COIN Toss
COIN Toss: The Cult of Counterinsurgency – Michael Crowley, The New Republic.
On the night of December 1, shortly after Barack Obama announced plans to send 30,000 more U.S. troops to Afghanistan, retired Lt. Colonel John Nagl appeared on MSNBC’s “The Rachel Maddow Show.” Maddow was dismayed by Obama’s new plan, which she called “massive escalation,” but, when she introduced Nagl, a counterinsurgency expert who has long called for a greater U.S. commitment to Afghanistan–even if it means raising taxes and expanding the military–she was surprisingly friendly. And, after Nagl spent the segment praising Obama’s plan, which he said would throw back the Taliban and enable more civil and economic development, Maddow may have remained skeptical–but she was also admiring. “It’s a real pleasure to have you on the show, John,” she said.
Had someone like Bill Kristol given that same assessment of Obama’s speech, Maddow might have tarred him as a bloodthirsty proponent of endless war. Which is why Nagl is one of the administration’s most important allies as it tries to sell the United States on a renewed commitment to Afghanistan. A former tank commander in Iraq and co-author of the Army’s landmark 2006 counterinsurgency manual, Nagl has become a fixture on television and in news articles about Afghanistan; he’s even made an appearance on “The Daily Show.” With the authority of a man who has worn a uniform in combat, and the intellectual heft of a Rhodes Scholar, he has helped to persuade many liberals that pursuing a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan is the only viable path to success…
Much more at The New Republic.
Gulliver said and Ken White concurred: “This MRAP obsession is strange to me”
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Guess I mirror Secretary Gates’ concern that the overwhelming casualties of these wars have come from IEDs. And no, the company I work for has no business relationship with MRAP/M-ATV manufacturers.
* In 2003 there were 81 IED events in Afghanistan.
* In 2009, that number has climbed to 7,228 resulting in 6037 casualties.
Read about the wheelchair wounded warrior parades in the halls of the Pentagon to understand there is so much more to the casualty count than deaths alone. Add traumatic brain injury to maiming events, and the problem is even more clear.
Does anybody believe that genie can be put back in the bottle or that this phenomenan is unique to these conflicts? Which is cheaper, 50 pounds of ammonium nitrate, a simple mine or piece of surplus ordnace, or a sophisticated anti-armor missile like our Javelin? The same applies to anti-aircraft weaponry. Will future hybrid foes be more likely to employ Manpads defeatable by jamming and countermeasures or a simple RPG aimed optically at landing aircraft.
“TTP for Counterinsurgency” mentions that there have been 81,000 IED events from 2001 to 2007. Guess that mean we will soon surpass 100,000.
Engineer M113s led heavier armor on the Thunder Runs of Baghdad. Which has more armor, the MRAP/M-ATV or the many M113s still out there? True, you must get out of these vehicles and patrol dismounted. But the AO an infantry platoon can cover is greatly expanded if troops can drive a few miles before they start walking. Frequent mounted route reconnaissances and establishment of checkpoints and mounted OPs can be just as crucial. Mounted overwatch from a tall vehicle with good .50 cal line of sight to extended ranges doesn’t hurt, either.
In addition, at Wanat and other battles, the Taliban targeted up-armored Hummers with crew-served weapons early in all engagements. In convoys, well-armed and armored vehicles often are the difference between deterrence or ambush. In COPs with surrounding HESCO fighting positions, these vehicles with .50 cal and grenade launchers could defeat far greater numbers of attackers, and use sensors to prevent surprise. Many supplies and basic loads could be picked up by modified MRAPs from BSB trucks to shorten the less-armored logisticians trip into unfamiliar no-man’s land.
I will confess that after checking my copy of FM 3-07.1, that I had no idea what comprised a Security Force Assistance brigade. I’m still not sure, after reading some of it.;) Still believe the heavy BCT needs a less threatening and fuel thirsty vehicle for many operations and the Infantry BCT needs greater armor than up-armored HMMWVs will ever provide. “Security Force battalion” MPs, Civil Affairs, Engineer, Psych Ops, MTTs, and PRT members could still operate and share the big trucks with combined arms battalions. The Army still must use 10,000+ vehicles effectively.
The final bottom line is we will have spent over $30 billion on these vehicles in short order…a sum we cannot afford to discard when these wars are over…especially given the survivability and utility such vehicles could provide with a little imagination and modification.
I will add that I find it highly regrettable that FCS manned ground vehicles were killed due to IED concerns even though a V-bottom kit was already planned and feasible. No such kit is possible with an EFV that is carrying far more exposed Marines once ashore where 99% of the fight will occur.
From Gulliver at Jan 7 10:12AM post:
“Bill – You may be proving Ken’s point:
Despite the success of these insurgencies and/or US apathy towards some, it had little effect on the overall struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (one could suggest that the places where the superpowers were goaded into counterinsurgency response — Afghanistan for the Soviet Union and Vietnam for the U.S. — to what seemed like proxy encroachment by their rival — this marked the most significant geopolitical setback for those states).”
A response:
Gulliver/Ken: I agree.
Likewise today, by being goaded — yet again –into another counterinsurgency response, the United States could, once again, be courting a most damaging setback to its objectives — even if:
a. There is no similar great power rivalry today.
b. There is no great power supporting the current insurgency(ies) and
c. The current political objectives of the United States have changed — to helping provide for the needs of its former great power rivals.
In the July/August 2008 issue of Foreign Affairs Magazine, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice authored an article entitled:
“Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New World.”
Therein, she articulated the foreign policy objectives of the United States:
“Investing in strong and rising powers as stakeholders in the international order and supporting the democratic development of weak and poorly governed states — these are the broad goals of US Foreign Policy …”
If one were to add the following to her shortened sentence above:
“This will be accomplished by transforming problematic societies and dealing with the resistance that will be encountered in this process.”
