5 ‘Big Ideas’ to Guide Us in the Long War Against Islamic Extremism by David Petraeus, Washington Post
The formulation of sound national policy requires finding the right overarching concepts. Getting the “big ideas” right is particularly important when major developments appear to have invalidated the concepts upon which previous policy and strategy were based — which now appears to be the case in the wake of the Arab Spring.
To illustrate this point, I have often noted that the surge that mattered most in Iraq was not the surge of forces. It was the surge of ideas, which guided the strategy that ultimately reduced violence in the country so substantially.
The biggest of the big ideas that guided the Iraq surge included recognition that:
●The decisive terrain was the human terrain — and that securing the people had to be our foremost task. Without progress on that, nothing else would be possible.
●We could secure the people only by living with them, locating our forces in their neighborhoods, rather than consolidating on big bases, as we had been doing the year before the surge.
●We could not kill or capture our way out of the sizable insurgency that plagued Iraq; rather, though killing and capturing were necessary, we needed to reconcile with as many of the insurgent rank and file as was possible.
●We could not clear areas of insurgents and then leave them after handing control off to Iraqi security forces; rather, we had to clear and hold, transitioning to Iraqis only when we achieved a situation that they could sustain.
Now, nine tough years later, five big ideas seem to be crystallizing as the lessons we should be taking from developments over the past decade…
Comments
The "Long War," I suggest, is best understood NOT from the much too-narrow perspective of a simple war against "Islamic Extremists."
Rather the "Long War" is best understood from the more-broad perspective of a war against those standing in the way of where the U.S./the West wants to go (to transform outlying states and societies more along modern western lines) and how it wants to get there (any way that it can).
Herein, to understand how not only the Islamic extremists might fall into our such -- "political"/"cold war" if not "real war" Long War cross hairs -- but also, increasingly, our Old Cold War rivals China and Russia.
In this more-broad and comprehensive light (the Long War, properly understood, is more about overcoming the state and non-state actors that are standing in our way) to consider the following; which corresponds roughly to GEN Petraeus' Five New Big Ideas above:
a. The requirement for the U.S./the West to secure the ungoverned spaces -- not only of the Greater Middle East -- but also elsewhere throughout the world.
b. The understanding of how the actions of these state and/or non-state actors -- determined to stand against the U.S./the West's expansionist efforts and agenda -- are likely to spew, in support of their such cause, instability, extremism, violence and refugees far beyond their immediate surroundings; these, posing increasingly difficult challenges for our partners in the various regions of the world, our allies residing therein, and even our own homeland.
c. The understanding of how only the U.S./the West -- pursuing its own/independent expansionist agenda -- can lead our own, individual, independent, and, indeed, now significantly contested, such effort.
d. The understanding of why the U.S./the West, as per this "contested" rather than "cooperative" world-view, must garner to itself new, and retain old, partners; and these, not only of the Islamic World but also elsewhere. And, finally,
e. Why these U.S.-led such efforts will have to be sustained for what may be a very long period of time, and must be, accordingly, understood more in (a) "marathon" and "world-wide/the world as a whole" terms; this, rather than as (b) a "one off" and as per the Islamic World only?
Bill M wrote:
‘I think we're just not comfortable with tough, nasty problems, and rather wish them away. ‘
I don’t believe that to be so. When we drop a bomb on a building containing a supposed ‘HVT’ it is a given innocent men, women and children are going to be killed. Whether someone cuts your throat or you die a slow painful death trapped under the wreckage of your home, the moral ‘nastiness’ is no different. Much of our society (as opposed to their society) believes there is a difference - which is obviously absurd. The ‘bombed’ look upon pilots as the lowest of the low and god help you if they get their hands on you.
The infantry, by their proximity to their victims, avoid the same tag of cowardliness – a kill with a sword rather than a kiss – if you will. However the traumatizing reality of the same moral ‘nastiness’ is the basis of PTSD and other mental aliments that plague so many veterans – hence the 20 who commit suicide every day. It would be interesting to study the nature of the service of the suicidal. Needless to say the Air Force vets would have killed many more innocent people than the average grunt but I would guess it is the ex-infantryman who form the bulk of the suicides.
