Journal Articles are typically longer works with more more analysis than the news and short commentary in the SWJ Blog.
We accept contributed content from serious voices across the small wars community, then publish it here as quickly as we can, per our Editorial Policy, to help fuel timely, thoughtful, and unvarnished discussion of the diverse and complex issues inherent in small wars.
by Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan
Download the Full Article: Looking for the Hedgehog Idea
Originally published in Australian Army Journal, and republished here with permission of the Journal, this article examines the limitations of traditional strategic approaches to the resolution of contemporary conflicts. It proposes control as the unifying idea for military action.
Download the Full Article: Looking for the Hedgehog Idea
by Tripp McCullar
Download the Full Article: The Rising Dominance of the Information Revolution within RMA Thought
The purpose of this piece is to argue that the Information Revolution will ultimately eclipse most of history's widely-accepted RMAs due to its ability to "empower the weak" by (1) widely propagating strategic weapons technology, (2) rendering traditional military organization near-obsolete, (3) providing open access to mass social mobilization platforms, and (4) bypassing the development of industrialized mobility to achieve strategic effects.
Download the Full Article: The Rising Dominance of the Information Revolution within RMA Thought
MAJ Tripp McCullar is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer and recent graduate of the Naval Postgaduate School Special Operations masters program. He is currently assigned to DIA.
by Richard M. Wrona, Jr.
Download the Full Article: A Better, Bad Choice
The Democratic Republic of Congo is a modern-day nightmare. After more than a decade of conflict, the country's eastern region is known for its seemingly unending human misery. Mass murder, forced displacements, and the horrible distinction of being the world's "rape capital" embody Thomas Hobbes' description of life in an anarchic world, (i.e. nasty, brutish, and short.) Reports two weeks ago of hundreds of women, girls, and babies being gang-raped by rebels and tribesmen within miles of a United Nations peacekeepers' camp only serve as the most recent chapters in an epic tragedy ("Congo mass rape numbers rise to 240—UN," BBC).
Download the Full Article: A Better, Bad Choice
Richard Wrona is a U.S. Army officer presently serving as a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Humanizing "The Man:"
Strengthening Psychological and Information Operations in Afghanistan
by A. Lawrence Chickering
Download the Full Article: Humanizing the "Man"
In this paper, I will argue there are three great challenges the coalition forces need to overcome in their search for narratives that resonate with Afghans and that ultimately will promote support for the coalition and for the government. First is the traditional and tribal Afghan antagonism to outsiders. Second is the lack of a stake that ordinary Afghans have in the larger system. And the third involves a conflict in impact of major activities in the country, a conflict between programs that empower Afghans and programs that disempower them.
Download the Full Article: Humanizing the "Man"
A. Lawrence Chickering is a social entrepreneur who designs and implements civil society strategies in public policy.
by Daniel R. DePetris
Download the Full Article: Arming the U.S. Military for the Future
There is a huge debate brewing in Washington today about the current health and state of the U.S. Military. And with good reason; virtually every branch of the military has been stretched to the brink over the past decade. 100,000 American soldiers are expected to be in Afghanistan by the end of this summer; 50,000 American troops will remain in Iraq for at least another year; and nearly 30,000 are deployed in South Korea as a deterrent against North Korean aggression. All of this is not to be outdone by the tens of thousands more who are stationed in bases all across the European continent.
Download the Full Article: Arming the U.S. Military for the Future
Daniel R. DePetris is a graduate candidate in the political science department at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University..
by Anthony Tsontakis
Download the Full Article: The Prospect for a Unified International Policy on Iran
Evidence made public over the course of the last year compellingly supports the conclusion that Iran's nuclear program is not peaceful, contrary to every maxim of Iran's stated policy, including a religious decree by Iran's Supreme Leader that says Islam forbids the production and use of nuclear weapons. As a result, and because confidence in the good faith and ultimate justice of the Iranian government yields, as it must, to the painful experience of endless disappointment, a consensus against Iran's nuclear activity has been emerging internationally.
Download the Full Article: The Prospect for a Unified International Policy on Iran
Anthony Tsontakis is a small business owner based in Phoenix, Arizona. He recently earned a J.D. from the Phoenix School of Law, where he served as Managing Editor for the Phoenix Law Review. Mr. Tsontakis previously served as a law clerk for the Arizona Department of Homeland Security, the Arizona State Legislature, and the Arizona Secretary of State.
Design and the Prospects for Mission Analysis
by Christopher R. Paparone
Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Mission Analysis
This episode attempts to expose the myth that design is a "methodology" that leads to "understanding" that eventually leads to good military planning as suggested in the US Army's latest doctrine, particularly its Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process. The focus is to reveal the issues associated with "mission analysis," that is, the breaking down of a "problem" into manageable tasks that, when all put together into a military plan or order, serve to solve the overall "problem." Beyond conventional, "force-on-force" fights, this essay argues that mission analysis is a misconception when it comes to framing complex operations.
Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Mission Analysis
Christopher R. Paparone, Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired, is an associate professor in the Army Command and General Staff College's Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations at Fort Lee, Virginia.
by Kevin Meredith, Sergio Villarreal, and Mitchel Wilkinson
Download The Full Article: The De-evolution of Insurgency
In this article we will examine contemporary definitions of insurgencies as presented in The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual (FM 3-24), compare the insurgency in Afghanistan to other insurgencies and present an argument that the present situation in Afghanistan is in-fact, not an insurgency. In our conclusion, we will present a theory that the situation in Afghanistan more closely resembles a synergy of criminal elements that have coalesced into a loosely organized front to form an anti-government, anti-coalition movement that has insurgent elements involved. Our theory also suggests that there is a cyclical nature of conflict in Afghanistan that includes the growth of insurgency and the de-evolution of insurgency as a part of a constantly changing Chaotic Cannibalistic State; a state of being that consists of groups of people in perpetual conflict, feeding on each other until a foreign body is introduced, at which point they frenzy on the foreign body, sapping strength and resources until the foreign body must limp away.
Download The Full Article: The De-evolution of Insurgency
Colonel Kevin Meredith is an Armor Officer who served in various command and staff positions in combat tours to Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently, he serves as Team Leader of a Human Terrain Analysis Team in Southern Afghanistan.
Major (ret.) Sergio Villarreal is a PhD Candidate in Psychology who serves as a social scientist on a Human Terrain Analysis Team in southern Afghanistan. He has experience as a military advisor in Colombia and Afghanistan.
Dr. Mitchel Wilkinson is a social scientist on a Human Terrain Analysis Team in Southern Afghanistan. Previously, he served in advisory duties in Afghanistan, Australia, New Zealand, and Vietnam, and he is a former instructor at the University of Oregon and Oregon State University.
The U.S. Strategic Imperative Must Shift From Iraq/Afghanistan to Mexico/The Americas and the Stabilization of Europe
by Dr. Robert J. Bunker
Download the Full Article: The U.S. Strategic Imperative Must Shift
The United States currently faces two strategic level non-state (network) threats—but only one of them is openly recognized. Al Qaeda, and other elements of radical Islam, have been recognized as the #1 threat since the 11 September 2001 attacks which killed nearly 3,000 Americans and caused well over 100 billion dollars in infrastructure damage, emergency response, and economic disruption. This threat which garners ongoing media attention, however, on many fronts pales in comparison to that represented by the drug cartels and narco-gangs which for decades now have been evolving, mutating, and growing in capabilities and power in the Americas. While presently viewed as a 'crime and law enforcement issue', as Al Qaeda was pre 9-11, this more subtle and encompassing strategic threat has resulted in the deaths of well over 100,000 citizens of the Americas (roughly 30,000 in Mexico alone in the last 4 years) and has caused the destabilization of a number of nations including Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras, and witnessed the rise of heightened narco influence within regions of the US homeland along its Southern Border. Economically, the sustained damage and disruption caused by drug cartel and narco-gang activities to private individuals, local economies, and governmental bodies is well past the trillion dollar mark and rising. Both of these non-state (network) threats challenge the institutions of the many nations affected, the loyalty of the indigenous populations to the state itself, and are indicative of the 'war over social and political organization' now being waged in various regions of the globe.
Download the Full Article: The U.S. Strategic Imperative Must Shift
Dr. Robert J. Bunker holds degrees in political science, government, behavioral science, social science, anthropology-geography, and history. Training taken includes that provided by DHS, FLETC, DIA, Cal DOJ, Cal POST, LA JRIC, NTOA, and private security entities in counter-terrorism, counter-surveillance, incident-response, force protection, and intelligence. Dr. Bunker has been involved in red teaming and counter-terrorism exercises and has provided operations support within Los Angeles County.
by Torie Rose DeGhett
Download the Full Article: The Misunderstood Private Dynamic of Modern War
The purpose of this article is to explore the use of private military contractors as a policy tool and their place in the context of rapidly changing ways of fighting wars. Its primary goal is to defy the conventional wisdom of contractors as overpaid, gun-toting mercenaries who wreak havoc in operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The hope is that this article shows a bigger picture, correcting misinformation and highlighting the real problems with privatization, namely the lack of bureaucratic clarity and control, and offering solutions.
