The Localization Strategy: Local Logic and Energy in Belgium’s Advising Mission to Niger

The Localization Strategy: Local Logic and Energy in Belgium’s Advising Mission to Niger

By Pierre Jean Deheane

Introduction

There are constant themes that continue to reappear in policy discussions regarding the effective use of military force. These themes, presented below, make up a persistent list of points Western militaries (and political decision makers) have been doing ineptly over – and – over – again. Discussions on war in general, but especially security force assistance (SFA), in academic circles and conferences have revolved around these issues for decades,^[i] giving the impression that they are insurmountable. The list is as follows:

1. End States are not clear
2. Lack of measures of effectiveness (monitoring, reassessing, feedback loops etc.)
   • Milestones – impact assessments that do not sufficiently recognize complexity (particularly non-linearity) and the harmonization (of interests and values) of the “assisted” and “assisting” state.
3. Energy (actions especially) is added into a system (assisted state) that cannot hold it
   • Sustainability
4. Lack of Coordination (whole of government/comprehensive approach)
5. Lack of local knowledge
   • Not understanding the problem
6. Focus on quick wins
   • ​​​​​​​Institutional short sightedness and design

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how the Localization Strategy (LS) has been shaped in order to confront the issues listed above. It will do this by presenting the strategic context from which the Localization Strategy developed and the underlying principles that guide a particular thinking process designed for uncertainty and complexity. A recent publication in Small Wars Journal focused on the theory of this approach;^[ii] this paper will focus on the application. The SOF force generation mission in Niger (2018 – ongoing) will be used as a case study to illustrate how these principles have been put into action with noteworthy results.

The Localization Strategy offers a process of thinking built on observations from a multitude of thinkers in unconventional and conventional warfare.^[iii] It explicitly brings together three dominant concepts (complexity, minimalism, and adaptive resilience) and places them on the human system. The human system is defined broadly as anything that impacts human behavior, whether material (things) or immaterial (ideas).^[iv] The name of the strategy – Localization – is meant to directly confront the greatest enduring shortfall in military thought and practice: yesterday’s success determining today’s logic. It should go without saying that every conflict is unique to its complex human system. This is why the human system is the bedrock upon which all tactical and strategic processes develop (see Resilience Temple graphic below).

As practitioners, we must always remember that our own human system (socio-political et al) – when intervening – is a fundamental factor. It will act and respond with unique harmony and/or discord depending on time, space, and the nature of the confrontation or cooperation. This critical element to military thought (dual human systems) in planning and executing operations remains insufficient, despite the repeated calls from many experienced voices. Perhaps the reason is simple: “differing systems” sounds good, but how does an organization break these theoretical ideas down (including complexity, minimalism, and adaptive resilience) into something organized and actionable? I hope to be able to convince the reader that the Localization Strategy is a step in the right direction.

Belgian Special Forces Group (SF Gp) in Niger

The short explanation that follows will provide operational and historical context for the rest of this paper. In late 2017, the Special Forces Group was sent to Niger to find and develop advising opportunities with a small team led by what a few months later became a Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (SOFLE). In simpler and more specific terms, the team was meant to make itself as relevant as possible to the Nigerien (NER) special operations command (SOCOM). The commander of the NER SOCOM received a mandate from the Nigerien government in early 2018 to build-up 12 battalions over the next 3-5 years, suddenly making it the largest SOF force generation project in the world. The Belgian team began engaging with the NER SOCOM commander several times a week to plan how this force generation project should develop - course content, course structure, timelines, phases of assistance (train, advise, assist, accompany), and an exit strategy for western partner support.

A “circular” phased approach^[v] - from training to accompanying - was presented to Brussels (Evere) and other western partner forces (who later greatly reinforced the efforts) in early 2018. The underlying “sense” to these phases were the principles that will be presented in this paper. One fundamental question guided every step: how will this technique or approach stimulate and reinforce the institutional, structural, collective and individual resilience of the NER SOF battalions? Standardization of equipment and courses were determined to be the first and foundational step to institutional development. As far as design - self-sustainability had to be the mortar bringing every piece of the NER force generation project together. The Resilience Temple below visually illustrates how all military assistance efforts should - in one way or another - aim to stimulate and reinforce adaptive resilience.

When Does the Localization Strategy Finds its Utility

The Localization Strategy provides a thinking process for any intervening force in any kind of operation where force is employed for effect. In other words, it finds relevance if force – in all its configurations^[vi] – will or could be solicited in order to change human behavior. All wars employ force – in one form or another – to attempt to favorably alter the behavior of an opponent. This employment of force is at the heart of the Localization Strategy. Every kind of force (kinetic, non-kinetic), combined with how it is used (direct, indirect) will have different implications on the human system (see the spectrum of force below). It is very difficult to predict the implications of any action in a complex system, but actions must sometimes be taken nonetheless. Planning and operating in complexity requires carefully structured thought sequences – yet with space to maneuver and adapt to unfolding realities.

The Resilience Temple (RT) is a visualization of this carefully structured thought sequence. Understanding of the problem is increased by carefully analyzing the human system we are meant to affect. Every strategic (and tactical) act should be linked to this comprehension. All human systems are unique and will respond differently to stimulus (action). Given that human systems are always complex, a misstep can eventually have enormous implications. It is therefore perhaps unwise to provide clear solutions when the problems remain unclear. Minimalism is an excellent cognitive tool for cautiously navigating a complex human system. It forces a certain reliance on local processes and logic while setting better conditions for increased sustainability potential^[vii] – defined and unpacked below.

