisted and enabled by Military Transition Teams and supported by Bill Ostlund's soldiers. They are making progress, but it is, to coin a phrase, messy and slow.
The strains on our ground forces are pressing and real; Andrew Tilghman, author of the excellent Washington Monthly piece on Captain retention in January's Washington Monthly, and I discussed those strains with "Talk of the Nation" a few weeks back; see http://www.npr.org/blogs/talk/2008/02/the_militarys_officer_crunch_1.ht…
However, the fact that our force is under strain does not mean that we can therefore not do what it takes to win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Good strategists find ways to accomplish as many of the tasks at hand as possible with the forces available, and seek more efficient ways to use their resources. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the best answer I see is to increase the use of host nation security forces, empowered by larger, better trained advisory teams, to hold ground and build space for the host nation government to expand its reach once it has been cleared by American forces. Coining another phrase: Americans clear, while our allies hold and build with our help.
Dave, thanks for posting this up on its own - I've seen few pieces of journalism more deserving then this story. Its a very up close and personal look at the human side of war. I met Dan a few years ago when he came to my old BN as a PL, he is an officer with heart and candor, and his company is lucky to have him as leader.
I think there are too few stories that depict the truth of war time life at the platoon and rifle company level. Those who make "big" decisions should always remember Dan and his men when they do so, they are the folks who have to carry the burden of the consequences. That's not an indictment, just pointing out that its easy to lose sight of the importance of riflemen, or the tanker or what have you. It has always been my narrow view that they compose the best of small margin of Americans who defend us.
Godspeed to Dan and Battle Company.
Agree with LTC Nagl that this is a superb job of reporting; top-flight, no question about it.
Also agree with him and Ken White for blessings on the brave men of battle company (and for the NY Times Elizabeth Rubin who shared their dangers for a short while).
I depart stridently with LTC Nagl on his call for more troops in Afghanistan. How much more of these calls can our Army take? Anthony Cordesman (in an article posted in a current SWJ thread) calmly notes that to succeed in Iraq we are looking at many more years well into the next administration and probably hitting 5000 KIA at some point in the future.
The sage Ken White hits the nail on the head in response to LTC Nagl by stating:
"Some areas in any insurgency simply have groups of people who are not amenable to any blandishments. That happens and it's reality; it also appears to be the case in the Korengal Valley."
Another sage to listen to is Colonel (ret) Andrew Bacevich when he warns that there are definite limits to what American military power can accomplish. This is the true and most important lesson from Vietnam. Others should consider heeding such sage advice.
Read the article two days ago. I agree with Nagl that it is a good article and has some good photography. The troops are doing the best they can; most are coping. As usual.
I disagree with him on the potential benefit of more Troops or any better provision of security. You could put a really good ODA with language skills in there and up the troop presence to a Battalion or more -- it would make little difference.
The headmen would simply chill until a good time to revert to violence occurred and the Talibs would do the same. You will eventually rotate out that ODA -- and the Battalion -- and the new guys will get to start all over again. The cycle would continue.
Some areas in any insurgency simply have groups of people who are not amenable to any blandishments. That happens and it's reality; it also appears to be the case in the Korengal Valley. NK2's a hot spot with intractable people, that simple.
The only thing that <i><b>may</b></i> make a difference is an improved government and a strong Afghan governmental presence there -- and even that is no guarantee with the truly hard core...
I can agree with his wish for a blessing on the Company; hope most of 'em make it back to Vicenza