Download the Full Article: The Misunderstood Private Dynamic of Modern War
Torie Rose DeGhett is a freelance writer. She can be found on-line at www.thepoliticalnotebook.tumblr.com.
by Lieutenant General James M. Dubik
Download the Full Article: Iraqi Police Priorities
Whether in Iraq or in the United States arguments remain as to the origins of the war as well as how it was conducted. But equally certain is this: most of the Iraqis that I've talked to are grateful for the American troops and families who have sacrificed so much and to the other nations of the coalition who have also contributed sons, daughters, and treasure to eliminate the Saddam regime and help create the evident progress in their country. They know that war is not over in Iraq, even if Iraq's enemies are far weaker than they had been. They also understand that Iraqi is in a far better place today than it was in 2006, and each year finds more progress. They may be frustrated that progress is not faster or more widespread, but they are not ungrateful for the freedoms and opportunities they now have.
Acknowledging this progress, President Obama outlined a "new page" for Iraq and highlighted the importance of a continued Iraqi/US relationship. This relationship appropriately rests upon Iraq's growing ability to "help itself," but recognizes the essential role the US can play in Iraq's future. I have returned to Iraq three times since I had responsibility for accelerating the growth of the Iraqi Security Forces during the 2007-8 surge, and in my view, the Ministry of Interior and the Iraqi Police Forces need assistance in the following three important priority areas.
Download the Full Article: Iraqi Police Priorities
LTG James Dubik (ret.) is a senior fellow at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). He is the author of Accelerating Combat Power in Afghanistan, a policy proposal and analytical work on the growth of indigenous security forces in Afghanistan. Prior to joining ISW, General Dubik was the commander of Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) from June 2007 to July 2008.
An Invading Force's Presence in a Foreign Land is its own Enemy
by Ali Iqbal
Download the Full Article: Bismarck's Lesson on COIN
An invading foreign force, on completion of its objectives i.e. regime change through violent means or having inflicted sufficient losses to a targeted group, should not prolong its stay and assume the role of occupiers. This tendency infuriates local passion built on independent beliefs, cultural biases, religious differences and historic events. This complex/non- linear environment poses tremendous challenges for an outsider to transform the invaded country and bring it to a desired level of stability. On the other hand, the same environment presents lucrative opportunities for non-state and other state actors who intend exploiting the volatile situation to further their agendas/interests. The actors relevant to this theory include a foreign force, which can be composed of a single nation or a coalition, local populace of the invaded country, non-state actors within, and outside the invaded country and regional/neighboring countries having negative or positive interests in the invaded country and the foreign force.
Download the Full Article: Bismarck's Lesson on COIN
Major Ali Iqbal, Pakistan Army, is currently a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served as an instructor in School of Armor and Pakistan Military Academy and has twice served as brigade operations officer in an infantry and armor brigade. He has also served as United Nations Military Observer in Sierra Leone. He is a graduate of Command and Staff College, Pakistan and has a master's degree in Arts and Science of Warfare.
by Kashif Taher
Download the Full Article: Counterinsurgency in Pakistan
The most immediate threat to the security of Pakistan is an Islamist insurgency raging in the north-west tribal regions. They have launched a deadly campaign of terror attacks throughout Pakistan over the last few years which have killed large number of civilians and non-civilians alike, devastated infrastructure, and hindered NATO success in Afghanistan. They may be also harbouring high-ranking members of Al-Qaeda. The insurgents are affiliated with various militant groups which pose a threat to the wider region, especially Afghanistan. Tackling this network is necessary to reverse the destabilisation of the Pakistani state and to ensure NATO success in Afghanistan. In 2009 the Pakistani army attempted to pacify this threat in its stronghold of the South Waziristan region in north-west Pakistan. This discussion aims to apply counterinsurgency principles to this particular war and recommend improvements counterinsurgency operators can make for future campaigns. In fact, the counterinsurgents succeeded militarily but the lack of infrastructure building will not ensure South Waziristan does not fall back into the control of the insurgents.
Download the Full Article: Counterinsurgency in Pakistan
Kashif Taher is a researcher and analyst for the Transnational Crisis Project. He graduated in July from the University of Reading with a BA in Politics and International Relations.
Recent Counterinsurgency Operations in Southern Afghanistan
by Brett Van Ess
Download the Full Article: The Fight for Marjah
In early 2010, in response to violent and rampant insurgent operations in the long-held Taliban stronghold of Marjah, located in central Helmand province, the International Security Assistance Force and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan began implementing a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign. This strategy stands in contrast to the counternarcotics and counterterrorism focus in Marjah from 2001 to late 2009. Initial elements of this new campaign plan were implemented in February 2010 when Operation Moshtarak began in Marjah.
This paper details the counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Marjah over the last year. The first section of the paper provides a background on operations in Marjah from prior to 2009 and an explanation of the structural organization of insurgent forces in Marjah. The second section of the paper describes Operation Moshtarak, the February 2010 assault on Marjah. This section details efforts by ISAF and Afghan forces to clear insurgents from their stronghold in Marjah as well as the actions by insurgent fighters to target ISAF forces and to maintain their influence over the population through intimidation. The paper concludes with a discussion of governance and policing efforts in Marjah. Counterinsurgent forces struggled to form a legitimate political authority and police force capable of convincing the local population that a new governing authority would bring security to Marjah. The case study of Marjah provides useful examples of successful and failed tactics and policies for future COIN operations in southern Afghanistan.
Download the Full Article: The Fight for Marjah
Brett Van Ess was an Institute for the Study of War contributor during the spring and summer of 2010. He is currently a graduate student at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He has also studied at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and holds a MA in Diplomacy and Military Studies from Hawaii Pacific University. Brett was formerly a United States Marine. This report was concluded in early September 2010.
by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling
Download the Full Article: Breaking Ranks?
There is no constitutional principle more important to a democracy than civilian control of the military. Unless the armed guardians of the state remain strictly subordinate to civil authority, no other liberty can long remain safe. In "Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional," (Joint Force Quarterly) Lt. Col. Andrew Milburn challenges this vital constitutional principle, arguing that "there are circumstances under which a military officer is not only justified but also obligated to disobey a legal order."
Milburn bases this argument on three propositions. First, that a military officer's commission and professional standing "grant him moral autonomy and obligate him to disobey an order he deems immoral." Importantly, Milburn defines an immoral order as one "likely to harm the institution writ large—the Nation, military, and subordinates." Second, that "the military professional's obligation to disobey is an important check and balance in the execution of policy." Finally, that "the military officer must understand that this dilemma demands either acceptance of responsibility or wholehearted disobedience."
The first proposition elevates military officers to the status of morally autonomous actors ultimately accountable only to their own consciences. Unlike other government officials, Milburn's military professional may substitute his judgment for the will of the public as expressed in law and the lawful orders of elected or appointed leaders. The benchmark by which Milburn's morally autonomous professional makes such a judgment is the individual officer's morality. Milburn's moral criteria are particularly interesting -- the wellbeing of the Nation, the military and subordinates are co-equal priorities. Indeed, Milburn asserts that military officers have "sworn to defend the Constitution and safeguard the welfare of his subordinates."
Download the Full Article: Breaking Ranks?
Lieutenant Colonel Paul L. Yingling is an Army officer who has served three tours of duty in Iraq and is currently a professor of security studies at the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany. The views expressed here are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Army or Defense Department.
Stabilizing One Village at a Time
by M. Shands Pickett
Download the Full Article: The Village Engagement Center
ISAF's brigade-level assets are hamstrung by a forward operating base-centric footprint. To partner effectively with Afghans, the various teams (or "functional enablers" in ISAF parlance) must establish a presence in the villages they hope to assist—a whole-of-place concept called the Village Engagement Center (VECs). Only full-time interaction outside the base gates with both local Afghans and GIRoA counterparts will give ISAF's functional enablers the village-level contextual knowledge necessary to create meaningful change. This is an idea with precedence from the Marines' Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam to a program, the Village Stability Platform (VSP), currently operated by Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan. The Village Engagement Center is not another new capability but is instead an organizing principle for existing assets. It pushes those functional enablers off of ISAF bases, thereby helping Afghan communities to resist insurgent pressures while increasing their stake in GIRoA's success.
