A Cheaper, Stronger Army by Mark Fitzgerald, David Deptula, and Gian Gentile, The National Interest.
Recently, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel held a somber press conference at the Pentagon in which he discussed the results of the Strategic Choices Management Review he ordered several months prior. In light of shrinking budgets, he said the so-called SCMR offered two choices: bad and worse. The ‘bad’ was reduced capacity; the ‘worse,’ reduced capability. In the former the Army would fall from its 2010 high of 570,000 to as low as 380,000 and in the latter the U.S. military “could find its equipment and weapons systems…less effective against more technologically advanced adversaries.” Fortunately, even in this era of constrained budgets, these two dire options are not the only ones available: there is a way to reform and reorganize the U.S. military within the constraints of smaller budgets that not only doesn’t put national security at risk, but actually increases combat power, especially that of the army…
Comments
I didn’t see the drastic change either.
I do not disagree with trimming some fat, but In the briefing COL Macgregor stated that single service warfare was obsolete. Then why do we even have services? I suppose we could cut some overhead that way too. On that same thought, I wish I could quantify the loss in overall efficiency and combat effectiveness that has resulted from diminished warrior ethos and reformed military culture.
A short article is normally best, but I think this one is perhaps too short because it generated more questions than answers. I don't have time to follow up in the depth I desire to at the moment, but I did find Douglas Mcgregor's website which contains a lot of briefs and papers that more fully explain his proposed concepts. I highly recommend you work your way through his 28 chart presentation on the homepage to grasp his logic. I still need to dig deeper, because I don't understand the logic of the proposed Combat Group. After all the talk about effectively changing organizations and adapting to new technologies (instead of adapting technologies to existing organizations), with the exception of a flatter hierarchy (a good thing) I don't see what is revolutionary. Again I need to read his papers, not rely on the charts. There is lot more to his proposals than the Combat Groups that I understand and agree with. His website is at the following link:
http://www.douglasmacgregor.com/
Comments on the article, the authors state/imply for this concept to work our national military strategy can't advocate for using military power to compel other peoples, races or religions to conform to Western views and governing structures. Certainly wise, and somewhat in accordance with the JAN 2012 National Defense Strategy (we won't size forces for large scale stability operations). This doesn't mean we won't do them in the future, so I am left wondering if this proposed organization is based on the real world challenges our national leaders will drag us into, or our desired way to fight?
Does anyone know if this concept/proposal is shaping the Strategic Landpower concept? Much of what I have seen written about Strategic Landpower so far focuses on the draft definition for "Human Domain." Just skimming over this I don't see how this proposed concept would better enable the Army to shape the human domain?
Interesting article, and even more interesting presentations and papers on the concept at the link I provided.