So no it is not our moral sensitivities. We have a truth problem. As you rightly point out it tends to infect the upper echelon. The disturbing aspect is many good men go bad if they choose to climb the greasy pole of the careerist. It doesn’t just effect the military. The same problem is responsible for much of the demise of our industrial foundation. The absence of effective leadership that are willing to promote those able to make hard balanced choices and promote those able to master difficult technical problems has completely destroyed our industrial base.
The military had a similar problem at the outset of both WW1 and WW2 – especially in Europe. Men who had secured positions of authority in much the same manner as our current crop of Generals were responsible for the most appalling military catastrophes in history. It took the blood of millions of men and the loss of many countries before our ranks were expunged of this cancerous plague.
It is difficult to quantify the character-type that was responsible in Russia because Stalin had been shooting just about anyone above the rank of corporal for ten years before and after WW2. However the General class responsible for the loss of France in just over a month can be studied in detail. The perfumed conceit and vain-glorious self-aggrandizement was painfully obvious as they all scuttled across the English Channel complaining of the indignity of having to make the passage on a small sailing boat and not a capital ship as someone of their rank was due.
The Brits had the same problem but were saved by being on an island and Field Marshal Alan Brooke. His uncensored 2001 edition of War Diaries encapsulates how to solve this problem. IMHO it is a very good read– but who do we have like that now? He was complimentary of ‘Dugout Doug’ which I thought to be a contradiction but Brooke did recognize some men who embrace pomposity can recognize their flaws and learn from them – but the war in the Pacific was the Navy’s – as such I’m not convinced and Korea suggests as much. Whereas Ridgeway in WW2, Korea and `Vietnam proved to be a tactical, operational and strategic master and visonary.
The one aspect I have encountered that removes conceit and vanity from all of us is watching the violent death of men who are better and braver than oneself. You come realize you are in a position of authority because better men have died to grant you the privilege. More often than not your rise to a position of authority is just dumb luck - any supposed talent you have would have amounted to zero if you’d stepped there, stopped a bit longer here, stopped bit less there or most sobering of all, been a bit braver.
Making decision and watching those good, bad, indifferent decisions kill better men than you will remove any desire to make a spectacle of oneself. If it doesn’t (and there are such egos one supposes) it will be so obvious you are unfit for command that you will be removed.
Needless to say losing half the world and suffering 10 million dead before you get your shit together is unacceptable. If you look at the spectacular early success of the Axis powers the case for Auftragstaktik or Mission Command as a solution comes to mind. You might argue the bastardized form of Shintoism the Japanese fascists forced upon the Japanese has as similar holistic sense of unity of purpose that shapes a similar chain of command dynamic. The concept of Jihad most definitely. People get caught up with the supernatural ‘God’ thing but that is just a characteristic, it is the sense that there is a unity of thought that empowers such feeble armies to sustain the fight – regardless of the righteousness ( or lack thereof ) that their effort entails.
Like I said earlier there are tens of thousands of men who have been thru the cauldron and have emerged without ego but do cherish the wish for the military to prevail. Perhaps the ‘Council of Colonels’ who appear assigned to guard the perimeter surrounding our perfumed General class are more formidable than they appear and the military cannot self-regulate.
Perhaps the demise of own industrial base and the flourishing of the Auftragstaktik-driven German industrial base will enable us to flank them and penetrate the inner-sanctum they guard so jealously. Any extra help for the effort is certainly needed.
So what?
Many might consider this all Pentagon/MIC inside Baseball and nothing will change. I disagree. We need to change it now – Mission Command seems a Ways to an Ends – if albeit for a somewhat elaborate process to get people to tell the simple truth. Unfortunately it will change, of that I am certain. The question is whether we are willing to change when the Butcher’s Bill is in the thousands or have it forced upon us wherein we suffer a rogue nuclear strike, we retaliate ten-fold and the public forces the removal of those responsible for allowing the disaster to happen.
In the meantime tens of millions will have perished ala WW1 and WW2.
