The Work of Moroccan Writer Muntasser Hamada

Ideologically Counter al-Qaida:

The Work of Moroccan Writer Muntasser Hamada

Review Essay by CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN

Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT)

Those immersed in the business of countering terrorism and threats

to the United States must read copious amount of materials each day.  However,

it is easy to neglect the treasure trove of information and insights afforded by

Arabic authors who comment and analyze terrorist groups like al-Qaida.  Moroccan

journalist Muntasser Hamada represents a new trend among Arab authors who

deconstruct al-Qaida ideologically, philosophically, and theologically.  Arabic

language works attacking al-Qaida offers America’s leaders a better way to

define the threat from Violent Islamist Groups who attack Muslims and

non-Muslims alike.  It offers the language by which to disaggregate al-Qaida

from Islamist Groups and those two from Islam.  Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein

has labored for several years bringing to life Arabic works of interest to

America’s counter-terrorism analysts and military personnel.  His work is then

used to train better counter-terrorism analysts and prepare deploying units

utilizing fresh Arabic language materials that dissect al-Qaida and its

franchises.  I look forward to the debate and discussion this expose of Hamada’s

work will generate among the readers of Small Wars Journal.

Introduction

Muntassir Hamada is a Moroccan journalist and author of three Arabic

books, who thinks deeply about the impact al-Qaida has had on the Arab Muslim

imagination.  The subject of this review essay is Hamada’s 2008 work Nahnu wa

Tanzeem al-Qaida (Al-Qaida and Us), which offers valuable insight into Arab

discourse on al-Qaida and Usama Bin Laden.  The book was published by Al-Awael

Printers in Damascus, Syria who maintains the website:

www.darawael.com. 

America’s leaders must take the time to understand and pay attention to Arabic

language books that discredit al-Qaida, its leaders, and its ideology.  Such

books provide a way in which Muslims and non-Muslims can better articulate the

threat and disaggregate the fragmented pseudo-intellectualism of al-Qaida’s

Islamic narratives from the diverse and rich beliefs of 1.5 billion Muslims. 

The purpose of this essay is to introduce Hamada’s work and to expose American

readers interested in counter-ideology to the level of Arab-Muslim discourse

that attacks al-Qaida philosophically, theologically, and ideologically.  

Saudi Critique of al-Qaida Ideology

Nahnu wa Tanzeem al-Qaida highlights Saudi political analyst

Mashary Zeydi, who emphasizes the concept of al-Harb al-Fiqhiyah (Battle

of Islamic Jurisprudence) as the pivotal and most important front in countering

Militant Islamist ideology.  He classifies this battle of Islamic

jurisprudence and interpretation as no less than a struggle for the modern

Muslim mind.  One can disagree with Zeydi, but it is important to amplify Arab Muslim voices who

are attempting to grapple intellectually with countering the ideology and

historical narratives of violent Islamist groups.  In particular violent

Islamist group’s reductionism of Islamic jurisprudence.  Among the chapters of

the book are the ways Saudi Arabia’s leadership rationalized their war against

al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) by comparing it to King Abdul-Aziz ibn

Saud’s suppression of the Ikhwan Revolt in March of 1929, in the Plains of

Sabilla.  Did the ideas of the Saudi Ikhwan (Brotherhood) die in the Plains of

Sabilla, or were they resurrected through Juhayman al-Utaibi (hereafter Juhayman)

in the 1979 takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, and by Usama Bin Laden now?

Zeydi claims that Saudi rebel Juhayman was a major influence on Bin

Laden, and that Juhayman was inspired by the thesis of an Indian student of

Islamic studies who graduated from Umm al-Qura University in Mecca. The thesis

was entitled, “Al Ahadeeth al-Warida fee al-Mahdy fee Mizan al-Jarh

wal-Tadeel,” [The Collection of Sayings on the Mahdi in Reforming and

Correcting (Islam)].  While the lead conspirator of the Mecca Siege (Juhayman)

spent much time at Islamic colleges and it is plausible that he may have read

this thesis, this cannot be definitively proven. What is fact is that the lead

conspirator of the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca was obsessed with the

return of the Mahdi (the expected one), due to events both inside and

outside of the Kingdom that made him feel that end times were near, as a new

Islamic century (1400 Anno Hijrae) dawned.

