Journal

A Disappearing Skill and Misunderstood Capability

by John D. Hurth and Jason W. Brokaw

Download the Full Article: Visual Tracking and the Military Tracking Team Capability:

Of all the potentially valuable skills in the military the one that is most commonly misunderstood and underestimated is Visual Tracking. Unfortunately most opinions are based on misconceptions within the civilian tracking community. Trackers who are teachers of a holistic form of tracking that focus their instruction on a spiritual aspect have crushed any true debate on the virtues of tracking as a military specialty skill. Visual Tracking is not an exclusive skill associated with the Native American, San Bushmen, Iban, or Dyak trackers.

Download the Full Article: Visual Tracking and the Military Tracking Team Capability:

John D. Hurth is a retired United States Army Special Forces soldier.

Jason W. Brokaw currently maintains active military status with the United States Army Reserves, assigned to a special operations unit as a Signals Intelligence Analyst (35N).

The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory

by Ben Zweibelson

Download the Full Article: The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory

Over the past nine years United States counterinsurgency strategy reflected a reliance on Clausewitzian industrial-era tenets with a faulty emphasis on superior western technology, doctrine fixated on lethal operations, and a western skewed perspective on jus ad bellum (just cause for war). American military culture is largely responsible for the first two contextual biases, while western society is liable for the third in response to September 11, 2001. To turn this operational failure around, the U.S. military instrument of power should replace the teachings of 19th century German military strategist Carl Von Clausewitz with Ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu and abandon the aforementioned contextual factors in favor of more appropriate counterinsurgency alternatives. These include an increased emphasis on civil-military relations, jus in bello (just conduct during war) through non-lethal operations, and quantifiable conflict resolution that includes negotiating with moderate Taliban militia groups, as unpalatable as that sounds to military purists. This paper stresses that moderates do not include radical Islamic terrorists or non-native fighters.

Download the Full Article: The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory

Major Ben Zweibelson is an active duty Infantry Officer currently attending the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

A Mandatory Path to Build a Nation?

by Marc-Andre Lagrange

Download The Full Article: Insurgencies in South Sudan

The 2010 elections in Sudan were more than just a formal exercise for the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLM/A). It was for both of them the ultimate test of the capacity of SPLM to turn from an armed insurgent/liberation movement into a government supported by a national army and set the base for separation from Khartoum regime. Immediately after its first elections, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) had to face two small scale insurgencies in Jonglei State. Led by General George Athor and David Yaw Yaw, those two insurgencies, despite their apparent limited scale, had a serious destabilizing potential for the first elected government of South Sudan.

Download The Full Article: Insurgencies in South Sudan

Marc-Andre Lagrange is humanitarian and relief aid expert specializing in the conflict zones of Africa. He worked on the ground throughout the last decade mainly in Central Africa.

by Robert Tynes

Download the Full Article: Children, the War on Terror and Decision Making

President Obama appears to be caught in a dilemma, poised between the hard rock moral choice of human rights and the cold-cocked fist of global terrorism. At least that's what his most recent decision to continue military funding to Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan and Yemen seems to indicate. President Obama has waived the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 for these four countries. The law, which he supported when he was serving in the US Senate, states that the US government shall not provide military funding to governments that use or support the use of child soldiers. That is, of course, unless the President deems it in the national interest to supply military aid to the countries. In other words: national interest trumps protecting children. Yet in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared that "the promotion of human rights cannot be about exhortation alone." What gives?

Download the Full Article: Children, the War on Terror and Decision Making

Robert Tynes is an adjunct professor in the Political Science & International Relations department at SUNY/New Paltz. His research focuses on child soldiers, political violence, and African politics.

Design and the Prospects for Artistry

by Christopher R. Paparone and George L. Topic

Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Artistry

Here, we would like to open a conversation about educating military practitioners, focusing more on the artistry of design (reflective practice) involving the "where," "why," and "how." Through our normative stance (i.e. taking a "should" perspective), we hope the community of educators and senior practitioners are spurred to better appreciate what we argue are the more desirable professional qualities of artistry. To that intent, we admit we argue provocatively rather than seek to ratify the status quo. Our intent is not to suggest current practices in professional military education have no place in the future, but that they must be subordinated to greater scope and methods of design.

Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Artistry

Dr. Christopher R. Paparone is an associate professor in the Army Command and General Staff College's Department of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Operations at Fort Lee, Virginia.

Colonel George Topic, USA (Ret.), is the vice director in the Center for Joint and Strategic Logistics at the National Defense University.

Evolution of Thinking on the War against Terrorism 2002-2004

by D. Robert Worley

Download the Full Article From Conception to Policy

This paper provides a synthesis of information drawn from several efforts conducted by a Washington-based think tank in the 2002 to 2005 time frame. Findings, conclusions, and recommendations should be of interest to senior policy makers across the agencies of the United States Government and members of Congress. Recommendations are developed specifically for the interagency process statutorily housed in the National Security Council. The focus is on three different conceptions of the conflict and how they evolved in the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks. The material presented remains relevant to those who study national security policy and how it is formulated. It may hold some interest for historians. It has been productively employed in a graduate program in government and security at Johns Hopkins University to evoke discussion on national security policy formation.

Download the Full Article From Conception to Policy

D. Robert Worley is a Senior Fellow at Johns Hopkins University's Institute of Government and an elected Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. He has served on the adjunct faculties of Johns Hopkins University's School of Arts and Sciences, George Washington University's Elliot School of International Affairs, and UCLA's School of Engineering and Applied Sciences.

by Irvin Oliver

Download the Full Article: U.S. Armor in Afghanistan: Worth the Effort?

With the arrival of 14 U.S. Marine M1A1 tanks in Afghanistan, it may be worth considering the wider role of armor and mechanized forces in irregular warfare. For many, the initial view may be that mechanized forces have little or no place in Afghanistan for several noted reasons -- the logistical burden of mechanized forces will further strain an already fragile supply chain; the Soviets used mechanized forces and failed; mechanized forces limit the effectiveness of counterinsurgency. While there may be some validity in all of these criticisms, they are flawed or incomplete arguments that rely on shaky assumptions. The primary consideration of the introduction of armor and mechanized forces into a situation like Afghanistan should be the means of employment and terrain considerations.

Download the Full Article: U.S. Armor in Afghanistan: Worth the Effort?

Major Irvin Oliver currently serves as an instructor of Comparative Politics at the United States Military Academy. Previously, he commanded D CO, 1-67 AR, 4th ID and he was the brigade plans officer for 2nd BCT, 4th ID.

by Gregory Conti, Dominic Larkin, David Raymond, and Edward Sobiesk

Download the Full Article: The Military's Cultural Disregard for Personal Information

This article outlines the problem by illustrating the common use of the Social Security number as a unique identifier and pseudo-password in the military services. We illustrate the many ways, both large and small, that PII continues to be abused, as well as common misperceptions. We conclude with actionable solutions that will help correct the problem.

