Gangs and the Military Note 4: The Role of the East Coast in the Development of Military-Trained Gang Members

Gangs and the Military Note 4: The Role of the East Coast in the Development of Military-Trained Gang Members

Carter F. Smith

This research note reviews the state of military-trained gang members (MTGMs) in the Eastern United States. In each wartime era since the Revolutionary War, there have been MTGMs who engaged in criminal activities in civilian communities. The earliest MTGMs in the United States received their training in the colonial militia. One group started as a New York City street gang, received military training and experience in Mexico during the Mexican-American War, and were released from active duty in San Francisco, just before the Gold Rush of 1848. An individual MTGM started as a well-known crime boss in New York and joined the military to fight in World War I. Contemporary MTGMs challenge military discipline and threaten community security.

Introduction

Street gang, Outlaw Motorcycle (OMG), and Domestic Terrorist Extremist (DTE) group members with military training are identified as military-trained gang members (MTGMs). Members of many street gangs, OMGs, and DTE groups have previously or are currently enlisted in every branch of the United States military.[1] An MTGM is defined as a street gang, prison gang, OMG, or DTE group member per the applicable jurisdiction’s definition, with military training or experience, as perceived by a reasonable, typical, police officer.[2] Criminal gang members and associates often join the military for one of two reasons: to get away from the gang lifestyle, or to acquire military training and access to weapons and sensitive information.[3]

Literature Related to Gang Members in the Armed Forces

At present, the literature includes limited empirical research regarding the presence of MTGMs in communities.[4] This section summarizes the early history of MTGMs along the East Coast of the United States and historical studies of MTGMs; street gang, OMG, and DTE members in the military. For a similar analysis of West Coast influences, see “Gangs and the Military Note 3: The Role of the West Coast in the Development of Military-Trained Gang Members.”[5]

A Brief History of East Coast Military-Trained Gang Members

As was detailed in the previous analysis (“Gangs and the Military Note 3’), an early militia member, Ebenezer MacIntosh (sometimes spelled Mackintosh) led Boston’s South Enders gang around 1764, engaging in violent protest of the Stamp Act of 1765. As a militia captain, Mr. Samuel Ross Mason served as a captain in the Ohio County, Virginia militia before becoming a counterfeiter, a river pirate along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, and finally a land pirate along the Natchez Trace. Street gang members in early New York City received military training with the New York Volunteer Regiment in preparation for and during the Mexican-American War. [6]

One of the more well-known and intriguing East Coast street gang members with a military connection was Edward (Monk) Eastman in New York, NY, around the start of the 20^th Century. Monk Eastman was a gangster’s gangster and was very well connected politically. Eastman fell out of favor with the local politicians after a few bad decisions, and in 1917, he decided to try another career. Eastman enlisted in the 106th Infantry of the New York National Guard, lying about his age like many others enlisting in the military at the time. Although forty-three years old, Eastman told the recruiter he was thirty-nine. Eastman served admirably in the trench warfare in France during was then known as the World War (WWI). When his service ended, he received a pardon from the governor of New York. Sadly, he did not change his ways after returning from combat and was murdered while selling bootleg alcohol and drugs in 1921. He was buried, nonetheless, with full military honors.[7]

A criminal associate of the more typical organized crime figures, Frank Lucas also had a connection to the United States military during the Vietnam War. After seeing a cousin killed by the Ku Klux Klan during the Great Depression, Lucas moved from North Carolina to Harlem, New York, in 1946 and immersed himself in street crime. Lucas ultimately developed one of the most lucrative crime organizations of the twentieth century. His vast drug empire was used to arrange and fund killings, extortion, and bribery. Lucas and his associates created an intricate network to send shipments of heroin on military planes from Southeast Asia to military installations on the East Coast. From there, the packages were sent to business partners who unpacked the heroin and prepared it for sale. Although some alleged that Lucas concealed the imported heroin in the bodies of dead servicemen, Lucas refuted those allegations, but admitted to using false bottom coffins. Lucas’ “Blue Magic” heroin was far more potent than most heroin and caused many deaths due to overdose.[8]

