Eating Soup with a Spoon - Lieutenant Colonel Gian Gentile
The Army's new manual on counterinsurgency operations (COIN), in many respects, is a superb piece of doctrinal writing. The manual, FM 3-24 "Counterinsurgency," is comparable in breadth, clarity and importance to the 1986 FM 100-5 version of "Operations" which came to be known as "AirLand Battle."
The new manual's middle chapters that pertain to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations are especially helpful and relevant to senior commanders in Iraq. But a set of nine paradoxes in the first chapter of the manual removes a piece of reality of counterinsurgency warfare that is crucial for those trying to understand how to operate within it...
Flashpoint: No Bungle in the Jungle - Peter Brookes
Whether you agree with it or not, it's likely there will be some changes to the current size and shape of U.S. forces in Iraq over the next year. For reasons from the political to the practical, the current troop surge in Iraq isn't going to last forever.
So, as the politicians and policymakers search for a future strategy in Iraq that would be amenable to the American people, Congress, the Pentagon and the White House, it makes sense to open the intellectual aperture pretty wide in the search for good ideas.
In some corners of defense intelligentsia, the U.S.-backed effort in the southern Philippines against the al-Qaida-affiliated Abu Sayyaf group ("Bearer of the Sword") is being touted as the most successful counterterrorism campaign of the post-Sept. 11 period. Indeed, some are promoting Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) as a model counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operation. Although not everyone would agree with that characterization, it's worthwhile to take a look at OEF-P to see whether the strategy and policy might be applied to the ongoing challenges in Iraq — or elsewhere...
Picking up the Pieces - Christopher Griffin
Over recent years, the blogosphere has been its own theater in a propaganda war that has centered on the significance of such individuals as "Jesse Macbeth," "Aidan Hajj" and "Jamil Hussein." These people, and the veracity of their stories, have served as proxies in the fight between bloggers who support U.S. efforts in Iraq and the Middle East and those who oppose them. In July, this fight leapt into the mainstream media when The New Republic published what was purported to be a soldier's firsthand account of his deployment in Iraq.
The article, "Shock Troops," was written by "Scott Thomas," a pseudonym for a soldier who The New Republic said was serving in Iraq at Forward Operating Base Falcon and who described scenes of callous brutality. According to Thomas, he and his cohorts publicly mocked a female IED victim on a crowded day at their base's chow hall; wore a child's skull found in a mass grave as a hat for more than a day; and used a Bradley fighting vehicle to run down dogs in the streets of Baghdad, killing three in one day. The piece is worth quoting at some length to give a sense of both its style and substance...
When Muslim Armies Won - Ralph Peters
When terrorists or insurgents in Iraq detonate a roadside bomb to draw out our forces in response, or when they stage a small ambush to lure us into a larger one, they're pursuing a Middle Eastern way of war more than two millennia old, with roots in the techniques of tribes from the steppes. What's surprising isn't that the old lure-and-ambush technique is still in use, but that, after many centuries of Western experience with this particular hook, we remain prone to taking the bait.
While doing research for a history project, I was struck both by the enduring characteristics of jihadi warfare — even though yesteryear's triumphant Muslim armies have been replaced by terrorist cells and irregular bands — as well as the specific military lore the Islamic world lost. Much of what Arab, Seljuk or Ottoman armies did in bygone campaigns to annihilate their enemies is now the intellectual inheritance of Western commanders — although cultural flaws that led medieval Christian armies to defeat remain with us, as well...
Culture Battle - Colonel Henry Foresman Jr.
The Army, like all military organizations, is defined by its culture, and the culture is defined by the history. Its culture has been defined by its overwhelming success in World War II and shaped by a perceived history of fighting grand wars. Although the culture is consistent with the perceived history, the reality is the Army has been involved in stability and support operations, not grand wars, for almost 80 percent of its existence.
Grand wars, as I define them, are those military engagements that pit army against army. I define stability and support operations as those in which the military is not fighting an army but is opposed either by those resistant to its occupation, passively or aggressively, or is opposed by an organized force executing disperse, nonconnected and localized operations designed to defeat the will of the occupiers to achieve victory.
For the Army, it is World War II that has shaped its thinking, culture and ethos. Fighting the grand war has become the Army's be-all-and-end-all mantra...
Building Resilience - Frank Hoffman
A pair of books build on Jared Diamond's warning in "Collapse" that rigid social structures and environmental mismanagement combined to destroy a society from within. Both share Diamond's chilling warning of economic and ecosystem disruption. Both authors realize that our increasingly technologically sophisticated civilization is built upon the fragile fault line of many pending environmental disasters and unsustainable patterns.
"The Upside of Down" lays out a theory about social life cycles, capturing the growth, demise and renewal of societies. The convergence of today's pressing economic, energy and environmental stresses could produce a global breakdown or just merely a national crisis. The author, Thomas Homer-Dixon, brilliantly mixes the history of Rome's development and its impressive architectural accomplishments with speculations on how societies rise and fall. This includes his theory of social catastrophe based on a concept called energy return on investment (EROI). Based on some historical sleuthing in the Coliseum, our author contends that societies can die off when their energy consumption patterns outpace the total effort required to acquire the energy. Having to search farther, dig deeper and expend more effort to extract every unit of energy we need to support our fast-paced and inefficient societies can put a strain on EROI. As we approach peak oil in the coming decades, this theory will become apparent...
