lessons learned

Many of the troopers and leaders who were part of the early deployments of the “Global War on Terrorism” have since departed the military. But I know many remain, though for a lot of them, I suspect their experiences consist of deployments involving security force assistance or limited patrols with limited goals as host-nation forces were pushed to take on more responsibility. Despite this, the troopers who are still in our military have valuable lessons that should be passed on to those with less experience.

Ken Burns and Lynn Novick’s epic, 18-hour television series on the war in Vietnam left me feeling the same way that the war did: sad, depressed, disillusioned, and ready for it to end.

This paper provides a survey of lessons learned on military roles in stabilization and reconstruction based on experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and seeks to highlight actions still required.

I still wish I could’ve done more but I did what I could given the time, resources, and understanding (by our leaders) available.  I say this in order to share the following.

This is not an all-inclusive how-to guide to developing a learning institution, but should serve as a springboard for any leader looking at taking their organization in a positive direction.

At present, for every US Soldier there is at least one 20-foot container of equipment in Afghanistan; a quantity that cannot be overemphasized as our military begins to face the challenges of retrograde in earnest.

Counterinsurgency is often a small-unit battle, with company-sized elements requiring organic intelligence capabilities to leverage information into tactical success.

Building a culture that accepts risk requires frank discussion about what words mean and how they translate into action. The Battle of Bunker Hill provides excellent fodder for any leader seeking to develop that shared understanding.

Some of the major “lessons learned” by ISAF while conducting Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations in Afghanistan