Prior Studies of Military-Trained Gang Members

As was detailed in the West Coast analysis Knox conducted an exploratory study in 1992 of 91 members of an Illinois National Guard unit. Survey respondents estimated gang membership in the military ranged from a low of zero to a high of 90% with a combined mean of 21.5%.[9] The results of that research were summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Estimates of the percent who were current or former gang members by branch

In 1996, a worldwide Department of the Army task force concluded there was minimal evidence of extremist-group activity in the Army, and more of a security concern with street gangs than extremists. Specifically, they reported “gang-related activities appear to be more pervasive than extremist activities as defined in Army Regulation 600-20.”[10]

The 2017 Gang and Domestic Extremist Activity Threat Assessment (GDEATA)

A recent report produced by the United States Army CID appeared to be designed to falsely portray an equally diverse problem with organized criminal MTGMs (Street Gangs, OMGs, and DTEs). The FY 2017 CID Assessment, as many others before it, conducted limited longitudinal analysis of the data, noted an increase in street gang investigations over the previous three years while the number of OMG-related investigations had little to no change. The authors did not attempt to identify or explain the results of their analysis.[11] As has been typical, most of the street gang suspects were junior enlisted (E-1 to E-4), young (under 24), and African Americans (80%). Half of the OMG suspects were African American, while under 40 percent were Caucasian and thirteen percent Hispanic. Most of the OMG suspects were noncommissioned officers (E-5 to E-9).[12] A more detailed analysis of these finding was presented in the preceding West Coast analysis.[13]

The Present Study: Surveys of East Coast Gang Investigators

The Modified Military Gang Perception Questionnaire (MMGPQ) has been used to collect data from gang officers and investigators.[14] The survey questions gauge the respondents’ perception of use of military weapons, equipment, and tactics by gang members in their jurisdictions. The questions were as follows:

1) Gang members in my jurisdiction are increasingly using military-type weapons or explosives.

2) Gang members in my jurisdiction use military-type equipment (body armor, night-vision, etc.).

3) Gang members in my jurisdiction use military-type tactics.

4) Gang members in my jurisdiction commit home invasions.

5) Gang members in my jurisdiction commit armed robberies.

6) There are gang members in my jurisdiction that currently serve in the military.

7) There are gang members in my jurisdiction that have served in the military in the past.

8) Military representatives advise our department when gang members are discharged.

Figure 1:  Legend summarizing responses by question

In July 2018, 110 Northeast United States training session attendees were surveyed in Glassboro, New Jersey, and 79 participants (from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware) completed the survey. That response rate provided a 95% confidence level and 5.88% margin of error. Most respondents reported gang members in their jurisdictions were using military-type weapons or explosives (51.4%), and many (42.1%) reported gang members were using military-type equipment like body armor, night-vision devices, etc. Although many (40%) agreed that gang members were using military-type tactics, a majority (over 80%) reported gang members committed home invasions and armed robberies. Many (46.3%) reported there were gang members in their jurisdiction currently serving in the military, while more (67.6%) reported they had gang members who had previously served in the military. Seventy-two percent believed that military-trained gang members were a significant concern to their jurisdiction, while almost as many (63.9%) were of the impression military-trained gang members were a greater threat to their jurisdiction than gang members without military training. Most of the respondents (55.5%) did not believe that military representatives advised their department when gang members were discharged from the military.

Gang members in the respondents’ jurisdiction represented many branches of the Armed Forces, although the Army was the most often reported, followed by the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. The Bloods, Crips, and Latin Kings were the street gangs represented most by the MTGMs in survey respondents' jurisdictions. Of the OMGs represented by MTGMs, the Pagans, Hells Angels, Black Pistons, and Outlaws were the main groups reported. White Supremacists comprised the largest group of DTEs represented by MTGMs, followed by Sovereign Citizens and Black Supremacists. Most survey respondents (54.4%) reported that fewer than 10% of their gang members had some form of military training, and most (82.6%) respondents reported the MTGMs in their jurisdiction received military training directly. The results were summarized in Table 2.