Download the Full Article: The Village Engagement Center
M. Shands Pickett is an analyst with the Human Terrain Team attached to TF White Eagle in Ghazni Province. He holds an MA in U.S. Foreign Policy from The George Washington University. The views of the author do not necessarily reflect the official policies and positions of the Human Terrain System, U.S. Army, ISAF or the U.S. Government.
by Mike Lydon
Download the Full Article: Right Tech Solutions for USAF SFA
For the USAF, Airpower and SFA is a ticket out of constant employment of our US forces, aircraft and tax dollars. The USAF must build the capability to directly engage, teach, and support the smaller, poor nations that need our expertise, helping them to defeat local or global terrorist networks and stabilize their local regions.
Download the Full Article: Right Tech Solutions for USAF SFA
Lt Col Michael Lydon is a staff officer in17AF A5/8 Ramstein, Germany, the USAF force provider that directs the USAF Security Force Assistance program for AFRICOM. Mike is a C-130 Command Pilot with two tours to Iraq and Afghanistan. He is a former USAF liaison officer to the Joint IED Defeat Organization and founding member of the HAF A5R-Q Irregular Warfare Office. The views expressed here are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Air Force or Defense Department.
Penny Packets Revisited:
How the USAF Should Adapt to 21st Century Irregular Warfare
by Ben Zweibelson
Download the Full Article: Penny Packets Revisited
This white paper will argue that C2DE in irregular warfare conflicts should be replaced with decentralized control, decentralized execution (DCDE) in a 'penny packets revisited' format utilizing lessons drawn from the French military in Algeria. This is a three part argument and requires the Air Force to adapt turbo-prop platforms in lieu of their preferred F-22s/F-16s and decentralize them at locally positioned forward operating bases within each irregular area of operations requiring ground assets. Lastly, the Combined/Joint Force Air Component Commander (C/JFACC), Joint Air Tasking Cycle, Joint Air and Space Operations Plan, Air Operations Directive, and Master Air Attack Plan all need significant dismantlement and refinement in irregular conflict environments for this 'penny packets revisited' to work.
Download the Full Article: Penny Packets Revisited
Major Ben Zweibelson is an active duty Infantry Officer currently attending the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a Masters in Liberal Arts from Louisiana State University and a Masters in Military Arts and Science from the Air Force. He participated in two deployments to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
A Question of Super-Empowerment
by Adam Elkus and Captain Crispin Burke
Download the Full Article: A Question of Super-Empowerment
Military operations have always been subjected to the effects of disruptive powers far beyond the control of the field commander. From the court intrigues of the past to today's domestic catfights, politics has definitely never stopped at the water's edge. Events such as the recent series of WikiLeaks scandals and Rolling Stone's expose on General Stanley McChrystal are evolutionary, rather than revolutionary in nature.
Nevertheless, analysts and pundits have pointed out that modern information technology and media have allowed elements beyond the military's direct control—so-called "super-empowered" individuals—greater opportunities to alter state policy through disruptive actions. However, neither WikiLeaks nor the McChrystal scandal significantly altered war policy. Momentary disruption, no matter how severe, does not matter if the basic policy remains unchanged. Both cases suggest that we ought to have a more tempered view of technology, individual influence, and change.
Download the Full Article: A Question of Super-Empowerment
Adam Elkus is an analyst specializing on foreign policy and security. He has published on defense issues in Small Wars Journal, West Point Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, Defense Concepts, and other publications. He is currently the Associate Editor of Red Team Journal. He is currently pursuing graduate study at Georgetown in security studies.
Captain Crispin Burke is a UH-60 helicopter pilot with assignments in the 82nd Airborne Division during Hurricane Katrina, Joint Task Force-Bravo in Honduras, and the 10th Mountain Division in Iraq. He is currently an observer/controller at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. He writes for Small Wars Journal and under the name "Starbuck at his blog, Wings Over Iraq.
by Dale C. Eikmeier
Download the Full Article: Design for Napoleon's Corporal
This explanation of FM 5-0's Design is for the Everyman, or as the title suggests the proverbial Napoleon's Corporal. It is for those with a need to use Design but lack a100 plus hours of specialized Design instruction. The focus here is on the "how to" techniques of Design rather than its cognitive theories. More simply this is about telling time, not building a watch. The techniques offered are only suggestions or aids, not prescriptions. These techniques are meant to serve as start points or considerations as the Design process starts and hopefully contribute to a better Design outcome.
Download the Full Article: Design for Napoleon's Corporal
Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier (Ret) is a faculty member in the Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He also served on the faculty at the U.S. Army War College. COL Eikmeier served in a variety of command and staff positions in the United States, Iraq, Qatar, Germany and Korea.
Brussels, Belgium
September 27, 2010
Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV
Commanding General, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
Read LTG Caldwell's Full Prepared Remarks to NATO's Military Committee
If we do not continue to resource the training mission in Afghanistan, we will definitely delay transition.
Tactical gains on the battlefield will not be enduring without a self-sustaining Afghan Security Force. To create this force, we must professionalize the police, army, and air forces; create viable logistics and medical systems; and improve the infrastructure and the institutions that train and educate them...above all, we MUST have the trainers to develop them. We cannot meet our goals without the resources to achieve them. As our Secretary General said recently, "no trainers, no transition."
This transition to Afghan lead is critical to Afghanistan and requires Afghan soldiers and police that are capable of independent security operations and have the capacity to generate and sustain their own forces. To do this, we must support the Afghan government in the development of this capacity, while building systems to set the conditions for transitioning the lead ...in other words ...developing the Afghan National Security Force is transition.
As SACEUR said earlier this month while visiting us in Afghanistan, "Training is Job One." Our most urgent need to accomplish this job is getting the coalition trainers required. We are at a critical stage in the development of the Afghan National Security Force. This past year our focus was on generating quantity...combat formations, battalions that we sent into the fight. But now, we must create a force that can generate, equip, and sustain itself to serve and protect its people; therefore, we must build the critical support formations over the next year, and professionalize this force. Accomplishing this will require additional NATO institutional trainers with special skill sets...skill sets to create and develop Afghan logisticians, maintainers, communicators, intel analysts, and the leaders this security force requires. The majority of this increase occurs in the six month period between this December... and next May. If we do not resource this critical phase of the mission...and resource it soon...the Afghan National Security Force will not be self-sufficient... in time to begin the process of transition next year. If they are not self-sufficient, then we... cannot transition...
Read LTG Caldwell's Full Prepared Remarks to NATO's Military Committee
SWJ Editors' Note: Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell, IV is Commander of NATO Training Mission Afghanistan and Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan. You can access LTG Caldwell's NTM-A / CSTC-A speeches, interviews, videos, and blog entries here.
Tough Choices for Advisors, Mentors and Teams Leaders
by Gene C. Kamena
Download the Full Article: Mission and Morality
In a recent article published in Foreign Affairs, Robert M. Gates, our Secretary of Defense, stated "Within the military, advising and mentoring indigenous security forces is moving from the periphery of institutional priorities, where it was considered the province of the Special Forces, to being a key mission for the armed forces as a whole." The number of military advisors, mentors and special team leaders, directly involved in training our allies continues to grow and will be of keen interest for some time to come.
Advisors and team leaders undergo specialized training and for the most part are prepared to face the challenges of their duties. However there is one shortfall, a gap so to speak, in the training of advisors, mentors and team leaders (grouped and termed "advisors" for the purposes of this article.) Advisors often confront crime, corruption and immorality (CCI) on the part of our host nation partners -- a task requiring more attention, research and resources.
Download the Full Article: Mission and Morality
Professor Gene C. Kamena currently teaches Leadership and Ethics at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama. He is a retired Army Infantry Colonel.
Defense, Diplomacy, and Development as a Modern American Foreign Policy
by Captain Nathan Finney
Download the Full Article: A Culture of Inclusion
Observers and commentators on modern American foreign policy have consistently identified that collaboration between the elements of national power appear to be punctuated by years of uncoordinated programs and internecine fighting. In the past the U.S. approach (to foreign policy) was a rather messy amalgam of the dominant preoccupations of the Department of Defense, State Department, and USAID, oftentimes in that order. Broadly speaking, the Pentagon views fragile and post-conflict states primarily through the national security prism, as part of a larger counterterrorist and counterinsurgency agenda, with a particular focus on the Muslim world; the State Department is preoccupied with transforming a wider range of weak and war-torn states into effective democracies; and USAID regards state weakness as a developmental challenge to be addressed by working with local actors to create the institutional foundations of good governance and economic growth.
In response a 3D (defense, diplomacy, and development) approach is a recent concept described by senior U.S. government officials, including the Secretary of Defense in his Landon Lecture at Kansas State University and the then Secretary of State-select in her testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee. This approach highlights the need for an increased focus on balancing defense, diplomatic, and developmental elements of national power. It provides "a national security tool chest that has been enhanced with a wide variety of capabilities which would flow from the integration of our nation's soft power."
