There are moments that define a war. Just such a one occurred on June 21, when Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke and U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry helicoptered into Marjah for a photo op with the locals. It was to be a capstone event, the fruit of a four-month counterinsurgency offensive by Marines, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, and the newly minted Afghan National Army (ANA) to drive the Taliban out of the area and bring in good government.

As the chopper swung around to land, the Taliban opened fire, sending journalists scrambling for cover and Marines into full combat mode. According to Matthew Green of the Financial Times, "The crackle of gunfire lasted about 20 minutes and continued in the background as a state department official gave a presentation to Mr. Holbrooke about U.S. and U.K. [United Kingdom] efforts to boost local government and promote agriculture in the town."

The U.S. officials were then bundled into armored cars and whisked back to the helicopter. As the chopper took off, an enormous explosion shook the town's bazaar.

When it was launched in March, the Marjah operation was billed as a "turning point" in the Afghan War, an acid test for the doctrine of counterinsurgency, or "COIN," a carefully designed strategy to wrest a strategic area from insurgent forces, in this case the Taliban, and win the "hearts and minds" of the local people. In a sense Marjah has indeed defined COIN, just not quite in the way its advocates had hoped for...

More at Foreign Policy in Focus.

Casual Send-Off for an Army Maverick - Julian Barnes, Wall Street Journal.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the former top commander in Afghanistan, retired from the military Friday evening at a ceremony that replaced the pomp of military honors with a certain informality long cultivated by the general. In a nod to the way he spent much of his career on the front lines of two wars, Gen. McChrystal eschewed the Army dress blues. He instead chose to wear his fatigues—as did the ceremonial Old Guard...

There was little in Gen. McChrystal's speech, delivered at the Fort McNair parade grounds in Washington, that made direct reference to how his career ended. But he said that in his career he had learned that people don't want to follow overly cautious leaders. He trusted his people and would continue to trust them, he said. He said his service "did not end as I would have desired."

"I left a mission I feel strongly about, ended a career I loved that began over 38 years ago," Gen. McChrystal said. "And I left unfilled commitments I made to many comrades in the fight, commitments I hold sacred." ...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's Retirement Ceremony Marked by Laughter and Regret - Greg Jaffe, Washington Post.

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's farewell to the Army began Friday evening with a confession. "This has the potential to be an awkward, even sad, occasion," he said. A month earlier, McChrystal resigned from his command in Afghanistan after a Rolling Stone magazine article quoted him and his aides making derogatory remarks about senior Obama administration officials. The sunset ceremony, held at Fort McNair on the Anacostia River, marked McChrystal's retirement from the military after 34 years. "With my resignation, I . . . left unfulfilled commitments I made to many comrades in the fight, commitments I hold sacred," McChrystal said. "My service did not end as I would have wished."

The general used his goodbye to thank Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and President Obama, who forced him to leave the military and his command in Afghanistan. With those brief remarks, McChrystal seemed to go out of his way to reaffirm the principle of civilian control over the military. Mostly, though, McChrystal's speech - which was disarmingly funny, personal and often wistful - poked fun at himself, paid homage to the troops who fought for him and offered thanks to his wife...

More at The Washington Post.

McChrystal Ends Service With Regret and a Laugh - Elisabeth Bumiller, New York Times.

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal retired on Friday with the full pageantry of a 17-gun salute, an Army marching band and an emotional send-off from the secretary of defense, but with his own acknowledgment that he was not leaving the military on his own terms. "Look, this has the potential to be an awkward or even a sad occasion," he told 500 guests on the historic parade ground of Fort McNair, in his first public comments since he was fired by President Obama. He added, "My service did not end as I would have wished." ...

"I have stories on all of you, photos on many," he told his old friends in the crowd. Then he suggested that he had just the method for making those stories public, adding, "And I know a Rolling Stone reporter." The crowd broke into laughter, then applause. Originally planned as a much smaller gathering, the ceremony expanded as many in the military asked to attend...

More at The New York Times.

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal Retires from Army - David S. Cloud, Los Angeles Times.

