The Perils and Prospects of the Infantry Brigade Combat Team in the Twenty-First Century

Andy Forney

This July marks the centennial of the Battle of the Somme. No other battle better encapsulates Armageddon in the Anglo-American mind - mud, barbed-wire, and the futility of “going over the top.” During the assault on the first day of the battle, over fifty-seven thousand soldiers died, with many British units not even reaching the German main line.

For all the appearances of widespread martial horror, though, the Somme marked the beginning of the widespread adoption of automatic weapons, airplanes, mechanization, and wireless communication. These technological adaptions impacted combat and changed its character, setting the stage for a technological evolution that led to Blitzkrieg and Air Land Battle.

One element has not benefited from such change, however - the infantry brigade. Today’s infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs) share striking similarities with their World War I antecedents. While the transition to the modular BCT and Army 2020 force designs has seen the inclusion of wheeled reconnaissance troops within the IBCT, the primary combat power of the Brigade remains its dismounted squads and the various crew-served weapons and mortars that provide direct fire support. The Army must address the IBCTs lack of tactical mobility and lethality immediately. Ignoring this yawning capability gap creates a striking amount of strategic, operational, and tactical risk within the Army and the Joint Force. Cost effective, rapidly deployable, and easy to train, the IBCT has come to dominate Army force structure. Fully thirty-three of the army’s fifty-six Total Force (Active Army and National Guard) BCTs are IBCTs – 59%. The National Guard witnessed an even more pronounced IBCT growth: nineteen of twenty-six (73%) Guard BCTs are IBCTs. This ratio made sense during the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. IBCTs could rotate into either theater and fall in on pre-positioned stocks of HMMWVs or MRAPs and conduct stabilization missions.

The current BCT mix should give army planners pause as they reorient towards a broader range of contingencies. Changes in IBCT combat capabilities occurred as part of its integration into the joint force. The IBCT can now rapidly deploy via strategic lift and then synchronize a wide range of joint fires. But these new capabilities have not paired with evolutionary upgrades in tactical mobility and lethality. While an IBCT can respond to any contingency within twenty-four hours, once there, it travels at less than four miles an hour and struggles to counter entrenched or mobile adversaries.

The future operational environment presents several Somme-like scenarios for Army IBCTs.

Increased investment in Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities by our potential adversaries has complicated early entry operations. Infantry formations will increasingly have to maneuver from drop zones/landing zones offset from their objectives to evade the A2/AD threat. Once deployed, IBCTs risk being overmatched by moderately equipped and trained adversaries that utilize complex terrain to nullify the impact of joint fires. To a shocking degree, IBCTs face similar prospects to that of their World War I antecedents: grinding battle over complex terrain against an entrenched enemy.

The U.S. Army Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy, published in 2015, proposed a trio of platforms to address the existing and projected capability gaps within the IBCT:

Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV).  GMV will provide a rapidly deployable expeditionary maneuver platform down to the squad level. GMV will provide speed and mobility to travel cross-country, thus avoiding primary and secondary roads and enemy strong points.  GMV can be employed by C-130/C-17 air-drop or UH-60 helicopter sling-load.

Light Reconnaissance Vehicle (LRV).  Cavalry Squadrons equipped with LRV will perform mounted and dismounted reconnaissance, route and area reconnaissance, and wide-area security operations. The LRV will host appropriate sensors and C4ISR, carry and protect a six scout squad, provide sufficient lethality to gain and maintain contact and with the enemy, and be transportable by CH-47.

Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF). MPF will protect infantry formations on their approach march, defeat entrenched enemy positions, and provides precision direct fires in support of dismounted infantry squads.  Air-droppable, the MPF provides the ground commander the lethality needed to maintain freedom of action while in close combat with the enemy.

Adding mobility and lethality into the IBCT creates a more capable formation. Based on force structure, the Army will increasingly have to rely on the IBCTs to rapidly execute a wide range of missions in austere, complex, and chaotic environments. While further discussions are needed to determine the level of equipping and logistical requirements necessary, we should determine now that not resourcing IBCTs to accomplish their 21^st century missions threatens 20^th century failures.

Inside the Pentagon's Secretive Preparations for a 'Cyber 9/11' by Andrew Tilghman, Military Times

The massive coordinated cyber attack began with rolling blackouts throughout the electrical grid stretching across the Midwest, leaving up to 10 million Americans' homes without power and businesses unable to process credit and debit card purchases.

Then came the inexplicable malfunction at a large oil refinery in Port Arthur, Texas, which spewed an oil-slick five-miles wide along the gulf coast shoreline. The governors of Texas and Louisiana declared states of emergency. In southern California, the attack shut down several major ports by disabling hydraulic systems. Dozens of cargo ships were stranded off Los Angeles, unable to offload their stacks of truck-sized containers.