Could one then get a better understanding of the utility being assigned — then and today — to the portfolio of “transforming” instruments, such as: enhanced COIN, FID, development, investment and aid?
Gulliver
Well, quibbling can be fun particularly if you’re old, retired and have a good memory and little else to do…
One would hope. In any event, those items you name and many otyhers were selected through the Foreign Comparative Testing program (LINK). As you can see that program dates back a bit. The FCT program was directed by Congress in 1989 as a consolidation and expansion of the former Foreign Weapons Evaluation and NATO Comparative Test programs. All of which were Congressional initiatives that the Army (and the other services) fought — until the benefits finally dawned on them. Thank former Senator Sam Nunn for pushing that one. The Armed Forces didn’t really wholeheartedly get with the program until 2001. For some reason, they got interested after that…
That Mickey Mouse stuff out of the way, go back and review the famous Weaponeer versus FATS battle; a classic example of a Building 4 idea against far better technology. Or look at Multicam versus the ACU pattern where I have it on good authority that the decision was made based on the answer to one question; “Which one is Natick’s digital pattern?”
I stand by my statement that the Army has long objected to tools equipment and doctrine not developed in house — though I will acknowledge in fairness that a part of that is often to save money by not paying royalties and, in doctrine, due to several unique features of the US and the US Army. As an aside, in WW II, we just started manufacturing Oerlikon and Bofors cannon without asking and no royalties — hard to do that in peacetime no matter how good the technology is.
The Army is getting a little better about that ‘not invented here’ syndrome nowadays. How much of that is due to a younger generation and how much to Congressional pressure is hard to determine. The good news is that it’s better.
I mention it often only to remind everyone that excessive service and community or branch parochialism is our worst enemy.
Gulliver,
I’ll take your word for it, because the name of that first system is just too bizarre for you to have made up. But are those instances that counter the assertion? Or are they examples of recent, desperate attempts to find anything in response to the IED threat – throwing a bunch of stuff at the wall and seeing what sticks?
Whoops, sorry about that, Gulliver. I started my comment before you posted your last and got interrupted — didn’t mean to preach to the choir on FCT.
There’s also more to Giraffe than FCT, as you say. Anything to avoid one other large foreign company’s products…
My comment on it not being developed here was aimed not at the specific vehicles but rather at the US Army mindset that rejects any ideas that do not come from within — unless, as with the MRAPs, the media or Congress force the issue..
I don’t mean to quibble, because I think you’re generally correct, but the Giraffe Agile Multi-Beam radar (Sweden) is an example of a foreign solution that the U.S. Army deemed best suited to meet an expedited operational requirement. Similar overseas solutions have been found for counter-IED technology, like SYMPHONY (which was originally developed by the British-Canadian firm Allen-Vanguard).
Gulliver:
Seems strange to me as well…
Minor point, our MRAPs owe more to the Casspir and Nyala than to the Buffel but your point that the South Africans were there first — after they copied the Rhodesian’s various vehicles including the Crocodile — is of course correct.
My comment on it not being developed here was aimed not at the specific vehicles but rather at the US Army mindset that rejects any ideas that do not come from within — unless, as with the MRAPs, the media or Congress force the issue..
If I might turn (or return) for a moment to “ends,” “ways,” and “means.”
As a possible starting point, might I ask: What would one say is, or should be, our overarching political objective for this region and why?
Could this be:
***** To make the region more compatible to the needs of the great powers — and to the needs of great power peace — both of which, today, increasingly depend upon a world made more safe and, otherwise, more accommodating to the demands of international trade and commerce? *****
If this is correct, what would be (1) the problem sets we would likely encounter and (2) the solutions sets we would propose to meet and overcome these problems and, thereby, achieve our political objective (described above)?
Or are there other, more appropriate and more correct descriptions of what our overarching political objective for this region is or should be — and why — and, accordingly, a different articulation of problem and solution sets?
Plenty of better vehicle options were about — but then, those vehicles weren’t invented here…
This MRAP obsession is strange to me, so this seems only peripherally related to what we’re talking about, but: the MRAP is now American-built, but it’s based on a South African design (the Buffel APC). When the decision was made to field MRAPs, it wasn’t exactly based on the fact that it was “invented here”… because it wasn’t.
Schmedlap — The CIED stuff is similar to MRAP in that it’s an expedited solution that was done outside of normal procurement in response to an urgent and unanticipated force protection requirement. (This is sort of confusing, though, because SYMPHONY isn’t actually used by U.S. forces — it’s a system that Lockheed now builds on contract from the USG for provision to allies and coalition partners for use in theater. I’m not that current on what U.S. units are fielding.)
Giraffe is sort of a different story: troops in the field needed a system that would do a certain thing, we didn’t have anything that could do it and couldn’t produce the system that would (which we ARE, in fact, producing now) in time, so we found a foreign system that would do what we needed and asked the Swedes for it. (There’s a whole program in the Army called Foreign Competitive Testing that’s designed to find non-developmental foreign systems for fielding in the U.S. arsenal, incidentally, though this isn’t how Giraffe got found, I don’t think.)
But yeah, to come back to your point, the IED threat resulted in a bunch of elected officials and military leaders saying “we need things that are going to protect our troops from this threat” and going outside of normal channels to find them, generally. As Ken said, it was a reaction to the fact that we were sustaining relatively high casualties (by U.S. public standards) to what seemed like an unsophisticated weapon that was unanticipated, so the leadership felt pressure to find solutions NOWNOWNOW. (Remember the whole “up-armored” debate?)
Cole — Gulliver, I’m aware that Advise and Assist Brigades are the current structure. However, how would you determine how many such brigades to create during a given ARFORGEN cycle during peacetime? Half the 14 BCTs? One third? All? None until the need arises?