God help us,
RC
Your rant suggests, "Our enemies are emboldened by our acceptance of military leaders who have risen to the highest rank employing the careerist creed that cunning and wisdom are the same thing and not polarity opposites. The enemy’s fascist militarism believes our apparent acceptance of our leadership’s deluded vain-glorious state indicates we are eviscerated of moral fiber and as such they have a warrior’s obligation to really stick it to us. To put a sick animal out of misery, as it were."
We are positively plagued and significantly degraded by political correctness, that point isn't even debatable. Many of our senior officers are little more than the perfumed princes that Hackworth identified them as. On the other hand, we have among the best trained, educated, and experienced officers in the world relative to other countries. They are actually capable of executing sophisticated operations with a high degree of precision and violence when required. Who in your view does it better?
As for the lack of honesty, one only needs to review the self-aggrandizing assessments of our progress in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Philippines, etc. to realize that the value of integrity is apparently situational dependent. Maybe that is just life, or maybe we have a real problem in our ranks. I also see a tension that should be expected when you have a military under civilian leadership, and that civilian leadership wishes away calling our adversaries enemies (such as Pakistan and Saudi) in hopes that they'll change their behavior.
I agree with much of your rant, but I also wonder if there really is a deep state manipulating us all (e.g. protecting their oil interests in Saudi, and whatever interests they have in Pakistan), or perhaps more probable I think we're just not comfortable with tough, nasty problems, and rather wish them away. Then we rationalize why we wish them away, and that rationalization becomes group think and accepted truth. If Saudi is really bad, how do we deal with it? What are the implications? Who will stand by our side (maybe Iran?)? Can't we just make this problem go away by pretending it is not a problem?
Bill,
Petreaus can’t bring himself to say publically that in Iraq and AF we were fighting the proxy armies of a fascist element that heavily influence the regimes that currently rule the KSA and PAK. The Beltway would go completely ape if someone like Petreaus did a Ridgeway, Gavin or a Shoup and called a spade a spade. IMHO his careerist nature renders him incapable of opposing the vested interests the Beltway is beholden to. I don’t have much time for senior Staff officers at the best of times and I have zero time for those who don’t have moral courage to speak the truth when their own men have given their lives.
30 years ago it was impossible to convince the brass what the ground-truth in AF/PAK was – there just wasn’t enough reliable men on the ground to force the truth out. That is not the case today. Where there were once merely dozens of voices to support the truth there are now tens of thousands. The first and foremost human virtue (more often than not the ONLY virtue) the infantry need from their Generals is that no matter what, they must stand up for the truth and be counted. IMO Petreaus and the rest of our senior leaders all fail this first and foremost simple obligation.
I have long tired of the tribal/spiritual/Jefferson explanations for why normal decent people, who have co-existed for centuries if not millennium, have apparently taken it upon themselves to rip themselves and their communities to pieces. I re-read Doug Livermore’s case study ‘Pakistani UW Against AF’ to remember why I get so bent out of shape when I hear Generals publicly spewing bullshit to satisfy the apparent insatiable desire for self-aggrandizement that has plagued our senior military leadership since the end of WW2.
IMHO a significant portion of our military/political complex is in bed with the enemy. Back in the day the KGB had penetrated both the CIA and the DIA and some of them (but not all) got what was coming to them. Unfortunately some (but not all) of the luckier ones are in Fed prison forever.
However we have other Fifth Columnists who are as American as apple pie and I’ve come to believe they are more dangerous; as they are more numerous, as the traitors who sold us out for money. Granted many of the current crop are probably unaware they are being led by the nose by our enemies but the danger is not lessened by their ignorance. Charlie Wilson being a perfect example of the well-intended but dangerous fool.
But I can’t buy that now.After all of the blood and treasure that has been expended over the last 15 years, we have every right to expect a military leadership to tell it as it is and to hell with the consequence.
Can you image the reaction of our parent’s generation if someone from the WW2 military/political/industrial complex merely suggested they enter into a commercial/political/military relationship with a member of the Axis powers? It’s no exaggeration to say the Knitting Society of American Grandmothers would demand the privilege of lynching them.