Download the Full Article: A Culture of Inclusion
Captain Nathan K. Finney, U.S. Army, is a strategist and currently serving with the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan in Kabul, Afghanistan. Captain Finney was previously a doctrine writer and wrote the Security Sector Reform section of Joint Publication 3-07, Stability Operations.
by Francisco José Moreno
Download the Full Article: Terrorism, COIN, and National Security
As a reaction to the 9/11 attacks, the United States invaded Afghanistan to kill or capture Osama bin Laden and to destroy his organization. The pursuit of bin Laden and Al Qaeda soon became a battle against the Taliban and as time passed the original mission receded into the background.
The Taliban lost control of the government, but it did not wither away. As the search for terrorists in Afghanistan turned into an all-out war against the Taliban, the 9/11 connection became increasingly difficult to retain. New reasons for staying in Afghanistan were then offered. In March 2003 the U.S. undertook the invasion of Iraq. While the new explanations for the Afghanistan war had been a stretch, the attack on Iraq obeyed no discernible logic and the attempts to justify it were mere fabrications. Despite the repugnant character of his regime, Saddam Hussein had no involvement with 9/11 and, as far as anyone has been able to show, posed no threat to any vital American interest.
The balance sheet of American actions in Afghanistan and Iraq is not a positive one.
Download the Full Article: Terrorism, COIN, and National Security
Francisco Jose Moreno is a political and economic consultant based in Miami, FL, who has published numerous books and articles on U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security. He was a professor of political science at New York University for over 20 years, chair of the NYU Politics Department, and a lecturer of economics at the University of California, Berkeley. Prior to his academic career, Dr. Moreno served six years in the U.S Army and Army Reserve, including four years in Army Intelligence and Psychological Warfare. Mr. Moreno holds a PhD from NYU as well as degrees in Law and Economics from Havana University.
Overcoming Afghanistan's Geopolitical Barriers
by James C. Larsen and Scott Kesterson
Download the Full Article: Three Wickets and A Bulldozer
This strategic and operational-level proposal discusses some of the important dynamics at play in Eastern and Southern Afghanistan, as observed by the authors from 2002 - 2009. It identifies key, positive catalysts that have been largely overlooked or under emphasized by the Coalition, its international and interagency partners, and the Afghanistan National Security Forces. The authors believe that these catalysts, if applied in a geographically focused and integrated manner, rapidly expand social networks across tribes, increase the amount and fidelity of human intelligence, and multiply areas of influence to overcome Afghanistan's geopolitical boundaries. This proposal offers an Afghan-centric and network-centric approach to counterinsurgency that ultimately leads to insurgent defeat in Afghanistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan, as well as a unified Afghanistan with rule of law and economic prosperity.
Download the Full Article: Three Wickets and A Bulldozer
Colonel James C. Larsen is an active duty Infantry Officer who served in various command and staff positions during multiple deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Panama, and Bosnia. Currently, he serves as the Commander of the Warrior Transition Brigade, WRAMC.
Scott Kesterson is an Emmy Award winning videographer and documentary filmmaker who's first film At War is due for release in late 2010.
Conflict resolution and the problem with being 'reasonable'
by Imogen Baxter and Robert Crowcroft
Download the Full Article: The Troubles in Northern Ireland
Recent events have brought a stark warning that, when it comes to peacemaking and the resolution of conflicts, pinning hopes on goodwill, or asking people to be 'reasonable', is just not enough. The morass between Israel and the Palestinian territories, in Afghanistan, or in Iraq, illustrate that every week. Now we have had another reminder, much closer to home, from an old foe. There have been multiple incidents related to dissident Republican terrorist groups. Indeed, there has been a significant surge in dissident activity throughout this year, including widespread rioting in Catholic areas of Belfast in July. On 14 August, a bomb detonated in a wheelie bin in Lurgan, injuring three children. Beforehand warnings were given of a bomb being placed near a school; the suspicion is that the device exploded prematurely, it being intended to kill the police officers searching in response to the school threat. That night, police officers investigating warnings of other devices were attacked by petrol bombs and missiles. On 16 August, Patrick Mercer MP expressed the view that Oglaigh na hEireann, a splinter group from the Continuity IRA, aim to renew attacks on British targets. When faced with this kind of situation, it is all too easy to simply cross our fingers and hope for the best. It is similarly tempting to shout 'Oh, come on!' at the television screen. But hoping for 'reasonableness' as a means of resolving conflict is inadequate, and Northern Ireland illustrates this point well; perhaps too well.
One of the worst fallacies in contemporary public life is the plea that if only people were more 'reasonable', problems could be resolved to everyone's satisfaction. The academic Professor Mary Kaldor, in a major book on modern war, actually contends that 'No solution is workable based on the political goals of the warring parties ... Once the values of inclusion, tolerance, and mutual respect are established, the territorial solutions will easily follow.' The unstated assumption in this view of the world is that if we approach a problem in a spirit of conciliation and willingness to see the other side's point of view, a successful compromise can be found. But this underrates the sheer difficulty of reconciling conflicting interests; of bridging gaps; and locating solutions. Look at the ongoing border tensions involving Venezuela, the Columbian government, and the FARC rebels. Clearly, human reason can only take us so far. The blunt truth is that people will disagree over really important things, and are sometimes —to fight, and kill, each other. In its implications this is tragic, and saying it often provokes hostility. But realising its essential truth should be part of debate in a mature democracy. It is comforting to think that if we were only more reasonable everything would be alright. Unfortunately it isn't true.
Download the Full Article: The Troubles in Northern Ireland
Imogen Baxter studies International History and Politics at the University of Leeds; this essay is adapted from an undergraduate piece that won an international award. Dr. Robert Crowcroft is a specialist in British politics and defence, and the author of 'Attlee's War' (I.B. Tauris, forthcoming 2011). He is currently researching the relationship between the British Ministry of Defence and Foreign Office.
Is this the Army's EBO?
by Andrew B. Nocks
Download the Full Article: The Mumbo-Jumbo of Design
The United States Army (and Joint Community) has been on a Design path before. In 2002, the United States Air Force began its campaign to explain to the broader joint community the power and value of the emergent concept of Effects-based Operations (EBO). In a condition setting white paper, it stated upfront that "...the concept of EBO is not well understood and requires further elaboration to ensure it is used properly. EBO is not a new form of warfighting, nor does it displace any of the currently recognized forms of warfare. EBO is a way of thinking or a methodology for planning, executing, and assessing operations designed to attain specific effects required to achieve desired national security outcomes."
The joint community embraced what the Air Force was selling and EBO began its proliferation across the services, to include the United States Army. "While EBO is not a joint or Army doctrinally approved concept, many commanders have found EBO beneficial, and incorporated aspects of the concept into their decision-making and staff process. Effects-based operations is both a way of thinking about operations and a set of processes and procedures for planning, executing, and assessing operations." After a period of several years and continuous dialogue, discussion and debate internal and external to the Army, in July 2008 General James N. Mattis, USMC, who commanded the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), issued a decree that EBO in and of itself was dead as a foundational concept for joint or service operations. General Mattis stated " After a thorough evaluation, it is my assessment that the ideas reflected in EBO, ONA, and SoSA have not delivered on their advertised benefits and that a clear understanding of these concepts has proven problematic and elusive for US and multinational personnel.... It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations."
Download the Full Article: The Mumbo-Jumbo of Design
Lieutenant Colonel Andrew B. Nocks, U.S. Army, Retired, serves as an Assistant Professor in the Center for Army Tactics, U.S. Army Command and General Staff School. He holds a B.S. from the United States Military Academy and a M.S. in Administration from Central Michigan University. He served in numerous command, operations and planning positions during his 22 years of active duty service. His last operational assignment was with the 3rd US Army, Coalition Forces Land Component Command's (CFLCC) Deep Operation Coordination Cell (DOCC) during OEF-1.
by John D. Johnson
Download the Full Article: The Iranian Ballistic Missile Threat
Iran's position in the Middle East is unique. Iran is a Persian country surrounded by Arabs and other non-Persian ethnic groups. Iran is a Shia Muslim country surrounded by mostly Sunni Muslims and some Christians. It sees the presence of Western militaries in neighboring countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. As such, Iran perceives an existential threat. Feeling threatened, Iran continues to develop offensive and defensive military capabilities including long-range ballistic missiles and proxy groups, and probably views a nuclear-armed ballistic missile as a credible deterrent against an external attack.
The threats posed by Iran's ballistic missiles and the nexus of Iran's ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs are of great concern to the U.S., NATO, and the international community. While Iran claims its missiles are defensive in nature and its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, insufficient cooperation and transparency on Iran's part leaves these claims open to serious debate.
Given Iran's military capabilities and ambiguous intent, the international community has gone to great lengths to engage Iran diplomatically. The U.S., NATO members and Middle Eastern countries have also engaged in threat mitigation activities including non-proliferation efforts, economic sanctions and the deployment of missile defense systems.