Funny you should ask, because the Army is currently working on figuring that out by surveying the Army Service Component Commands on the demand signal for peacetime/Phase 0/steady state security cooperation. But the intent is to have one SFA brigade per COCOM (with the exception of NORTHCOM), with an additional brigade or two in certain cases depending on requirements.
Ken,
Sorry, never intended to quote you from anywhere about the Balkans, but caught the implication that we should not have stability-dedicated forces because we might use them.
Also caught an earlier statement about Desert Storm being a success because it was short…but it was short because it was incomplete in achieving desired strategic goals.
The artillery bit was because Artillery Soldiers have been used extensively in OIF as surrogate infantry which is tough to do in a Palladin.;)
Schmedlap, our nation was lucky to have you and yours. Caught your blog comments about training and enjoyed them, as well. But not as much as I’m enjoying the National Championship game!
Gulliver, if you can say, what does “SFA” stand for? I google it last night and got a McAfee website alert and my computer locked up!
Thanks for the answer on the numbers and allocation of brigades. Still wonder what the Army is going to do with 10,000 MRAPs…especially since they just announced that Secretary Gates will be around another year and wants them used.
Also caught an earlier statement about Desert Storm being a success because it was short…but it was short because it was incomplete in achieving desired strategic goals.
This is actually not correct. Desert Storm was an overwhelming success, precisely because it completely accomplished the strategic objectives — to stop Iraqi aggression, protect Saudi oil, and liberate Kuwait — and did not exceed its mandate. It’s also the reason the international coalition remained so unified and strong.
Now you can argue that those were the wrong objectives, but you can’t argue that the operation failed to accomplish them.
SFA = security force assistance. What are being called AABs in Iraq are properly referred to (in Afghanistan and into the future) as “modular brigades augmented for security force assistance.”
Cole:
There is no implication by me that we should not have stability-dedicated forces because we might use them. What I have repeatedly said is that if we have them we will use them; no ‘might’ to it and no “implication.” Using them, is in one sense not a problem. In another sense, the probability of misusing them is quite high…
Er, no, that’s not what I said. Here it is: “The conclusion I draw from all those (stability) operations is that they are expensive, tedious, constraining and generally do not provide satisfactory results and they should therefor be avoided if possible. Desert Storm is of course the exception — I wonder why that is…” I said Desert Storm was an exception to tedious, constraining and unsatisfactory result(s) operations, not that it was successful. As far as strategic goals of that operation are concerned, Gulliver has it right, the strategic goals were achieved so it was de facto and de jure ‘successful.’ It was short and no ‘stability ops’ were required so it was totally successful in that sense. I just happen to disagree with not going to Baghdad so it was not totally successful IMO — but then I was not and am not in charge…
We disagree on the value of MRAPS/M-ATV. I think they’re broadly useless for much of any thing except moving a few people about in an unwieldy cocoon and that they create bad tactical efforts. Gates may like them and I know some commanders do — but IMO, those are folks more worried about casualties than they are about doing the mission. I don’t like casualties anymore than anyone else but sometimes the job requires a little risk taking. Those that aren’t into that should find another line of work.
I strongly suspect the majority of those vehicles will be left in Afghanistan and Iraq and that most of those will fall apart due to lack of maintenance in fairly short order. Multi-billion dollar boondoggle. All because the senior leaders of the US Army were not paying attention in the 1990s. Plenty of better vehicle options were about — but then, those vehicles weren’t invented here…
Thanks Gulliver, although the full title makes my head hurt. Good comment about Desert Storm. Started reading the approved TRADOC Army Capstone Concept today which talks a lot about “Operational Adaptability.”
Seems like TRADOC prefers “area security” more than “COIN” which I have not seen much of yet in the concept. In fact, I just searched the concept and “counterinsurgency” is used only three times with one being a source. “Irregular warfare” is listed just twice. Stability is listed 25 times.
Seems like lots of changes were made from the earlier version, but COIN does not seem to be popular with Armor officers.;)
Cole:
I see no confusion in the fact that the alleged Plug and Play design of the BCTs — specifically designed to allow ad hoc taskings — and the ad hoc arrangement for various stability forces meld into each other nicely — but that’s just me, I guess. YMMV.
The mind boggles at the thought of an MRAP or even a M-ATV (how AT is that A-T…) being used for reconnaissance. Nor can I figure what the FA would do with them. Ammo carriage — awfully low payload. FDC perhaps? Dunno.
I am totally unsure what precipitated this comment:
If by that you mean that I have said and still believe there was no US interest in the Balkans, then you’re correct but that is far from what you said. I in no way said those things were acceptable — I said it was not our business, not the same thing at all. It was and is a European problem. Not cool to deliberately misquote people so I’m sure that was just another error on your part. As for the rest of that paragraph from which the quote is extracted, you answered that with your next opening sentence — “We don’t need to save the world.” Absolutely correct — and we could not even if we wanted to do so.
That’s not what I call them, that’s what the Army and DoD call them. So does Congress. I just use their term. You can call them anything you wish.
They are capable of acting in any sensible scenario — IF they are adequately trained. I’d also suggest that as long as we have a volunteer force, we’ll never have enough “boots on the ground” (that’s a particularly silly media / punditocracy phrase) to do what you suggest.
No, Desert Storm was not a success because had we gone to Baghdad then it would’ve been twice as cheap and four times as effective as it was 2003-2012 (all figures approximate).
Someone really needs to do a seminar on The Limits of Power and invite a whole lot of people…
Bill C:
Why? Because they probably believe that they know the correct governmental methodology and unless others do it their way, said others are wrong.