IMO the Fruitcake leadership are smarter than our own political and military leaders. They are definitely braver. The most benign weighing of the account of resources favoring ours and what our opponents enjoy, suggests the intellect-gap is in fact vast. In terms of UW their leadership is on another planet. Needless to say the smartest guy in the room doesn’t make the best war-fighter, but hoping an intelligent and forthright Pershing, Patton, Shoup, Ridgeway walks into the room and saves us is as unacceptable as it is unlikely. IMHO in the absence of a military savior there will be nothing but disaster if our leadership continues to embrace deceit.
Our enemies are emboldened by our acceptance of military leaders who have risen to the highest rank employing the careerist creed that cunning and wisdom are the same thing and not polarity opposites. The enemy’s fascist militarism believes our apparent acceptance of our leadership’s deluded vain-glorious state indicates we are eviscerated of moral fiber and as such they have a warrior’s obligation to really stick it to us. To put a sick animal out of misery, as it were.
Unfortunately the reality of nuclear PAK/India MAD and the demand for heroin have conspired to shape events whereby if we maintain our current heading a nuclear strike on the homeland is only a matter of time. Some of the Fruitcake elements within the OE can actually physically touch nuclear ordnance. The Cosa Nostra’s illicit drugs supply line has created a fully autonomous delivery system that successfully impacts every point on the globe. The countless thousands of individual payloads refined in Pakistan and delivered by the Cosa Nostra can weigh as little as a kilo and as much as 5 ton. If you find this hard to believe contact your local FBI/DEA office and they will put you straight.
The unattached warheads are there. The secure ‘launch-sites’ are there. The ‘combat-tested’ delivery vehicles are a reality. The guidance systems are fully operational and as resilient as they are well-proven. Any Geo-coordinates on the planet can be selected and hit. For all of these components to synergize into a weapon system all that is necessary is a few sympathizers to look the other way for a few minutes. And we are not talking a one off opportunity. The status of the threat is in a perpetual state of criticality. The old adage of the IRA bomber encapsulates the threat with a succinct simplicity. ‘We only need to be lucky once, you need to be lucky every time.’
All of these elements are located within a failing state that is run by an elite who are enriched by the income provided by 90% of the world's heroin supply.
Surely our Best and Brightest will never allow this to be, I hear you say.
In 1945 whilst attached to Giap’s Staff Major Archimedes Patti of the OSS Deer Team was asked by Ho to help incorporate sections of the US Declaration of Independence into the Vietnamese Dec of Independence. Ho duly delivered the VN Dec of Independence with Patti’s pointers in on Sept.2 1945, a few weeks after the nuclear strikes on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. During this time Patti was finalizing various Policy Reports for the Chief of the OSS, General Donovan. He described the nature of the Vietnamese Independence movement and its possible implications for US strategic interests in general vis-à-vis post-war VN, China and SE Asia in general.
The OSS men were unanimous in their belief (that was shared just about everyone including Eisenhower) that French colonialism was doomed and US strategic interests were best served by bolstering the nationalism of the fiercely anti-Chinese Vietnamese (now why would we want to do that?).
The Deer Team’s reports were finalized, sealed and sent off to Gen Donovan’s HQ. We backed the colonists, millions of people died, we subsequently fell apart and it’s taken a generation for both countries to get over it.
After bidding farewell to their wartime comrades the Deer Team flew home and Col Patti got a job that required frequent periods in the White House, the Pentagon and the DoS. For 30 years he had an inside view as the whole debacle in Vietnam unfolded. In 1973 Patti decided to retire and was squaring up his duties when he came across an old folder addressed to Gen Donovan that looked familiar. He was amazed to discover it was the reports he had written whilst attached to Giap’s HQ in Hanoi in 1945.
For 30 years Patti had wondered why not one person had come thru his office door and asked him about Vietnam, leave alone the skinny on his old wartime comrades Ho and Giap. As it happened during his last few days as a federal employee he finally got an answer. To open the file Patti had to break the security seal on the envelopes he’d secured it with back in 1945.
