strategy

Exploiting America’s openness and diversity, various state and non-state actors have encouraged large segments of the population to mobilize against one another and the government to address a wide range of social and political grievances. These efforts have increased civil unrest and created extensive polarization that now defines the American social and political landscape. Not only have they effectively chipped away at any semblance of national unity, they have created conditions that make it socially and politically unacceptable to cooperate or engage in meaningful dialogue with people who hold opposing views.

This article argues that a more comprehensive understanding of lethality is necessary to improve US strategic performance in present and future wars. We argue that central to lethality at the strategic level is influence. LtGen (ret) James Dubik emphasized foreign influence operations as the #1 strategic-level preparation civilian and military leaders must make for the next war. To view lethality only through a physical lens limits its full potential. Take the example of the Vietnam War.

The U.S. government, corporate America, academia and the U.S. Joint Armed Forces must design a policy, strategy and doctrine for a “Whole of Nation” approach for the conduct of warfare.

The Concert-Balance Strategy needlessly cedes terrain signaling weakness and undermining U.S. status as a global leader.

What is the role of allies and alliances in the modern era?  There are four choices for Western governments.

Strategy is one function we perform continuously and tacitly, in part because military justice demonstrates Clausewitz’s timeless caveat about simple things being hard.

Because we love Carl von Clausewitz and the center of gravity concept, we need to grant them a divorce- for our sake.

This essay seeks to de-literalize the word strategy—theorizing that its meaning has been morphologically displaced from an ancient Greek wartime phenomenon.