Perspective: Unmasking the Turf Wars − The Complex Rivalries of Turkish Mafia Groups in Europe and Links to Latin America
Mahmut Cengiz
Turkish mafia groups have drawn significant attention due to their involvement in the cocaine trade across Latin America and Europe, as well as their internal conflicts within Europe. Recent drug seizures reveal that Turkish traffickers are connected with cartels in Mexico and Colombia. High-level politicians are also implicated in the cocaine trade, which involves drugs being transported from Peru, Ecuador, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela to Europe via Türkiye.
Turkish Jandarma (Gendarmerie) Aircraft, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International
Recently, Turkish mafia groups have started targeting each other. The deadly spree began in May 2024 in Barcelona, where a man dining in a busy seaside neighborhood was shot dead by an assassin. Three weeks later, a drive-by shooting in London injured three men and shocked the United Kingdom (UK) when a stray bullet hit a nine-year-old girl, critically wounding her while she was dining with her family. The violence continued in Moldova in mid-July, when a 41-year-old man was shot seven times while sitting at an outdoor café in Chișinău. Authorities link these attacks to rival Turkish criminal gangs, with two of the victims identified as major mafia figures. This series of violent incidents raises concerns about why Turkish groups are targeting each other and whether the violence will continue.
The rise of Turkish organized crime in Europe can be traced back to the arrival of the Turkish diaspora. In the 1960s, economic difficulties in Türkiye and emerging opportunities in European countries prompted the Turkish government to send workers abroad. Consequently, millions of Turks relocated to Western Europe, including Germany, France, Denmark, Switzerland, the UK, and the Netherlands. The early immigrants, focused on preserving their culture, settled in close-knit communities, forming enclaves over time. During the 1970s and 1980s, Western governments struggled to integrate these communities effectively. While the first and second generations were generally less involved in criminal activities, the lack of integration and the economic struggles of later generations contributed to an increase in criminal behavior.
By the 1990s, crime statistics began to show a significant presence of Turkish criminals in Europe. Globalization further expanded opportunities for Turkish groups to engage in organized crime across borders between Türkiye and European countries. Türkiye's strategic geographic location offered key advantages to these criminal groups, facilitating their operations both within the country and across Europe. This advantageous position contributed to the growth and expansion of Turkish organized crime.
By the early 1970s, Afghanistan had emerged as a major center for opium cultivation, leading to significant heroin production aimed at Western Europe. While heroin was transported via various routes, including the northern route through Russia and the Black Sea or the southern route through Pakistan and the Mediterranean, the Balkans route became the most prominent. This route, passing through Iran, Türkiye, and the Balkans, was essential for trafficking heroin to Western Europe. The amount trafficked through the Balkans varied between 30 and 45 percent, allowing criminal groups to develop and establish networks along this route. From the early 1980s onward, Turkish drug trafficking groups became increasingly influential in controlling the Balkans route. Behcet Canturk, a notable drug trafficker at the time, remarked in the late 1980s that the massive scale of these shipments would have been noticeable to government officials. Turkish criminal groups established networks in Europe to manage the final distribution of drugs to street dealers.
Since then, Turkish organized crime groups have become major players in Europe. For example, they have competed with Moroccan groups for dominance in heroin trafficking in the Netherlands, Albanian groups in Germany, and Jamaican groups in the United Kingdom. In the UK, Turkish criminal groups are notably active in cigarette smuggling, human trafficking, and heroin trafficking. The Baybaşin family, a powerful entity in the criminal underworld, is particularly influential in heroin trafficking operations across the UK.
Today, Turkish drug trafficking groups in Europe capitalize on their extensive networks and strategic positioning within diaspora communities to expand their criminal enterprises across the continent, contributing to complex transnational criminal activities. Their operations typically involve sophisticated methods of organization and coordination, using both local connections and international networks to maximize profits and minimize risks. Their competitive edge has led to significant success, establishing them as dominant players in many European countries. For instance, Turkish organized crime controls approximately 90 percent of heroin trafficking in the UK, with similarly high levels of influence in France and the Netherlands.