In September 2009, President Barack Obama announced a new U.S. missile defense policy for Europe called the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA). The new U.S. approach is largely based upon the growing threat posed by Iran's ballistic missile capability.
At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO will consider the Iranian ballistic missile threat and decide whether to make missile defense of Alliance territory a NATO mission.
This article examines NATO and U.S. perspectives of the threat posed by Iran's ballistic missiles, reviews missile defense policies, and makes recommendations related to NATO missile defense policy as follows:
- NATO should make missile defense a NATO mission at its November Summit.
- NATO should merge the U.S. PAA capabilities with NATO's Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) capabilities to create one overarching NATO missile defense shield.
- NATO members should agree to provide funding and to make national contributions to the overall missile defense shield (e.g., Aegis-capable ships and the purchase of SM-3 missiles for those ships).
- NATO should increase cooperation with Russia on missile defense, particularly where PAA plans are being laid to place future missile defense infrastructure in Eastern Europe.
- NATO should intensify nuclear and missile nonproliferation strategies vis-í -vis Iran; the U.S. and NATO must engage countries such as Russia, Turkey, China and India to find common ground on the implementation of UNSC sanctions.
This article first looks at perspectives of the Iranian ballistic missile threat, followed by a review of NATO and U.S. missile defense policy for Europe, and concludes with several analytical findings.
Download the Full Article: The Iranian Ballistic Missile Threat
Lieutenant Colonel John D. Johnson is a U.S. Army Senior Fellow assigned to the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. He holds a B.A. Degree in Business Finance from Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, Texas, a M.A. Degree in International Relations from Alliant International University, San Diego, California, and a M.M.A.S. Degree in Strategy from the U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. LTC Johnson has served in a variety of command and staff positions with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of the Army Staff, U.S. Army Europe, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (Baghdad), III Corps, U.S. Division South-Iraq (Basra), 1st Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, and 501st Military Intelligence Brigade.
by Roy Keyes
Download the Full Article: Hezbollah: The Party of God
Viewed as both hero and villain, Hezbollah is possibly the most dangerous terrorist organization in the world today. Hezbollah's worldview is fueled by the perception that the Muslim world is experiencing a period of deep crisis and as a result, members of the organization are encouraged to strike at the forces of evil in the world in order to accelerate the final battle between Muslims and the West (Hezbollah Dossier, 2009).
Download the Full Article: Hezbollah: The Party of God
Roy Keyes graduated from American Military University in 2010 with a BA in Intelligence Studies Specializing in Terrorism Studies. He is an amateur military historian who concentrates on World War II and the current Global War on Terror. He runs a small blog called Cowboy Jihad which follows events in Southwest Asia and the Middle East.
by Ronald Holt
Download the Full Article: The Use of Pseudo-Operations in the AFPAK Theatre
What would be the effect if we had small integrated groups of former Taliban and US Special Operators working together, masquerading as Taliban, living off the villagers as the Taliban do, and feeding USSOCOM actionable HUMINT?
This short paper is designed to be a "thought-piece" with the purpose of stimulating "out of the box" ideas. Pseudo Operations involve recruiting and training ex-insurgents to operate as insurgents and produce intelligence, cause enemy casualties, and create distrust between the local population and the insurgents. Such on the ground intelligence gives a deeper picture of enemy intentions, infiltration routes and support amongst the local population. Real- time intelligence can lay the groundwork for successful direct actions missions. Sometimes pseudo-operators will disguise themselves as members of adjacent countries' military in order to operate in enemy sanctuaries. In this paper I will argue that Pseudo-Ops might be of use given the current situation in AFPAK and particularly in southern Afghanistan and in areas of Pakistan such as North Waziristan or even Baluchistan.
Download the Full Article: The Use of Pseudo-Operations in the AFPAK Theatre
Dr. Ronald Holt is a tenured Professor of Anthropology and Fulbright Scholar. He was the senior social scientist for Human Terrain Team AF-1 at FOB Salerno Afghanistan in 2008. Dr. Holt has done fieldwork in several Islamic countries and with Native American tribes.
by Gene C. Kamena
Download the Full Article: Iraq: Finding a Victory
When the President announced the end to combat operations in Iraq; Operation Iraqi Freedom ended, but is our mission in Iraq finished? As one of over a million veterans who served and fought in Iraq, I cannot help but ask, "Did we win and was this effort worthwhile?" Were the seven and half years of American commitment worth the cost in terms of lives, national treasure, and disruption to families? Today, it feels like a hollow victory; fifty thousand fellow Americans are still in Iraq, the Iraqi government is in turmoil, and violence is on the rise. In this war where nothing was as it appeared, the enemy at night acted as your friend during the day, and liberators were often painted bad as people in the international media. Alas, it may be fitting to have an inconclusive end to our involvement in Iraq.
Download the Full Article: Iraq: Finding a Victory
Professor Gene C. Kamena currently teaches Leadership and Ethics at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama. He is a retired Army Infantry Colonel. He holds a B.A. in History from Auburn University and a Masters Degree in Military Art and Science from Central Missouri University. He graduated from the Army War College in 1998 and Commanded the 2nd Brigade, 1AD. He also served as the Chief of Staff for the 1st Infantry Division, Director of Staff of U.S. Space Command and the Deputy Chief of Staff for U.S. Northern Command, Director for Iraqi Security Forces and formed and led an Iraqi Special Border Commando Brigade on the Syrian border. His operational deployments include; Desert Shield Desert Storm, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Iraq (OIF).
Plan Mexico?
Towards an Integrated Approach in the War on Drugs
by Alfonso Reyes
Download the Full Article: Plan Mexico?
The illegal drug trade has been present in Mexico since the beginning of the twentieth century when prohibition of the opium trade started. Since then, the social harm of the illegal drug trade in all its forms has been constantly increasing. Today, the most obvious example of the social harm of the illegal drug trade in Mexico is drug-related crime. As a result, Mexican authorities have launched a frontal attack against the drug cartels in an effort to reduce drug-related violence. However, the results of these efforts have not been as expected. One of the main problems that Mexican authorities face in their war on drugs is the lack of a well-coordinated anti-drug strategy to fight the illegal drug trade. Further, the efforts made by the Mexican government are based on a supply-reduction approach that has proved ineffective both in Mexico and around the world over the last century because it is not aimed at the social roots of the illegal drug trade. Thus, Mexico's war on drugs has become a never-ending story. This thesis traces this history and then proposes a broader integrated approach based on attacking the roots of the illegal drug trade in Mexico.
Download the Full Article: Plan Mexico?
Commander Alfonso Reyes is a Mexican Naval Infantry Officer and former student of the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He has served in various leadership positions in the Mexican Navy. The views expressed in this paper are the authors and do not represent the views of the Mexican Navy.
by William O'Hara
Download the Full Article: Drone Attacks and Just War Theory
The philosopher Cicero once wrote: Silent enum leges inter arma -- or laws are inoperative in war. Despite the temptation in the age of technology to utilize new combative innovations to their full and most exact advantage, we must not fall prey to the falsehood presented by our Roman ancestor. With a new capability for waging war comes the requirement of determining in what capacity that capability should be utilized within the confines of a modern limited war. It is with this in mind that the United States tactic of targeted killing utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles (termed drones) must be evaluated. While the Obama administration insists that they have been following all laws of war in the execution of their strikes, not all of the international community agrees.
Utilizing the most fundamental principles of the law of war -- Just War Theory (JWT) -- this paper aims to frame the discussion surrounding targeted killing. Much of the international law applicable to drone attacks are derived from JWT, but current interpretations of that law are often quite diverse, from the hawkish to the overtly pacifistic. Some insist that the standing law indicates that drone strikes should be nearly unlimited; others argue that the practice should be conducted on a significantly limited basis. This paper will utilize thought from contemporary JWT scholars and the underlying purpose of limited war in an attempt to find a common ground in statutory interpretation.
While JWT offers guidance on both when to use force and how to use force, this paper will focus on the latter, commonly recognized as the jus in bello principles of distinction and proportionality used to conduct a limited war. Part I of the paper will provide a synopsis of JWT jus in bello development and principles, and how it has been adopted into both customary international law and international treaties. Part II of this paper will first apply JWT derived standing law to a standard example of drone targeted killings. Subsequently, JWT principle and law will be applied to two different case studies in which the utilization of drones threatens to breach the boundaries of JWT, while providing guidance as to where hard lines on the jus in bello application of drones should be drawn. The case studies serve one purpose -- to create a fertile environment for different interpretations of jus in bello principles (codified into law) to be discussed. These interpretations, as mentioned earlier, are often disparate; in such cases, the original purposes of JWT, and contemporary scholarship on the subject will hopefully help highlight the proper opinion.
