Do US Military Commands Really Need Reorganizing? By Michael E. O'Hanlon, Brookings Institution

In recent weeks, the basic question of how the Pentagon organizes itself for overseas operations has gained new attention. Thanks are due largely to Senator John McCain, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who has held a number of hearings on the subject and seems bent on pushing the issue in 2016. The new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, has also expressed interest in reform.

Some modest changes are likely in order, perhaps most of all in the cyber domain. Dunford's idea to streamline his own joint staff, housed in the Pentagon, also makes sense. But in an era when the government has been seemingly reorganizing itself to deal with every new problem, most notably with intelligence and homeland security, we need to avoid change for change's sake…

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Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014 by Catherine A. Theohary, Congressional Research Service

Summary

This report provides Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) transactions. Similar data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all government suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons supplying governments to nations in the developing world.

Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers. During the years 2007-2010, the value of arms transfer agreements with developing nations comprised 74.4% of all such agreements worldwide. More recently, arms transfer agreements with developing nations constituted 75.5% of all such agreements globally from 2011-2014, and 86.0% of these agreements in 2014.

The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2014 was $61.8 billion. In 2014, the value of all arms deliveries to developing nations was $20.6 billion.

Recently, from 2011 to 2014, the United States and Russia have dominated the arms market in the developing world, with both nations either ranking first or second for each of these four years in the value of arms transfer agreements. From 2011 to 2014, the United States made nearly $115 billion in such agreements, 46.3% of all these agreements (expressed in current dollars). Russia made $41.7 billion, 16.8% of these agreements. During this same period, collectively, the United States and Russia made 63.1% of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations, ($156.4 billion in current dollars).

In 2014, the United States ranked first in arms transfer agreements with developing nations with $29.8 billion or 48.2% of these agreements. In second place was Russia with $10.1 billion or 16.3% of such agreements. 

In 2014, Russia ranked first in the value of arms deliveries to developing nations at $8.4 billion, or 40.8% of all such deliveries. The United States ranked second in these deliveries at over $7.6 billion or 27.2%. 

In worldwide arms transfer agreements in 2014—to both developed and developing nations—the United States dominated, ranking first with $36.2 billion in such agreements or 50.4% of all such agreements. Russia ranked second in worldwide arms transfer agreements in 2014 with $10.2 billion in such global agreements or 14.2%. The value of all arms transfer agreements worldwide in 2014 was $71.8 billion.

In 2014, South Korea ranked first concluding $7.8 billion in agreements. Brazil ranked third in the value of arms transfer agreements among all developing nations weapons purchasers, concluding $6.5 billion in such agreements. Iraq ranked second with $7.3 billion in such agreements.

Continue on for the full report.

Reports of Global Disorder Have Been Greatly Exaggerated by James Dobbins, Foreign Policy

This commentary is part of the RAND Strategic Rethink project, which explores important strategic questions facing the United States, producing a guide for policymakers, citizens, educators, and the media on the most critical global choices and challenges facing the country.

The world is more dangerous than it was a few years ago, and the mounting chaos in the Middle East has fed wider, more exaggerated anxieties. Many observers feel that the pace of technological change is quickening, that the international order is disintegrating, that power is shifting from national governments to individuals and nonstate actors, and that America's capacity to lead is waning.

Oftentimes, however, these portents of disaster and decline are overstated…

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Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson’s new long range guidance for the U.S. Navy: A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority.

The “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority” document lays out four lines of effort for the Navy: strengthen naval power at and from the sea, achieve high velocity learning at every level, strengthen our Navy team for the future, and expand and strengthen our network of partners.

This document gives a first look at Richardson’s view of where the Navy stands today, how it should evolve and how those ideas may shape future budget submissions. After taking over as CNO in September 2015, Richardson spent weeks traveling the globe, meeting with sailors from all parts of the Navy to understand their capabilities and needs. In similar fashion, his predecessor, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, became CNO in September 2011, traveled around the fleet and released his CNO’s Sailing Directions. That document was updated during Greenert’s time leading the Navy but never strayed from his three main tenets: warfighting first, operate forward, and be ready.