Zeydi, writes that the religious condemnations, in the form of

fatwas, are not catching up to the likes of condemnations from government and

security officials during the 1979 Siege of Mecca.    Hamada’s book highlights

the fact that the fatwa attacking Juhayman was released to the public on January

7, 1980, a full month and a half after the end of the siege, illustrating that

the fatwa condemning Juhayman came only after his movement was crushed.  The

fatwa itself used adjectives such as kharijeen (those who acted outside)

the Islamic religion, munharifoon (wayward), mukharijun (fringe),

but did not use the outright label of kufr (apostate).  Perhaps the most

damning charge within the Saudi fatwa against Juhayman was his group’s

presumption that they were following the Mahdi and ushering in his

arrival.

The militant Islamists today who utilize Juhayman’s epistles ignore

the troubling aspect of the movement, which is the presumption that they were

the Mahdi. They instead focus on their calls for the removal of the Saudi royal

family and cutting Arabia off from the social ills of the west.  Juhayman’s

central argument that the al-Sauds should not rule because they are not from the

Quryash (Prophet Muhammad’s family) flies in the face of traditional Sunni views

that do not make this a requirement for leadership of Muslims, and is more in

line with Shiite views.  The other aspect of Juhayman’s grievance that the Saudi

monarchy does not uphold Islam and denigrates the faith, is a charge repeated by

al-Qaida today, despite the condemnation of Juhayman’s violent methods. 

Juhayman’s Islamic Views: Fragmented and Theological Reductionism

Hamada does a marvelous job arguing that Juhayman’s writings,

epistles, and theological views can be reduced to selections from a few books

that Juhayman uses to usurp the entire discourse and scholarly opinions of

Islam.  The books are:

(1)  Tafseer Ibn Kathir

(2)  Mukhtasser Sahih Muslim (Summaries of a multi-volume work)

(3)  Sahih al-Jamaa al-Saghir wal Daifa

(4)  Mishkah Masabeh

(5)  Select fatwas of Sheikh Ibn al-Uthaymeen (1925-2001)

Four of these works are by one cleric Sheikh Nasser al-Albani (1914-1999),

ignoring fourteen centuries of debate, fatwas, opinions, and commentaries.  The

use of Al-Albani exclusively by Juhayman highlights how militant Islamist

ideology is narrow, and designed not to educate in the the faith, but to justify

direct violent action, whether it be the attackers of the grand mosque in Mecca

or al-Qaida today. 

Central Questions in 21^st Century Islam

Hamada discusses central questions in 21^st century Islam,

such as: what type of Islam do Muslims want?  Among Islamists (those who want to

usher in an Islamic government), what form of Islamist movement do they want? He

also asks rhetorical questions, including: what is al-Qaida’s socio-economic

program? And, interestingly, what should the position of Shariah be towards

al-Qaida?  Is there a moral relativism to al-Qaida attacks and attacks conducted

by Palestinian resistance fighters? Are there differences between amaliyat

intahiriyah (suicide operations) and amaliyat istishadiyah (martyrdom

operations)?  The mere posing of these questions in an Arabic book written by a

Saudi demonstrates a refreshing direction in Islamic discourse in the 21^st

century. The author provides no straight answers to these complex questions, but

acknowledges that these questions cannot be answered without first answering the

question of what kind of Islam Muslims want?  Who speaks in the name of Islam?

Are they Islamic leaders sanctioned by the state, or leaders of Islamist

movements?  Is it the Islam of Usama Bin Laden? The Islam of Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi? 

If it is state sanctioned Islam, then which regime?  Is it the Islam of the

family, or of the tribe?  Among Islamists is it the jurisprudence of Islamist

movements or Sahwa (reawaking scholars)?

A chapter in Hamada’s book is entitled “Al-Qaida and the Crisis of Methods of

Tafsir” (Exegesis or Interpretation).  He begins by asking which Islamic

models can challenge al-Qaida’s Islamic narratives.  Is it Islam? If Islam,

which constructive Islamic narratives  can be distilled to marginalize

destructive narratives?  Or can Islamists, and if so, can the Muslim

Brotherhood?  If the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood can, which phases of its

history and, if today, which faction: the pragmatic Muslim Brotherhood

parliamentarians who reach out to pan-Arabists, Nasserists, and leftists to form

a coalition against Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic Party?