Table 2: Responses for New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware

In March 2018, 198 gang officers in Annapolis, Maryland were surveyed. Seventy-eight participants completed the survey, for a 95% confidence level and an 8.66% margin of error. Most respondents reported gang members in their jurisdictions were increasingly using military-type weapons or explosives (57.5%), as well as military-type equipment like body armor, night-vision devices, and so on (42.5%). Over half (55%) agreed that gang members were using military-type tactics, and a majority (over 87%) reported gang members committed home invasions and armed robberies. Many (47.8 %) reported that there were gang members in their jurisdiction who were currently serving, while 65.8 percent reported they had gang members who had previously served in the military. Most of the respondents (65.7%) did not believe that military representatives advised their department when gang members were discharged from the military.

Gang members in the respondents’ jurisdiction represented many branches of the military, although the Army was the most often reported, followed by the Marine, the Army National Guard, and the Navy. The Bloods, Crips, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Gangster Disciples were the street gangs represented most by the MTGMs in the survey respondents' jurisdictions. Of the OMGs represented by MTGMs, the Pagans, Hells Angels, Mongols, and Outlaws were the main groups reported. White Supremacists comprised the largest group of DTEs represented by MTGMs, followed by Black Supremacists and Sovereign Citizens. Most survey respondents (53.6%) reported that fewer than 10% of their gang members had some form of military training, and most (81 percent) respondents reported the MTGMs in their jurisdiction received military training directly. The results were summarized in Table 3.

Table 3: Responses for Maryland

In October 2014, 152 gang officers in Dupage County, Illinois were surveyed. Seventy-one participants completed the survey, for a 95% confidence level and an 8.52% margin of error. Many respondents reported gang members in their jurisdictions were increasingly using military-type weapons or explosives (34%), as well as military-type equipment like body armor, night-vision devices, etc. (24%). Although few (24%) agreed that gang members were using military-type tactics, a majority (over 87%) reported gang members committed home invasions and armed robberies. Many (29%) reported that there were gang members in their jurisdiction currently serving, while 47% reported they had gang members who had previously served in the military. Most of the respondents (77%) did not believe that military representatives advised their department when gang members were discharged from the military.

Gang members in the respondents' jurisdiction represented many branches of the Armed Forces, although the Army was the most often reported, followed by the Marine Corps and the Army Reserve. The Gangster Disciples, Latin Kings, and Vice Lords were the Street Gangs represented most by the MTGMs in survey respondents' jurisdictions. Of the OMGs represented by MTGMs, the Outlaws, Hells Angels, and Black Pistons were most reported. Sovereign Citizens comprised the largest group of DTEs represented by MTGMs, followed by White Supremacists and Racist Skinheads. Most survey respondents (74%) reported that fewer than 10% of their gang members had some form of military training, and most (45%) respondents reported the MTGMs in their jurisdiction received military training directly. The results were summarized in Table 4.

Table 4: Responses for Illinois

In August 2015, the survey was presented to 505 North Carolina gang officers in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, and 117 answered all or almost all the questions on the survey. That response rate provided a 95% confidence level and a 7.95% margin of error. Most respondents reported gang members in their jurisdictions were using military-type weapons or explosives (35.2%), and many (25.7%) reported gang members were using military-type equipment like body armor, night-vision devices, etc. Although few (16.5%) agreed that gang members were using military-type tactics, a majority (over 70%) reported gang members committed home invasions and armed robberies. Many (33.1%) reported there were gang members in their jurisdiction currently serving in the military, while more (56.4%) reported they had gang members who had previously served in the military. Many of the respondents (73.6%) did not believe that military representatives advised their department when gang members were discharged from the military. A lower percentage of respondents reported use of military weapons, explosives, equipment, and use of military tactics by gang members in jurisdictions compared to those in recent surveys, including those in other mature and moderately mature gang states and those near military installations. A similar percentage of respondents reported they had gang members in their jurisdiction that had and were serving in the military. Speculation regarding the reason for such differences was beyond the scope of this article.