They might seek to do that transform thing as you suggest — I suggest that if they do, they aren’t nearly as historically aware as they should be. I also suggest there might be an excess of arrogance involved…
Not to mention their not being as bright as many would think and with respect to this:
I’d add invalid ends, a failure to understand ways, means not really available in the numbers or types to do what is suggested the way it is suggested and an obviously poor understanding of current international trends.
Guys/Gals,
Ken, guess I’m confused why we moved Brigade Support Battalions, Brigade Special Troops battalions, Artillery battalions, and Reconnaissance squadrons into BCTs but we want to continue to “ad hoc” the stability forces.
Gulliver, I’m aware that Advise and Assist Brigades are the current structure. However, how would you determine how many such brigades to create during a given ARFORGEN cycle during peacetime? Half the 14 BCTs? One third? All? None until the need arises? Is there value in providing heavy BCTs with MRAP/M-ATVs so they can leave their big armor behind if necessary to respond more like Infantry BCTS in complex terrain like Afghanistan?
We have reconnaissance squadrons and artillery battalions in every BCT that could benefit from MRAP/M-ATVs as well.
Adapt…but plan to facilitate operational adaptation.
Adjust per Von Moltke’s “no plan survives contact.” But assure the assets are trained and in theater to permit responsive adjustment.
I’m also somewhat incredulous that Ken would believe that sniping and genocide were acceptable in the Balkans. Would things have ended as they did with bombing alone? Did we give up in Somalia too soon? Did we drop the ball entirely in Darfur? Was Desert Storm a success given the no-fly worthlessness that followed and the slaughter of Kurds/Shi’ites with gas?
We don’t need to save the world…but we don’t need to be isolationists either. We can count on the need for stability operations before, during, and after offense and defense. General purpose forces, as you call them, are simply not always up to task acting alone with the equipment they use in major combat operations. We can never create enough special ops or Marines to substitute for lots of Army BCT boots on the ground.
Cole:
Being a practical guy and not a strategic thinker, I would question the assumptions. Do MRAPs provide any value at all? Would plussing up a BDE with another set of vehicles to train on, maintain, and account for result in a unit that has a longer time window necessary to attain a given readiness status and significantly greater resources necessary to maintain a given readiness status? I suspect “yes” to both and, moreover, at a cost that would throw the value of the endeavor into question.
Also, I missed your earlier comments to me (which are somewhat related to this issue)…
Nope. Never assigned to a FOB (a point of great pride, incidentally!).
We lived within our sector. With fewer higher-imposed requirements for minimum vehicles/personnel, it was common to split my platoon into one-vehicle patrols with 4 or 5 Soldiers. There was no IED threat at that early point in the game and we never suffered a casualty to SA. I cannot count the number of times that I was in sector alone (with just my terp) or with just one Soldier when meeting with locals.
Again, nope. Thin-skinned HMMWVs with no doors – and no casualties.
I agree (but would just say that “organic to the Advise and Assist Battalion” is irrelevant). However, given that my comment was merely highlighting the fact that we were attempting to do things now regarded as “COIN tasks” or “COIN best practices” and that the shortcoming was not our knowledge, but rather support and planning from higher, I guess I am led to the question of “so what?” Yeah, money (CERP or any other type) would have been great. That is not something that we recently learned. That is common sense, not new doctrine or an expansion of institutional knowledge. The fact that a plan is needed is nothing new either. Ditto civil military personnel. State Department personnel would have been nice, I guess, but where do they come from? There aren’t many available.
I don’t understand the obsession with the MRAP or the Advise/Assist BN. Having any plan would have been a huge improvement. Have any money would have been a huge improvement. How is an MRAP going to help? Why would an advise/assist BN be necessary when we already knew what we needed to do, but simply lacked money, manpower, and time to make it happen?
I don’t think the Marines have necessarily cracked the code, either. There is not much to be said for familiarizing yourself with the AO just in time for redeployment.
Before we start changing military force structure in accordance with this
foolhardy?bold vision of the future, how about we get the “whole of government” thing at least to square one (and preferably get it to about an 80% solution). See the words of Admiral Mullen (quoted here) below…We can’t just count on those other departments to make this transformation at some distant point in the future, count on them to do it correctly, and then restructure our forces on the basis of these hopes and dreams. Large groups of federal civilian employees aren’t particularly known for their ability to be break out of their habits, take risks, or be innovative. Many of them like their jobs because they provide predictability and simplify their lives.
Regarding our capacity to pull off a “whole of gov’t approach,” see some (unofficial) figures posted at SWC.
Argh. Bill, I’ll get you for this…
That Anonymous twit above is me, Pete. Thought I’d logged in, apparently not. 🙁
The New Republic article we have been commenting on, “COIN Toss: The Cult of Counterinsurgency,” focuses significantly on John Nagl and CNAS, and the affinity between these two and the current Democratic Party and present administration.
(Dr. Nagl is famous, I believe, for his belief that America must “transform entire societies” as its 21st Century security mission.)
Why would these closely linked entities (Nagl, CNAS, Democratic Party, Obama Administration) seek to transform whole socieites, how would they do this and to what end?
I am suggesting that Dr. Nagl, CNAS, the current Domocratic Party and the present administration (not Dr. Barnett) would seek to transform certain societies:
First: So that they would no longer pose a security problem to the new world order (now including Russia, China, India, etc., — and a growing list of others — as nations, great powers and peoples who are dependent on trade, commerce and market-economies for their very survival) and
Second: Transform these socieites so that they could be configured to more-adequately service and support the market-economy needs of this huge new body of producers and consummers (described above).
How would they do this (transform whole societies such that they [a] do not pose a security problem and [b] can adequately service and support the new world order)?