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal said goodbye to the Army on Friday in a poignant ceremony that paid tribute to his three decades of military service and barely mentioned his firing by President Obama for insubordination. It was McChrystal who alluded most directly to his own precipitous fall, standing at the podium and looking out at formations of soldiers and former comrades. "Service in this business is tough and often dangerous, and it extracts a price for participation, and that price can be high," McChrystal said. "If I had it to do over again, I'd do some things in my career differently, but not many."

McChrystal's remarks were the first in public by the former top commander in Afghanistan since he was summoned back to Washington in June and relieved of duty over remarks in a Rolling Stone article in which he and several aides seemed to mock and criticize civilian officials. McChrystal was replaced in Afghanistan by Army Gen. David H. Petraeus. The farewell ceremony was held on a sweltering early evening on the parade ground at Ft. McNair in Washington, a few miles from the Pentagon and adjacent to Arlington National Cemetery. Dressed in combat fatigues rather than dress uniform, McChrystal was joined on the reviewing stand by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the Army chief of staff, as well as McChrystal's wife, Annie. In the crowd of several hundred were soldiers, many now retired, with whom McChrystal had served in the Rangers, the 82nd Airborne Division and other units...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

McChrystal Retires Amid Praise for Career - Michael J. Carden, American Forces Press Service.

Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, who most recently commanded all U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan, retired today in a ceremony here near his Fort McNair home. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates called McChrystal one of America's greatest warriors and a treasured friend and colleague. "We bid farewell to Stan McChrystal today with pride and sadness," Gates said. "Pride for his unique record as a man and soldier; sadness that our comrade and his prestigious talents are leaving us.

"This consummate ranger possessed one of the sharpest and most inquisitive minds in the Army," the secretary continued. McChrystal's contributions to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were groundbreaking, Gates said, as the general "employed every tool available" to create success on the battlefield. "Over the past decade, no single American has inflicted more fear and more loss of life on our country's most vicious and violent enemies than Stan McChrystal," he said. "Commanding special operation forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, Stan was a pioneer in creating a revolution in warfare that fused intelligence and operations." And when violence in Iraq seemed almost unstoppable in 2006 and 2007, McChrystal and his special operators all but "crushed al-Qaida," Gates said...

More at American Forces Press Service.

--Secretary Of Defense Robert Gates

Remarks by Secretary Gates, General Casey, and General McChrystal - Transcript

U.S. Army Recognizes Gen. McChrystal's 34 Years of Service - Slideshow

Gen. McChrystal's Retirement Ceremony - Nancy Youssef, Nukes and Spooks

McChrystal Says Goodbye - Gordon Lubold, Politico

Army Says Farewell To Gen. McChrystal - Spencer Ackerman, Wired

Female Suicide Bombers

The New Threat in Afghanistan

by Matthew P. Dearing

Amidst the disarray following General McChrystal's interview with Rolling

Stone, a much less reported but profound event marked the course of the

insurgency in Afghanistan. The recent female suicide operation in eastern

Afghanistan reveals not only a paradigm shift in Taliban insurgent tactics, but

also a mutation of the organization's founding ideology.

On June 20, dressed in a long-flowing burqa, Bibi Halima walked up to

American and Afghan soldiers on patrol in the Sheltan area of Shegal district in

Kunar province with the intention of detonating explosives attached to her body.

In recent months, soldiers have had reason to be skeptical of burqa-clad

pedestrians. Many of the Haqqani Network's fedayeen tactics in eastern

Afghanistan have included men disguised in burqas, allowing them to approach or

breach heavily cordoned buildings and district centers prior to opening fire or

detonating explosives.  But as NATO and Afghan counterinsurgency experience

heightened, security forces became well adept at reading bodily gestures and

cues that distinguished a man from a woman underneath the large Afghan dress.

Until June 20th, this was a valuable force protection measure since not one of

the over 430 suicide attacks in Afghanistan since 2001, was perpetrated by a

woman.  In comparison, women have executed nearly one in ten suicide attacks in

Iraq.  Until June 20th, NATO troops could rest assured that of the many

insurgent tactics adapted from Iraq to Afghanistan, female suicide bombings was

one that would likely never emerge. 