Drug trafficking is not the only area where Turkish organized crime operates regionally and globally. These groups are also involved in arms trafficking, cigarette smuggling, antiquities trafficking, human trafficking, and human smuggling. Türkiye’s borders with Syria and Iraq have seen the trafficking of arms and explosives, with these illegal transfers often routed through Türkiye to conflict zones in the Middle East. Similarly, Iraqi and Syrian antiquities have been smuggled through Türkiye to European countries. Turkish criminal groups have become integral parts of trafficking networks, collaborating with local smugglers, antiquities dealers, and transnational organizations. Cigarette smuggling is another key area for Turkish criminal groups, with millions of cigarette packages transported from Iran and Central Asian countries via Dubai to Türkiye. Additionally, Turkish human trafficking networks have been involved in trafficking women across European countries. The ongoing conflict in the Middle East and emerging opportunities in Türkiye have also led to a surge in human smuggling, with hundreds of thousands of immigrants being transported from Türkiye to Greece and other Western European destinations. Despite their involvement in various criminal activities, Turkish organized crime's drug trafficking operations—particularly in heroin and cocaine—have garnered significant attention due to their clashes in the heroin market and recent developments in the cocaine trade.
Several factors contribute to these violent clashes, but the most significant is the Taliban's recent ban on opium production. This ban has severely disrupted the heroin supply chain, leading to significant shortages across Europe. As a result, Turkish organized crime groups have been affected in two major ways: they have shifted their focus to the cocaine trade, and competition for market share has intensified, leading to increased violence.
Transition to Cocaine Trade
In addition to heroin shortages, several other factors have contributed to the shift towards cocaine trafficking. Türkiye has experienced extensive police purges, especially following the late 2013 corruption scandals involving the prime minister and his ministers. The suspicious 15 July coup attempt further intensified these purges, resulting in the dismissal of over 40,000 police officers and 5,000 judges and prosecutors. Since then, the government has grown increasingly authoritarian, with new officers and prosecutors loyal to the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi – AKP) administration who are reluctant to investigate organized crime linked to the government. This environment has turned Türkiye into a safe haven for Turkish and Balkan criminal groups, who exploit the situation to evade law enforcement and even target their rivals.
Turkish organized crime groups have expanded their involvement in cocaine trafficking. Recent major seizures by Turkish authorities include 294 kilograms of cocaine in Izmit in May 2017, 1.3 metric tons hidden in bananas at Mersin Port in June 2021, and additional large finds such as 30 kilograms in August 2021, 610 kilograms in October 2021, and 49 kilograms in October 2022. In November 2023, 51 kilograms were seized in Iskenderun, and 109 kilograms were discovered in a truck in Edirne in January 2024.
Cocaine destined for Türkiye is frequently intercepted before reaching its destination. Significant cases include the seizure of 4.9 metric tons in Colombia in June 2020, allegations involving Erkam Yildirim in May 2021, and notable finds such as 1.5 metric tons in Panama in September 2020, 616 packets at Mersin Port in May 2021, 2.9 metric tons in a Spanish vessel's fuel tank in April 2022, and 68 kilograms in Ecuador in September 2022. Further interceptions include 2.3 metric tons in Peru in March 2023, 5.3 metric tons in Italy in July 2023, and 210 kilograms in Greece in May 2024.
Rivalries for Criminal Supremacy
In response to heroine shortages, Turkish criminal groups are vying aggressively to secure a larger share of the dwindling heroin supply. This competition has intensified conflicts among these groups as they attempt to dominate the market and capture the business opportunities left by the reduced supply. The result has been a rise in violent confrontations, as each faction seeks to outmaneuver and overpower the others to establish or maintain their dominance in the heroin trade.
Internal disputes among Turkish crime groups have begun to spill over into Europe, where these networks have built extensive operations. The violence not only underscores the fierce competition among the groups but also highlights how geopolitical changes and disruptions in the supply chain affect international organized crime. The following case studies explain why these groups are targeting each other and why Türkiye has become a preferred safe haven.
Naji Sherifi Zindashti
Zindashti, a Kurdish drug trafficker, became deeply involved in drug trafficking along the Turkish-Iranian border from a young age. Zindashti's criminal career began early when he was arrested at 20 alongside fellow drug traffickers, including Çetin Koç. After escaping from prison, he moved to Türkiye, where he established himself as a major drug lord by aligning with Turkish traffickers. Zindashti sought to monopolize the drug trade, targeting rival kingpins either through violence or by collaborating with the police. In one incident, Zindashti received assistance from police officers to locate and kill his rivals in Istanbul.