Partially through the use of COIN/FID/Whole-of-Govt, aid, development, etc., (all being undertaken today — and all which require changes to military force structure and the civil/military relationship.)
Ends, ways, means? (And a better understanding of current international affairs direction?)
Gee, Pete — Not me as I’ve seen it do just that a bunch of times. 😉
However, CONARC was not a good idea, TRADOC is (mostly) and a FORSCOM like command is needed, no question, it just should be about a fourth the size it is so it cannot get over involved in and with subordinate units.
After viewing FORSCOMs Training Guidance for deploying units last year, I reaffirmed my opinion that they do almost as much (if not more) harm as good. Too many smart Type A people with too much time on their hands; Standard staff problem, Bn to DA — FORSCOM is, sadly, no exception. Said staffs are the problem with the ARFORGEN process.
Battle Groups worked — the basic problems were that the concept was ahead of the equipment power curve and the Colonel BG Cdrs were in a great many cases not quite flexible enough to tactically the five companies. The fact that they objected quite strongly to going from a 10-15 Co Regt with three subordinate LTCs to a seven Co BG with CPT subordinates didn’t help. 😀
You also went wrong on the conversion. A BG was just a big Bn, so all we have to do is eliminate the BCT Hq and make Colonels Bn Cdrs. 😉
“The ARFORGEN process may be the way it is now done — but how much of that ‘process’ exists to justify FORSCOM (a Command that never needed to exist and contributes little — trust me, I’ve been there…).” — Ken White
Gee, if that’s the case maybe we should take FORSCOM and TRADOC and merge them into the same organization, which we could then call the Continental Army Command. Then we could start working on making the ARFORGEN model functional, which could be done were we to have more organizations to work with than our current number of brigades. This we could do by converting our brigades into battle groups! Who says history don’t repeat itself?
Bill — That’s certainly what Tom Barnett would tell you, sure.
Heh. I rest my case… 😉
Gulliver has an excellent point re: failures. I believe there’s a message in that…
Bill C, I hope you’re correct on the first point though history says we almost never take advantage of such learning opportunities.
Your second point is an idea shared by some. I believe the majority of the US populace will not succumb to that fallacious — even terribly flawed — logic. Again, History indicates that success is slight to none (in this case of transforming whole societies by any exterior power). Indeed, it shows far more adverse than positive results from such attempts. See Gulliver above…
There is no need to tinker with force structure. Mostly due to fear that even though it is only reasonably effective, the possibility of a less effective structure is dangerously likely. It is always a mistake to predicate one’s force on the war of the day; tomorrow may bring a very different problem. Add to that there is really no new factor…
Don’t the proponents of COIN in Afghanistan also stress that it requires a “whole of government” approach to implement it? If so, doesn’t this mean that it will not be implemented? We do not have the capacity for a large “whole of government” effort.
If it cannot be implemented, then what are we attempting? I know what we’re calling it, but what is it? And one follow up to that: what evidence or plausible theory suggests that it (whatever it is) will succeed?
“Washington is already planning for a more counterinsurgency-oriented future–witness the latest Pentagon budget, which shifts billions of dollars away from high-tech weapons systems designed for fighting a great power like China, toward equipment like aerial drones and armored personnel carriers.”
While technically true, this statement is so misleading as to be disingenuous.
Also: “if Afghanistan doesnt turn around soon, [the COIN squad] may find themselves wondering whether its time to go back to the drawing board.”
What does this really mean? In terms of the strategy in Afghanistan? How it is resourced? How it is implemented? Or is it about COIN theory in general?
Talk like this risks confusing a possible failure in Afghanistan with the bankruptcy of counterinsurgency as a concept. Therefore, it also risks throwing the baby (the great amount of conceptual learning that has occurred since 2004) out with the bath-water (everything that is wrong about the current predicament in Afghanistan).
David:
Might you describe the “great amount of conceptual learning” that has taken place as you say since 2004? Perhaps you could give some specifics to this assertion. Also, why does it begin in 2004 and not 2003, or 2002, or 1995 for that matter? What is special as a starting point for 2004?
gian
2004 was probably the timeframe that GEN Petraeus, John Nagl, Nate Fick, Andrew Exum, et al, all saw the light and had their epiphany and (re-) discovered COIN. Sure Petreaus and Nagl wrote about Vietnam (and Malaya) in the dissertation but they were not COIN advocates or as some say COINdinistas until probably after 2004.
My bad, I meant 2005…
So then why 2005…?
I saw that interview Nagl mad a strange comment it at the end when he said the bad economy would be good way to make sure the Army has all the recruits it needs…..not the way to win friends and influence people.
COL Gentile — Not sure if you’ve heard, but David Ucko wrote a book. The answer might be in there.
As for this article: yawn. The COINdinista Cabal, the “dominant narrative,” the sinister progressive hawks, etc etc. Anything new? Not so far as I can tell.
Slapout9–I hate to say it, but there’s a large amount of truth to it.
Gian:
Replace ‘2005’, or ‘2004’ even, for ‘in recent years’ if you prefer. To me, as much as definite turning-points help to make sense of history, 2005 is a useful reference point for the U.S. ground force’s conceptual (re)learning of COIN. You’re not fond of my book (thanks for the plug though Gulliver) but it does provide a fuller answer to your question than I can provide here.
Because your book, David, conforms to the Coin template. It accepts the notion without evidentiary proof that the American Army did not start learning and adapting until a certain point, then after that it did. You say 2005, then I ask again why 2005 and not 2003? What proof do you have? Don Wright’s and Tim Reese’s book, “On Point II,” argues the opposite that the majority of Army combat units were learning and adapting and adjusting to Coin very quickly, almost as soon as they hit the ground in Spring and Summer of 2003. I heard a very senior American Army General who commanded a Division in Iraq in 2003 (not General Petraeus by the way) state basically the same thing that his Division learned and adapted quite well to the various situations that confronted them on the ground.
