Is War Over?
Is War Over?
by A.E. Stahl
It appears that war, that is to say, ‘interstate industrial war’ or ‘regular war’, is coming to an end, or so we are led to believe. Rather, we are now challenged with a multitude of hotspots around the world containing “confrontation, conflict and combat”. We even have a glut of names and taxonomies for current war and warfare: population-centric counterinsurgency, network-centric warfare, new wars, asymmetric wars, compound wars, netwar, twenty-first century warfare, and even an “actor-centric theory of war.” The idea that interstate industrial war has been on the decline and that war has transformed is not new. Scholars such as Martin Van Crevald had persuasively but unsuccessfully already brought this non-Clausewitzian perspective to our attention as early as 1990, which was followed up by a number of other academics that attempted the same feat. However, even newer speculations are being drawn up in order to help place both war and warfare in its proper context — for example, General Rupert Smith’s “War amongst the people”. Smith states that war amongst the people “…is the reality in which people in the streets and houses and fields — all the people, anywhere — are the battlefield.” Interstate industrial war or regular war, where two or more sovereign nation-states face off in a physical competition of force to ultimately impose political will on one’s opponent, backed by tank and airpower, artillery and infantry, with aims of decisive battles, no longer exists. That’s the speculation, at least. On the surface it would seem that Smith’s musings, among others, holds water. After all, post-1945, the world has been witness to more state versus non-state fighting than at any point since the inception of the modern state system. Moreover, many claim that globalization — that seemingly unstoppable force responsible for our global interconnectedness on all levels — has begun to diminish the boundaries of the nation-state. That is, the artificial borders that once clearly demarcated a state are becoming blurred, some think soon to the vanishing point and, hypothetically, if states were to become irrelevant, so too would national armies with it, regular war. While these speculations may have some validity, it ultimately leads to the great strategic question: so what?
While so-called regular war — which is nothing more than a title of a specific category — has in fact been on the decline, it is still very much alive. Moreover, a decline in prevalence of “state on state” does not automatically infer that the pattern will not at some point reverse itself. It is a possibility, and not a far fetched one — we could very likely see an increase in state on state war in the future. As such, it is something that states must continue to consider and prepare for. While modern warfare has mainly consisted of irregular fighters engaged with a state, the list of regular wars is far from shabby: the Bosnian War; First and Second Chechen Wars; First and Second Congo Wars; Kosovo War; 2001 War in Afghanistan (against the Taliban); 2003 War in Iraq (at least the first 3+ weeks of combat), and now NATO in Libya. One could argue that these are all “hybrid” or “asymmetrical” wars and not truly regular war. But, hasn’t all warfare throughout history been hybrid or asymmetrical or both? That is, even the wars we refer to as “regular” have almost always contained irregular elements.
In other words, regular wars do have irregular participating actors, such as a supporting guerilla organization, mercenaries, or even criminal networks — this is currently witnessed in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. The use of irregular elements for the support of conventional forces is not a new concept. Clausewitz spoke of their support for the army, though playing minor roles (irregular detachments, not criminal networks). Even earlier, mercenaries, slaves and prisoners played major roles in the armed forces of Carthage, Rome and Greece. The difference is that today, irregulars clearly play a much greater and independent role in waging warfare. So much so that it is being predicted that regular war (state versus state) will cease to exist.
While warfare does change, it is the view that if war in the state-on-state model declines, then war will no longer be ‘war’ — it will become (as some already believe) some new type of war or “confrontation, conflict and combat” — as if they are not the same. This is problematic mainly for four reasons. First, as others have stated, it is impossible to truly know where war will end up. We simply cannot know the future and prognosticating borders on the “waste of time”. No matter how confident an assessment of future war may seem, it will always be extremely unreliable. Moreover, if we are to accept the notion that war is transforming, then we must not view transformation as equivalent to something that changes in only one direction. As easily as war has taken on an irregular bent, there is no reason to exclude the notion that the opposite may result. The second reason, and perhaps the most important, is that war and warfare are still affairs of the state, managed by political animals. There is no reason to believe that the state is quickly losing legitimacy as the main political actor. There may be more nonstate or irregular actors than in the past, but there are also more states today than ever before in history. Even if the state were to cease to exist, new political entities would likely be formed, as that is part of human nature, and war would continue amongst and between these new entities, as violence regarding the distribution of power is also an inescapable element of human nature. The third reason is that “war is war is war”. Despite the various characteristics it espouses, the diverse forms it adopts, and the differing labels applied to it, all organized violence for political aims represents “war”. War will continue shifting and shaping society, influencing great and small powers, creating new communities and aiding in the fall of others, destroying peace only to usher in an even better era than previously existed, all through the use of force for the ends of policy, as this has always been war’s purpose. The evidence for such comments lies in over 2,500 years of the history of warfare. Lastly, there is no reason to purport that the nature of war or warfare will alter. This is not to say that it is not possible. This is to say that in over 2,500 years, the nature of war and warfare has never changed. It remains the realm of passion, chance, and reason and there is nothing, at least not in the foreseeable future that can remove these ever-present elements from conflict.
Is regular war over? Definitely not but it does not matter even if state-on-state combat were to cease because war in other forms would still be taking place; it would not be “new war” or “something other than war”. While we may be facing “confrontation, conflict and combat”, that is just a fancy way of saying “war” and “warfare”. War and warfare, in its many forms and diverse characteristics, are occurring at this moment in various parts of the world and one will be hard pressed to find one period in human history when warfare was not taking place. States, tanks, artillery, and technology are not the cause of war and warfare: that belongs to people and politics. We must not confuse the lack of a state-on-state character with a decline in war. Trends express that non-state actors will continue to be the primary opponent in wars against states — but those are still wars, albeit with the application of violence carried out by a mix of regulars and irregulars. It is the same for any irregular-versus-irregular conflict as well — it is still warfare. It would be wise to always keep in mind the near-perfect definition of war proffered in the 19th century: “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” War is not about states. War is the risky and unsavory business rooted in politics, both of which have existed since the rise of human civilization.
As regards the future, no one knows and no one will know how things will unfold. New speculations (dare we say “theories” or “paradigms”) about war and warfare may be helpful but they are not concrete and therefore, can only assist us to a certain degree. We can attempt to use (and should use) other tools, such as our deductive reasoning and of course history to offer insight into what may happen — but that is all we can do. What we must ensure, simultaneously, is to never write-off anything, to prepare for everything, to avoid being seduced by fashionable words or slogans, and most importantly, to never forget the fundamentals of war and strategy.
A.E. Stahl is the co-founder and publisher of Infinity Journal and a Research Fellow at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT).