Hamada identifies an Arab critique of Bin Laden as bringing upon Muslims and

Islam a ma’zaq hadari, or civilizational crisis.  This crisis is more

than Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilization thesis, and a crisis that impairs

Islam’s proselytizing mission inherent in the Abrahamic traditions of faith,

most notably Christianity.  In other words, Islam and Christianity both have a

proselytizing component, and Bin Laden is severely impairing Islam’s ability to

proselytize and convert.  This is an interesting argument, and can be better

packaged to say that Bin Laden and Zawahiri, who have caused the death of

thousands, are the last people able to represent Islam and call people to the

faith. Other Arab critiques of Usama Bin Laden are that his al-Qaida group

failed to impact the world’s political institutions or even that of Arab nations

specifically.  Instead, he has only succeeded in touching the most sacred

aspects of Islam, causing increased challenges for Muslims to freely practice

their faith. Nasser Ahmed al-Bahri, Bin Laden’s bodyguard, reduced Bin Laden’s

strategy as an attempt to disengage the United States from Islamic nations. 

This has been his strategy since Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.  I believe

there are strategic communication opportunities embedded in Arabic language

critiques of Bin Laden and al-Qaida. 

Hamada Attacks Bin Laden’s Claim to Leadership

Hamada highlights the Kuwaiti al-Qaida spokesman Suleiman Abu Ghaith, who is

believed to be among those detained in Iran.  There are a dozen points Abu

Ghaith uses to justify Bin Laden as leader of the Muslims, all these points

reveal al-Qaida’s insecurities. The following are examples highlighted by

Hamada:

• The

  crisis of the Umma (the Muslim community), is a crisis of capability

  and role models. Bin Laden provides the right path in addressing these

  crises.  This desire to represent the Muslim community is presumptuous, and

  not in keeping with Quranic injunctions to accept diverse Muslim beliefs

  that are inherent in the human condition. 

• “We

  follow Bin Laden not from emotion but based on a rational application of

  Islamic law.”  This statement by Abu Ghaith shows an attempt to project

  al-Qaida’s own views of  capitalizing on emotion and irrationality upon

  those who attempt to Islamically criticize Bin Laden.  His need to assert

  that Bin Laden’s leadership is derived on an application of Islamic law

  shows al-Qaida’s insecurity, and that Bin Laden’s understanding of

  leadership is derived not from Islamic law but from the political expression

  of violence and terrorism.  Such points are important in deconstructing Bin

  Laden’s false humility by identifying his real desire to lead even if that

  legitimacy is derived through violence. 

• Bin

  Laden is the awaited figurehead.  Although stopping short of calling him the

  Mahdi, Abu Ghaith’s appeals on this point have the tinge of Mahdism. 

  Al-Qaida understands that outright claims to be the Mahdi would likely

  undermine the group’s image, as it harkens back to the 1979 Mosque Takeover

  in Mecca, in which one of the leaders was declared the Mahdi. 

Other Bin Laden Blasphemies

Hamada cites even wilder blasphemies relating to Bin Laden that are

on the internet.  For instance, the internet inciter, under the cover name Louis Awad, refers to the al-Qaida leader by a blessing reserved to Prophet Muhammad

alone, Salaa Allah Alayhi wa Salam (Peace and Blessings of God Be Upon

Him).  Observant Muslims typically utter this small prayer after the Prophet

Muhammad’s name as a sign of reverence. Yet Louis Awad refers to Bin Laden and

invokes this prayer reserved to the Prophet alone.  This confirms Imam

al-Sherief’s (Zawahiri’s former mentor) accusation that al-Qaida is nothing but

the cult of Zawahiri and Bin Laden.  Al-Qaida leaders remain silent on Louis

Awad’s indiscretion, which should be offensive to most Muslims, as well as the

charge that the organization is merely a cult designed to serve the al-Qaida

leader and his deputy, not God.  Hamada also distills other anti al-Qaida

clerical arguments, such as:

• Killing Muslims in the World Trade Center; the twin towers contained a

  mosque that catered to Muslims working in the financial district.

• Bin

  Laden deceived fellow Muslims into committing suicide; while pilots knew of

  the mission, those charged with subduing the passengers did not.

• The

  group caused Islamic treaties and agreements to be jeopardized with the

  west.

Plans?

Hamada underlines a problem with European legislation of Islamic

behavior, such as the French ban on women’s Islamic dress, the hijab. 

Aside from the recruiting opportunity this provides militant Islamists by

galvanizing the Muslim population, the adversary has seized upon the narrative

of democratic hypocrisy.  Hamada emphasizes how the third column (articles

18–21) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned with spiritual,

public and political freedoms such as freedom of religion and freedom of

association. However, the banning of Islamic dress seems to contravene this

seminal document of western democracy. We cannot allow al-Qaida to extract a

narrative in which democratic ideals work for all, except Muslims. This is

exactly their aim and why they have seized upon the narrative of democratic

hypocrisy.