Your book reads almost verbatim like the Nagl/Krepinevich critique of the American Army in Vietnam in which the American Army did not learn and adapt in that war. Moonshine. It did, in many different ways. So too did the American Army start its learning and adapting in Iraq in 2003. And do you want to know why it was able to do that learning and adapting so quickly, David? Because it was an army trained and optimized for combined arms warfare. It is books like yours that elevate the principle of learning and adapting toward better population centric coin above the fundamental necessity to do combined arms. In a sense you and many of the other Coin experts are putting the cart before the horse. The ability to do combined arms at all organizational levels gives an army in whatever situation it is thrust into the subsequent ability to seize and maintain the initiative; it can act. And if it acts first in response to a hostile enemy force or complex conditions through the initiative it can learn and adapt. My worry is that all of this talk of Coin and learning Coin and learning and adapting, yada, yada, yada, has taken our eyes off the absolute necessity of combined arms competencies and replaced it with an artificial construct of learning and adapting toward better population centric Counterinsurgency. As I have argued before, the rules of this construct, however, do not allow a unit to learn and adapt its way out of doing Coin. This box that we are in continues to push us down the Coin path toward significant organizational changes, and it keeps us locked in a world of tactics and operations, unable to see and do strategy. Strategy in war of course is more important than tactics and operations. It was a failure at strategy that caused us to lose the Vietnam War, not because the American Army didnt learn and adapt toward doing better Coin tactics and operations.
Have I got this right?
Accepting that the mission of the United States in the 21st Century continues to be “changing entires societies,” the argument remains only as to how to do this.
COL Gentile says that we must face the fact that this wrenching, ambitious and difficult task frequently requires the use of harsh tactics and heavy forces.
John Nagl, et.al. — while acknowleding this classic mission requirement (the need to transform entire societies) — believes that this cannot, in the current era, be achieved using the “harsh and heavy” tactics of old.
Why? Because in the current post-Colonial and post-Cold War World, one cannot hope to mobilize support for one’s political interests (at home, with allies, elsewhere abroad and within the camp of the targeted nations/societies) through the use of such tainted methods. Today a (seemingly?) more “humane” and reasoned method (COIN/whole-of-government approach) is believed to be what is needed — in order to mobilize the requisite political support — and, thus, achieve victory.
After 4 years of steady-state operations in which to…
– gather intelligence
– establish contacts
– erect FOBs and establish LOCs
– standardize theater-specific and AO-specific procedures to streamline operations
– stand up and train ISF
– establish a government
And, after 4 years in which…
– the people had largely separated into homogenous ethnosectarian communities and political factions with strong views on the security situation
– our adversaries had developed coherent networks that we could analyze and target
– people become more convinced that we would withdraw our forces due to domestic political pressure
– some of our forces began consolidating into FOBs
We abruptly change course by…
– announcing (by the President) that we aim to restore security, thus helping to remove doubts among fencesitters that we are leaving
– sending in an additional 5 US Brigades
– reversing the incomplete FOB consolidation
– pushing the “surge” forces into PBs and COPs
– dismantling AQI networks
– killing and capturing senior and mid-level leaders of AQI and JAM
– attacking EFP and human smuggling networks
– dismantling networks of bomb-makers and financiers to prevent or thwart mass-casualty attacks
By 2007, the people had made up their minds. The lines were drawn, the leaders were established, and the weapons were loaded. We set out to co-opt tribes, pay informants, gather intelligence, kill insurgent leaders, mentor ISF, and engage in a lot of high level political maneuvering at the national level.
What did we learn after 2005 that was so critical to working through the fundamentally different situation in 2007? What knowledge were we lacking from 2005 and before? How can anyone attribute the outcome to anything more than four years of preparation, a change in the situation, and a change in strategy as articulated by the President?
What knowledge were we blessed with at this moment of COIN Pentecost in 2005 and why was it more significant than any of the factors above?
My question/comment stated in the alternative:
In determining what are feasible and achievable national goals — and the requisite strategy needed to achieve these goals — one would think that nations are constrained by the availability and sustainability of certain critical resources.
A most critical such resource would seem to be the “support of the people.” Specifically: (1) the support of the people of the nation embarked on its mission to achieve certain national goals, (2) the popular support of allies and, optimally: (3) the support of the people of the world at-large and (4) a segment of the people in the opposing camp(s).
COL Gentile might argue that conventional warfare done right (with the appropriate number and type of initial and follow-on forces) achieves a quicker, cleaner, more sustainable and more humanitarian victory; precludes the need for “forever war” COIN scenerios and, as such, renders an outcome which COIN often cannot, to wit: (1) the long-term popular support “of the people” (as defined above) and (2) the capitulation of other enemies.
This method (conventional warfare done right), one might suggest, is how a nation mobilizes and maintains the critical resource of popular support in the post-Colonial/post-Cold War era and, thus, is able to “transform entire societies” in the 21st Century.
@Bill C.
If we are to accept the premise that ‘conventional warfare done right’ is the more efficient answer that we are looking for we should be able to compare the portions of OIF in which COIN warfare and ‘conventional warfare done right’ were used and identify the differences in effectiveness.
Testing your premise I would then ask why, since OIF1 began conventionally, did warfare TTP’s move towards COIN over the course of that year in some parts of the country?
From the Conclusion of On Point II (additional paragraphs added to break it up and my CAPS added for emphasis):
Chapter 14
Implications
“Phase III and Phase IV Operations*”
“While planning and preparation for what in 2003 was called Phase III, Decisive Operations, of a joint campaign will always tend to have primacy for Joint and Army planners, it is time to increase the importance of what is now known as Phase IV, Stabilize. Sustained and decisive ground combat is the sine qua non of the US Army. The Armys operational record from Phase III of OIF, though not without flaws, is superlative. Phase III military operations may be the most intense and dangerous within a campaign, and without a military victory in Phase III, strategic success is impossible.”