In 1982 Patti recounted it thus:
‘In my opinion the Vietnam War was a great waste. There was no need for it to happen in the first place. At all. None whatsoever. During all the years of the Vietnam War no one ever approached me to find out what had happened in 1945 or in ’44. In all the years that I spent in The Pentagon, Department of State in the White House, never was I approached by anyone in authority. However, I did prepare a large number, and I mean about, oh, well over fifteen position papers on our position in Vietnam. But I never knew what happened to them. Those things just disappeared, they just went down the dry well.’
Our enemies are emboldened by our acceptance of careerist leadership that has risen up the chain of command invigorated by a philosophy that is thoroughly unsuited to war-fighting. Those who wish us harm are bemused by the fact that, despite our military failures, we continue to produce a leadership class who are enraptured by their own magnificence and possess an insatiable desire to share their 'Big Ideas' with all of us.
The fascist mentality of the Fruitcake considers this apparent evisceration of our political and military decision-making as an indicator of cowardliness and as such they believe the society responsible for such a travesty is deserving of the worst possible punishment. Many elements within their sphere of influence can physically see and handle nuclear ordnance. Like I’ve said before the Cosa Nostra’s delivery system is fully autonomous and to state the obvious, neither it nor they possess a moral conscience. Once it’s launched there’s no way it will stop. All that is required for the system to execute the mission is a mere handful of people need to turn their backs for a few minutes and the outcome is a dead certainty.
So what?
IMHO our military leadership’s contempt for the truth acts like a cancer that causes any Tactical success to implode into Operational and Strategic failure. We continually twist ourselves inside-out attempting to glean a firm understanding of events without realizing the sea of deceit we are drowning in. As such all manner of eloquent and weighty political, spiritual, Jeffersonian, economic explanations are so much offerings of water to a drowning man. Needless to say some of these lofty arguments have considerable currency but they all amount to zero when we fail to recognize the disastrous consequence of ignoring simple ground-truth.
Since WW2 we have a rich history of deliberately ignoring solid intelligence even when it is quantified by those who we acknowledge are well-placed, highly skilled and above any reproach or suspicion. Whether the Operational Art argument draws upon the virtues of ‘snake-eating’ UW or a ‘PlayStation’ RMA-MICkey Mouse nothing will work if our leadership propagate their ‘Big Ideas’ on a world they insists on declaring to be flat.
The Fruitcake meanwhile are marching on and they continue to get closer and closer to achieving their Strategic objective.
The full unedited interview of LC Archimedes Patti made for his book ‘Why Vietnam? Prelude to America’s Albatross’ (1982):
http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_3267C58E4C104A54A0AFDF230D618AE6 1h 15 min
For those who still have the watches but not the time the same interview abridged:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MIJfV2cTUHc 3min 51 sec
We’ve all got one,
RC
General Petreaus is still outlining Fm 3-24.
The problem in studying or fixing on the human terrain, is mainland battles are still going on. It isn't simply a matter of fighting a counter insurgency. The General's outline worked for the Surge and was a tremendous success often overlooked by the anti- American lead war ideologues. A US armored Brigade a year ago two years ago in Iraq would have had a greater impact than trying to pick up where the US left off in Iraq. No doubt part of the frustration is the fact Assad is as big a mass murdering torturing tyrant as Saddam Hussein thank God that man has been dealt with, and the American public is being made numb or blithely unaware of that fact too.
As for the rest of FM-3-24 you need a Leader. America doesn't have one that can implement the General's ideas.
While I continue to have a lot of respect for GEN Petraeus, I question the big five ideas presented. They're fine to a point, but I think we need to dig deeper and see if this proposed approach is sustainable for the long run? We're talking a large and expensive deployment of ground forces for an extended period, and if we're hoping to address expanding lawless or under governed spaces globally, then this approach is simply not viable, even if our allies had the will, they still don't have the capacity. The reality is most don't have the will either.
Furthermore, if we commit to this sort of grand tactics, it will weaken us overtime allowing other adversaries to take strategic advantage of our distraction. Perhaps we have seen Russia and China do this already?
I think we need to rethink the whole thing, not just the grand tactics for the U.S. to conduct COIN, but the larger strategy. Arguing that a FID approach is better is also a lame approach if the government we're supporting is illegitimate. We don't have the answer yet to our challenges, and we need to stop pretending we do.