Download the Full Article: Drone Attacks and Just War Theory
Lieutenant William O'Hara is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, and is a juris doctor candidate at the George Washington University Law School, where he is the vice-president of the Military Law Association. The views expressed in this paper are the authors and do not represent the views of the United States Navy or the United States Department of Defense.
by Derek K. Barnett
Download the Full Article: The Fallacies of Fourth and Fifth Generation Warfare
In evaluating current warfighting trends (and reconciliatory attempts to understand said trends), it appears the conceptual model of Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GW) (and, by extension, Fifth-Generation Warfare (5GW)) has achieved a level of dominant preeminence to the point of doctrinal establishment. Granted, there are frequent (and cogent) counterarguments against inherent 4GW precepts, but said arguments appear to face an almost uphill battle as 4GW/5GW concepts have permeated through the irregular warfighting spectrum, becoming established as "common knowledge." As these terms have become commonplace, frequently spoken with self-assured absolution, it is rather troubling that these concepts of future warfare, intended to reveal (as proponents argue) the myopic stasis of "conventional" understanding, have themselves become a closed and limited paradigm. Thus, the inherent problem with 4GW/5GW (and the difficulty in countering these concepts) is the nature of their own conventionality.
Download the Full Article: The Fallacies of Fourth and Fifth Generation Warfare
CTRC Derek K. Barnett is currently serving as an All-Source Intelligence Analyst at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., for an organization that specializes in countering IED threats. He possesses a master's degree in Strategic Intelligence and recently completed a graduate certificate program in Asymmetric Warfare.
Korea & Iraq
by Jonathan Stafford
Download the Full Article: Comparisons in Nation Building
As the American experiment in nation building winds down in Iraq, a perception is slowly being created that combat operations in Iraq are largely over and that the United States is on its way from largely disengaging from Iraq. As the lull in violence in Iraq continues an increasing number of American leaders and opinion makers from both sides of the political debate on Iraq are declaring that the country is stabilizing and becoming a democratic state. For example US President Barack Obama has said:
"Every mission that's been assigned, from getting rid of Saddam to reducing violence to stabilizing the country to facilitating elections, you have given Iraq the opportunity to stand on its own as a democratic country. That is an extraordinary achievement."
Some media pundits have even declared Iraq a "victory" and speculate that US military operations in the country are largely over . Each side of the political debate has their own reasons for declaring stabilization and victory in Iraq. Despite the political calculations behind these views, should these claims of stabilization and "victory" in Iraq be heeded?
The best way to determine if Iraq is on a glide path to becoming a US allied democratic state or the biggest foreign policy blunder in US history is by comparing the country to other historical nation building efforts the United States has conducted in recent history. Often times the war in Iraq is compared to America's failed effort in nation building in Vietnam. However, many forget that America's efforts in nation building amidst an ambiguous and unpopular war actually pre-dates the Vietnam Conflict. America's first nation building effort amidst an unpopular war was not in Vietnam, but rather in Korea.
Download the Full Article: Comparisons in Nation Building
Major Jonathan Stafford is currently serving as a Test Officer for the Operational Test Command. He is a 2000 graduate of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and was commissioned into the Air Defense Artillery. He has served in various command and leadership positions in the continental United States, Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Australia.
A study of Intervention in the Congo (2007-2008)
by Marc-Andre Lagrange
Download the Full Article: When Relief Aid Becomes Counterproductive
Conventional wisdom assumes that insurgencies can be suppressed through the introduction of money and humanitarian assistance into a conflict region. Sometimes, these efforts are counterproductive. Sometimes, the more aid and assistance an external actor introduces, the more the situation is complicated. This essay will describe one such example through my own observations as a humanitarian assistance worker in the Congo from 2007-2008. The purpose of this essay is to describe when humanitarian assistance is counterproductive and introduce a model to assist practitioners working in similar environments.
Download the Full Article: When Relief Aid Becomes Counterproductive
Marc-Andre Lagrange is a humanitarian and relief aid expert specializing in the conflict zones of Africa. He worked on the ground throughout the last decade in the Democratic Republic of Congo. He received a Masters Degree in International Development in 1998 from the ISTOM, Cergy Pontoise and a second Masters in Crisis Management in 2009 from La Sorbonne in Paris
A Campaign Assessment of the US-led Coalition's Psychological and Information Operations in Afghanistan
by Oleg Svet
Download the Full Article: Fighting for a Narrative
Despite increases in military and civilian personnel to Afghanistan, the United States is losing in a field crucial to the counterinsurgency's long-run success: the battle of perceptions. Information and psychological operations have failed to substantially gain support for US-led efforts or gain credible legitimacy for the host nation's government. Two reasons have contributed to this failure, both unrelated to political or military realities on the ground. The first is that communication methods used by the Coalition often do not reach a majority of Afghan citizens. The second is that the specific messages and general themes that actually make it to Afghan audiences frequently fail to resonate.
This paper analyzes Coalition and Taliban efforts to shape the battle of the narratives through information operations (IO) and psychological campaigns (PSYOP). Geographically, the scope of this paper is Afghanistan and to a lesser degree Pakistan; temporally, attention is paid to more recent efforts, although early operations are referenced as well. The paper first provides an analysis of Coalition and Taliban efforts aimed at influencing the information environment. Next, it offers a general background on the role of information operations in counterinsurgency and insights on Afghan society drawn from anthropology. Finally, drawing on the analysis presented in the first two sections, the paper proposes ways in which the Coalition's psychological and information operations in Afghanistan can be improved. The three main recommendations are that the US-led Coalition (1) use more traditional and accessible methods of communication; (2) incorporate ethnographic data into its messages; and (3) focus the overall narrative on the country's tribal and socio-cultural legacies rather than religious aspects.
Download the Full Article: Fighting for a Narrative
Oleg Svet is a graduate of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where his studies focused on the intersection of behavioral and national security studies. He is now working for Strategic Social, where he provides analysis of Arabic-language Iraqi and pan-Arab media for the U.S. military in Iraq.
A Remembrance of 9/11
by Stephen Phillips
Download the Full Article: A Remembrance of 9/11
Five men stood together on the New York subway car as it headed toward the World Trade Center. Any passengers who noticed them would mark their similarities; athletic builds, short haircuts, and each one wearing the exact same black backpack. A first guess might be that they were missionaries, that their bags were filled with Bibles and proselytizing literature. These men were in fact on a mission, not to convert souls, but to protect heads of state. Their packs did not contain religious paraphernalia, but carried tools of the trade for bomb disposal.
The U.S. Secret Service utilizes military Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Technicians to provide bomb search services. Thus, EOD Techs often wear civilian clothes and carry Department of Defense credentials while assisting the USSS in providing a safe environment for the president, presidential candidates, or visiting heads of state. One of the busiest times for the latter mission is during the U.N. General Assembly when dozens of kings, queens, presidents, and prime ministers descend into New York for two weeks of talks. This event occurs annually in September.
Boatswain's Mate First Class Jim Prewitt and Sonar Technician Surface Second Class James "Billy" Little were two of the five men from EOD Mobile Unit Six heading to World Trade Center Seven (WTC 7) to receive a briefing on their assignments for the U.N. General Assembly. Earlier that morning the pair found a place to eat a big breakfast within walking distance of their hotel. Prewitt was amazed as he watched Little consume platefuls of food. He knew that the two sailors were connected for this mission by design. Though clearly seasoned, Little was the junior of the two. Prewitt, though not yet a chief petty officer, had achieved recognition as a Master EOD Technician. In fact, when Billy Little was a student at Naval School Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Prewitt was one of the instructors. Such an encounter is not uncommon in EOD. In a small, select community, instructors often find themselves serving with former students. This is an extra incentive to ensure everyone who emerges from the curriculum with an EOD "crab" -- the breast insignia worn by all EOD Techs - is capable. Thus, while watching Little eat a second helping, not a single concern crossed Prewitt's mind about the two of them working together in the most dangerous of environments. As they headed for the subway forty minutes later, events were unfolding that would thrust them into such an environment -- Ground Zero of 9/11.
Download the Full Article: A Remembrance of 9/11
Stephen Phillips served in the U.S. Navy as an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician. He is the author of the award winning novel, Proximity: A Novel of the Navy's Elite Bomb Squad.
Unconventional Advisory Forces in Counterinsurgency
by Patrick James Christian
Download the Full Article: Rebuilding The Force
The United States Military strategy is in the midst of the largest disarray since the ending of the cold war with global communism in the early 1990s. US Ground forces are now split between two competing and divergent missions: Counterinsurgency Warfare and the projection of High Intensity Combat (HIC) capabilities to its potential adversaries. Even as Army and Marine brigade commanders prepare for their missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, they try to retain one set of HIC skills while learning an entirely new skill-set necessary for the unconventional nature of countering insurgent warfare. Most senior conventional brigade commanders do not believe that they can do both successfully, and their use in one (COIN), renders them less than capable in the other (HIC). Finally, the sheer financial costs of breaking and rebuilding conventional force units for their (mis)use in COIN advisory missions will certainly result in decreased COIN mission performance as well as decreased levels of deterrence of the remaining political states hostile to US interests and objectives. Given the reality that our military and diplomatic forces will be tasked with operating in both the unconventional and conventional theaters of conflict for decades to come, a rebalancing of forces against these mission sets is now a stark requirement that we must accomplish sooner rather than later.