“At the same time it must be remembered that THE PURPOSE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IS TO ACHIEVE A SPECIFIC STRATEGIC OR POLITICAL OBJECTIVE. AS OIF HAS SHOWN, THIS PHASE OF OPERATIONS IS ULTIMATELY MORE IMPORTANT THAN PHASE III IN SECURING THE END FOR WHICH MILITARY OPERATIONS WERE INITIATED. In spring 2003, however, the DOD and the Army lacked a coherent plan to translate the rapid, narrow-front attack that avoided populated areas whenever possible, into strategic success. Soldiers and commanders at nearly every level did not know what was expected of them once Saddam Hussein was deposed and his military forces destroyed.”
“Clearly the Coalition lacked sufficient forces on the ground in April 2003 to FACILITATE, MUCH LESS IMPOSE, FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC CHANGES in Iraq. Troop density ratios were on the low end of previous US occupation experiences, much lower than many of the prewar plans for the invasion of Iraq and far lower than previous US and Western counterinsurgency campaigns. These factors were in line with prewar planning for a quick turnover of power to Iraqis and a quick withdrawal of US forces, leaving Iraqis to determine their own political future–options that proved impossible to execute.”
“While CENTCOM and the US Army might not have been expected to plan for a full-blown insurgency of the type that emerged by late 2003, the historical record should have indicated that many more troops would be needed for the post-Saddam era in Iraq. Key decisionmakers ignored cautionary warnings about the paucity of troops, both official and unofficial, without giving them sufficient review. The Coalitions inability to prevent looting, to secure Iraqs borders, and to guard the vast number of munitions dumps in the early months after Saddams overthrow are indicative of the shortage. US commanders found it difficult to balance increasing requirements with the units available throughout 2003 and 2004.”
“Furthermore, by the time the Saddam regime fell, most Iraqis had yet to see a Coalition soldier. Unlike Axis military forces and their citizenry in 1945, who had no doubts about their utter defeat and who accepted the imposition of far-reaching political and social changes by the victorious Allies, Iraqis not favorably inclined toward the Coalitions postconflict goals had much less reason to passively accept fundamental change.”
“It is too early to pass definitive judgment on the wisdom of the strategic decisions in mid-2004. In that period, the Coalition decided to rely on the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) to implement a federal solution to Iraqs political and economic problems and to keep US force levels relatively steady while rapidly building up Iraqs security forces so they could tackle the internal security problems.”
“By mid-2006, however, it appeared that the dysfunctional qualities of the nascent Iraqi political process, the chronically slow rise in effectiveness by Iraqs security forces, and the incredibly violent sectarian strife undermined the hopes generated by the success of the Iraqi elections of January 2005 that serve as the end point of this study. What IS NOT OPEN TO DISPUTE IS THAT DEPOSING THE SADDAM REGIME WAS FAR EASIER THAN IMPOSING OR FOSTERING A NEW POLITICAL ORDER IN IRAQ. One simple explanation is that the Coalition directed far more resources and energy into planning for the former objective than it put into planning for the latter goal.”
“The concepts concerning postconflict operations are not new to military history or to US military doctrine. Joint and Army commands, nevertheless, have over recent decades rather consistently shown a tendency to ignore them in practice. Joint and Army planning doctrine and processes must be changed to more specifically include planning and preparation for the inevitable transition to Phase IV and the ACHIEVEMENT OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES.”
“The transition to stability operations should begin before the end of major combat operations. Thus, planning must occur nearly simultaneously. Force level or troop density calculations must not simply be an exercise in minimalist thinking based on an alleged revolution in military affairs. PLANNING MUST ALSO INCLUDE AN ANALYSIS OF PHASE IV FORCE LEVEL REQUIREMENTS AT EVERY PHASE OF A CAMPAIGN. The doctrinal military decision-making process (MDMP) should make this explicit and prevent the sharp division between those phases that allow commands to relegate Phase IV planning to another day or to a follow-on command.”
“Planners must also take into account the historical, cultural, and political factors that will affect national strategy and military operations, particularly Phase IV operations. The Armys education system must emphasize these principles beginning at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and continue it through the Army War College. Army training programs, such as the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), should include Phase IV planning and operations in their exercises and simulations–not as an afterthought, but as a primary exercise goal.”
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
The Phase III and IV terms may no longer apply, but as used, “On Point II” implies that our ground component, its resources, and planning processes were ill-prepared for Stability Operations. If viewed from a COIN/Stability Ops perspective, kinetic operations from FOBs with insufficient troops and interaction were not achieving any of the lines of operations sufficiently. Viewed from an “offense and defense” traditional view, we were not satisfactorily closing with and destroying the unseen enemy.
Schmedlap, thought you were making a superb argument for how COIN transitioned the FOB-oriented force incapable of securing or stabilizing a deteriorating situation into a more effective stability operations force. Then I realized…
If we really care about recent history related to U.S. forces being able to close the strategic deal…then Viet Nam, Desert Storm, the Balkans, OIF, and OEF indicate far greater need for more training and resources for Stability Ops. Combined arms operations have been far more successful, yet even with half a million air/ground/sea combatants in Viet Nam losing nary a battle, we could not achieve our strategic goals there using primarily kinetics.
Cole:
I draw a quite different conclusion from the same operations:
Not least because Viet Nam and “primarily kinetics”( kinetics is a silly word to apply to combat…) is somewhat of a misnomer. IOW, it was far more nuanced than that. We also lost some battles — and we initiated very few of the ones we won or lost, Clyde tended to be more flexible than we were.