But as in all insurgencies, there is little a counterinsurgent can be

certain. The element of surprise is probably the greatest tool an insurgent

holds over the parties attempting to glue together the fragile pieces of an

orderly society in Afghanistan.  However, in the midst of what many skeptics

argue is a repeat of Vietnam (be it increasing violence and corruption

throughout the country, a change in leadership, or a muddled strategic policy)

there is reason to be hopeful over this new paradigm of violent tactics in

Afghanistan.  The Taliban have just thrown down one of their wild cards by

sponsoring and implementing their first female suicide bomber.  Not only have

the Taliban opened themselves up to a new range of criticism by moderate and

fence-sitting Pashtuns, whom the Afghan government increasingly seeks to win

over, but they will also likely find cleavages develop within their own ranks

that see the inclusion of women in the insurgency as dishonorable and outside

the realm of acceptable jihad. 

There are plenty of practical reasons the Taliban would want to use women as

suicide bombers. Like the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the Kurdish insurgency in

Turkey or Chechen separatist movements in the Caucasus, the Taliban have used

the tactical elements of the burqa as a disguise since at least 2007—dressing

many of their male martyrs in this garb as a way to evade detection.  More than

disguising a male under a burqa, the female bomber can actually allow insurgents

to penetrate deep within hardened security structures where men would otherwise

be unable to pass through undetected and unsearched. Given cultural constraints,

men are forbidden from searching women, leaving insurgents a gap in security

measures that they can exploit.  In a recent graduating class of cadets from the

Kabul Police Academy, only ten of the over 1,600 graduates were women, thus

ensuring that few women will be searched in at least the near future.  Thus,

women provide a convenient tactical advantage in terms of suicide attacks,

because they are unlikely to be suspected or searched.

Until recently, the Taliban and associated groups such as the Haqqani Network

and Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, have largely avoided implementing women in the

insurgency for several reasons.  First, there are larger social and historical

considerations such as norms and collective memory within Afghanistan that have

prevented Taliban tacticians from utilizing women in insurgent operations. 

Female involvement in jihad has largely been absent in Afghanistan throughout

history.  Some examples exist that serve as motivating stories for male

combatants such as the tale of the Pashtun heroine Malalai who rallied Afghans

to defeat the British at the Battle of Maiwand in 1880. Like Lady Liberty or the

French Marianne, Malalai served more as an iconic image of motherhood and

national pride.  Few women participated in the anti-Soviet jihad beyond the

important, but less combative supportive roles, such as serving as couriers,

conditioning weapons, or preparing the dead for burial. Ever since the Taliban

ruled Afghanistan from 1996-2001, women have been relegated to second-class

citizenship.  Today's young insurgent has grown up inculcated with the beliefs

and value systems espoused by ultra-conservative mullahs.

Second, until recently, the Taliban have resided in a fairly permissible

environment, controlling large swaths of territory including urban district

centers and rural villages throughout the country.  They also had considerable

cross-border access in Pakistan where they could plan operations, train

jihadists and indoctrinate future martyrs. Today, in many respects due to the

success of counterinsurgency operations run by General McChrystal and his team,

the Taliban have lost vital areas of sanctuary, elements of command and control

have been infiltrated and broken down, and operations have been successfully

countered and prevented due to a transfer of much needed assets from Iraq to

Afghanistan.  Thus, whereas deferment of female suicide bombers as a tactic was

easier one year ago when insurgent were in much better strategic position, today

they look more appealing as the organization becomes increasingly threatened.

Compare this environment to 2008 in Diyala Province, Iraq.  U.S. Special Forces,

under the command of Lt. Gen. McChrystal became exceedingly efficient at

liquidating mid-level Al Qaeda commanders, breaking apart the structural

alignment of the organization to the point that female combatants became a

logical conclusion for a squeezed organization seeking to create space against

an offensive U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign.  By the end of 2008, female

suicide attacks reached 32 in Iraq, as this tactic became a necessary adaptation

for insurgents.

