U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Call for Papers

Last year’s Symposium resulted in a rich discussion captured in the Symposium and Roundtable reports and 2016-17 Civil Affairs Issue Papers. The Symposium report begins: “Civil Affairs” (CA), is increasingly understood as a na­tional strategic capability to consolidate military into political gains during the transition from war to peace, from military to civilian lead, while engaging partners and other players in the ‘human geography’ to effectively con­tribute to national interests and policy objectives.” This is largely through civil-military operations (CMO).

As CA’s strategic importance continues to grow, more in Washington realize the importance of the Regiment’s comparative capabilities – if not of CA itself. As new National Security staff member, Nadia Schadlow explained in War & the Art of Governance, “to wage war effectively, civilian and military leaders must operate as successfully on political battlegrounds as they do on the physical. As the challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan revealed, integrating those efforts across those battlegrounds is essential to success in war.” “Being the best warfighter in the world is not enough,” added Center for Strategic & International Studies Strategy Chair Anthony H. Cordesman in the March Military Review, “Neither is treating stability operations and civil-military affairs as a sideshow.” In addition to greater focus on “successful civil-military operations as being as important for success as combat,” he even calls for a “revolution in civil-military affairs if [the U.S.] is to be successful in fighting failed-state wars that involve major counterinsurgency campaigns and reliance on host-country forces.”

CA’s overall value, however, is less in its own direct role in the consolidation of political-military gains for post-conflict stabilization. When appropriately leveraged by Joint commanders at especially regional levels, it can help enable and enhance national and international efforts to: plan and conduct CMO and peace & stability operations; support humanitarian assistance & disaster relief operations; counter violent extremism and dark networks; and, perform security cooperation and assistance to support political-military objectives per Army and Joint Operations doctrines and the Joint Concept of Military Engagement, in closer coordination with international, regional, and civilian partners in the Joint, Interorganizational and Multinational Environment.

How, then, is Civil Affairs a force for consolidating gains in a way that helps the larger Joint Force and the Army (as the Service lead for peace & stability operations) take on the political-military challenges the current and future Joint Operating Environments present? How can the CA Regiment better leverage its diverse force – including Active and Reserve Component and Special Operations and General Purpose Force CA units and personnel in the Army and Marines – to help plan and conduct CMO, Military Engagement and other activities in support of political-military strategies for post-conflict stabilization, decisive action, and conflict prevention?

To help address some or all of these questions, the Civil Affairs Association and its partners are inviting experienced civil-military operators to send an originally written Issue Paper (10 pages not including endnotes, Cambria 12, 1.5/double-spaced, with short author bios) with an issue summary, analysis and discussion, and further recommendations in consideration of the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) findings and recommendations of the 2016-17 work.

The top five Issue Papers will appear in the 2017-18 Civil Affairs Issue Papers at the spring 2018 Roundtable in Washington, D.C.., based on response to the call above, originality of thought, clarity of presentation, and feasibility of recommendations at especially the Joint level. Authors will present their papers at the Symposium in Chicago, IL on November 3rd, to compete for a first prize cash award of $500, second prize of $250, and third prize of $100 per author. Papers prepared jointly by civil and military professionals are most welcome. The deadline is Friday, 8 September 2017. Send inquiries and papers to Colonel (ret.) Christopher Holshek, Civil Affairs Issue Papers Editor, at holshek@hotmail.com. For more, go to: Caution-http://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/ .

5 Reasons Trump Should Send More Troops to Afghanistan by James Stavridis, Time Magazine

As the Trump Administration wrestles with locations, numbers and missions for American combat deployments globally, one perennial has re-emerged near the top of the list: Afghanistan. Famously called the “Graveyard of Empires” to reflect the successive defeats of Alexander the Great, the British Raj, and the Soviet Union, Afghanistan continues to vex US military planners and political figures leaders. After perhaps a $1 trillion investment and thousands of casualties, another “ask” for troops is particularly unwelcome.

The question on the table is simple: how many troops do we need in Afghanistan? When I was the Supreme Allied Commander at NATO for global operations, I had strategic responsibility for the fighting in Afghanistan and a total NATO force of over 150,000. Over my four years in command, I had four brilliant Generals working for me commanding those NATO forces: Generals Stanley McChrystal, David Petraeus, John Allen and Joseph Dunford, the latter still on active duty as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With each of them, I spent considerable time honing our requests for more troops, apportioning the burden among the 28 nations of NATO and, sadly, writing condolence letters to the families of thousands killed on my watch. But we generally succeeded in wresting control of much of Afghanistan from the Taliban, safeguarding the election that delivered President Ashraf Ghani (an enormous improvement over his volatile predecessor Hamid Karzai), and turning over the fight to the Afghan security forces we financed and trained.

As we downsized our presence considerably around the time I left command in 2013, the number we all agreed as a sustaining force was roughly 20,000, still a decrease of nearly 90%. The idea was that with 20,000 troops, we could maintain four major regional headquarters around the country, a sizable “training mission,” reasonable special forces strike capability, and of course sufficient self-protection for all US personnel in country. That number remains roughly correct, but the overall force level for several years has not met the 20,000 goal — today we have fewer than 14,000. With an additional 3-5,000 requested by General Mick Nicholson — the current 4-star commander and a superb, experienced hand — we have a reasonable shot at stemming the increasing momentum of the Taliban and achieving a better outcome…

Read on.

Time to Take a Step Back From Afghanistan by James Durso, The Hill

Otto von Bismarck said, “The whole of the Balkans is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.” America should apply the same reasoning to Afghanistan.

This month we learned the U.S. Marines are back in Helmand, Afghanistan’s most violent province and the center of opium poppy production, and their mission may expand. President Trump will soon decide if he should send 8,400 more troops there for the latest chapter in America’s longest war. Should he?

I think not. We gave Afghanistan out best effort: over 2,200 dead soldiers, over 20,000 wounded, and over $700 billion for everything from ammunition to medical care for veterans. We need to face the fact that it’s an endemically violent place and may never change and another “whole of government” effort may not make any difference.

And don’t take my word for it: the Talban has rejected peace talks with the Afghan government as surrendering to the enemy and against Islam.

The Afghans have seen off every visitor and invader, from Alexander the Great to the U.S. Central Command, so why spend another dollar there? For example, the regional transport network has avoided Afghanistan and the enthusiasts for a New Silk Road or One Belt, One Road haven’t absorbed that the world is avoiding Afghanistan not out of stupidity but out of hard-won experience…

Read on.