In a notable incident in 2014, Zindashti provided information to the police about a ship carrying 2.1 tons of heroin, leading to an international crackdown. The heroin belonged to rivals Çetin Koç and Orhan Üngan. In retaliation, Zindashti’s car was shot at, resulting in the deaths of his daughter and driver. Zindashti accused Koç and Üngan of orchestrating the attack and declared war on them, which lasted until 2018 and included armed confrontations in various cities.
Zindashti's vendetta continued when he hired assassins to kill Çetin Koç in Dubai, successfully exacting his revenge. He was arrested in April 2018 on charges of drug trafficking and homicides but was released in September 2018, thanks to his influential connections within the AKP government. Zindashti’s criminal network also extended to Iran, where he engaged in political kidnappings and assassinations with the support of the IRGC. Notable targets of his operations included Habib Chaab and Mesut Molavi Vardanji.
Zindashti is sought for his alleged involvement in criminal activities, including a plot to murder two Maryland residents. From at least December 2020 to around March 2021, Zindashti's Iran-based criminal network is said to have used encrypted online messaging apps to recruit criminal operatives in North America for the assassination of two individuals who had fled Iran. The network is also accused of providing resources for the attempted international murder of a person within the United States. On 13 December 2023, a federal arrest warrant was issued for Zindashti by the US District Court for the District of Minnesota, where he faces charges of conspiracy to use interstate commerce facilities in the Commission of Murder-for-Hire.
Barış Boyun
Boyun leads the organized crime group known as the Daltons Gang. Originally a local gang based in Istanbul, the organization has expanded its criminal operations internationally and gained notoriety for its motorcycle hit squads and involvement in various murders. Before 2017, Boyun worked alongside Bilal Yaman, but after Yaman's arrest that year, Boyun took over as the group's leader. The Daltons Gang also subcontracts for Balkan mafia groups and recruits young men from Anatolian towns as hitmen through social media. Recently, the gang has been engaged in violent conflicts with four other gangs, with media reports indicating that these clashes have led to 20 deaths.
Barış Boyun was arrested in Italy during a joint operation by Italian and Turkish police in May 2024. He faces charges from the Milan Prosecutor's Office, including terrorism, armed gang activity, and murder. Boyun had previously been detained in Rimini in August 2022 on charges of murder and criminal conspiracy. Extradition requests from Türkiye were denied by both the Bologna court and the Court of Cassation. The prosecutor's indictment alleges that Boyun was involved in smuggling large quantities of cocaine from Latin America to Istanbul. In one instance, where cocaine was being transported to Ambarli Port in Istanbul, police officers were implicated as accomplices in facilitating the cocaine’s transfer from the port.
In September 2023, a shooting near Athens resulted in the deaths of six people. Greek police have not released details about the motive or the victims' identities. It is speculated that some of the deceased were members of Barış Boyun's gang. The Greek police are investigating whether the shooting was related to a conflict between drug gangs.
Tekin Kartal and Baybashins
Ilmetin Aytekin, known as Tekin Kartal, was a drug trafficker who was killed in Barcelona in May 2024. He was a well-known figure on social media, catering to the interests of younger people and highly respected by Kurdish and Turkish youth. Holding both Turkish and German passports, he traveled frequently between Türkiye and EU countries and played a significant role within drug trafficking circles. Several months before his assassination, he left Türkiye due to escalating threats to his life.
Kartal became involved in the drug trade at a young age and joined the Baybashin clan. Hüseyin Baybashin, internationally recognized as a drug baron, is currently serving a life sentence in the Netherlands; he is alleged to have ordered numerous murders and kidnappings. It appears that Tekin Kartal was acquainted with Abdullah Baybashin, the current leader of the clan; recent photos shared on social media show the two together. Abdullah Baybashin was sentenced to 40 years life imprisonment in Türkiye in 2010 but was released in 2016.
Tekin Kartal first gained attention in 2021 when he was in the midst of an armed conflict between two groups in Şişli, resulting in the fatal shooting of Okan Karaten's daughter while trying to protect her. According to allegations, Tekin Kartal, along with Deniz Saruhan, appeared to be managing a hotel owned by H.E. in Taksim. Kartal had been planning to build a parking lot in an empty area adjacent to the hotel for a long time. However, Kartal was released due to lack of evidence.
Kartal, engaged in drug smuggling, had been under surveillance by his adversaries for a long time before his assassination. It was alleged that someone betrayed Tekin Kartal and exposed him to his rivals. The purpose of the meeting was portrayed as "aiming for reconciliation between two mafia groups, one under Tekin Kartal's control and the other originating from Türkiye.