Download the Full Article: Rebuilding The Force
Lieutenant Colonel Patrick James Christian is an active duty Army Special Forces Officer who most recently deployed as a Military Transition Team (MiTT) Chief in Iraq, where he now serves as the senior advisor to the Iraqi Counterinsurgency School based in Taji. He has deployed for numerous missions in support of the global war on terror, including service in Darfur Sudan, Ethiopia, and Colombia. Additionally, LTC Christian authored a number of professional authors and co-authored Winning Damaged Hearts & Minds, with General (Retired) David Grange and Scott Swanson
by Morgan Sheeran
Download the Full Article: Approaching Doctrinal Training the Army Way
Our forces were exquisitely trained for the Gulf War. Everyone knew their roles in executing AirLand doctrine. The forces could move forward, backward, left, right and vertically. Each service was able to create the necessary effects at the proper time and place. Specific units trained for the breaching operations, with follow-on operations as their secondary responsibility. They created the breaches while other units passed through and exploited. The exploiting units knew how to breach, but their primary task was to expand and exploit the breach. They were using different tools drawn from the same bag; and they trained these tasks in the standard Army way. Recent history demonstrates that our bag of tricks is incomplete. Army units should have COIN and Stability capability as part of their repertoire. The secret to that is training. The Army can do anything that it properly trains Soldiers and leaders to do. We can look at our own history for guidance.
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Morgan Sheeran is an Ohio National Guard Sergeant First Class with 28 years of experience, including a tour in 2007-2008 as an embedded advisor with the Afghan National Police as part of Task Force Phoenix. (Fort Riley Class 15) Since July, 2009 he has been assigned to the Counterinsurgency Training Center -- Afghanistan as a COIN instructor and has worked with Afghan National Security Forces , the forces of over 25 Coalition nations, governmental and non-governmental civilian implementation partners. An Infantryman and Cavalryman, his career has spanned assignments ranging from Rifleman to Operations NCO and Police Mentor Team NCOIC. He resides in Cincinnati, Ohio.
Hezbollah in the Tri-Border Area of South America
by Cyrus Miryekta
Download the Full Article: Hezbollah in South America
Hezbollah, Lebanon's Iran-sponsored Shi'i Muslim terrorist organization, has established global networks in at least 40 countries. Its growing presence in South America is increasingly troublesome to U.S. policymakers, yet there are few experts on Hezbollah and fewer still on Hezbollah Latino America. Hezbollah's operatives have infiltrated the Western Hemisphere from Canada to Argentina, and its activity is increasing, particularly in the lawless Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. This research was conducted to expose the actions and objectives of Hezbollah in the TBA. The majority of US officials and operators believe that Hezbollah's terrorist wing is separate from its political wing, but these are misconceptions from people who "mirror-image" the American experience when assessing Hezbollah. Unfamiliarity with the organization makes these assessors vulnerable to its propaganda, which is a severe problem that permeates the US government and its operatives. People who think Hezbollah is or could be compartmentalized or disunited are not familiar with the organization and perceive Hezbollah through the lens of the organization's extensive propaganda effort. Hezbollah has a large operational network in the TBA, which generates funds for the party, but its primary mission is to plan attacks and lie dormant, awaiting instructions to execute operations against Western targets. The following is a look at Hezbollah's modus operandi, an analysis of how operational its networks in the Tri-Border Area are, as well as some possible solutions to this threat. First, is an examination of how Hezbollah traditionally operates to establish the context.
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Cyrus Miryekta is a veteran paratrooper of both Afghanistan and Iraq with the 82nd Airborne, who has fought Islamists from 9 different nations in 3 separate countries. He recently earned his M.A. in Statecraft and National Security from The Institute of World Politics.
by Javier Osorio and Christopher Sullivan
Download the Full Article: What the Afghan War Diary Really Tells Us About the Changing Dynamics of the Conflict
The major news headlines that followed the release of the Afghan War Diary, a collection of tens of thousands of leaked field memos from Afghanistan, describe how U.S. forces are battling an increasingly resilient and well-armed Taliban army. Coverage in the New York Times featured two major stories -- an intensive review of events at Combat Outpost Keating, where U.S. forces defended themselves against an ever-growing and more violent Taliban enemy, and the analysis of a half dozen significant incidents highlighting the changing dynamics of the conflict. Coverage in the Guardian, meanwhile, focused on 200 "key events" that documented significant increases in the Taliban's fighting capacity. Indeed, from these reports it appears as though U.S. efforts in Afghanistan are, at best, maintaining an uncomfortable status quo. At worst, the war is being lost to Taliban forces, whom we now know have been receiving aid from Pakistan.
But how can we draw inferences about a war involving more than 100,000 American soldiers and nearly 10 years of combat based solely on a smattering of documents hand selected by reporters? By purposefully choosing to report just a few hundred documents released as part of the War Diary, and ignoring the broad swaths of data contained in the rest of the records, the existing reportage has opened itself up to charges that the coverage is biased towards the perspective given off by those hand selected documents. A better strategy for understanding what the War Diary can tell us about how the war is faring would be to analyze all of the records and let the data speak for itself.
A statistical analysis of the more than 76,000 events so far released by Wikileaks reveals that the war is not faring as reported on in the major newspapers. The picture revealed is actually much worse.
Download the Full Article: What the Afghan War Diary Really Tells Us About the Changing Dynamics of the Conflict
Christopher Sullivan is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, where he studies Comparative Politics and International Relations. Mr. Sullivan is also an International Dissertation Research Fellow at the Social Science Research Council, and serves as Managing Editor at The Journal of Conflict Resolution. During the 2010-2011 academic year, he will be conducting field research for his dissertation on state surveillance in Guatemala.
Javier Osorio is a PhD student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame where he studies Comparative Politics in Latin America and American Politics. Mr. Osorio's dissertation research focuses on the spatio-temporal dynamics of organized crime Violence in Mexico. He currently serves as Statistical Consultant for the Department of Political Science at Notre Dame.
by Staff Sergeant Jeffrey Wall
Download the Full Article: A Rifleman's War
Afghanistan has become a rifleman's war.
Because we are fighting a counterinsurgency campaign against a tribal warrior society we have and increasingly continued to limit the use of supporting arms. Machineguns are even proscribed in villages and cities for fear of inflicting innocent civilian casualties.
The result is that we must rely more and more on our riflemen to engage and defeat the enemy. We know that 52% of the fights in Afghanistan begin at 500 meters and go out from there.
Recent publications by Dr. Lester Grau (Foreign Military Studies Office) indicate that a majority of the fights in Helmand Province are between 500 and 900 meters.
The problem is that we don't teach soldiers to engage with their rifles at those ranges anymore.
Download the Full Article: A Rifleman's War
Jeffrey Wall, now a Staff Sergeant in the California Army National Guard, is a 1976 graduate of VMI, and a former infantry officer in the Marine Corps who commanded infantry and weapons platoons, a rifle company and guard forces and other companies of up to 600 Marines. He retired as an independent business man in 2001and fought his way back into the service after 9/11. Since then he has served as an ETT in Afghanistan in the Eastern Operating Zone at company through brigade levels. At the California PTAE he has trained hundreds of Soldiers in rifle and pistol marksmanship as well as machinegun gunnery. A Distinguished Pistol Shot, he has "leg points" toward distinguished with the rifle and is a qualified sniper. He is the 2010 All Army Combat Marksmanship Open Champion.
Can the Hamlet Evaluation System Inform the Search for Metrics in Afghanistan?
by David Gayvert
Download the Full Article: Teaching New Dogs Old Tricks
After years of tracking and reporting various pacification metrics without a uniform methodology or purpose, in 1967 the US implemented the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) as a critical element in a comprehensive reporting schema that came to include a number of US and Vietnamese metric reports. Although it went through a number of modifications, HES remained in force for the remainder of US active involvement in the conflict, and notwithstanding other meaningful data sources, came to be regarded by many as the single most reliable means of assessing trends in Vietnam pacification efforts. While it had short-comings and its share of detractors, a number of independent studies confirmed that HES was a well-designed and implemented system that met accepted tests of validity and reliability, and provided commanders and policy-makers solid data upon which to base decisions.