Third, a culture of martyrdom has been a powerful aspect of the Taliban

insurgency.  Martyrdom has been a convenient rhetorical strategy that wraps a

variety of economic, political and social grievances around the all-inclusive

narrative of jihad.   The Taliban jihad has evolved to include narratives of

Macedonian, British and Soviet defeat at the hands of warrior Pashtuns. This can

be seen through war ballads, poetry, and personal testimonies distributed via

21st century technology—passed from Afghan to Afghan via mobile telephones,

compact discs chanting martyrologies, as well as developed websites and monthly

publications.  A significant difference between the Taliban insurgency and the

anti-Soviet jihad has been the absence of women in the martyrdom mythology. 

Women have always played a significant role in Afghanistan as poets espousing

the heroics of their men in combat and as defenders of a family's honor. 

However, under Taliban tyranny, women were noticeably absent in resistance

literature, oral narratives or the Taliban movement in general.  Thus, the

choice to engage women in violent jihad will soon test the viability of the

organization's ideology that has long positioned women as outsiders.  If

inclusion of women occurs, the Taliban will be forced to evolve and adapt its

strict fundamental beliefs to less restrictive standards. 

We may never know who the real Bibi Halima was, nor why she chose to kill

herself for an organization that would rather hold women in a position of

permanent servitude. But the act she participated in will undoubtedly stand as

an unrecognized changing point in the Afghan conflict.  Will more women follow

her lead or resist the temptation of asymmetric violence?  U.S. and Afghan

forces would be wise to capitalize on this moment to lower that risk and build

partnerships with a broader segment of society.  First, it presents a

significant opportunity to characterize the violent, inhumane nature of the

Taliban.  Second, it shows there is a deep ideological divide between the

Taliban's foundational ideology and what the organization adopts as legitimate

conduct today.  When approaching options for reconciliation, this can be a

notable point of contention between "moderate" Taliban and irreconcilables. 

Third, there must be a doubled effort to train female Afghan police and

intelligence operatives in order to be the eyes and ears preventing future

female suicide bombers.  Finally, the West should continue to pressure

Afghanistan's government to ensure women have a viable voice and opportunity in

the new Afghan society. While some women may feel pressured to work with the

Taliban, if viable options exist, such as an amnesty or call-in program for

potential suicide bombers, the few female bombers who emerge may think twice

about ending their life in such a tragic fashion.

Matthew P. Dearing is a PhD candidate at the Naval Postgraduate School and

member of the Center for Emerging National Security Affairs.

Topics include:

1) China picks a foolish fight over the Yellow Sea.

2) The Army's next nightmare scenario

China picks a foolish fight over the Yellow Sea

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates arrived in South Korea on July 21 to display their commitment to that country's defense. In March, a North Korean torpedo sank the South Korean corvette Cheonan, killing 46 sailors. Last month, South Korea took its case to the U.N. Security Council but was unable to get much satisfaction -- China, with North Korea's stability its paramount concern, blocked the Security Council from explicitly naming North Korea as the perpetrator.

China had hoped that the Cheonan incident would simply disappear, keeping the strategic situation in northeast Asia in the frozen state it prefers. After the Security Council's non-action, Chinese leaders should have anticipated that the United States and South Korea would take their own actions to reinforce deterrence against the North. China's handling of this affair will end up costing it and brings Beijing's judgment into question.

With South Korea's attempt at justice having come up short, the U.S. and South Korean governments have arranged for a showy two-part display of solidarity. Part one was the arrival of Clinton and Gates, with a photo-op at the demilitarized zone and a meeting with their South Korean counterparts. Part two will be a large U.S.-South Korea military training exercise, involving 8,000 troops, 100 aircraft (including the first deployment of F-22s to South Korea), and the USS George Washington carrier strike group.

Having dug itself into a hole by energizing the U.S.-South Korea military alliance, the Chinese government continued digging: On July 21 its Foreign Ministry spokesman warned, "We resolutely oppose any foreign military vessel and planes conducting activities in the Yellow Sea and China's coastal waters that undermine China's security interests."

