As Gen. David Petraeus takes over the U.S.-led mission in Afghanistan, he is right to continue a strategy of counterinsurgency and to strengthen it with a plan that seeks to give local Afghan communities the means to defend themselves. However, both the recently announced local defense plan, which pays community members to don a rifle and police uniform, and the over-arching counterinsurgency of which it is a part take the wrong path to reducing violence in Afghanistan.
As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said in 2008, the U.S. "cannot kill its way to victory." Yet, the Pentagon has emphasized "providing security to the people," in counterinsurgency parlance, primarily by defending them or, in the case of this new local defense force, by arming them. This is not enough to resolve the problems that have allowed insurgents to thrive in the first place, which require political solutions that change the very conditions that facilitate the insurgency. However, there is one initiative that, because it does focus on the social and political factors that drive insecurity, shows the most promise for permanently ending the insurgency: the Local Defense Initiative.
Since the conflict's earliest stages, coalition forces have attempted to deal with Afghanistan's insurgency through locally focused programs. Whether supporting tribal militias or creating new ones like the Afghan Public Protection Program, these programs have all been based on a fundamental misconception: that additional fighting is the answer. But Afghanistan does not need any more armed groups. They only make conflict worse, not better...
More at World Politics Review.
Comments
I think Foust and Meinshausen portray a false dichotomy. While the term "militia" is problematic, it seems entirely necessary and useful--so long as they're accountable to some respected, local government.
Guns alone are not the answer, but so long as the warlords and Taliban are in business, guns are going to be <em>part</em> of the answer.
I think the miliita label is used more for its connotation than for its accuracy. I think people envision a militia as a bunch of armed men accountable to a strong man or warlord, rather than a bunch of local men with weapons who are accountable to their community. I'm not sure what form our latest initiative will take, but I suspect it will learn more toward the latter.
I am at a loss to understand this sentence:
"Such transparency cuts against some old instincts in the Special Forces, and is at odds with ODAs' traditional missions."
With all due respect to the authors I am not sure they understand ODAs traditional missions or Special Forces "old instincts."
As a follow-up to my comment above (and at this risk of beating a dead horse as I have posted the below information either as comments of part of articles written for SWJ), I have pasted the doctrinal definition for Special Forces Remote Area Operations. AP3, LDI, VSO, "Tribal Engagement" are all adaptations of this Special Forces traditional mindset and the "instincts" of Special Forces and Special Forces have been adapting this concept in many operations since Vietnam. Remote Area Operations, like Unconventional Warfare, is in the DNA of Special Forces Soldiers. Of course the key word is adaptation.
"Remote Area Operations. Remote area operations are operations undertaken in insurgent-controlled or contested areas to establish islands of popular support for the HN government and deny support to the insurgents. They differ from consolidation operations in that they are not designed to establish permanent HN government control over the area. Remote areas may be populated by ethnic, religious, or other isolated minority groups. They may be in the interior of the HN or near border areas where major infiltration routes exist. Remote area operations normally involve the use of specially trained paramilitary or irregular forces. SF teams support remote area operations to interdict insurgent activity, destroy insurgent base areas in the remote area, and demonstrate that the HN government has not conceded control to the insurgents. They also collect and report information concerning insurgent intentions in more populated areas. In this case, SF teams advise and assist irregular HN forces operating in a manner similar to the insurgents themselves, but with access to superior CS and CSS resources. (From FM 3-05.202 Foreign Internal Defense 2007.)"
And in terms of adaptation even though the above doctrinal definition does not exactly fit AP3, LDI, VSO or "Tribal Engagement" (but it is close and very useful) we should recall LTG Cushmans words:
LTG (RET) John H. Cushman writing in his 1993 pamphlet "Thoughts for Joint Commanders" in which he recalls some historical admonitions on doctrine:
"A 1950 definition called doctrine 'the compilation of principles and theories applicable to a subject, which have been developed through experience or by theory, that represent the best available thought and indicate and guide but do not bind in practice." (emphasis added)
"Doctrine is basically a truth, a fact, or a theory that can be defended by reason."
"Doctrine cannot replace clear thinking... under the circumstances prevailing."