Download the Full Article:The Military's Cultural Disregard for Personal Information

Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Conti is a Military Intelligence Officer and Director of West Point's Cyber Security Research Center.

Major Dominic Larkin is a Field Artillery Officer and Instructor in West Point's Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.

Lieutenant Colonel David Raymond is an Armor Officer and Assistant Professor in West Point's Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.

Colonel Edward Sobiesk is an Armor Officer and Director of West Point's Information Technology Program.

A Political-Military Path to Peace

by Linda Robinson

Download the Full Article: How Afghanistan Ends

This paper presents a scenario for resolution of the Afghan conflict in a manner that achieves U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. This scenario takes the current U.S. approach as the starting point and adds 1) a more detailed theory of the conflict that highlights the political effects that must be achieved; 2) emphasis on bottom-up measures that can produce momentum in the short term, and 3) a political diplomatic strategy embraced and pursued in concert by the Afghan government, the United States and key international partners. Finally, the paper identifies requirements for a smaller follow-on military force to pave the way for a long-term advisory and assistance effort.

Download the Full Article: How Afghanistan Ends

Linda Robinson served as Senior Adviser to the Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence at US Central Command in 2009-2010.

by Robert Jordan Prescott

Download the Full Article: Second Land Armies and Excess Combatant Commands

On August 12, 2010 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced he had ordered a thorough force structure review of the Marine Corps to determine what an expeditionary force in readiness should look like in the 21st century, echoing the intermittent characterization of the Marine Corps as a "second land army." Three days prior, Gates announced U.S. Joint Forces Command, established to foster joint doctrine and conduct joint training and experimentation, would close, asserting the "U.S. military has largely embraced jointness as a matter of culture and practice" and the need for an entirely separate four star command no longer existed. Together, the two steps constitute major components of the secretary's now well-publicized initiative to enhance efficiency across the Department of Defense. The secretary's efforts are laudable, but exploring opportunities within legacy service and combatant command structures will achieve the minimum. Instead of prompting the world's premier strike force to justify itself or closing a command tasked with cultivating a joint force, the secretary should be exploring how the American military can emulate the Marine Corps and become a truly global joint force.

Download the Full Article: Second Land Armies and Excess Combatant Commands

Read more by Robert Jordan Prescott at House of Marathon. He is private consultant to defense industry, formerly in the securities industry who switched to national security after September 11, 2001. He is grateful to have the opportunity to meet and work with individuals who fight and sacrifice on behalf of our country. House of Marathon is a blog featuring essays on American Politics, International Security, and Popular Culture.

The Soviet and American Approaches to the Critical Tasks of Counter Insurgency

by Bart Howard

Download the Full Article: A Well Worn Path

The conflict in Afghanistan is clearly at the top of the list of U.S. foreign policy challenges. Each year more and more resources are committed to the effort to stabilize and secure Afghanistan. The cost of this effort is more than just monetary. U.S. "blood and treasure" is being spilled as Americans debate the potential success or failure in this enigmatic and distant country. Soon all discussion and debate will intensify on the concept of "transition" sometime in the near future.

Download the Full Article: A Well Worn Path

Colonel (Ret) Bart Howard earned a Bachelor Degree in History and was commissioned a Distinguished Military Student in Armor from Santa Clara University in 1984. He holds a Master of Military Studies and a Master of Military Science. He has commanded at the Company, Battalion and Brigade level. He currently serves as the Operations Manager in the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

Editor's Note: This essay continues our conversation with the deep thinkers of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA on the need/utility of rethinking modern counterinsurgency.

by Ahmed Humayun and Ali Jafri

Download the Full Article: Karachi's Ethnic Tinderbox

Over the last month, Karachi- Pakistan's largest city and the center of its commercial and financial life - has witnessed its worst ethnic violence in years. On October 16 a wave of targeted ethnic killings began rolling across the city; four days later, more than 60 people were dead and Karachi had come to a standstill. Since then, the city has been teetering on the brink of even more bloodshed. Why is this violence erupting now?

Download the Full Article: Karachi's Ethnic Tinderbox

Ahmed Humayun is Senior Analyst at Georgetown University's Emerging Threats Project, and Ali Jafri is an Analyst at the Project. The Emerging Threats Project examines the key drivers of conflict in regions of critical interest to the United States.

by Joseph Purser

Download the Full Article: A Response to "A Shot in the Dark"

A response to A Shot in the Dark: The Futility of Long-Range Modernization Planning by Lieutenant Colonel Eric A. Hollister, published by the Institute for Land Warfare, Association of the U.S. Army.

The premise of A Shot in the Dark is that the operating environment of the future promises to be so complex it will overwhelm any attempt to anticipate it, especially in the long term. Therefore, argues the author, strategic planners should avoid attempts to describe the future and instead pursue incremental improvements to the force based on what they can understand now and in the near term. This attack on long-range force planning is in fact misguided, as it misidentifies the true root cause of previous Army major acquisition program failures -- institutional bias. Put another way, the article unintentionally makes the point that Service bias for and against certain military missions overwhelms the ability to objectively develop long term futures studies, and prevents logical force development based on those predictions.

Download the Full Article: A Response to "A Shot in the Dark"

Joe Purser is the Director of a small think tank in the Department of Defense charged with identifying future challenges to the joint force and implications for new concepts and capabilities.

The views presented here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense.

Thoughts on Irregular Threats for north Korea Post-Conflict and Post-Collapse:

Understanding Them to Counter Them

by Colonel David S. Maxwell

Download the Full Article: Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula

What is going to happen on the Korean Peninsula? This is the question that plagues policy makers, strategists, and military planners in the Republic of Korea (ROK), the United States (US) and in Northeast Asia (NEA).

If this question can be answered, the next question is: How will the ROK, US and the international community deal with what happens on the Korean Peninsula?

The purpose of this paper is to explore some of the potential outcomes on the Korean Peninsula following either collapse of the Kim Family Regime or following conventional and unconventional conflict with north Korea as well as to examine some of the possible ways to prepare for and deal with those outcomes. While optimistic planners and policy makers hope for a co-called "soft landing" and peaceful reunification of the Peninsula, prudence calls for planning for the worse case scenarios. This contradicts the current focus of the United States on having to "win the wars it is currently fighting" as stated in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). However, the worse case scenarios are, in the author's opinion, at once both the most dangerous and the most likely threats in NEA and they should be considered. Therefore soft landing and peaceful reunification scenarios will not be addressed. (however, the author hopes they would become a reality). This paper is intentionally provocative, yet only focuses on one of the many complexities of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, namely Irregular Warfare.

Download the Full Article: Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula

Colonel David S. Maxwell is a US Army Special Forces officer with extensive experience in Asia to include Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, and the National War College, National Defense University. He is currently a member of the faculty at the National War College. The opinions expressed in this paper are the author's and do not represent National Defense University, Department of Defense or U.S. Government positions.

Note: This paper will appear as a chapter in an upcoming book to be published by the Marine Corps University Foundation, edited by Dr. Bruce Bechtol.