The U.S. government has made no commitment to send the USS George Washington carrier strike group, the most ostentatious display of U.S. military power, to the Yellow Sea. But with the Chinese government now having thrown down the gauntlet over the U.S. Navy's right to sail in international waters, the United States will have to respond with a significant display. Anything less than a transit of the Yellow Sea within the next few weeks by USS George Washington and its escorts will come off as a loss of face by the United States.

This tussle between China and the United States over prestige is alarming. Why has China suddenly decided to pick a fight over the Yellow Sea? The USS George Washington carrier strike group last made a routine transit of the Yellow Sea in October, which few noticed or cared about. If the Chinese government is interested in stability in northeast Asia, it should have stayed quiet and allowed the Korean training exercises to proceed uneventfully as they have for many decades.

What is disturbing is the newfound lack of judgment by China's decision-makers. China's gauntlet-throwing has given a boost to the U.S. military alliances in the region. And China's troubling misjudgment in this case does not bode well the next time a real crisis in the region occurs.

The Army's next nightmare scenario

After the Cold War ended, Pentagon planners restructured the U.S. military's ground forces to cope with what was considered at the time to be the worst-case scenario -- simultaneous high-intensity wars in the Middle East and Korea. But recent Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) have drifted away from planning for traditional conventional combat. The 2010 QDR discussed the need for ground forces to prepare for conventional warfare, irregular warfare, stability operations, and disaster assistance. However, the review recommended few significant changes to the military's force structure.

Did the 2010 QDR provide any useful planning guidance to the Army and Marine Corps? Nathan Freier, a retired Army officer and a visiting research professor at the U.S. Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, says no. Writing at Small Wars Journal, Freier says the QDR's "more of the same" conclusions failed to provide ground forces with either a long-term threat narrative or a vision about structure, operating concepts, or missions they need to prepare for the future.

What ground-force planning concept does Freier envision? In his essay, Freier describes a worst-case scenario demanding enough to prepare the Army and Marine Corps for a full range of comprehensive and lesser tasks. Freier calls his worst-case scenario "opposed stabilization" and imagines a nuclear-armed state that has collapsed into insurgency and civil war. Freier's scenario portrays Hobbesian chaos with well-armed local, foreign, and criminal groups battling each other as well as outside intervention forces for control of territory and populations. In spite of the distasteful memories of the stabilization missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Freier's scenario sees the United States drawn into this new opposed stabilization mission due the potential for nuclear proliferation, violent ethnosectarian contagion, threats to strategic resources, or the possibility of mass refugee migrations into key allies or the United States itself.

Freier adds to the difficulty by providing no outside or local U.S. allies and no nearby logistics base to support U.S. military operations. Intervention would require a forcible entry by U.S. expeditionary forces and the buildup of combat power and logistics support, presumably over long distances. The U.S. expeditionary force would then have to fight some combatant groups while attempting to form alliances with others. The campaign objective would be to establish minimum essential order with the goal of containing the proliferation, regional instability, ethnosectarian, and migration threats that sparked the intervention.

Freier asserts that if the Army and Marine Corps can prepare for all the tasks required to complete the opposed stabilization mission just described, these services would also be prepared for currently envisioned missions such as conventional combat, counterinsurgency, and security force assistance. It takes little imagination to pick out a few spots on the globe where Freier's scary scenario seems plausible. One wonders whether his worst-case scenario is too demanding for Pentagon planners to care to think about. Alas, no one, least of all staff planners, gets to choose how history plays out.

The top U.S. military officer says critics who claim it will take years to even have a chance to defeat the Afghan insurgency ignore the fact that a similar counterinsurgency strategy turned around a similarly difficult situation in Iraq in 2007. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, spoke to reporters traveling with him to South and Central Asia Thursday.

Admiral Mullen acknowledges that it may take years to fully defeat the Afghan insurgency. But he says that is not what the United States expects to accomplish by this time next year, when President Barack Obama has said he will begin to withdraw U.S. troops. But Mullen says the year-and-a-half the president allowed for the new strategy to prove itself is adequate.

"Insurgencies last a long time," said Mullen. "But, as you look at how long it took to turn Iraq around, it was about 18 months. Now, we're about two-and-a-half years later, and we're still working in Iraq. But it was sort of that period of time where it really turned. Turning it doesn't end it, [but] you've got to turn it to get it moving in the right direction."

