Update: For even more on the report see Christian Bleuer at Ghosts of Alexander, Herschel Smith at The Captian's Journal, Bernard Finel at his blog, and Justin Logan at The National Interest. And Foust responds to his critics.
Comments
<b>Andy:</b>
We haven't been on the ground for nine years. A very large number of people have been on the ground for nine years worth of 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 12 and 15 month tours, a <i>totally</i> different thing.
Some of those people have been there more than once, some more than twice, a few even more times -- however, most went to a different AO each time they went. Thus no continuity to speak of..
So, I can agree that's ignorance -- but it's self imposed ignorance AND poor application of tactics and the operational art (which in FID, is whatever one is doing in the entire country at any one time, no more...).
In essence you're correct and agree with Dave Maxwell and Robert C. Jones, as do I. We jumped in without fully understanding the problem or our capabilities...
Dave,
Call me cynical, but I've been hearing that for six years now. We've been on the ground for nine years and we still don't understand the "problem?" The same tactics/strategies get discussed and rediscussed, tried and retried as if they were new. Try as we might, tactical excellence won't save us from strategic incoherence.
IMO, the problem is not ignorance of Afghanistan or poor application of tactics or operational art, but ignorance, as a nation, of ourselves and our own limitations.
Bob,
As always, excellent comments. I could not agree with you more - COIN (and Nation Building as well) are not strategies. We really need to discuss in plain language what are our ends are and then the ways and means to achieve those ends.
Also, your comment about a clearer understanding of the problem vice a new opinion for a solution sounds like the same argument we have for Design in campaign planning and the military decision making process (MDMP). We have become so focused on problem solving and developing solutions that we risk attempting to solve the wrong problems at the tactical, operational, and even strategic level. Although design is controversial what should not be controversial is that we absolutely have to first understand the problem and all that surrounds it before we can devise a course of action, campaign plan or a strategy.
Arguing tactics.
We all do it, but we also understand that if something works, it was a good tactic.
My biggest beef with the Afghan Studies Group product was that they chose to argue tactics; which brought out all of the defenders of the current tactics in spades.
Calling something strategy doesn't make it strqategy, and calling ones self an expert on COIN doesn't make them a expert on COIN. In fact, God save us from the COIN experts who have led us to the current tactics packaged as strategy laid out here:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/afghanistan_pakistan_white_p…
Personally I suspect the tactics laid out in the Afghan Studies Group's product are at least as likely to produce positive results as those laid out in the White House White Paper; and with far less strategic risk to the US than is associated with the "nation building" approach we are currently pursuing. But again, that is just arguing tactics.
Where I believe the real debate needs to shift to is the pursuit of a clearer understanding of the problem rather than a new opinion on solutions. Whether we execute the Trillion Dollar A+ answer or the 1/4 Trillion Dollar B+ answer, it is still just a C+ if we read the question wrong and didn't identify the correct issues.
This is the problem with COIN experts, they focus on the study of answers; what is most needed is more insurgency expertise and more input from those who study problems.
But, for what its worth, if someone handed me the Whitehouse Whitepaper linked above and the Afghan Studies Group's product and told me to pick one? I'd have to pick the latter. Now, they may not understand why theirs is probably closer to right any better than those who produced the White House product; but if you don't understand the game you are playing it is better to bet small. Currently we are "all in" and that in of itself is not too wise.
Afghanistan is the grave yard of great civilizations, it is the Gordian Knot Alexander encountered, it is not a endeavor in the interests of the United States; in whatever words the problem is expressed, bemoanded, or described it is in the more modern definition a "ill structured problem." Afghanistan will likely keep its characteristic identity as described by the authors of "A New Way Forward in Afghanistan" until, considering one extreme, yet possible outcome, the nation is laid to waste much as Rome did to Carthage. From a more recent historical context another possible outcome could come about in much the way that Great Britain and Russia related to Afghanistan through the 19th century. Both Asian powers attempted to play the Afghans off on the other to prevent the one from gaining a strategic foothold that could imbalance their regional interests, i.e. Britains interests in India and Russia's interests to not see a strong Britain presence at their back door. Both powers had a rather incoherent policy and did things that had the results of going against their interests. Both Britain and Russia called their policy: The Forward Policy. Martin Ewans authored a good book on Afghanistan and its history which describes the policies of Britain and Russia. In the end, it is known how it turned out for all three nations involved. Britain and Russia both departed and Afghanistan rather worked its own situation out until the late part of the 20th Century and Russia's return and again departure. The United States is the next to confront the Afghanistan Gordian Knot and they are there for good reason. History has yet to determine if the U.S.'s bold stroke to solve the Afghan problem has a similar outcome as Alexander, Britain, or Russia. The one detail regarding the U.S.'s efforts is that the their efforts are not for colonial, imperial, regional domination, or resource exploitation. The U.S. vital interest is to likely remain an effort to prevent a Radical Islamic regime from forming and harboring a staging ground for international terrorist organizations to launch attacks on the west. As a benefit of the U.S. efforts the Afghan nation and peoples could possibly build a stable nation with institutions that contributes to the regional and continental good; respects human rights, and supports the welfare of the many ethnic people who call Afghanistan home. In the context of Afghanistan history and failures of nations dealing with that history, for success in the modern day the current endeavors do require a monumental effort by intraregional and extraregional powers. Those that will contribute must be for the long haul. Those that seek to hinder or prevent progress should be dealt with severly by the institutions who endeavor to accomplish something for the good of Afghanistan. What Afghanistan requires is steadfastness of effort, force, and incremental progress. A western power again began this chapter. It is a different chapter than those that preceded it. The outcome is as of yet undetermined but far from impossible.