Now, five years into the war, American commanders say that the reborn force is coming into its own. And Mosul, an ethnically mixed city that has been under stepped-up assault by insurgents and where Iraqi Army units far outnumber their American counterparts, offers a possible glimpse into the future. But the Iraqi Army's performance in Mosul so far suggests that while the Iraqi forces are taking on more responsibility and have made strides, there are still troubling gaps.
Kip has more at Wired's Danger Room blog.
Bill Roggio of Long War Journal is currently on an embed in Mosul and provides a quick-look situation update as well an insight on Iraqi Army training.
In Mosul, the Iraqi Army also lives a dual existence. As the Iraqi Army conducts operations to dismantle the terror networks in the city, it also builds for the future. The 4th Brigade, 2nd Iraqi Army Division seeks to expand its ranks while developing its noncommissioned officers, the backbone of any modern military. This is a difficult task to manage while fighting a brutal insurgency, but a necessary one as a professional army is required to successfully fight an insurgency.
On a related issue, Alexandra Zavis of the Los Angeles Times discusses a byproduct of one counterinsurgency tactic of our strategy in Iraq - as calm returns to some areas, the U.S. military is faced with the question of what to do with the tribesmen it hired to defend their neighborhoods.
After five years of trial and error, the strategy of recruiting tribesmen to help defend their neighborhoods against Islamic extremists has proved one of the most effective weapons in the U.S. counterinsurgency arsenal.
But restoring a measure of calm to what were some of the most violent places in Iraq has in turn presented the U.S. military with one of its biggest headaches: what to do with the more than 80,000 armed men whose loyalty has been bought with a paycheck that cannot go on forever.
*SWJ Note: SOI (Sons of Iraq), formerly know as Concerned Local Citizens, serve as neighborhood watches and man checkpoints.
Comments
<i>U.S. military is faced with the question of what to do with the tribesmen it hired to defend their neighborhoods.</i>
This seems like a case of there are no jobs for these tribesmen to seek. How good or bad is their economy? Can anyone provide a link to RELIABLE info on the Iraqi economy?
The infrastructure was in horrible shape because Hussein did no upkeep and then stuff was destroyed in the war. With all the money spent on infrastructure, has there been any progress? Have insurgent attacks erased any progress made?
Has oil production increased?
I provide some insights regarding this issue on my blog (in English). There are several cases:
-some will integrate "national" forces (Army and Police
-others are targeted by "vocational Education" programs throughout the Sunni Triangle (HAWR RAJAB provides a good example of this, but it's not alone).
-the core of these militias will remain as a "proxy" force for Stabilisation Ops (in fact, SOI programs are financed by the US Taxpayers...)
Cordialement
Stéphane TAILLAT