The admiral says the situation in Iraq seemed impossible to resolve a few years ago, and, although the two countries are very different, and progress in Iraq is not a guarantee of progress in Afghanistan, it does give him reason to be hopeful about Afghanistan - even during the current period of heavy violence and, at best, slow progress.

"There are similarities and differences between Iraq and Afghanistan, and I understand that," added Mullen. "But I don't accept the fact that, just because it takes insurgencies a long, long time [to be defeated], that we're not at a point where it can't be turned, because I think it can. It doesn't mean it's going to be easy. But, I think it can be [turned] over the period of time that we're talking about."

U.S. officials acknowledge that, even if the situation in Afghanistan begins to turn during the next 12 months, the U.S. withdrawal will likely be very gradual, and some number of international troops will be needed in Afghanistan for many years to come...

More at Voice of America.

As I hear more voices join the chorus against counterinsurgency, both its theory and its practice, I get the sense that the 'counterinsurgency era' that began some time after the invasion of Iraq is now reaching its end. Yes, NATO will retain a presence in Afghanistan for years to come, but there is little enthusiasm for the idea of counterinsurgency or hope that the lessons of FM 3-24 might help, either in Afghanistan or elsewhere. In fact, mentions of FM 3-24 and of counterinsurgency are increasingly likely to invite sniggers, tired sighs or outright hostility ('how dare you theorise about hearts and minds when there's a war going on?').

It might be interesting to trace how an idea so welcome less than four years ago has since fallen from grace. Was it the perceived confidence with which the concept was rolled out? Was it the perceived automacity of its widespread acceptance? Is it anger at the arguably simplistic explanation that counterinsurgency, and counterinsurgency alone, won the day in Iraq? Or is it due to a perception of counterinsurgency experts gaining power and prestige in DC by peddling a theory that is not working so well in Afghanistan?

What follows is an attempt to address some of these issues: how did we get here, are the critics right, and is there anything in this bathwater that should be saved? This is hardly an exhaustive take on the topic, which would require much more than a blog post, but just a few thoughts...

Much more at Kings of War.

Transcript

Hillary Rodham Clinton

Secretary of State

Kabul, Afghanistan

July 20, 2010

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you very much, Minister Rassoul. And I am honored to join representatives from more than 70 countries and organizations to stand in strong support of a peaceful, prosperous, and stable Afghanistan. I want to thank President Karzai and the Afghan Government for hosting us today and for the months of preparation that were needed to make this conference a reality. And before I begin, I want to join the secretary general in congratulating the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan for the successful negotiation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement earlier this week. This is the most significant achievement between these neighbors in nearly 50 years and it will go a long way towards strengthening regional economic ties, creating jobs, and promoting sustainable economic development -- all of which are critical to the people of both countries.

Today's conference represents a milestone in a long and difficult journey. Here in Kabul, we are following Afghanistan's lead. The Afghan people and government have charted a comprehensive strategy for their future. Their plans are detailed, practical, and reflect a great deal of work and consultation. And we are here as representatives of individual nations and as members of the global community to offer our support and align our resources behind Afghan goals and Afghan policies.

Now, we know the road ahead will not be easy. Citizens of many nations represented here, including my own, wonder whether success is even possible, and if so, whether we all have the commitment to achieve it. Well, we will answer these questions with our actions. Today, we join in launching what the Afghan Government has termed "the Kabul process." It is a process that reflects a commitment to accountability, including clear benchmarks and milestones. And indeed, this conference is about accountability -- accountability for the United States, for the United Nations, for members of the international community, and for the Afghan Government. We are called not only to voice support for the people of Afghanistan, but to honestly assess the progress we've made, identify the gaps between our expectations and our performance, and resolve to close those gaps together through patient, persistent efforts.

But it is important to note that we are making progress. Resources and personnel are flowing into the country, including almost 10,000 new international troops for ISAF. We are working around the clock to strengthen Afghanistan's security forces. With our Afghan partners, we are on the offensive in parts of the country where the insurgents have gone unchallenged for too long. And we are matching our military efforts with an unprecedented civilian surge to help create stronger institutions and economic development.