Attacks on the Defense Department's networks threatened the systems that monitor North American airspace and the radars on which the U.S. military relies.

Total mayhem.

This fictitious scenario was laid out for nearly 1,000 military, government and private sector personnel here at this year’s Cyber Guard exercise, the nation’s largest test of its network defenses. Conducted over nine days in June, the event offered a disturbing look at the type of catastrophe that could unfold during what the government's top officials call “cyber 9/11.”

“For us, it’s not a question of if it will happen but when,” said Coast Guard Rear Adm. Kevin Lunday, U.S. Cyber Command’s director of training. “The more relevant question is: When it does [happen], will we as a Department of Defense, will we as a nation and with our allies, be ready for it?” …

Read on.

Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, Volume 9, Issue 6 (June 2016), Now Posted

Cover Story Overview

Islamic State-inspired terrorism returned to the headlines this month on both sides of the Atlantic. In Orlando the United States suffered its deadliest terrorist attack since 9/11 while in France a police couple were stabbed to death in their own home by a French extremist who threatened that France would become a “cemetery” during the Euro 2016 soccer championships. In our cover story Richard Walton argues the threat to Euro 2016, which concludes on July 10, is more acute than for any other international sporting event in history because of the unprecedented threat to France from the Islamic State and its followers. Walton was the head of the Metropolitan Police’s Counterterrorism Command during the London Olympics and looks at lessons learned for protecting Euro 2016 and the upcoming Rio Olympics. In our second cover story Pieter Van Ostaeyen outlines how the emergence of three clusters of radical extremists in Brussels and Antwerp is the key reason Belgium has contributed more foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq, per capita, than any other Western nation.

Sam Mullins analyzes all 47 cases of jihadist-inspired violence between 2012 and the June 12 Orlando attack. He finds that knife attacks like the one in France this week were the most common while shootings like the one in Orlando were the deadliest. Robert Graham, a cyber security specialist, examines how terrorist groups are exploiting powerful end-to-end encryption to try to communicate securely. He explains that while “end-to-end” encryption technology cannot be put ‘back in the box,’ intelligence agencies still have several strategies available to intercept the “ends” of communications. The June issue also focuses on counterterrorism challenges facing Greece. Our interview is with Vassilios Kikilias, who served as Greece’s Minister of Public Order and Citizen Protection in 2014 during which time he oversaw the country’s intelligence and police services. Ioannis Mantzikos outlines how the country has become a gateway for foreign fighters traveling back and forth from Syria creating potential terrorist threats inside Greece as well as the rest of Europe.

Paul Cruickshank, Editor in Chief

In This Issue

A View from the CT Foxhole: Vassilios Kikilias, Greece’s Former Minister of Public Order and Citizen Protection by Charles Kim, Paul Cruickshank

Belgian Radical Networks and the Road to the Brussels Attacks by Pieter Van Ostaeyen

How Terrorists Use Encryption by Robert Graham

Protecting Euro 2016 and the Rio Olympics: Lessons Learned from London 2012  by Richard Walton

The Greek Gateway to Jihad by Ioannis Mantzikos

The Road to Orlando: Jihadist-Inspired Violence in the West, 2012-2016 by Sam Mullins

Australian Army Research Papers are vehicles for progressing professional discussion and debate concerning military strategy, particularly the application of land warfare concepts and capabilities to the security of Australia and its interests. Research papers are intended to provide comprehensive treatment of their subject matter at the time of publication.

Army Research Paper 9, Short War in a Perpetual Conflict by Dr. Russell W. Glenn, has just been posted.

Israel’s is a state of continuous conflict, frequently of the armed variety, and not uncommonly achieving levels of violence that qualify as war. Significant spikes in that level of violence have occurred several times during the past decade alone. These include – but are by no means limited to – the Second Lebanon War (July-August 2006), Operation Cast Lead (December 2008-January 2009), and Operation Protective Edge (July-August 2014). 

The third of these constitutes the focus of this study while the two preceding help to establish a foundation for considering that most recent spike in violence. This analysis will identify of issues relevant to assisting the Australian Army’s preparation for future conflict. Much of the analysis will additionally be of interest to Australian policymakers, the country’s multinational partners, and students of contemporary conflict. Some of the following pages’ observations will suggest areas of greater cooperation between the army and its joint, multinational, and civilian whole-of-government partners. A few reach so far as to potentially influence relationships with nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), and industry representatives.

Research Papers 1-8 can be found here.