Military Review - July-August 2017

Multi-Domain Battle: Driving Change to Win in the Future by Gen. David G. Perkins, U.S. Army

In the first of a series of articles, the commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command describes the framework for the development of multi-domain battle concept.

Curbing the “Helicopter Commander”: Overcoming Risk Aversion and Fostering Disciplined Initiative in the U.S. Army by Maj. Lynn Marie Breckenridge, PhD

The author discusses the problem of risk-averse leaders who engage in micromanagement—what she describes as “helicopter commanding”—as an alternative to mission command in this 2016 General Douglas MacArthur Military Leadership Writing Competition winner.

The Collapse of Venezuela and Its Impact on the Region by Dr. R. Evan Ellis

An expert on Latin American and Caribbean security issues provides an insightful discourse on the critical situation in Venezuela, its impact on neighboring countries and the United States, and actions those countries must be prepared to take in response to potential future Venezuelan scenarios.

The Evolving Nature of Russia‘s Way of War by Lt. Col. Timothy Thomas, U.S. Army, Retired

A senior analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office analyzes and compares three prominent Russian military articles to describe contemporary Russian military thought regarding modern warfare.

North Korean Cyber Support to Combat Operations by 1st Lt. Scott J. Tosi, U.S. Army

North Korea should be considered a major cyber threat to U.S. and South Korean military forces at both strategic and tactical levels. The author suggests North Korea will launch tactical cyber attacks in support of combat units during war.

Advancing Security Cooperation through Executive Education by Maj. Michael Carvelli, U.S. Army

The military must properly capitalize on security cooperation educational opportunities so U.S. forces can continue to improve their ability to work in concert with allied and partner nations.

The Role of Forward Presence in U.S. Military Strategy by Col. Dave Shunk, U.S. Air Force, Retired; Lt. Col. Charles Hornick, U.S. Army; Maj. Dan Burkhart, U.S. Army

The authors argue for maintaining a U.S. military forward presence in key geographical regions to deter wars, assure allies, favorably shape the security environment, and enable contextual and cultural understanding.

The American Motor-Rifle Brigade: Issues with the Stryker Brigade Combat Team Concept by Capt. Matthew D. Allgeyer, U.S. Army

There are many similarities between development of the Stryker medium-force concept and that of Soviet-era motorized rifle units. The author recommends new directions for its development based on historical analysis and current scholarly research.

Understanding Japan’s Role in Securing the Western Pacific by Lt. Col. Peter D. Fromm, U.S. Army, Retired

The U.S. military must ensure its bilateral alliance with Japan progresses in a way that considers Japanese sensitivities and enhances Japan’s role in the East Asian security community.

Professional Military Education: Proven in Combat during the Mexican War by Capt. Patrick Naughton, U.S. Army Reserve

U.S. Army success during the Mexican War validated the need for further development and implementation of professional military education for U.S. armed forces.

The Military Moral Education Program: Checking Our Ethical Azimuth by Maj. Timothy Leone, U.S. Army; Maj. Saythala Lay Phonexayphova, U.S. Army

The Army must characterize its ethical training as moral education and implement systematic methods of reinforcement so that the profession interprets its ethic as a standard that each member aspires to internalize.

Navigating through the Challenge of Culture and Law in Postconflict Stability Operations by Lt. Col. John B. (J. B.) Shattuck, U.S. Army, Retired

U.S. military members must fully understand their own culture before they can gain a thorough understanding of other cultures, specifically with respect to the establishment of foreign-nation law enforcement agencies.

Queen of Spies: Daphne Park, Britain’s Cold War Spy Master by John G. Breen, PhD

The author critiques a book by Paddy Hayes that explores the role of women in espionage, specifically detailing the life and career of Daphne Park, who rose to the most senior ranks of the British Secret Intelligence Service.

Multi-Domain Battle Driving Change to Win in the Future by General David G. Perkins - Military Review

Perhaps we are losing too many men,” is not the way to start a conversation about changing doctrine.  Army Gen. John J. Pershing penned these words in August 1918 after American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) sustained more than sixty thousand casualties over about four months.

When the United States entered World War I in the spring of 1917, Pershing firmly believed the Germans would be driven from the trenches and defeated in the open by self-reliant infantry employing a doctrine of open warfare. Open warfare doctrine imagined infantry brigades maneuvering outside the trenches that had immobilized the war months after it began in 1914. Instead of stationary fighting from trenches, U.S. brigades supposedly would employ speed and mobility to inflict decisive defeats on the Germans. Though Pershing coined the phrase open warfare, the ideas were consistent with prewar doctrine—heavily influenced by German military thought—that minimized the use of artillery and machine guns.

However, casualties suffered by German and Allied forces starting in 1914 forced the combatants to realize that the lethality of rapidly firing artillery, machine guns, mortars—and later, gas, tanks, and aircraft—made tactics such as those advocated by Pershing’s open warfare doctrine almost suicidal. European armies, confronting unsustainable casualties, had to adapt and develop new doctrine and tactics after a stalemate settled in.

Facing his own unsustainable list of casualties, Pershing directed his General Headquarters to conduct a doctrinal review. What little change came was too late; over half of U.S. casualties in World War I happened in late 1918 during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Despite the talk of change, open warfare persisted as leaders such as Pershing maligned Allied tactics and doctrine while continuing to create extraordinarily aggressive and optimistic attack plans. They underestimated the importance of heavy firepower and their control, communication, and coordination.

The approaching centenary of the end of World War I provides a moment to reflect on how land forces should adapt to changing operational environments. Despite the heroism of the AEF in 1917 and 1918, it is clear that the Army did not adapt its doctrine for the operational conditions that existed on the Western Front before the United States entered the war. The United States had an opportunity to observe and learn from European experience. Instead, the Army persisted with doctrine that had already been found wanting. The United States now faces a comparable moment. Operational environments are changing rapidly. However, when called to fight, the Army cannot afford the price paid in blood during World War I. This time, the Army must understand the changes as they occur and anticipate how they will affect operations. Doctrine must evolve before the Army faces potential enemies, not after. We must learn from careful study and analysis so we will not have to learn from bitter experience…

Read on.