President Obama has said that we will begin a responsible, conditions-based transition to Afghan security leadership in July 2011. Toward this end, the Afghan Government, working with NATO, has developed a broad framework for the process that will help create conditions for transition, province by province, district by district, so the Afghan security forces can assume full responsibility for security in the transitioned areas.

Now, the July 2011 date captures both our sense of urgency and the strength of our resolve. The transition process is too important to push off indefinitely, but this date is the start of a new phase, not the end of our involvement. We have no intention of abandoning our long-term mission of achieving the kind of Afghanistan that President Karzai set forth in his speech.

Too many nations, especially Afghanistan, have suffered too many losses to see this country slide backward. We intend to continue our economic development assistance and our support for training, equipping, and assisting the security forces of Afghanistan for a long time to come.

But our progress in the months and years ahead will largely depend on the people and Government of Afghanistan as well as the international community. So let me address the Afghan side of the partnership first.

The Afghan Government is stepping forward to deal with a multitude of difficult challenges, and I have to say some of their challenges have been made more difficult by the international community's intervention. And I think recognizing that and accepting the analysis that was present in President Karzai's address is very important. We are encouraged by much of what we see, particularly the work to improve governance. The government has created a new task force, new offices, and new legal tools to combat corruption. And President Karzai recently issued a decree prohibiting nepotism in government.

Now, these steps are important, but we know much more work remains. There are no shortcuts to fighting corruption and improving governance. On this front, both the Afghan people and the people of the international community expect results. As the government takes the steps it must to address this challenge, it can count on the United States for support.

We are also closely following the efforts to reintegrate insurgents who are ready for peace. There have been positive steps since last month's consultative peace jirga. President Karzai's decree establishing the Afghan peace and reintegration program has created a useful framework, but progress will depend on whether insurgents wish to be reintegrated and reconciled by renouncing violence and al-Qaida and agreeing to abide by the constitution and laws of Afghanistan.

I also want to emphasize the importance of President Karzai's recent statement that the rights of women, Afghan ethnic groups, and civil society will not be sacrificed in pursuit of reintegration and reconciliation. Over many years, I have observed and participated in post-conflict reconciliation efforts -- in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, Africa, Latin America -- and I speak from my own experience when I say that the work of Afghan women and civil society groups will be essential to this country's success. If these groups are fully empowered to help build a just and lasting peace, they will help do so. But if they are silenced and pushed to the margins of Afghan society, the prospects for peace and justice will be subverted.

Earlier today, I met with a number of Afghan women leaders who are doing heroic work to strengthen their communities and country, and I was privileged to announce several new programs that the United States will fund to support women and families by improving maternal and child health in pursuit of Afghanistan's desire to move closer to the Millennium Development Goal. We will double our support for the Ministry of Public Health's Community Midwifery Education Program and begin a new Community Nursing Education Program. And we will increase funding to programs that support gender equality in Afghanistan and an advocacy campaign to encourage religious leaders and influential members of communities across the country to encourage women and their families to access maternal health services.

I think that it is only fair for the international community to set forth its expectations, and the more we can speak with one voice, the less the confusion on the part of the Afghans themselves. And I appreciate the recommendation that President Karzai made that we do even more to try to unify our actions so that there are not so many voices speaking at once about what should and must be done inside Afghanistan.

Because the international community bears responsibilities as well. As we look at the more than 70 nations and international organizations helping Afghanistan move forward, we have to recognize the invaluable work that the United Nations is performing in Afghanistan, NATO allies, ISAF partners -- all making extraordinary sacrifices and financial contributions. There are more countries and international institutions here today than were at the Bonn conference eight years ago.

This is all cause for optimism, but we have to resolve to work more effectively together. And I think beginning to understand the importance of supporting sustainable democratic institutions inside Afghanistan is a big piece of that responsibility.