A briefing that accompanies this paper can be found at the following link: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/6891151/nK%20IW%20Threats%20Brief.pps

How can French Encounters with Irregular Warfare in the 19th Century Inform COIN in our time?

by Michael Few

Download the Full Article: Interview with Dr. John Arquilla

To complement the recent interviews conducted by

Download the Full Article: Interview with Dr. John Arquilla

Dr. John Arquilla has been teaching in the special operations program at the Naval Postgraduate School since 1993. The themes covered in his comments above -- and many other ideas -- are developed further in his forthcoming book, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits (due spring 2011).

by Colonel Robert M. Cassidy

Download the Full Article: A Précis on the Logic of the Afghan War

This Thanksgiving weekend marks when the duration of our current war in Afghanistan surpasses the duration of the Soviet-Afghan War. About nine years ago, on 13 November 2001, the U.S. backed and advised Northern Alliance forces marched into Kabul. Approximately three weeks later, on 7 December 2001, the Taliban quit Kandahar. However, chasing the Taliban and al Qaeda out of Afghanistan required considerably less strategic thinking, resolve, and leadership than it does to design a long-term solution which undermines and precludes al Qaeda sanctuary here and in Pakistan. Pundits, policymakers, and the public are losing patience, wondering, why nine years on, the U.S. and its partners have not been able to yet create durable stability in Afghanistan. The reasons why it took so long to give Afghanistan the strategy and emphasis it required are manifold, and some are explained in this précis. Afghanistan is governable but it requires a government suited to its complex character. It is not the graveyard of the U.S. and NATO. Nor do the Afghans perceive our current effort as an imperial conquest.

The Afghans would welcome peace and normalcy. They have suffered predation and conflict for well over three decades, dating back to the bloodless usurpation of Zahir Shah in 1973. More importantly, collusion between al Qaeda, the Haqqanis, the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, and others in the Pashtun areas, in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, represents the gravest threat to the homelands of the U.S. and its partners. This précis addresses the efforts to help build durable stability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to eliminate sanctuary for al Qaeda and its nefarious hosts. This perspective derives from research which informed a brief the author delivered at the U.S. Army War College April 2010 Strategy Conference and an essay written for requirements at the U.S. Naval War College in May 2010 . The first part, below, framed that presentation and amplified a list of near truisms about the region. Part one also briefly identifies imperatives for success in the theater. The second part lays out the context and the rationale for the comprehensive counterinsurgency argument and the counterterrorism-light counterargument, followed by a rebuttal and a conclusion.

Download the Full Article: A Précis on the Logic of the Afghan War

Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army, is serving in Afghanistan. These views stem from service there and a study on Afghanistan and Pakistan completed at the U.S. Naval War College in 2009-2010. After peer review and editing, this became an article which appeared in the August-September 2010 issue of the RUSI Journal with the title, "The Afghanistan Choice: Peace or Punishment in the Pashtun Belt." The post-peer review printed article can be found at this link. The Army War College brief can be found here.

by Frank G. Hoffman

Download the Full Article: Is Armor Antithetical to Good COIN?

Undoubtedly everyone has seen the recent report in the Washington Post on the introduction of a company of Marine M1A1 tanks into unruly Helmand province in Afghanistan.

Given the rugged terrain and complex nature of the ongoing operation there, the Marines will certainly get a moral boost out of having some armor protected firepower. Surely the Taliban is not happy about this new development unless someone's really trying for the proverbial 72 virgin martyrdom. Taliban elements will not be trying to sneak up on any isolated outposts that have a pair of tanks at the gate either. Ambushes will be more circumspect anytime a tank is escorting a unit. While many a SOF operator will tell you that the drone of an AC-130 overhead is sweet to his ears, the grunts will tell you that there is nothing like the crack and reach of a 120mm gun to keep the wolves at bay.

Download the Full Article: Is Armor Antithetical to Good COIN?

The author is a retired Marine infantryman and national security analyst. He is on the board of advisors or editorial board at Small Wars Journal, Joint Force Quarterly and Prism. These views are his own and do not reflect the policy of the Department of Defense or any agency with which he has been affiliated.

Civil Society and Counterinsurgency-- II:

Recruiting Citizen Armies for COIN

by A. Lawrence Chickering

Download the Full Article: Civil Society and CounterInsurgency II

This paper will argue that expanding our capacity is an important reason for developing a powerful civil society strategy—empowering citizens, who are a greatly underutilized resource, to become active participants in COIN. A common statement of this objective would be to say this will greatly increase "our capacity" to resist insurgencies, but the real point is to increase "the societies' capacity" to resist.

Download the Full Article: Civil Society and CounterInsurgency II

A. Lawrence Chickering is a social entrepreneur and writer who designs and implements civil society strategies in public policy.

Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) Special Report

Download the Full Report: Partnering: A Counterinsurgency Imperative

As statements from the U.S. Secretary of Defense and Commander, International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) make clear, partnering is an essential skill for Coalition Forces (CF). The ISAF Partnering Directive, dated 29 August 2009, provides clear guidance for the practice:

However, while this directive defines what partnering is—and tells us what we must do—it does not tell us how to accomplish it. And make no mistake: effective partnering is hard, complex work. Units in the field continue to struggle to figure out just how to make partnering work on the ground. Fortunately, many effective practices have emerged from the laboratories of small unit improvisation and innovation. The best of these have been incorporated into the recently COIN Collective Tasks for company and platoon level operations, and are also summarized below. But before delving into the critical "how's" of partnering, it is useful to consider more fully the factors that combine to make effective partnering such a powerful COIN tool.

Download the Full Report: Partnering: A Counterinsurgency Imperative

The CAAT observes, assesses, and reports on counterinsurgency activities; identifies best and worst practices; advises and assists commanders at all levels to enable effective, integrated counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.

Interview with Brigadier General (ret) Dr. Klaus Wittmann

by Octavian Manea

Download the Full Article: A New NATO Social Contract

The previous Strategic Concepts of the Alliance were forged in some very different security environments. In that sense some of their elements are outdated. Does the Alliance need a new social contract, a new consensus? On what elements?

A new consensus is indeed required in two regards: Firstly, while in the Cold War era NATO would have fought an existential "war of necessity", with a monolithic threat unifying Allies, in the new and ever-evolving security environment it engages in "wars of choice", "discretionary operations". There consensus is much more difficult to muster, because different threat assessments, historic experiences and national interests come to the fore. Honesty is required about the fact that there are ever more marked regional groupings within the Alliance such as those advocating a global orientation (US, UK, partly Canada); others emphasizing NATO's regional character and advocating cooperative security ("old Europe", but far from being united); several new members who, particularly after the Georgia war, insist on the priority of Article 5 and collective defense; and the Southern members emphasizing the dangers in the Mediterranean region. This makes the need for re-establishing strategic consensus very obvious. Secondly, there is great disunity within the Alliance about several central themes, such as NATO's reach (regional or global), its main emphasis (Article 5 or out-of-area), the approach to Russia, nuclear policy and strategy, and the evaluation of some "novel" security challenges (including terrorism, proliferation, cyber threats, interference with energy security, and obstruction of the freedom of the seas).

