The United States needs an Iran strategy, not a ‘campaign’
SWJ-El Centro Associate Alma Keshavarz has a new op-ed at the Atlantic Council blog on the need for a revamped Iran strategy. Keshavarz, a post doctoral fellow at the Institute for Politics and Strategy at Carnegie Mellon University, argues that the US needs better policy advice and more engaged diplomacy to implement a strategy that explain US goals while articulating a clear means of achieving those goals in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iranian proxy attacks against the US, and the US killing of Quds Force head Major General Qasem Solemani. Dr. Keshavarz's op-ed is available here.
Source: Alma Keshavarz, "The United States needs an Iran strategy, not a ‘campaign’," Atlantic Council. 23 June 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/the-united-states-needs-an-iran-strategy-not-a-campaign/.
Confidence building measures rely on four key components: Reputation, Status, Transparency & Trust. In theory, when RTS2 combine to establish sustainable CBMs, regional conflicts can be prevented.
About the Author(s)
It’s an appropriate time to reflect upon the role of diplomacy in the War on Terror through the years of the Bush and Obama administrations.
About the Author(s)
This essay offers a close reading of Sparta’s diplomatic engagement with Athens following its stunning defeat at Pylos.
About the Author(s)
Building a unified foreign policy establishment.
About the Author(s)
Author's Note: Some of the ideas in this short essay were born from a conversation I had with Mr. Edward Burke of the Center for European Reform, to whom I owe due thanks.
Hilary Clinton’s June 12 accusation against Russia put forward nothing new. And what is worse, it could not have come at a worse time. Only three days earlier, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced the “urgent” need for an international conference to prevent Syria’s further slide into civil war, to force all parties “to sit down at the negotiating table after first halting the violence.” This plan -- markedly similar to Kofi Annan’s proposal -- belies a great sacrifice by the Russian leadership, but one on which the Secretary failed to capitalize.
Russia’s foreign policy is rooted in a Cold War psychology. Lavrov and his Foreign Ministry view international politics as a geopolitical chess game. It would be no stretch to say that Lavrov has acted as Russia’s “new Kissinger,” seeking to maintain Russian influence at any cost: quintessential realpolitik. Moscow’s influence has diminished since 1991, but Russia’s support for the Assad regime is rooted in Moscow’s desire to maintain its ally in Damascus, and appear powerful in the face of western opinion: the last thing Lavrov wants is to cave to Washington’s desires.
So why would he make such a concession? Russian leaders know that Assad’s days are numbered. The only realistic option for Moscow now is to push for a compromise, evinced by their desire for an international conference. Such an entity would provide parts of the Syrian government with an “escape hatch” from the conflict. Without the threat of vengeful massacres or reprisals against Assad loyalists, support for the government would shrink. Indeed, much of the regime’s support comes from those who fear for Syria’s security in a post-Assad region, not pro-government idealists.
It is thus important to see that Lavrov put quite a bit of leverage on the line over the last few days. He could only make his proposal after being given permission from the highest echelons in the Russian government. The fact that he was able to offer Russian support for such a multilateral conference indicates that Russian diplomats are finally realizing that it is in their best interests to maintain some of their influence in Syria lest they lose it all: for Russian leaders to express a willingness to work towards a “post-Assad Syria” is relatively groundbreaking. An internationally-brokered compromise with the opposition is essential to this envisaged transition.
Secretary Clinton’s accusation derailed these significant steps. Coming hours after Lavrov’s most recent concessions, her words can easily be seen as a rebuke against the Russian government, and will likely be interpreted as such in Moscow. It has been a poorly-kept secret that Russia has been delivering weapons to Syria for a long time, and the intelligence which supported her claims takes a very long time to verify. Clinton’s timing sends the clear message that the United States continues to be unwilling to work with Moscow towards any solution except that which Washington prescribes.
This type of unilateralism is extremely harmful. It is easy to underestimate or forget the anger Russian leaders still feel about American actions in 2002-2003 during the lead-up to the Iraq invasion, against which they were strongly opposed. The ensuing rift in the Security Council between these two powers led some analysts to wonder if the United Nations could survive. This resentment has only been exacerbated by the most recent accusations. Indeed, the way Russia interpreted Clinton’s words becomes painfully clear in Moscow’s most recent refusal on July 5 to attend international talks aimed at halting the bloodshed in Syria, a meeting spearheaded by the United States, France, Britain and Germany. Russia intransigence further inspired China to boycott the meeting as well. If the United States ignores any movement by Russia towards accepting a proposal for slow but steady peace, the comprehensive victory envisaged by Washington will become even more of an impossibility.
A solution to the Syria crisis will require Russian involvement. Such cooperation is not as difficult to achieve as it may seem: Russian diplomats, headed by Lavrov, are ready to negotiate. Arming the Syrian regime against its own citizens is indefensible. Yet, Washington cannot continue to ignore the goals and motivations of those groups that are backing the regime, especially Russia. It is critical to bring these groups to the negotiating table so that a difficult but necessary compromise can be extruded, albeit painfully.
Syrian government leaders feel right now as if they are faced with a “do or die” reality. The international community must offer a third way out, whereby parts of the regime can realize it is in their best interest to end the conflict. The Russian plan would create such an avenue, but Clinton’s accusations risk killing it.
Recently, Moscow declared that it would stop supplying the Syrian government with weapons, specifically the Yak-130 attack aircraft; however, this declaration is yet shaky, and it is unclear whether Russia will discontinue current shipments, or simply stop supplying new arms. To solidify these important steps forward, and to keep the Syrian war “small,” the US government should learn from the diplomatic mistake it made in June.
There are many paper options for how to proceed with respect to Iran's nuclear program, but which have any real hope of success?