foreign internal defense

“Not to have an adequate air force in the present state of the world is to compromise the foundations of national freedom and independence.”[1] British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, recognized the value of airpower as early as 1933 during the rise of Adolf Hitler, and his words hold to this day. The United States spent sixteen of the last twenty years and precious resources attempting to rebuild the Afghan Air Force (AAF) into a viable, self-sustaining military aviation component capable of supporting the democratically-elected Afghan government. The withdrawal of U.S. and Coalition forces in August of 2021, and the embarrassingly swift takeover by the Taliban, have left the AAF in shambles. Many pilots fled with their aircraft to neighboring countries, where their fate remains uncertain, while the rest are now in Taliban hands.

It is difficult to ascertain if a security cooperation initiative is effective or not. This could be in part because most of the indicators of success used by security cooperation stakeholders may not be focused on measures of effectiveness, but of performance, i.e., quantity of equipment delivered and number of units trained.  As one begins to peel back the layers of an initiative, it becomes apparent that the necessary in-depth analysis which forecasts secondary and tertiary orders of effect may have been overlooked, along with critical, measurable metrics that explain how an initiative would specifically elicit a proposed reaction.  The example utilized by Maj Croshier described the unanticipated difficulties of providing a C-208 fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft and Command and Control (C2) equipment to Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.  The focus of this initiative was placed mainly on the equipment, without fully accounting for the significant personnel, doctrinal, and maintenance challenges that would ensue.

The Localization Strategy: Local Logic and Energy in Belgium’s Advising Mission to Niger

By Pierre Jean Deheane

Introduction

This article is informed by the author’s experience adapting his previous fieldwork studying counterinsurgency in Colombia into lecture content for the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School’s Contemporary Irregular Warfare Course.

Responding to the crisis of ineffective governance will require governance advising during all phases of military operations.  We describe here the potential role of the SFAB in such a response.

As Iraq appears to unravel, it is only right to continue the debate about counterinsurgency, the appropriate application of landpower, and  the expanding role of Special Operations in the US military.

Ten easy to follow recommendations to help you become an effective military advisor.

The Civilian Irregular Defense Group was one of Special Forces’ greatest success stories and by far the greatest example of how to fight unconventional warfare with an economy of force approach.

Do the terrain and the friendly and enemy situations allow stability operations at the village or district level?

Under certain conditions, supporting rebels can achieve strategic objectives without causing instability or humanitarian catastrophe.