My view about how the preparation of NATO's new Strategic Concept has been handled in NATO (with the Group of Experts established by the Secretary General under former Secretary of State Albright's leadership) is the following: Public debate, transparency, inclusiveness are desirable, and the "participatory process" can "loosen the ground" as it were, prepare consensus, fuel public debate and interest in NATO, get the strategic community involved, provide transparency and induce member states to clarify their positions and "show the colour of their cards". But this will not replace the political work governments must do to create or re-establish the consensus on the central contentious issues. That cannot be achieved by informal groups and seminars, and it should not be left to the drafting and negotiation process. Work on a draft cannot create political unity on highly controversial matters, it cannot replace tough decisions. Ideally, the Strategic Concept, to be agreed on at NATO's Lisbon summit, would reflect the consensus established among governments.

Download the Full Article: A New NATO Social Contract

Brigadier general (ret) Klaus Wittmann is former director of academic planning and policy at the NATO Defence College in Rome. In May 2010, he co-authored together with Ronald Asmus, Stefan Czmur, Chris Donnelly, Aivis Ronnis and Tomas Valasek a major policy paper for The Centre for European Reform (CER, London) entitled "NATO, New Allies and Reassurance". In September 2010, Klaus Wittmann also proposed an illustrative draft for the NATO's new strategic concept that can be accessed here.

Octavian Manea is Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy.

All-In at the GIRoA Casino

by James Sisco and David C. Ellis

Download the Full Article: Gambling on the Districts

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is gambling in the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) Casino at a table with a crooked dealer. ISAF is preparing to go all-in at the National GIRoA table, betting that National GIRoA reform initiatives and the recent troop surge will extend accountable, responsive government to the population. At the same time, National GIRoA's dealer is dealing from the bottom of the deck to former Mujahedeen powerbrokers (and possibly the Taliban) to distribute the table's winnings (international funding and key districts) for his own benefit. ISAF needs to diversify its gamble by moving some of its chips from the National GIRoA table to the Local GIRoA table, which has a more legitimate dealer and better odds of winning.

Download the Full Article: Gambling on the Districts

LCDR James Sisco is an Afghan Hand currently serving in Afghanistan. His previous tours include the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, Deep Blue, and service in Afghanistan in 2005-2006 as the military liaison for President Karzai.

Dr. David C. Ellis is a SOCOM human terrain analyst currently deployed to Afghanistan. His research covers peacekeeping, ethnic conflict, democratization, and economic development.

by Richard N. Pedersen

Download the Full Article: Mission command

Mission Command is emerging as a multifaceted construct that integrates the functions and techniques of the art and science employed during the exercise of command authority over missions applying military and other instruments of national power.

Download the Full Article: Mission command

COL Richard N. Pedersen, USA Ret., is the lead mission command analyst at the Combined Arms Center's Mission Command Battle Laboratory. He commanded a Combined IBCT Task Force with duty in combat as Commander, Regional Command-South in Afghanistan; he also commanded BCTP.

by Octavian Manea

Download the full article: Counterinsurgency Insights by Tom Ricks

The US Army Organizational Culture before Emphasis on COIN:

What I saw in Iraq in 2003-06 was a US Army that was focused on destroying the enemy by killing or capturing him. The population was seen as the playing field, not the prize.

The Surge:

The surge achieved its military or tactical goal of improving security. But its stated goal was the larger, strategic one of creating a breathing space in which a political breakthrough could occur. The strategic rationale was to create a breathing space for Iraqi political leaders in which they could move forward. I think it is too early to tell if that really happened. But my gut feeling is that it didn't.

Download the full article: Counterinsurgency Insights by Tom Ricks

Counterinsurgency Insights by Tom Ricks by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).

From the TBA to the USA: Barbarians at the Gate

by Marilyn Stern

Download the Full Article: From the TBA to the USA: Barbarians at the Gate

On October 10, 2010, an illegal Mexican immigrant was found beheaded in Phoenix, Arizona as a result of the Mexican drug wars. On October 27, 2010, drug gangs attacked the headquarters of the Los Ramones, Mexico, police department with grenades and the police force quit en masse the next day. The following research provides pertinent background to the increasing chaos at the U.S. southwest border that the federal government continues to ignore.

Download the Full Article: From the TBA to the USA: Barbarians at the Gate

Marilyn Stern is presently a Master's candidate in National Security at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C.

by Octavian Manea

Download the full article: Interview with Dr. David Ucko

"The conceptual and institutional advances within the US military since Iraq are the product of a whole COIN community."

What was the role of David Galula in shaping the mind of the US Army or the Army Concept? Could we see him as an intellectual founding father? And what specific beliefs do you have in mind when you assess his role in shaping the organizational culture of the US military?

As certain individuals and groups within the US military again became interested in counterinsurgency, this time as a result of the persistent violence in 'post-war' Iraq, one of the more immediate reference points for how to understand this type of political violence were the scholars and theorists who had marked the US military's previous 'counterinsurgency eras', during the 1960s primarily, but also during the 1980s. In the former camp, the thinkers of the 1960s, David Galula stands as an intellectual forefather to much that was finally included in the US Army and Marine Corps' FM 3-24 counterinsurgency field manual; indeed I believe his book is one of the three works cited in the manual's acknowledgements. I think it is fair to say far fewer people have read than heard of Galula, and it would be an interesting study to go through his writings more carefully and see to what degree they apply to our understanding of counterinsurgency today. Nonetheless, even at a cursory level, Galula has been extremely helpful in conceptualizing some of the typical conundrums, dilemmas and complexities of these types of campaigns: the civilian capability gaps in theater; the political nature of counterinsurgency; the importance of popular support, etc. These were issues that US soldiers and Marines were confronting in Iraq and struggling to find answers to; Galula's seminal texts were in that context helpful.

In terms of influencing US counterinsurgency doctrine, perhaps one of Galula's main contributions is the emphasis on the political nature of these types of campaigns, and - importantly - his concomitant warning that although the fight is primarily more political than military, the military will be the most represented agency, resulting in a capability gap. Galula's answer to this conundrum is explicitly not to restrict military forces to military duties, a notion picked up on in US doctrine, which also asks the US military to go far beyond its traditional remit where and when necessary. In a sense, this line of thinking is one of the greatest distinctions between the Army's first interim COIN manual in 2004 and the final version in 2006: in doctrine (if not necessarily in other areas, such as force structure), Galula's view of military forces filling civilian capability gaps had been accepted. Of course, it should be added that all of this is much easier said than done, and perhaps some of the implications of involving military forces in civilian tasks (agriculture, sewage, project management) have not been thoroughly thought through - do the armed forces have the requires skills, the training, and how much civilian capability can one realistically expect them to fill? Also, the danger with following Galula on this point is that by doing what's necessary in the field, the armed forces may also be deterring the development of the very civilian capabilities they reluctantly usurp.