Gang members in the respondents’ jurisdiction represented many branches of the military, although the Army was the most often reported, followed by the Marines and the Army Reserve. The Bloods, Crips, United Blood Nation, and Gangster Disciples were the street gangs represented most by the MTGMs in survey respondents' jurisdictions. Of the OMGs represented by MTGMs, the Hells Angels, Outlaws, Mongols, and Pagans, were the main groups reported. White Supremacists comprised the largest group of DTEs represented by MTGMs, followed by Sovereign Citizens and Black Supremacists. Most survey respondents (76.1%) reported that fewer than 10% of their gang members had some form of military training, and most (86.4%) respondents reported the MTGMs in their jurisdiction received military training directly. The results were summarized in Table 5.

Table 5: Responses for North Carolina

In August, 2014, the survey was presented to 164 Tennessee gang officers in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and 70 answered all or almost all the questions on the survey. That response rate provided a 95% confidence level and an 8.9% margin of error. Many respondents reported gang members in their jurisdictions were increasingly using military-type weapons or explosives (51%), as well as military-type equipment like body armor, night-vision devices, etc. (30%). Although few (24%) agreed that gang members were using military-type tactics, a majority (over 90%) reported gang members committed home invasions and armed robberies. Many (46%) reported that there were gang members in their jurisdiction currently serving, while 64% reported they had gang members who had previously served in the military. Most of the respondents (66%) did not believe that military representatives advised their department when gang members were discharged from the military.

Gang members in the respondents’ jurisdiction represented many branches of the Armed Forces, although the Army was the most often reported, followed by the Army National Guard and the Marine Corps. The Bloods, Crips, Gangster Disciples, Vice Lords, and Mara Salvatrucha were the Street Gangs represented most by the MTGMs in survey respondents' jurisdictions. Of the OMGs represented by MTGMs, the Outlaws, Hells Angels, and Black Pistons were most reported. White Supremacists comprised the largest group of DTEs represented by MTGMs, followed by the Sovereign Citizens and Racist Skinheads. Most survey respondents (43%) reported that fewer than 10% of their gang members had some form of military training, and most (44%) respondents reported the MTGMs in their jurisdiction received military training directly. The results were summarized in Table 6.

Table 6: Responses for Tennessee

In May 2014, 70 gang investigators in Birmingham, Alabama were asked to complete the survey, and 49 of them did. That response rate provided a 95% confidence level and a 7.72% margin of error. Many respondents (51%) reported gang members in their jurisdictions were increasingly using military-type weapons or explosives, but few (18%) reported their gang members were using military-type equipment (body armor, night-vision, etc.). Although only one in three (31%) agreed that gang members were using military-type tactics, a majority (over 80%) reported gang members committed home invasions and armed robberies. Many (22 percent) reported that there were gang members in their jurisdiction currently serving, while 41% reported they had

gang members who had previously served in the military. Most of the respondents (71%) did not believe that military representatives advised their department when gang members were discharged from the military. Survey respondents reported an estimated 11% of their gang members had some form of military training. The results were summarized in Table 7.

Table 7: Responses for Alabama

In March 2019, the survey was presented to 310 Southeast United States gang officers (from Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, South Carolina, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia) in Destin, Florida, and 109 answered all or almost all the questions on the survey. That response rate provided a 95% confidence level and a 7.57% margin of error. Most respondents reported gang members in their jurisdictions were using military-type weapons or explosives (55.6%), and many (45.6%) reported gang members were using military-type equipment like body armor, night-vision devices, etc. Although only a few (24.2%) agreed that gang members were using military-type tactics, a majority (over 70%) reported gang members committed home invasions and armed robberies. Many (41.2%) reported there were gang members in their jurisdiction currently serving in the military, while more (57.6%) reported they had gang members who had previously served in the military. Most of the respondents (64.8%) did not believe that military representatives advised their department when gang members were discharged from the military.

Gang members in the respondents’ jurisdiction represented many branches of the military, although the Army was the most often reported, followed by the Army National Guard. The Army Reserve and the Marines. The Bloods, Gangster Disciples, Crips, and Vice Lords were the street gangs represented most by the MTGMs in survey respondents' jurisdictions. Of the OMGs represented by MTGMs, the Outlaws, Bandidos, Black Pistons, and Mongols were the main groups reported. White Supremacists comprised the largest group of DTEs represented by MTGMs, followed by Sovereign Citizens and Black Supremacists. Most survey respondents (80.6%) reported that fewer than 10% of their gang members had some form of military training, and most (78.9%) respondents reported the MTGMs in their jurisdiction received military training directly. The results were summarized in Table 8.