The conclusion I draw from all those operations is that they are expensive, tedious, constraining and generally do not provide satisfactory results and they should therefor be avoided if possible. Desert Storm is of course the exception — I wonder why that is…
I also suggest that we are not going to have the resources or the time to devote to ‘stability operations.’ That doesn’t address the fact that the voting public doesn’t like them and will not support them to an adequate degree. Nor does it address the fact that one cannot win such a conflict, the best that can be obtained is a ‘satisfactory’ conclusion — I put that in quotes because my observation in all those operations you named was that the satisfactory part was defined downward on a rather steep slope as time passed in the operation.
COIN theory (and it is a theory, an effectively unproven one at that) is a dangerous illusion…
I guess I need a remedial course in English composition because that is the exact opposite of what I was getting at. It is doubtful that if our 2007 operations had been attempted in 2005 or 2006 that they would have worked. The situation was not amenable to that solution. The big issue in 2007 was “ending the cycle of violence.” We were only able to do that because the warring factions segregated themselves into ethnic/sectarian communities. It is easier to step in between two groups of 100 people facing off than it is to break up 100 individual one-on-one fights occurring all around you. It is easier still if those people are already weary from fighting and are not so determined duke it out. In 2005/6, they had not fully separated into Sunni/Shia and the real bloodshed didn’t begin until early 06. They were neither separated, nor weary. I don’t care how many flaming tongues descend from the heavens to spread the COIN gospel or how many Hail Nagls you say – you’re not stopping that fight until the belligerents coalesce into manageable groups and get worn down.
I think that’s the wrong way to look at it. If I jump off my roof three times and each time I break an arm or leg, the conclusion that I draw is not that I need to improve my landings or invest in something that breaks my fall. The proper conclusion is that I need to stop jumping off the roof. (And as I preview this comment, I see that Ken White beat me to the punchline – ditto his comment).
1) Schmedlap (and Gian): Perhaps I was not clear: I was talking about institutional learning, not operational conduct or even operational outcomes. So my evidence is not what happened in Iraq (which hinges on much more than the actions of U.S. troops) but on my research into DOTMLPF of the U.S military as an institution. I am not married to 2005 as a turning-point, but it does seem justifiable-enough from my research. Compare, say, the interim COIN manual of late 2004 with the feel of the many COIN-related articles in, say, Military Review in 2005. Humble beginnings for sure, and not doctrine, but stuff that would later inform doctrine directly. This is just one example of many.
2) Operationally, in Iraq, it would seem to me that learning was patchy and cannot be divided into pre- and post- a certain date. Gian, you cite On Point II to suggest everyone knew what they were doing right from the start. I think there are many other credible sources that argue otherwise. Why is Point II held up as Gospel and those other sources dismissed as “dominant narrative COIN porn”?
3) I don’t buy the idea that COIN is an evolutionary impasse that will stifle further innovation. Again it comes down to what the strategic objectives are. If it is to stabilize a war-torn country, which I am not saying is always a wise or even possible end-state, some of the core principles and actions of COIN seem necessary.
4) Schmedlap: I am not so certain that a different approach earlier on would not have produced different results. I think that there were identifiable groups and leaders even in the initial years of ‘post-conflict operations’, but much of the talk back then was of a ‘hydra-headed network’ of ‘cells’ without structure, something that meshed with the transformation-dominated lexicon of the time. Yet from the very outset of ‘post-conflict’ operations, individual units were able to apply approaches similar to those encouraged under the surge and obtain greater levels of stability in their AO. That’s not to say that particular opportunities were not also there in early 2007, but maybe it is also the case the opportunities could have been spotted and exploited earlier on, but were not. Of course, the greatest such opportunity would have been to work things differently from the very outset. A greater preparation and familiarity with COIN at that point would, in my mind, have had a great difference on subsequent events.
Quote from David Ucko:
“A greater preparation and familiarity with COIN at that point would, in my mind, have had a great difference on subsequent events.”
I would agree with that if you make the argument that it would have led to a campaign plan that dealt with the realities of the situation on the ground (and was able to be adapted over time as conditions evolved).
I think many of us are talking past each other. Yes there is a lot of evidence that units “got COIN” – in fact I am confident that at the Battalion level and below a great many of our LTCs, MAJs, company grade officers and NCOs were very effective and without training or doctrine many intuitively knew what needed to be done and in many cases got it done in their area.
But I would trace all our problems back to strategy and campaign planning. Our units will execute the missions they are given even if they are non-standard or not what was trained for at the NTC. But it is up to the higher level commands to lay out and resource the strategy and campaign plan. We need a military that can accomplish the missions assigned to it (whatever mission); that can figure out and understand the problems that it faces in order to accomplish the missions given to it and that requires the ability to develop and resource strategies and devise campaign plans to accomplish those missions whether they be in a “conventional” (whatever that is??) state on state conflict, assisting a friend, partner or ally against lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency, or conducting stability operations. I think we have tactical units for the most part that can do that but we have the operational and strategic level HQ (and national policy makers) who can?
If having doctrine for COIN would have helped in developing the strategy and effective (feasible, suitable, and acceptable) campaign plans then we were remiss. But most of our doctrine development I think is too focused on our tactical units (who get it for the most part – and those that did not get it if they had been given the correct missions and resources then would have got it by direction). But while we try to “fix” our tactical units we forget that the key is strategy and campaign planning (and of course we cannot forget that ultimately it is policy that drives them). In that I agree that we need better institutional training (and more importantly education) to be able to prepare our planners to deal with the complex realities of the 21st century era of persistent conflict. And I am afraid the era is going to continue to bring many forms of conflict that we will have to be prepared to face.