Download the full article: Interview with Dr. David Ucko

Interview with Dr. David Ucko conducted by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).

by Octavian Manea

Download the full article: Interview with Dr. John Nagl

"Counterinsurgencies are after all learning competitions."

What is the legacy of David Galula for US Counterinsurgency doctrine? Is he an intellectual father?

The most important thinker in the field is probably Mao whose doctrine of insurgency understood that insurgency is not a component or a precursor of conventional war but could by itself accomplish military objectives. The greatest thinker in my eyes in COIN remains David Galula who has the enormous advantage of having studied and seen the evolution of insurgency in France during WW2, then spending a great deal of time in Asia, and really having thought through the problem for more than a decade before he practiced COIN himself for a number of years. His book is probably the single biggest influence on FM 3-24, the COIN Field Manual. David Galula is the best COIN theoretician as Kennan was for containment.

What are the lessons of Lawrence of Arabia for COIN doctrine?

Lawrence is more important for insurgency than counterinsurgency. Lawrence was an insurgent himself. The lesson I drew from him is the extraordinary difficulty of conducting COIN, drawing upon on his own thinking about how hard it was for the Turkish army to confront him. Any good strategist is going to look at the battlefield from the enemy perspective and Lawrence did this. He understood the advantages the insurgents have and the disadvantages, and that is probably the greatest insight he provided to the study of COIN. The other significant understanding is when you are working with a host nation population, either leading them in an insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign; it is possible to do too much as the intervening power. Ultimately the host nation has to carry the majority of the weight.

How important is the developing of the local troops for winning a COIN campaign?

Ultimately foreign countries cannot defeat an insurgency. Only the host nation forces can do that. But the intervening powers bring enormous advantages to the fight and if you can properly integrate the host nation forces and the intervening forces you can multiply the effects of both and the natural advantages of both. That is the objective, but we have struggled to do that as effectively as we could, both in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Download the full article: Interview with Dr. John Nagl

Interview with Dr. John Nagl conducted by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).

by Octavian Manea

Download the full article: Interview with Colonel Peter Mansoor

"Local relationships are really the key in winning a counterinsurgency."

It is usually said that insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are always competitions for legitimacy. Could you explain this?

Insurgency and counterinsurgency are essentially struggles for legitimacy and for competing visions of governance and the future. The goal of the insurgents is political power and in order to gain political power they need to show the people that either they have better programs for the future or that the government is incapable of protecting them. Counterinsurgency is a struggle for winning the trust of the population. To win, a COIN effort needs to show the people that continuing existence under the government is preferable to a not-so-certain future. The struggle for legitimacy and for competing political programs is really at the heart of COIN and insurgencies.

Why is the "population" the center of gravity in a COIN campaign?

The issue is that guerillas don't wear uniforms, but rather civilian clothes and fight among the people. It is very hard to come to grips with who is the enemy and therefore killing or capturing them is difficult at best. The Western approach to COIN is to protect the population and by doing so make it very difficult for insurgents to live among them. By isolating the insurgents from the people, their strength decreases. Living among the people and protecting them normally leads to better intelligence which leads to identifying and targeting insurgents. Moreover, by decreasing the insurgent's support among the people you can reach out to the reconcilable elements.

Download the full article: Interview with Colonel Peter Mansoor

Interview with Colonel Peter Mansoor conducted by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).

by Christopher R. Paparone

Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Decision

The proposed view of decision presented in this essay reflects quite a departure from US "PPBE" procedures, "JOPP" doctrine and Service-equivalent procedures, such as the US Army's Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process. US Joint Forces Command recently released a pamphlet that equally subordinates design as process methodology subservient to a rational-analytic model of decision-making. These depictions unfortunately portray design as just another staff method to reach sufficient commander's understanding in order to eventually reach a rational or programmatic decision.

Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Decision

Christopher R. Paparone, Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired, is an associate professor in the Army Command and General Staff College's Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations at Fort Lee, Virginia.

by Octavian Manea

Download the full article: Interview with Dr. David Kilcullen

What would success and victory look like in a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation? What specific role should the Western expeditionary forces should have in this fight?

What would victory look like? It doesn't look like victory in a conventional military campaign. Insurgency is much like a disease. It has very negative symptoms that affect the whole of society. Victory in COIN is a lot less like military victory and a lot more like recovering from a disease. If you think about the last time you were sick, you may not able to get out of bed, you had to take medicine, you couldn't do the things you wanted to do, but gradually you got stronger and you were able to do more. You might have continued to take antibiotics for a few weeks until you were completely better, but basically, sooner or later, you forgot that you were sick.

When we see societies that have recovered from an insurgency, we typically don't see a single big military victory. What we see is a slow gradual improvement to the point where a society comes back to full functioning. Now in the case of Afghanistan the problem is that the country hasn't functioned properly for at least one generation. Afghanistan in particular is not a counterinsurgency in a classical sense. It is actually a stability operation. We really care about the Taliban because they make the country unstable. But there are other things that make the country unstable as well, including the Afghan government, the destabilization by Pakistan, the corruption and criminal activity, the drugs. There are a lot of things that must be dealt with. If we were to defeat the insurgents, in a military sense tomorrow, and not fix all those others problems, a new Taliban would arise next year. We must think more broadly than counterinsurgency in the context of Afghanistan.

What is the role of foreign forces? I think that the role of foreign forces is to create an environment that is conducive to stability and societal recovery. If you think that victory is when the society recovers, then what we have to do is to create an environment that fosters this recovery. But there are limits to what we can do: we can set the conditions for the Afghans to come together or Iraqis to come together and solve their problems. But the long history of counterinsurgency emphasizes that foreigners can't fix all these issues. It has to be the locals.

Download the full article: Interview with Dr. David Kilcullen

Interview with Dr. David Kilcullen conducted by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).

by Lee Lacy

Download the Full Article: A Timely Lesson from the Korean War

The recent removal of General Stanley McChrystal by President Barack Obama as NATO Commander in Afghanistan sheds some light on the complex relationship of the civilian government with the military in U.S. society. The issue reminds us of a similar disagreement during the Korean War between President Harry S. Truman and General Douglas MacArthur. The essay explores the background of this complex relationship, makes comparisons between the two incidents and puts forth lessons learned. An analysis of the two incidents affirms the Constitutional provision of the primacy of civilian elected leaders over military authority. Drawing on archived material from the Truman Presidential Library, historical accounts of the Truman-MacArthur affair and current events, the essay continues the important dialogue of how civil authority and the military establishment interact. Although, first-hand accounts of the Obama-McChrystal affair will not likely be written until the President leaves office, this project serves a reference to study the doctrine of civilian control of the military, for

future generations.

Download the Full Article: A Timely Lesson from the Korean War

Lee Lacy is an Instructor for the Advanced Operations Course at the U.S. Command & General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kans. Additionally, he is a Lt. Col. in the U.S. Army Reserve, currently in command of Detachment 3, 2100 Military Intelligence Group.

