Small Wars Journal

A storm ahead for the U.S.-Japan alliance?

Tue, 07/14/2009 - 8:49am
After suffering another humiliating defeat in local elections in Tokyo, Prime Minister Taro Aso has called for a general election for Japan's lower house of parliament to be held on August 30. Aso's Liberal Democratic Party has, except for a quirky two-year period in the mid-1990s, basically ruled Japanese politics since the country regained its sovereignty after World War II. Yet the LDP is predicted to lose power to the Democratic Party, an event which would be a watershed in Japanese political history.

Will it also be a watershed for the U.S.-Japan strategic alliance? We are just entering the election campaign period so the specific party platforms have yet to be revealed. In addition, foreign policy and national security issues are expected to play a minor part in the campaign.

Yet three murmurs have come from the Democratic camp: stricter adherence to the non-interventionist Article Nine of the constitution; less cooperation with the U.S. foreign policy agenda; and greater Japanese defense self-reliance. Such murmurs should be considered warily; it is one thing to propose something during a political campaign and another to dramatically change a long-standing national policy, something about which the permanent bureaucracy in Japan has much to say.

Yet even without the drama created by a change in government, the U.S.-Japan strategic alliance has come under increasing strain. In February the Center for Strategic and International Studies held its annual conference on the alliance and released its report from the conference last month. Academics and think-tank scholars from Japan and the U.S., along with U.S. Pacific Command officials, exchanged views on the health and trajectory of the alliance (see the key findings starting on page 1).

The conference concluded that the Japanese side has some growing concerns. The Japanese policy establishment is concerned that the U.S. will reach agreements with either North Korea or China that will cut out Japan's security interests. Japan is concerned that the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review will neglect Japan's concerns about threats in the region. Japan is angry about being strung along on a possible F-22 purchase. Japan wonders about the U.S. commitment to missile defense.

The expansion of Chinese military power and North Korea on the edge of some transition would be stress enough for the alliance. Now add in a new administration in Washington with new geopolitical views and an impending landmark change of government in Japan. For years, top U.S. policy makers have treated Japan, America's most important ally, with benign neglect. With the rapid changes now occurring in northeast Asia, complacency is a dangerous policy.

POSTSCRIPT

At least the Obama administration has followed the practice of its predecessors and appointed as its ambassador to Japan the most experienced statesman it could find ... oh wait!

Comments

Robert Haddick (not verified)

Wed, 07/15/2009 - 9:07pm

Readers, I received a note from Brad Glosserman, Executive Director of Pacific Forum CSIS which clarifies some information about the report I cited in this post. Here is his note in full:

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1. the dialogue is hosted by Pacific Forum CSIS. We are part of the CSIS family, but located in Honolulu. We are the only part of CSIS not located at 1800 K street. We run all our own programs. We are often referred to as CSIS, but when it comes to shorthand, we appreciate being recognized as Pacific Forum, rather than just CSIS.

2. we run TWO US-japan dialogues. The first has been going for 15 years, and is a larger, more broad-based discussion. It is usually held in San Francisco and those reports are also available online. (the most recent report is being translated into Japanese and should be available in a week or so). it brings together the main folks working on the alliance from both bureaucracies as well as independent analysts and former govt officials. It has a good record of anticipating alliance developments. the strategic dialogue is of much shorter provenance - only two years, is more focused on extended deterrence, and much smaller. I[t] grew out of concerns at the big conference about the credibility of the extended deterrent and the need to hone in on that and related issues.

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Tom F (not verified)

Wed, 07/15/2009 - 3:35pm

Something else to consider here is Japan's demographic bubble.

With population that's going to end up having a higher percentage of senior citizens than any other industrialized country in the next few decades will they be able to maintain a convential defense force of any size?

It may not be a real issue right now but it wouldn't be surprising to see a discussion about going nuclear move from the fringe to the mainstream in Japan over the next decade or so.