Sound bites to Counter Militant Islamist Slogans 

Hamada’s book also delves into a few themes that counter militant

Islamist sound bites, such as:

• Their

  unwillingness or purposeful suppression of delineating between verses and

  meanings by using exegesis.

• The

  blurring of the concept of jihad and irhab (terrorism) in their

  slogans.

• Reaching an immediate and negative judgment on the intent of the Ulema

  (Islamic scholars) and thereby attacking not their arguments, but their

  person and reputation.

• Excessiveness in matters of faith, known in the Quran as ghilu.

Nahnu wa Tanzeem al-Qaida urges the amplification of a series

of anti al-Qaida fatwas issued by the Saudi Higher Ulema Council, as a means of

adding a cacophony of competing Islamic voices to al-Qaida and militant

Islamists.  Hamada also advocates the amplification of the Egyptian Islamic

Group’s revisionist volumes that ideologically attack al-Qaida and other

militant Islamist ideologies.  He mentions eight volumes that utilize Islamist

argumentation to undermine militant Islamist ideology.  In addition, many of

these volumes’ authors ideologically lapsed from militant Islamist to Islamist,

the difference being a renunciation of attaining an Islamic state through

violent means. However, from a counter-narrative perspective there is value in

these volumes.  In addition, after 9-11 there are many so called Sahwa (Islamist

Reawakening) clerics, some of whom Bin Laden holds dear, such as Salman

al-Awdah, who have since written open letters criticizing Bin Laden

Islamically.  This criticism led to a trend of Saudi revisionism that, when

added to Egyptian Revisionism, offers a corpus of anti al-Qaida ideological

arguments.  Saudi revisionism centers on how takfir (declaring fellow

Muslims apostate) has caused division among Muslims, and how Bin Laden has

damaged the reputation of Islam and retarded proselytizing. It also focuses on

the declaration of jihad through the permission of the waly al-amr

(recognized authority) and questions Bin Laden’s authority.

Conclusion

Hamada’s work offers insight in which the United States can begin to

understand the complexities within Islamic clerical discussions pertaining to

Islamist politics and the narratives of Militant Islamist groups.  The author

highlights schisms between Jihadi Ulema (those clergy who advocate

violent action), Sahwa Ulema (those clergy who are revisionist and may

share the same vision as violent Islamists), and finally Regime Ulema

(government sponsored clerics who challenge militant Islamist clerics).  For

instance, Hamada highlights the cleric Abdul-Aziz Bin Saleh al-Jarbuah, and his

book, “The Religious Rulings on What Happened in America,” issued after 9-11. 

The cleric ruled that the 9-11 operation was suicide and by implication not

martyrdom.  “Killing infidels in this manner is excessive in Islamic law,” he

writes, and “the condition of Muslim states and the United States is that of

a’hd (truce)”   Jarbuah says that the Taliban should surrender those wanted

for justice, and cites the example of Prophet Muhammad, who turned over a

criminal (Abu Basir) to his Meccan adversary for justice, in accordance with the

treaty arranged with the Meccans.  The book charges that the Taliban has caused

irreparable harm to the body of Muslims worldwide, to the reputation of Islam in

particular, and has ruined opportunities to spread the faith. Of course, a

cleric’s rulings are only as good as Muslims who choose to follow him, and we

should be attuned to Islamic counter-argumentation that seeks to undercut

al-Qaida theologically and ideologically as the basis for an effective and

long-term campaign to make militant Islamist ideology unpopular among Muslims. 

The goal of this essay is to highlight the nature of the Arab-Muslim

debate on al-Qaida for America’s counter-terrorism experts.  It is not to agree

or disagree with Hamada or other clergy’s work, but to offer a means for the

United States to see an opportunity to de-popularize and marginalize al-Qaida

rhetoric. Some of these clergy are by no means friends of the United States, as

many disagree with American foreign policy, but they have been vocal in Islamically

attacking al-Qaida.  This aspect of their discourse needs to be amplified

to marginalize militant and violent Islamists who represent an immediate threat

to the national security of the United States, and attempts to disaggregate

America from the region.

Commander Aboul-Enein is author of “Militant Islamist Ideology:

this work.