Table 8: Responses for Southeast United States

Although military laws prohibit service members from active membership, MTGMs are found in many street gangs, OMGs, and DTEs within civilian communities across the United States. Neither the issues identified by the Secretary of the Army’s Task Force of 1996 nor the issues identified over twenty years later by the research in this and previous articles have been addressed by the military and MTGMs continue to be discharged without warning after being trained in skills that significantly increase the threat of street gangs, OMGs, and DTEs.

The National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) recently found that known or suspected gang members in over 100 responding jurisdictions had sought or obtained employment in the military or a public criminal justice field.[15] Employment with the United States military ranked as the most common, yet many military leaders suggest the problem is small, discounting the increased dangerousness to the civilian community as the MTGMs depart military service. A more detailed analysis was conducted in the preceding West Coast analysis.[16]

Responses to Gangs

While the response to gangs is hardly well-coordinated, it has been organized into categories: 1) community organization, 2) social intervention, 3) opportunities provision, 4) suppression, and 5) organizational development and change.[17] Sadly, there may not be a real solution for the existence of gang members in the military community, although a strategy based on suppression would be a likely candidate. That may not be due to the inability of policymakers or military leaders, but because of the unique nature of the military justice system. In the absence of an integrated intelligence system like the one used by civilian police departments to limit the gang threat, the Military Police have one opportunity to learn who is a gang member, and if the military system works there will be no need to do anything further. If a person’s behavior is so bad that the police are engaged, that person is not likely to remain a member of the military community. Thus, the police are severely restricted from gathering valuable intelligence on embedded and concealed gangs and gang members, and will only interact with the less advanced criminal element. The following suggestions have not been previously applied to MTGMs in the military, nor has any other possible solution.

High Intensity Cognitive–Behavioral Program

Some prison systems are using a system of treatment described as a high intensity cognitive–behavioral (HICB) program, which focus on communities inside the prison system.[18] The HICB program uses culturally sensitive teaching and therapeutic approaches. Recidivism is significantly reduced, and for those who reoffend, the activity is less serious. A military version of the HICB treatment might assign counselors to debrief the admitted gang member as he enters the military. A plan of action could be designed to help him through the stressors and triggers likely to appear during the term of his enlistment, with periodic follow-up could be scheduled, to ensure the process is effective.

Gangs as a Public Health Issue

Sanders noted that gang-involved youth were at increased risk for incarceration, as well as negative health and social outcomes, and suggested community responses to gangs might improve if they were public health problems.[19] A military version of the public health application might include medical specialists who categorize and track the progress of enlisted gang members, in coordination with many other administrative and investigative agencies, and report, as needed, to military leadership.

Pulling Levers

The pulling levers approach was designed to influence the behavior and environment of chronic offenders by making would-be offenders believe that severe consequences would follow.[20] This strategy involves rounding up offenders and holding a community meeting to explain the consequences of their continued criminal actions. A military version of the approach might entail a treatment plan and follow-up that included a contract with a recruit with a long-term commitment on both sides.

As advanced gangs, like those identified by Sullivan and Bunker as Third Generation (3GEN) Gangs, continue to evolve and influence governance and state interaction, it is time for the United States to respond to this threat to national security.[21] The NGIC has repeatedly reported business interactions between street gangs and Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). Those same connections exist with OMGs.[22]  Such corporate-like criminal partnerships should be countered with an operational plan with achievable measures of effectiveness.  This counter-gang/cartel business plan needs to be more than an annual recap of activity and must be based on analysis and prioritize specific enforcement actions.

Summary

Although the increasing number of MTGMs is a concern for both criminal justice practitioners and the community, the majority of the population is not aware of this trend, nor are they aware of the gravity of the threat to the safety of their communities. Survey results regarding the perception of MTGM presence in the Eastern United States are included, as are the results of the most recent Gang and Domestic Extremist Activity Threat Assessment (GDEATA) by the United States Army and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC). The connection of street gangs, OMGs, and DTEs to the military was examined, as were possible remedies for limiting the dangerousness of those criminals in the community. While none have been tried in the context of MTGMs, nothing else has, so those solutions are offered in an attempt to start the process towards establishing an effective response for the military and the civilian community. This research note is intended to promote the awareness of the MTGM situation and encourage scholars and practitioners to explore this issue in other locations in the United States and foreign nations towards identifying strategies to control the problem or mitigate the effects. As argued in the preceding note, “Gangs and the Military Note 3,” the military-gang nexus presents significant security and social challenges with profound national and global security implications.