So this conference makes it clear the world is with Afghanistan and the world stands in opposition to the common threat and the common enemy that stalks us all. There will still be too many days when we wake up to news of violence, conflict, and loss of life. But we must not forget that not only are millions of Afghans working to lay the foundation for a better future, but tens of thousands of young men and women from across the world are as well. Some might carry a gun as part of the military forces, others might carry a notebook as those who are attempting to improve governance or work on education or health, but so many around the world are counting on the success of what we can achieve together here in Afghanistan.

History will hold us accountable for our efforts, and here today we must do the same for each other. President Obama and I look forward to working with the Afghan Government, the United Nations, and all of you in seeing this mission through to completion.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

The US Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Center is pleased to host Major Nathan Springer, U.S. Army: from 1000 CST, (1100 EST), (1600 ZULU) on Thursday, 22 July 2010.

Major Springer Commanded in Afghanistan as he served in the 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry, 173rd ABCT in Northeast Konar and Eastern Nuristan Province during OEF 07-08. His briefing will discuss the leader and Soldier training necessary to be successful within the current ISAF population-centric COIN strategy. MAJ Springer holds a M.A. in National Security Affairs, Homeland Security and Defense, from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA and has published numerous articles on the execution of population-centric COIN at the tactical level.

Those interested in attending may view the meeting on-line at https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinweb and participate via Defense Connect Online (DCO) as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.

Col. McCuen was an author, lecturer, business executive and a consultant on Irregular Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Hybrid War. He was a 1948 graduate of West point and earned a Master of International Affairs degree from Columbia University's School of International Affairs. He commanded a dual paratroop/Armored Cavalry Squadron in Germany, was Director of Internal Defense and Development Studies and Chairman of the First Current Affairs Panel at the US Army War College at Carlisle, PA. He was the author of The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War -- The Strategy of Counter- Insurgency which during the 1960's -- 1970's was on the Department of the Army's "required reading" list. After retirement from the Army, he was General Dynamics Chief of Abrams Tank Training and then later General Dynamics Manager of Field Operations, having a hundred of his men and women in Desert Storm with Abrams Tank units. Beloved husband of Gloria S. for 61 years. Dear father of John J. Jr. (Vera) and Les S. (Theresa). Grandfather of Matthew, Haley, Christopher, Vitale and Victoria. Also survived by his pet dogs Tanker, Tillie and Ruby. Family will receive friends at A.J. Desmond & Sons (Vasu, Rodgers & Connell Chapel), 32515 Woodward, (btwn 13-14 Mile), Thursday 4-8p.m. Memorial tributes to Almost Home, P.O. Box 250602, West Bloomfield, MI 48325.

During the Obama administration's strategic review last year, the U.S. government and media paid surprisingly close attention to the selection of Afghanistan's cabinet members, and pressed Karzai to retain the ministers whom Westerners deemed most capable. The forced resignations of Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar and National Directorate of Security (NDS) chief Amrullah Saleh last month garnered less attention, despite the fact that they were two of the government's most important figures. The decline in Western enthusiasm about Atmar no doubt contributed heavily to the tepidness of the response. Soon thereafter, the replacement of General Stanley McChrystal with General David Petraeus drew all foreign attention to the American side of things, with the result that scarcely any Westerner noticed Karzai's appointment of Bismillah Khan Mohammadi as Interior Minister in late June. Yet this change of command could influence the course of the war more than the change of the senior American military commander. In the current war, the Interior Ministry is the most important of all Afghan ministries, as well as the one most in need of repair, and the new minister has an excellent track record that could allow him to succeed where others have failed so miserably.

In a country with an authoritarian culture and a scarcity of seasoned executives, the quality of cabinet ministers has an enormous impact on the development of governmental institutions. This reality is seldom appreciated fully by Westerners, accustomed as they are to professional bureaucracies staffed with experienced civil servants. A minister's ability to shape leadership development and to select individuals for leadership positions determines long-term institutional effectiveness more than anything else. Afghanistan's Interior Minister performs these functions for the Afghan National Police, and has never done either very well. From the start, leadership development in the Afghan National Police has been hampered by poor recruiting and poor training, and police chiefs have regularly received their appointments through personal connections or bribery...

Much more at Orbis.