The Wikileaks "Collateral Murder" Case Study

by Larisa Breton and Adam Pearson

Download the Full Article: The Wikileaks "Collateral Murder" Case Study

On April 5th 2010 the website Wikileaks, historically known for publicizing sensitive and sometimes classified documents online, released classified cockpit footage of an American helicopter strike on armed insurgents in New Baghdad, Iraq that took place on July 12th 2007. Wikileaks posted 39 minutes of "research" video along with 17 minutes of "edited" content purported to show American troops killing Iraqi civilians and two Reuters journalists in cold blood. The posting received more than 5,000,000 views; commentary from the public was transnational in scope and condemnatory of perceived American action. This type of online messaging is picked up by, and used as an influence tool, by groups seeking a) to discredit Western nations; b) to drive negative perception of the West; and c) to recruit newcomers for physical, material and emotional support for causes espousing violence and terrorist action.

Download the Full Article: The Wikileaks "Collateral Murder" Case Study

Larisa Breton is a strategic communications engagement and influence specialist with a wealth of US Government, commercial digital, and traditional multimedia experience.

Adam Pearson is a Cyber Investigator with Striker Pierce Investigations, LLC, and has over 12 years experience with the Intelligence Community in both the military and civilian world.

Cholera in Haiti?

Send in the Marines

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download the Full Article: Cholera in Haiti? Send in the Marines

The Cholera outbreak in Haiti is an utterly avoidable disaster; and it is likely to be exacerbated by the approach of Hurricane Thomas, but it is one that can still be contained if we act quickly. Cholera is one of the world's most preventable diseases. It is primarily caused by drinking contaminated water although poor sanitation practices exacerbate it. The reason that this outbreak is so inexcusable is that billions have been poured into the country since the January earthquake and some of the most experienced disaster relief organizations in world are on the scene. These include OXFAM; which is probably the most experienced non-governmental organization in the world in dealing with clean water issues, and the United Nations Development Program which has a long history with such emergencies. One can only presume that the Haitian government, which has retaken the lead in recovery, got so consumed with rubble removal and rebuilding that it took its eye off the public health ball. This isn't the time to find fault; the disaster requires immediate help before this epidemic becomes a debacle.

Download the Full Article: Cholera in Haiti? Send in the Marines

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps officer. He is a veteran of disaster relief operations in Bangladesh, Somalia, and the Philippines. He has published several academic studies on humanitarian relief operations.

Operation Yarborough and U.S. Army Special Forces in Southern Iraq (January -- June 2008)

by Duane L. Mosier

Download the Full Article: The Road to Al Amarah

Stability in Iraq and the overall outcome of Operation Iraqi Freedom were in question during the spring and summer of 2007 as the "Surge," the offensive campaign implemented by General David Petraeus, was taking root. Coalition casualties peaked in 2007 with 961 fatalities in Iraq (up from 872 the previous year) as the coalition focused on the Sunni insurgency in Baghdad, the north, and west of Iraq. As a result of the coalition focus, the majority of Surge related brigades were centered on or near the dense population center of Baghdad leaving few available forces to monitor southern Iraq.

Download the Full Article: The Road to Al Amarah

Major Duane L. Mosier served as the SFOD-A 5331 Detachment Commander during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM V and participated with fellow members of the detachment in Operation YARBOROUGH as well as several of the associated events discussed in this article.

Lessons from Vietnam

by Franz-Stefan Gady

Download the Full Article: Negotiating with the Taliban

Despite many critical voices of the overuse of the Vietnam War metaphor when talking about the war in Afghanistan there are many striking similarities between the last years of the Vietnam War and the Obama administrations attempt to extract US combat forces from Afghanistan. I therefore think it is important, given the upcoming NATO Summit in Lisbon in November and the looming withdrawal of NATO forces from the region, to examine the Nixon administration's effort to win the Vietnam War on the negotiation table and to have in Nixon's words "Peace with Honor".

Download the Full Article: Negotiating with the Taliban

Franz-Stefan Gady is an associate at the EastWest Institute.

Is it possible to have Center of Gravity given all the Fog and Friction?

by Grant M. Martin

Download the Full Article: COIN, Complexity, and Full-Spectrum Warfare

The United States Army uses a concept called the Center of Gravity (CoG) to help determine where the focus of efforts should be during warfare. For instance, during recent U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) practical exercises, students many times identified an enemy's most powerful corps or armored division as the Operational CoG that must be defeated in order for U.S. forces to be successful in a conventional fight. In counterinsurgency exercises the CoG was usually identified as "the will of the people", in fact many instructors stifled debate by insinuating there was no alternative. Students took hours to debate CoGs and usually arrived at a consensual conclusion that was widely regarded as wrong by the students. This follows statements made by senior-ranking field grade guest instructors such as, "CoG analysis has never helped me understand a problem" and "getting the CoG right isn't important, doing the thinking is." The possibility that CoG analysis may offer no greater understanding of the true nature of a conflict should cause military professionals concern.

Download the Full Article: COIN, Complexity, and Full-Spectrum Warfare

MAJ Grant Martin is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer assigned to the NATO Training Mission- Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.

Civil Society and Counterinsurgency

by A. Lawrence Chickering

Download the Full Article: Civil Society and Counterinsurgency

Since the end of the Cold War—and especially since 9/11—civil society has become an important potential strategic instrument for both foreign and national security policy. This is obvious from the logic of the new challenges that have appeared from the "weak states" that have become the new priorities for policy. Governments from Pakistan to Egypt are weak because they do not control—or command allegiance from—their largely independent, tribal societies, and they lack the capacity to provide effective leadership for change. The organizations that have an important role to play in influencing these societies are civil society organizations (CSOs), and they need to become active in order to promote significant change.

Download the Full Article: Civil Society and Counterinsurgency

A. Lawrence Chickering is a social entrepreneur and writer who designs and implements civil society strategies in public policy.

Roughly on time (go us!) here's

volume 6, number 10

of Small Wars Journal. It continues our emerging m.o. of presenting an index of

all the Journal articles published in the past month.  This month, in

addition to a few select reprints, we debut some new material with the issue and

present content on two broad themes: 1. Defining the nature and environment of

current warfare; 2. Negotiating the peace. .......

Where, When, and Why Should the U.S. Intervene?

by Carol E. B. Choksy and Jamsheed K. Choksy

Download the Full Article: Stabilization and Reconstruction of Nations

Abstract. Despite the backlash from American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq during the presidency of George W. Bush, the administration of President Barack Obama is finding its international stability and reconstruction involvements expanding. But the U.S. currently possesses neither the resources nor the political will or the public support to maintain sufficiently large military and civilian forces for lasting S&R in more than a few key locales. So why does intervention benefit the U.S.? What are the factors most effective in predicting where S&R may become necessary? How can the U.S. assess the degree of threat when deciding whether to intervene or not?

Download the Full Article: Stabilization and Reconstruction of Nations

Carol E. B. Choksy is adjunct lecturer in Strategic Intelligence and Information Management at Indiana University. She also is CEO of IRAD Strategic Consulting, Inc.