Additional Reading

Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan (2013). Studies in Gangs and Cartels. London: Routledge.

National Gang Intelligence Center [NGIC]. (2005-2017). National Gang Reports 2005-2017. Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center.

Carter F. Smith (2017). Gangs and the Military: Gangsters, Bikers, and Terrorists with Military Training. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

End Notes

N.B. Excerpts from the author’s book Gangs and the Military: Gangsters, Bikers, and Terrorists with Military Training are included in this note.

[1] National Gang Intelligence Center [NGIC]. (2013). National Gang Report - 2013, Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/stats-services-publications-national-gang-report-2013/view

[2] Carter F. Smith (2017). Gangs and the Military: Gangsters, Bikers, and Terrorists with Military Training. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

[3] NGIC, National Gang Report - 2013. 

[4] Carter F. Smith (2018). “Gangs and the Military Note 1: The Increased Threat of Third Generation Gangs with Military Trained Gang Members.” Small Wars Journal, 18 April, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/gangs-and-military-note-1-increased-threat-third-generation-gangs-military-trained-gang

[5] Carter F. Smith (2020). “Gangs and the Military Note 3: The Role of the West Coast in the Development of Military-Trained Gang Members,” Small Wars Journal, 22 January, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/gangs-and-military-note-3-role-west-coast-development-military-trained-gang-members-0

[6] Ibid.

[7] Smith, Gangs and the Military.

[8] Ibid.

[9] George W. Knox, (2006). An introduction to gangs (6th ed.). Peotone, IL: New Chicago School Press.

[10] Secretary of the Army. (1996). The Secretary of the Army’s Task Force on Extremist Activities: Defending American Values, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 21 March p. 34, para. 16, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=28893.

[11] U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command. (2018). Gang and Domestic Extremist Activity Threat Assessment (GDEATA), Fiscal Year 2017 (FY 17).

[12] Ibid.

[13] Smith, Gangs and the Military Note 3.

[14] Carter F. Smith and Joshua Harms (2018). “The Threat of Street Gangs, Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, and Domestic Terrorist/Extremist Groups with Military-Trained Members.” Small Wars Journal, 23 March, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/threat-street-gangs-outlaw-motorcycle-gangs-and-domestic-terroristextremist-groups.

[15] National Gang Intelligence Center [NGIC]. (2015). National Gang Report - 2015. Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center, https://www.fbi.gov/filerepository/ stats-services-publications-national-gang-report 2015.pdf/view.

[16] Smith, Gangs and the Military Note 3.

[17] G. David Curry, Scott. H. Decker, S, and David C. Pyrooz (2014). Confronting gangs: Crime and community (3d ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

[18] Chantal Di Placido, Terri L. Simon, Treena D. Witte, Degiang Gu, and Stephen C.P. Wong, (2006).  “Treatment of Gang Members Can Reduce Recidivism and Institutional Misconduct.”  Law and Human Behavior, 30(1), 93–114.  DOI: 10.1007/s10979-006-9003-6.

[19] Bill Sanders (2017). Gangs: An introduction. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

[20] Anthony A. Braga. (2008). “Pulling levers: Focused deterrence strategies and the prevention of gun homicide.” Journal of Criminal Justice, 36, 332–343. doi:10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2008.06.009, https://www.uc.edu/ics/crimereduction/jcr%3Acontent/MainContent/download/file.res/Braga%20Pulling%20Levers.pdf

[21] John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker (2007). “Third generation gang studies: An introduction.” Journal of Gang Research, 14(4), pp. 1-10.  Retrieved from https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu_fac_pub/136/.

[22] National Gang Intelligence Center [NGIC] (2017). National Gang Report - 2017. Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center.