planning

Over the years I have heard time and again the argument made that “the only problem with the operations planning process is that we don’t use it!” Often this argument is made at a staff college by some “greybeard” or other, although I have also heard it made by other less venerable staff and on occasion even by students of such institutions. It is usually offered as a reason why no reform, change, or update is required to whichever operations planning process is under discussion.

If we want to increase the chances of our missions succeeding, we must first understand the complexity of what we are dealing with and plan accordingly. Moreover, we need to treat planning not as a one-time activity but as an ongoing, iterative affair that is responsive to the continual and multifaceted changes characteristic of complex crises.

NATO rarely, if ever, exercises the deployment to and operation of the force in an environment that is under “hybrid” attack.

If we have our decisive conditions wrong, we will construct the wrong effects and wrong measurements.  It doesn’t matter how good our actions may be.

Danish philosopher Kierkegaard noted almost 200 years ago, “There are only two ways to be fooled.  One is to believe what isn’t true; the other is to refuse to believe what is true.” 

American leaders secured victory by reviewing the strategy and making corrections.  Conversely, Tripolitan leaders placed their faith in a comfortable, outdated strategy.

Why acronyms are ruining shared military understanding.

Deeper understanding of groupthink, its causes, and mitigation techniques should help a commander and his staff prevent it from occurring, and red teams can assist in the cause.

Making IPB an “entire staff” process is critically important to achieve shared understanding of the various mission variables.