Jamsheed K. Choksy is a professor of Central Eurasian, International, Iranian, and Islamic Studies and former director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at Indiana University. Additionally, he is a member of the National Council on the Humanities at the U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities.

This research was supported by the Indiana Complex Operations Partnership (InCOP) through Indiana University, Bloomington.

by Kaustav Dhar Chakrabarti

Download the Full Article: Building Bridges in Afghanistan

The debate on Afghan nation building has pivoted on the duration of America's presence. The concept of joint India-Pakistan teams across military training, government and development spectrums, presents a wildcard that carries the potential of correcting systemic flaws and resource deficiencies, and also promises to reduce deep rooted mistrusts between rivals India and Pakistan. Joint Indo-Pak nation building teams could concurrently yield four positive results- provide additional resources, bridge ethnic and political polarities, foster cooperation between India and Pakistan and device means to enable them to verify each other's role, and ultimately, present a mechanism to ensure Afghanistan's neutrality.

Download the Full Article: Building Bridges in Afghanistan

Kaustav Chakrabarti is a junior fellow in the Centre for International Relations at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. His research interests include Pakistan, insurgency, civil military relations, and nuclear security.

Design and the Prospects for Frame Reflection

by Christopher R. Paparone

Download The Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Frame Reflection

As we arrive to this fifth in a series of essays on design philosophy, it is a good place to pause, step back, and re-appreciate that the meaning of "design" is metaphoric (as are many of its derivative meanings). The root prefix "de-" is from Latin and means "of." "Sign" has Latin roots, meaning "image." Originally, the word design was closely related to "of image" or human imagination. Interestingly, Webster's Third New International Unabridged Dictionary has dozens of definitions for the word; nevertheless, those who have imported the term to identify it with professional practice borrowed meaning from the field of architecture, signifying "design" is concerned with "the art and science of building." Hence, it is no wonder that those who have used design to speak to professional practice borrow other meanings from architectural design. One such metaphor is "framing;" after all, how can one construct a building without frames? Several images come to mind -- structural frames (that can be blue-printed), roof frames (to block adverse weather), window frames (to see through), door frames (to walk through), and so on.

Download The Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Frame Reflection

Christopher R. Paparone, Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired, is an associate professor in the Army Command and General Staff College's Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations at Fort Lee, Virginia. He holds a B.A. from the University of South Florida; master's degrees from the Florida Institute of Technology, the U.S. Naval War College, and the Army War College; and a Ph.D. in public administration from Pennsylvania State University. On active duty he served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Bosnia.

by Captain Scott A. Cuomo and Captain Brandon J. Gorman

Download the Full Article: CSIS's Afghanistan IED Metrics Report Does Not Tell the Whole Story

We were recently sent the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 21 July 2010 improvised explosive device (IED) metrics for Afghanistan report. This report illustrates a significant spike in IED activity in Afghanistan over the past year. This report also suggests that in this same period there has been an exponential decrease in the number of IEDs found by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) due to local national tips or turn-ins. Upon reviewing this report, we can understand why one might argue that the current counterinsurgency (COIN) operational design in Afghanistan is flawed and/or in part responsible for the seemingly increasing IED threat. For a variety of reasons, we discourage anyone from using this report to draw conclusions on the tactical conduct of the fight in Afghanistan today, especially conclusions about how best to counter the IED threat.

We caution against doing so because the experiences of the Marines, Sailors, and Afghan National Army (ANA) Soldiers that we had the privilege to serve with in southern Helmand Province from October 2009 to May 2010 completely contradict the seemingly logical conclusion that one might make from the report: IED incidents continue to grow while IED turn-ins due to local national tips appear to be exponentially decreasing; therefore, more troops and resources in Afghanistan have not led to greater security and cooperation for and among the population, but rather increasing hostility between ISAF/Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the Afghan people.

Download the Full Article: CSIS's Afghanistan IED Metrics Report Does Not Tell the Whole Story

From October 2009 to May 2010, Captain Gorman and Captain Cuomo served as Easy Company and Fox Company Commanders, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, respectively, in Garmsir District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The views expressed herein are their own and do not represent those of the United States Marine Corps or the Department of Defense.

That may also Mitigate IEDs

by Eric T. Furey

Download the Full Article: A Comprehensive Approach to Local Engagement in Afghanistan

This paper intends to provoke thought on the connection between Stability Operations and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) reduction. Stability Operations emphasizes the need for a simultaneous bottom-up, top-down, and whole of government approach in order to "...outsmart the insurgents and wrest away the initiative." Ultimately, the end state is to link the informal (traditional) local sub-national consensus governance structures with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Afghan Central Government) at the district level. Therefore, one may reasonably ask whether an engagement program with local villagers might also diminish the IED threat.

Experience demonstrates it can. Interviews with US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (Special Forces Team{s}) conducting the Local Defense Initiative program from July 2009 until January 2010 provide evidence that a population-centric, bottom-up local engagement program within the rural areas of Afghanistan can reduce the number of IED incidents. What was further revealed was that indigenous reporting of IEDs and related information increased proportionately to the degree of trust, respect, and credibility developed between local village elders and United States Army Special Forces (Green Berets).

Download the Full Article: A Comprehensive Approach to Local Engagement in Afghanistan

Eric Furey is a retired US Army Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel. He served as a Red Team Leader and as part of the first Red Team (Alternative Perspective) to deploy with the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan from July 2008 to January 2009. He along with his fellow Red Teamers wrote the initial concept and plan for Tribal Engagement. In addition, they created a Tribal Engagement Fusion Cell. Their efforts became the genesis for subsequent local engagement activities in Afghanistan.

by Thomas Talley

Download the Full Article: Southern Sudan - the Four Theses

This paper is not about the likelihood of war in Southern Sudan -- it is about the likelihood of U.S. involvement in a war in Southern Sudan. As with many other interested observers, I have been following the development of Southern Sudan's upcoming referendum with great interest, and increasingly, with a degree of alarm. This paper intends to be predictive -- by discussing the three elements that I believe to be missing from the current discussions and analysis, I intend to show where the official U.S. policy (COA 1) is leading us. Accordingly, this paper will not elaborate further on the other two courses of action. Stated another way, this paper will discuss what will be, whereas the other courses of action offer insight into what could be, or even what should be. Those discussions are conversations for a different audience.

Download the Full Article: Southern Sudan - the Four Theses

Thomas Talley, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, is a Strategic Plans and Policy Officer (Functional Area 59), currently assigned to U.S. Africa Command.

A Primer on Tribal Political Systems

by Stan Wiechnik

Download the Full Article: Governance in the Raw

This paper will introduce the reader to some different types of pre-state or tribal governance systems a person is likely to find in portions of the planet where people are living at just above the subsistence level and there is limited or no state influence. While each culture may be unique, certain commonalities can be seen between tribal people living across the globe. The intended audience for this paper is the practitioner working with these people, be they military or civilian, who are trying to influence the group without necessary trying to change it. To achieve this, a better understanding than might be provided by being told you are going to be dealing with a tribal society might be helpful.

