Army Special Operations Forces Support to the Multi-Domain Battle Concept

Army Special Operations Forces Support to the Multi-Domain Battle Concept

Provided by U.S. Army Special Operations Command via STAND-TO!

What is it?

U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) is supporting the development of the United States Army and Marine Corps Concept Multi-Domain Battle (MDB): Combined Arms for the 21st Century. This concept describes military operations against a peer adversary that can contest U.S. forces in all domains -- in competition and in armed conflict -- and challenge the deterrence efforts in 2025-2040.

Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) is nested with the Army's MDB concept and deliver tactical, operational, and strategic value through an indigenous approach, precision targeting operations, developing understanding and wielding influence, and crisis response.

What has the Army done?

USASOC partnered with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) to link Silent Quest 17, USASOC's title 10 Wargame, to the Army's deep future wargame, Unified Quest 17. The result was an integrated and synchronized approach to the future-focused peer adversary problem set. It incorporated a detailed examination of the competition short of an armed conflict period leading to armed conflict under the MBD concept.

What continued efforts are planned for the future?

USASOC will deliver physical and cognitive effects to shape the operational environment and extend the reach of the Joint Force. This includes improving SOF and conventional force integration, interoperability and interdependence to enhance unity of effort across multiple domains. To prepare ARSOF capabilities needed by the Army, USASOC Strategy -- 2035 identifies how ARSOF must adapt to address future threats. This means promulgating an indigenous approach that views challenge to stability as problems to be solved by empowered people in the region.

USASOC is also broadening the concept of maneuver to encompass both physical and cognitive objectives in order to gain a position of relative advantage with respect to the enemy and population.

Why is this important to the Army?

U.S. military advantages across all domains. Future wars may be fought using new technologies; however, they will be fought by people for social, economic, cultural, and political reasons. The interaction of armed forces with societies in conflict will affect the outcome of wars. Partners will require support from the U.S. military to withstand attacks on their populations, forces, and commercial interests and to support U.S. operational and strategic goals.

ARSOF provides Joint Force commanders the ability to transform indigenous mass into combat power in order to develop effective partner forces that can win against determined enemies.

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Comments

Consistent with my questions and concerns of yesterday -- outlined at the SWJ thread "The Need to Understand and Conduct Unconventional Warfare" -- do we not see, in this case also re: the "Multi-Domain Battle Concept," a significant problem with our current move to:

a. Abandon our strategic goal of transforming the outlying states and societies of the world more along modern western political, economic, social and value lines? And likewise to:

b. Abandon the populations of the world that have, and would continue to have, supported our -- and their -- such strategic objective?

This, while adopting, in the place of same:

1. A strategic goal which notes that we do not care on what basis the states and societies of the world are organized, ordered and/or oriented; this,

2. So long as such states and societies remain peaceful and "stable" (to wit: have their populations, and thus law and order, well in hand).

Is not this such strategic goal "sea change" rather disruptive for -- and indeed rather problematic to -- the Multi-Domain Battle Concept, Army Special Operations Forces support to same and the "indigenous approach" critical to both; all of which are addressed in our article above?

In fact, does not this such strategic goal "sea change" tend to undermine, emasculate and/or actually eliminate our ability to effectively operate in -- and win -- "Multi-Domain Battle?" This, given that, via our adoption of such a new strategic "worldview" (see items "1" and "2" above), we have -- actually ourselves -- now discredited, undermined, set aside and generally made unavailable:

a. The very "idea" weapons (re: the U.S./Western way of life, way of governance, values, attitudes, beliefs, institutions, etc.) and

b. The very indigenous allies (who value and are willing to fight for same) that

c. Have helped the United States, the United States Army and the U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (a) operate effectively in the critical "Human Domain" and (b) win the "Multi-Domain," and other battles, of the past?

(This such discrediting/discarding of our very own "idea" weapons and allies occurring at a time when other states and societies of the world are pressing "hard forward" -- in the "Human Domain" -- with their alternative ways of life, their alternative ways of governance, their alternative values, etc, "idea" weaponary. Talk about [a] playing directly into our enemies' hand, [b] actually helping them win the "Multi-Domain Battle" and, this, [c] exactly at the wrong time ????)

Bottom Line Questions -- Based on the Above:

Given the emasculating effect -- of the strategic goal "sea change" noted above -- this, re: our need to (a) win the "Multi-Domain Battle," (b) apply Army Special Operations Forces support to achieve same and (c) utilize the "indigenous approach" effectively in these such efforts,

Given these such matters, should not the U.S. reconsider the apparent "throwing the baby out with the bath water" complications/consequences -- i.e., the exceptionally negative national security implications and costs -- of:

a. Abandoning our strategic goal of transforming the outlying states and societies of the world more along modern western political, economic, social and value lines? And, likewise,

b. Abandoning the populations of the world that have in the past, and would continue to in the future, support our -- and their -- such strategic objective?

(What will the U.S./the West replace these such -- amazingly useful, amazingly prolific and amazingly available -- "ideas"/"moral authority" weapons and allies with? "Ideas"/"moral authority" weapons and allies which have allowed the U.S./the West to [a] effectively operate in the "Human Domain" and, therein and elsewhere, [b] win the "Multi-Domain," and other battles, of the past?")

Again, and as also noted in the SWJ thread "The Need to Understand and Conduct Unconventional Warfare," I am hoping that COL Maxwell, COL Jones, Bill M., Outlaw, et al., will weigh in here and help us with this conundrum.

You're reading *way* too much into this...Multi-Domain Battle is the flavor of the month in HQDA and TRADOC, designed to keep the Army relevant in the budget wars while people talk about area denial and anti-access futures. USASOC, as an Army component, has to fold themselves into this.

Warlock:

The difficulties that I note here -- and their source -- would seem to transcend the "Multi-Domain Battle Concept" (flavor of the month or no) and "Army Special Operations Forces Support" to same.

Accordingly, I would also appreciate your thoughts, re: my similar questions and concerns; in this case, as relates to "The Need to Understand and Conduct Unconventional Warfare" -- similar questions and concerns which are to be found at the SWJ thread of this same title/name.

(This, given that unconventional warfare -- and political warfare also for that matter -- can, in no way might we agree, be considered as "flavors of the month?")