The Baybashin family has also close ties with the police in Istanbul. For example, in 2022, Murat Kartal, who was involved in a fatal incident with the Baybashins, was captured by two police officers and subsequently handed over to the family.
Rawa Majid
Rawa Majid, an Iraqi Kurd and Swedish citizen, founded a criminal organization in Uppsala and seized a significant portion of the drug market in Sweden, instilling fear in his rivals. He was known by the nickname "Kurdish Fox." Majid, previously wanted by red notice in Sweden for charges of drug trafficking and attempted murder, acquired Turkish citizenship and settled in Istanbul. His clan members were involved in clashes with a rival group in Istanbul on March 2024.
After becoming a fugitive, Majid engaged in a major conflict with a Greek-born gang leader in Sweden. Since 2022, there have been numerous armed and bomb attacks in Stockholm and its surroundings. In one such attack on a restaurant in Stockholm, a 15-year-old child dining there was killed. Swedish authorities have claimed that Rawa Majid's gang receives instructions from abroad via the Signal app.
On 15 April 2022, a municipal worker in Marmaris found a bag full of money left on a park bench. The police identified the bag, which contained $12,000, through surveillance camera footage and called the owner to the police station. It was revealed that the owner was Rawa Majid, who also goes by the nickname Baron. During a raid on the villa where Majid was staying in Marmaris, a Swedish passport in his name was also found. Initial reports indicated that a fake Turkish identity card in the name of ‘Miran Othman’ was also seized. However, the Turkish citizenship was not fake. Rawa Majid had first traveled to Iraq, where he changed his name to Miran Othman. He then purchased a villa in Bodrum for $400,000 and obtained Turkish citizenship.
Swedish authorities had stated that Majid was not extradited to Sweden due to his Turkish citizenship. Rawa Majid was released four months after his arrest in Marmaris. The intelligence information that Sweden sent to Türkiye about Rawa Majid was obtained from the cell phone of a member of a criminal organization arrested in Sweden. It was claimed that this information was delivered at the highest level from Sweden to Türkiye. Swedish officials described it as a major scandal that the information which could lead to Rawa Majid's arrest in Türkiye fell into the hands of the gang. There were allegations that the information enabling the gang to take precautions against operations had been leaked by Turkish authorities.
The commonalities among Naji Sherifi Zindashti, Barış Boyun, Tekin Kartal, and Rawa Majid lie in their extensive involvement in international drug trafficking and violent criminal networks. Each has orchestrated or participated in significant drug operations spanning multiple countries, employing violence to maintain control and eliminate rivals. Their criminal activities have led to high-profile legal issues, including arrests and trials, often involving attempts to exploit political or social connections to evade justice. Their operations frequently clash with rival groups, resulting in violent confrontations that further complicate their criminal endeavors.
Conclusion
To conclude, Turkish organized crime has emerged as one of the most formidable criminal networks in Europe, dominating heroin trafficking across many Western European countries. The Taliban’s ban on opium has disrupted the heroin supply, creating shortages and leading Turkish groups to compete violently for market share. Their violent activities have extended to several European countries, including Spain, Sweden, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany.
Additionally, political changes in Türkiye have made the country a safe haven for these groups. Over the past decade, the AKP government has become increasingly authoritarian, suppressing corruption investigations, purging around 40,000 police officers (including those specializing in organized crime), and ignoring the criminal activities of government officials. This has fostered a permissive environment for criminal networks to thrive. One significant area of concern is their involvement in the cocaine trade, with tons of cocaine being transferred to Europe via Türkiye. The growing connections between Türkiye and Latin America suggest that cocaine trafficking through Türkiye will likely persist. European law enforcement has also criticized the Turkish police for their reluctance to cooperate in investigations involving mafia leaders based in Türkiye. Given these conditions, Turkish mafia groups are expected to remain a major security threat to European countries due to their escalating violence and criminal activities.
Understanding this nexus is crucial for both global security and the Western Hemisphere. The ongoing cocaine trafficking from Latin America through Türkiye to Europe fuels drug-related violence. For the Western Hemisphere, particularly Latin America, the involvement of Turkish mafia groups in drug trafficking poses a significant challenge to efforts aimed at curbing drug production and distribution. Addressing this issue requires international cooperation to disrupt these criminal networks and enhance security across borders.