Download the Full Article: Governance in the Raw

Major Stan Wiechnik deployed to Afghanistan as a company commander and Iraq as a battalion executive officer. Currently, he serves in the ROTC Department at Northeastern University in Boston, Massachusetts.

by Mark Schapiro and Stephen Petzold

Download the Full Article: Team Ninewa Models Successful Civilian-Military Unity of Effort

Over the past year within the restless province of Ninewa Iraq, the "Team Ninewa" concept was born. This concept is a highly successful model of U.S. civilian-military cooperation that resulted in an unprecedented unity of effort among the State Department and U.S. military goals/objectives in the region. This unity of effort led to tens of millions of dollars in savings on redundant projects and a highly effective use of Defense and State Department funding streams targeted at very specific local communities. Key to this strategy was "thinking small" -- de-prioritizing large infrastructure projects in favor of income-generating activities for neglected economic actors among Ninewa's myriad ethnic groups and business associations.

Download the Full Article: Team Ninewa Models Successful Civilian-Military Unity of Effort

Mark Schapiro, a career foreign service officer with the State Department, recently completed an assignment in Iraq as the Economic Chief in the Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team.

Major Stephen Petzold is the S9 of 2nd "Spartan" AAB, 3rd Infantry Division, currently deployed in northern Iraq.

Design and the Prospects for Critical Dialogue

by Christopher R. Paparone

Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Critical Dialogue

This is the fourth in a series of short Small Wars Journal articles on design. The thesis of the present essay (#4) is that, especially in a military context, dialogue is central to the method of design. In the midst of operating in highly volatile, uncertain, complex and uncertain (high "VUCA") environmental niches we have to continuously design meaning and find clever ways to communicate about that unique, novel, and highly contextual, wicked situation. We have to continuously and collectively MAKE SENSE when commonsense (the presumed esoteric "science" found in professional groups) does not seem to help. Dialogue is the condition that enables such collective sensemaking.

Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Critical Dialogue

Christopher R. Paparone, Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired, is an associate professor in the Army Command and General Staff College's Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations at Fort Lee, Virginia.

by Dr. Bernard I. Finel

Download the Full Article: Planning a Military Campaign to Support Negotiations in Afghanistan

The policy debate in Washington over Afghanistan periodically lurches from irrational exuberance over the prospects of defeating the insurgency there to a sullen "throw the baby out with the bathwater" phase where everyone begins to talk about an "exit strategy" without much sense of what is left behind. In December 2009, the strategy was to defeat the insurgency, end corruption, and train up a viable Afghan national security apparatus. By later spring 2010, pessimism had set in and prominent analysts both inside and outside the government are now talking about much more modest goals focused on counter-terrorism and regional militias. With the firing of General Stanley McChrystal and his replacement with counterinsurgency guru General David Petraeus, enthusiasm is again on the upswing.

Unfortunately, neither the overly optimistic assessments nor the overly pessimist are likely to be borne out. As a practical matter the United States is unlikely to be able to fully defeat the insurgency -- not necessarily because any shortfalls in military capacity, but rather because of the fundamental implausibility of the non-military elements of modern counterinsurgency doctrine. Economic development is hard enough to promote under ideal circumstances; it is virtually impossible under conditions of "opposed development" where an armed group is actively trying to prevent the initiative from being successful. Anti-corruption initiatives are rarely successful as well and anti-drug programs almost always fail. Clearing insurgent controlled areas is relatively easy. Holding those areas against insurgent activities is costly but not fundamentally impossible. But building responsive and resilient local governance is at this point purely in the realm of conjecture.

But if the counterinsurgency model is flawed in its overly optimistic assessment of the non-military tools available, the alternative approach focused on a rapid transition to a smaller footprint in Afghanistan is also flawed. A smaller footprint approach would have made sense back in 2009, and it may be the best long-term approach. But for the next 12-24 months at least the United States is going to have in the neighborhood of 100,000 troops in Afghanistan. The key is to use this deployment to best effect.

Download the Full Article: Planning a Military Campaign to Support Negotiations in Afghanistan

Dr. Bernard I. Finel is currently an Associate Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College. Previously, he was a senior fellow at the American Security Project, a non-partisan think tank located in Washington, D.C. and Executive Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He holds a BA in international relations from Tufts University and an MA and Ph.D. in international relations from Georgetown. His views are my own and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of the National War College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense.

by David Malet

Download the Full Article: In Afghanistan, Less is More

Two recent developments have brought optimism to some Afghanistan-watchers. The first is the appointment of General David Petraeus as commander of the United States Forces. Petraeus is credited as the architect of the Surge of troops that brought greater levels of stability to Iraq in 2007 when all had seemed lost there, and the hope is that he can cause lightning to strike twice. The second is an anti-Taliban uprising in the Gizab district that perhaps signals a newfound willingness by even Pashtun tribesmen, the Afghan demographic most closely tied to the Taliban, to turn against it and ally with the United States. The Washington Post quoted American officials as claiming the Gizab revolt as "the most important thing that has happened in southern Afghanistan this year" and heralding a "breakthrough" if only the patterns of involvement by local tribesmen could be discerned.

Download the Full Article: In Afghanistan, Less is More

Dr. David Malet is Director of the Center for the Study of Homeland Security and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University-Pueblo. From 2000-2003 he served on the defense and foreign affairs staff of U.S. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle.

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download the Full Article: Afghanistan: It Never Hurts to Talk

Some pundits have questioned the wisdom of General Petraeus' decision that allows certain Taliban leaders safe passage to conduct preliminary peace negations with the Afghan government. He has been second guessed before and has generally proven the critics wrong; there are three good reasons to believe that his decision was the right one.

Download the Full Article: Afghanistan: It Never Hurts to Talk

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who is now a defense consultant and professor at the George Washington University Elliott School.

by David C. Ellis and James Sisco

Download the Full Article: Implementing COIN Doctrine in the Absence of a Legitimate State

The failure of ISAF's COIN strategy to achieve its political objectives is the result of a conceptual error in its COIN implementation framework. Though ISAF places meeting the needs of the population at the center of its strategy, attempting to do so through a kleptocratic, illegitimate, and unaccountable Afghan national government (GIRoA) will not succeed. This conceptual error is due to a reading of COIN theory that defines "the counterinsurgent" doctrinally as the national government. Thus, while ISAF strategy now claims to adopt a population centric, district-focused COIN strategy, it still tries with predictable results to reach the population top down through the very kleptocratic government that has precipitated the current political crisis.

Download the Full Article: Implementing COIN Doctrine in the Absence of a Legitimate State

LCDR James Sisco is an Afghan Hand currently serving in Afghanistan. His previous tours include the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, Deep Blue, and service in Afghanistan in 2005-2006 as the military liaison for President Karzai.

Dr. David C. Ellis is a SOCOM human terrain analyst currently deployed to Afghanistan. His research covers peacekeeping, ethnic conflict, democratization, and economic development.