Our second book, "The Edge of Disaster," is more direct and very much reflects the blunt and relentless personality of its author. Stephen Flynn is a retired Coast Guard officer who has established himself as the nation's leading homeland security expert. One of the very few analysts who could define vulnerabilities with chilling predictions before Sept. 11, he has been aggressively challenging policymakers in both the executive and legislative branches about the growing dangers the nation faces from an aging infrastructure, misplaced investment priorities and highly interdependent but brittle systems that undergird our daily lives...
Much more at AFJ.
Comments
On Eating Soup
I do not take issue with the fact that War is violent and that COIN is war - in my reading of 3-24, I dont think it does either. Part of this is my preference to always view doctrine as descriptive and not prescriptive (Unit SOPs are generally prescriptive). Id also say that I never saw guys on the ground contemplating if it was a good idea or a bad one to shoot a clearly identified AIF setting an IED, carrying an RPG, or PKC, or even setting up a mortar - nobody was confused about the best way of immediately securing the populace was to kill those AIF actively engaged in violent activity. If there was information on a cache or meeting of AIF conducting plans or related activity - a mission was generated as quickly as possible to capture or kill them. The Iraqis and CF I worked with understood that until physical security was established, the other LLOOs would be compromised - they also understood that you had to prepared to quickly transition from conducting a Community Engagement type activity to pouncing on the enemy if he showed the will to contest our control of an area.
At the level where dyed in the wool insurgents seek to impose their will on the population it is a duel & no amount of LLOOs is probably going to convince them to give up - this minority is going to have to be captured or killed by either HN or CF.
I don't think 3-24 advocates sacrificing Tactical success - it just acknowledges that you can't pursue purely lethal Tactical operations and expect that success at that level will translate to Operational and Strategic success in COIN, or for that matter any type of war. Do we want it - you bet - every time we meet that enemy we should relentlessly pursue him until he is captured, killed, denied any freedom of movement, expelled, etc. Tactical success is credibility, and it permits our (friendly forces) own freedom of movement to pursue the LLOOs that can be translated to Operational and Strategic success in a COIN environment.
Clausewitzs duel where there are winners and losers is appropriate. Within a province or city where insurgents have the initiative and unrestricted freedom of movement then COIN forces (HN or CF) will not - its a zero sum game - you either have the initiative or you dont at what ever level you are considering. The priority for COIN forces at that point goes to seizing and retaining the initiative. This begins with lethal operations at the Tactical & Operational levels, but does not end there. 3-24 recommends transitioning to a mix of security operations and other LLOOs to develop the PMSEII so that while those who will not re-enter society are captured or killed, the conditions which lend credibility to the insurgent message and attract people to the insurgent cause are changed.
Within the COIN environment there are ongoing operations that are going to feel more like the "Other then War" we once doctrinally used to describe those missions. The problem with that doctrinal description was that increasingly those environments proved that they could go to "War" on one side of a city, while on the other side of the city it remained a "Other then" environment. However, you cant sacrifice the gains youve made that permitted a transition on one side of the river to a mix of lethal and LLOOs; and you cant sacrifice the gains that permitted a larger transition at the provincial level - these are the operations that provide the long term gains because they address the conditions that made the insurgency possible.
At the lower tactical echelons the focus is going to be sharper by comparison with larger echelons. If a BCT has the bulk of a province, it may have two TFs focusing primarily on LLOOs because the conditions permit it. However, the other TF may be clearing insurgents for months - the enemy gets a vote, and may have decided that he is willing to fight and die within the battlespace assigned to that TF. However within the Battlespace assigned to that TF - the part of the city assigned to a specific Company or CO TM may have a local leader that has galvanized the community against the goals of the insurgents - the violence within that community might be limited to assassinations and car bombs targeting the community leadership from insurgents infiltrating that company AOR- but its still lethal. The higher the echelon in COIN, the greater the chance that it contains different types of threats, must pursue different types of LOOs and LLOOs.
I dont think LTC Nagl or any other contributor to the 3-24 would take issue with that. On the Daily show - he made the remark - I have to paraphrase - "be prepared to kill". Operrations on the ground would seem to reflect this - the number of AIF killed or captured, the number of caches seized and the limitations of AIF freedom of movement started with, or were generated from our ability to impose our will on the enemy through the use of violence. However, that tactical success was built upon with other LLOOs that engaged the communities and secured additional benefits that could not be attained otherwise. The NGO community and passive IOs cant conduct COIN because they dont have the capability to employ violence or contest the armed resistance employed by insurgents - we do. However, because COIN occurs in a Social setting, and is a contest for the will and support of the citizen - we must be able to follow up security by generating the foundations for stability.
No doctrine IMHO should be a prescription for a problem - this is Clausewitzs recognition that there is a subjective nature to War. Every War is going to be unique in the subjective due to the political context which surrounds it. There are all kinds of political goals by the various enemies we find in Iraq - the subjective nature of War may be different in Baghdad, then Anbar - thats just the way it is. If we conduct a COIN campaign in another part of the world, those conditions will change along with the subjective nature unique to that War. The Objective nature, that War is violent, it has winners and losers, it is rife with fog, friction and chance, and the more protracted it is- the more chance plays a role, it is a social activity, it makes no sense when divorced from its political context is valid in any War.
The problem with any doctrine that addresses the complexity of War is going to be its interpretation - Im not sure you can have a doctrine that is going to change that while remaining broad enough in scope to acknowledge both the Objective and Subjective nature of War. Take what works and apply it to the War you (your element) are in, and save the rest when conditions change - that is the value in descriptive doctrine.