Nine years into fighting the Afghan insurgency, neither the US nor its coalition partners have developed a similar uniform means to measure counterinsurgency (COIN) progress. Notwithstanding the hundreds of post-9/11 analyses touting lessons learned, parallels and contrasts between US experiences in Vietnam and the current conflict in Afghanistan, none seems to have considered the development and implementation of HES as potentially instructive in the quest for developing useful measures of current COIN effectiveness. Meanwhile, debate continues over how to track improvement in Afghanistan—which metrics are valid and reliable, how to collect, normalize and interpret them, and how to get all relevant organizations to agree to a common standard.
This essay argues that a conceptually simple approach like HES may hold elements of solution to the vexing problem of metrics for COIN in Afghanistan. It does not suggest that a "HES for Afghanistan" should necessarily replace current data collection and analysis efforts, nor that the metrics and methodology employed in HES can be seamlessly overlain or incorporated into existing intelligence and reporting structures. It does suggest that a careful examination of the development, implementation, modification, and validation of HES may yield clues for those seeking to put in place meaningful measurements of COIN progress in Afghanistan.
Download the Full Article: Teaching New Dogs Old Tricks
David Gayvert is an avid reader of Small Wars Journal, and he currently works as a consultant for the Irregular Warfare Support Program. The views expressed in this essay are his own, and do not reflect the positions or policies of the US Department of Defense.
Design and the Prospects for Deviant Leadership
by Christopher R. Paparone
Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Deviant Leadership
As a follow on to the short essay, "Design and the Prospects of a US Military Renaissance," (published in Small Wars Journal in May 2010 ), it is also important to pay some attention to the potential impact of design philosophy on the institutionalization of leadership -- rephrased, what is the "ideal" leadership model in the context of military design science? Several authors have attempted to reconceptualize organizational leadership to a postpositivist view (postpositivism is the underlying philosophical paradigm shift associated with "design"). The purpose here is to summarize postpositivist views of leadership by three noteworthy authors that are arguably very important to the design mindset: Ron Heifetz of Harvard University, USA; Donna Ladkin of Cranfield University, UK; and, Keith Grint of Warwick University (and formerly of the Defence Academy), UK. This essay will explore the impacts of postpositivist leadership defined by these authors in the context of military approaches to design.
Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Deviant Leadership
Christopher R. Paparone, Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired, is an associate professor in the Army Command and General Staff College's Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations at Fort Lee, Virginia. He holds a B.A. from the University of South Florida; master's degrees from the Florida Institute of Technology, the U.S. Naval War College, and the Army War College; and a Ph.D. in public administration from Pennsylvania State University. On active duty he served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Bosnia.
Assessing the War on Terror
by Colonel Joseph J. Collins
Download the Full Article: Nine Years After 9/11
It has been nine years since terrorists struck the United States in New York, Pennsylvania, and at the Pentagon, killing nearly 3,000 Americans. Few Americans, especially those of us who were in the Pentagon or near the World Trade Center that day will ever forget it. A modern day Pearl Harbor, 9/11 was a day that radically changed our national security strategy. The smoke, fire, and casualties were stark reminders that the United States had failed to deal adequately with an emerging threat. Nine years of war have followed those attacks. The lives of the agents, police officers, and members of the Armed Forces who fight the war on terrorism --- as well as their families --- have been changed forever.
The costs of this war have been high. Over 5,600 American service members have been killed, and 1,050 of our Western allies have perished. Over 38,000 Americans have been wounded; countless stress and brain trauma injuries must also be added to that human toll. The number of Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani dead --- mostly at the hands of terrorists or insurgents --- dwarfs the Western total. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq alone have directly cost the US taxpayer over a trillion dollars.
This anniversary is an appropriate time to think about where we have been and where we need to be headed in this epic struggle to accomplish the U.S. goal to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda and its allies." Much good work has been done, but the nature of the war on terrorism --- the common euphemism for the war against Islamist extremism in its many varieties --- is changing, and the United States needs to chart a new course for the future. It will help any assessment to divide the war on terrorism into four interdependent campaigns: the worldwide campaign, the one on the home front, and the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Download the Full Article: Nine Years After 9/11
Colonel Joseph J. Collins, a retired Army officer, teaches national security courses at the National War College and Georgetown University. From 2001 to 2004, he was deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations. The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the Defense Department, the National Defense University, or any government agency.
An Organizational Proposal for Counter-threat Operations in Low Intensity Conflicts
by Matthew R. Modarelli
Download the Full Article: DoD Special Branch
The United States military must develop a single, enduring organization for gathering and acting upon threat information in low intensity conflicts. Around the globe, current and future strategic partners of the United States are mired in bloody and relentless internal wars for stability and legitimacy of government. Since the early 19th century, the US has played an important role in irregular warfare abroad and as the government continues to identify and pledge assistance to struggling nations, that role will expand and grow. With a growth in low intensity conflict missions comes an exponential need to adapt and apply successful information gathering methods from past conflicts. For the US, victory in today's low intensity conflicts will depend largely on our capacity to enable partner nation counter-threat operations (CTO) conducted primarily by indigenous law enforcement agencies. To succeed in current and future low intensity conflicts, an enduring Department of Defense Special Branch dedicated to the complex mission of working with indigenous special police units and security agencies to gather and exploit threat information must be established.
Download the Full Article: DoD Special Branch
Major Matthew R. Modarelli is a special agent with the Department of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI). He has served as a major crimes investigator, joint drug enforcement team member, and counterintelligence field agent and team leader. He has held four separate OSI field command positions including two command tours in Iraq. He has served at Headquarters, United States Air Force, as the Air Staff Counterintelligence (CI) Policy representative. He currently serves as the Counterintelligence Branch Chief for U.S. Africa Command. He has a BA in History from VMI, a Master of Science in Management Information Systems from Bowie State University, MD, a Master of Military Studies from the United States Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, and is a graduate of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA. His last article on Military Police Operations and Counterinsurgency is currently listed on the Army War College Bibliography for Irregular Warfare.
Shaping the Battlefield in Afghanistan in Dari and Pashto -- not English
by LT Sean "Shoe" Stevens
Download the Full Article: Khastan Tawanestan
How does a nation conduct a successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operation in a country in which it does not speak the local language? Can we facilitate the development of a transparent, corruption-free Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) without being able to communicate directly with its people? These are questions that I wrestled with time and time again during my deployment to Afghanistan. I witnessed first-hand a remarkable dearth in the ability of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) forces to communicate with Afghans. This lack of language abilities in both American military and civilian forces impedes our counterinsurgency campaign. As my tour in Afghanistan progressed, this realization motivated me to attempt—in some small way—to remedy this problem. As a result, I personally taught Dari to hundreds of military members and civilians, and created a six-lesson syllabus for future teachers to follow. While I experienced small successes as a result of my efforts, they were insufficient to overcome the dearth of language capability that threatens to undermine OEF.
Download the Full Article: Khastan Tawanestan
LT Sean "Shoe" Stevens is a Naval Aviator currently working on his Masters degree in Homeland Security and Defense at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.
by Lieutenant General James M. Dubik
Download the Full Article: Afghanistan: It's Not Over
In May, 2007 I deployed to Iraq to become the Commanding General responsible for accelerating the growth of the Iraqi Security Forces in size, capability, and confidence. Prior to deploying, I made a series of rounds in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill. I was met with more condolences than congratulations. The general feeling, no pun intended, was that the war was lost and it was only a matter of time before we would admit our defeat and withdraw. I am getting the same "all is lost" attitude about Afghanistan from what I read and hear around the Washington, D.C. Beltway. We were too quick to declare defeat in Iraq then, and it's too soon to declare it in Afghanistan now.
We are at a crossroad in Afghanistan, no doubt about that, but the future—success or failure—is not predestined. Our enemy may have a vote, but so do we. What we do, primarily in Afghanistan but based upon decisions in Washington and other Capitols, in the next 12 months will determine our future direction.
Afghanistan is not a "war of choice" as some have recently declared it. It is a war of necessity derived from our self defense. The choice has been how we execute the war that came to us with the 9/11 attacks.
Unfortunately, the war was characterized as a "Global War on Terror." It was never that. The war that was thrust upon us is a war against Al Qaeda, their ideology, and their affiliates—one of whom had been, and may still be, the Afghan Taliban.
Download the Full Article: Afghanistan: It's Not Over
Lieutenant General James M. Dubik, U.S. Army (Ret.), is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War. LTG Dubik assumed command of Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) on June 10, 2007. During this final command, he oversaw the generation and training of the Iraqi Security Forces. Previously, he was the Commanding General of I Corps at Ft. Lewis and the Deputy Commanding General for Transformation, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. He also served as the Commanding General of the 25th Infantry Division. Dubik has held numerous leadership and command positions with airborne, ranger, light and mechanized infantry units around the world. He was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry from Gannon University as a Distinguished Military Graduate in 1971, and he retired from service on September 1, 2008.