The 3 Fundamentals of the Localization Strategy:

In order to function in this type of complex environment, the three fundamentals of the Localization Strategy are: 1) minimalism – when you come in “light” (materially and immaterially), you must rely on local actors and procedures to a much greater extent, making strategies more likely to be adapted to local realities and less likely to create dependencies; 2) having less intrusive and less entangling forms of intervention with a clear purpose (vision) of stimulating adaptive resilience in fragile states; 3) and most importantly – the more security forces open up to and are guided by the local energy and logic of the host nation’s state of being, the less authority and “foreign notions” will be necessary for durably strengthening it.

The Dark-side of the Localization Strategy:

It is not difficult to turn the intentions of this strategy upside down. If an intervening force understands strategically and tactically how to structurally strengthen a human system to be more resilient, that same intervening force also understands how to destroy the psycho-socio-structural nutrients of a healthy social system (increasing the fragility). I refer to this as the dark side of the Localization Strategy. Understanding the make-up of a system: what makes it strong, what makes it adaptable, and what allows it to grow in spite of disruption, are of course the same things that make it vulnerable. However, this will not be the focus of this paper, as security force assistance (the case study in this paper) is first and foremost about strengthening partner forces.

The Resilience Temple^[viii],

Strategic Context

It is imperative in strategy to construct a model or approach built on legal requirements and cultural values. It is also imperative to recognize that one must often act without fully understanding the situation. This has and will always be the case. Not having a clear end state (sometimes considered as not having a strategy altogether) may be the most sensible strategy when confusion and ambiguity are the only certainties. How does one determine a clear end-state in a complex area of operation, and perhaps more provocatively, should one do so? The graphical representation of the Localization Strategy above (very) intentionally places adaptive resilience as its end-state – or in other words, the constant and “general direction” north star regardless of confusion and ambiguity. 

The Localization Strategy has been designed with one underlying principle: an end-state – adaptive resilience – that complements a complex and volatile world. This complementarity has a certain strategic looseness, ‘an intentional stance of both fluidity (of strategies, structures, and actions) and fixedness (of values and purpose)’.^[ix] The rest of this paper will demonstrate how adaptive resilience as an end-state in the LS provides both strategic fluidity (in creative application) and fixedness (in strategic sense and purpose).

A Clear End-state Without a Clear Problem

Fragile conflict environments are vulnerable to stimuli in highly unpredictable ways. (This concept will be revisited when unpacking the principle “non-intrusiveness” below.) Therefore, the idea of a clear end-state where intervening nations assume straightforward objectives largely disregards the reality of war. As previously mentioned, unclear and evolving problems (always the case), should equal highly flexible^[x] and evolving solutions. Lawrence Freedman speaks of sequential strategies involving discrete steps, ‘each dependent upon the one before, which together shape the outcome of the war’.^[xi] The Localization Strategy – with adaptive resilience as an end state vision – encourages an approach that takes discrete steps, each highly dependent on real-time changes and shifting trends from previous steps. The agility necessary for sequential strategies, as defined by Freedman, has enormous implications for rigid command and control structures that persist in modern militaries.^[xii]

The Complex Situation in Niger

The Principles of the Localization Strategy:

1. Local energy and logic
   1. Avoid creating dependencies
   2. Less intrusiveness
   3. Less authority more relationship
   4. Emphasize strategic sense over strategic effect as it directs attention towards the purpose of an effort with more conviction^[i] and offers a general vision of change.
   5. Compress the tactical and the strategic: Strategic-tactics (no tactical actions without strategic alignment)
   6. The human system as the “clay” from which “the bricks” of tactics and the structures of strategies are made
   7. Synchronization and coordination: The 3D+ Approach
   8. Minimalism: Inspiring tactics and strategies more adapted to local realities

As Geoffrey MacKechnie explains: ‘the ease of acceptance of a change will be influenced by the degree of incongruence with preexisting values and cognitions’.^[xviii] This is where we must begin when we want to effect change without miscalculated disruption.

The basic idea is to rely on local actors and practices in order to avoid creating transient dependencies^[xix] – the primary trait of fragile systems. Local energy and logic is written vertically on the right-hand side of the resilience temple where the “intake and flow” arrows from the soil (illustrated by the brown color) progress towards the end state. It underscores the entire Localization Strategy. How does one use local energy and logic at a tactical and strategic level to stimulate the resilience of a partner force or population? The rest of this paper will focus on connecting principles that should accompany the process of using local energy and logic. Most importantly this “organic”^[xx] approach requires time and patience as one should try, as much as possible, to work by, with and through existing processes and established procedures.^[xxi] There are certainly other advantages such as local buy-in and ownership, increased sustainability potential, increased need for coordination and communication (C2) across all sectors, increased need for understanding and navigating human factors,^[xxii] and more advantages that will be discussed below.

Sustainability Potential

A quick and necessary word on increased sustainability potential. In Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations, this may be the most logical and least understood concept of all. Every human system functions at a different speed and efficiency due to countless factors that make up the system. Some systems are cruising at 25% while others are at 10% or at 80%. If we see these systems as trains moving at different speeds, it may very well be due to the quality of the tracks/terrain/climate. The train cannot go much quicker in these conditions. The input energy – what is brought in by the advising security forces in whichever form – must consider the existing systems’ capacities. Progress in the form of assistance cannot ignore what should be thought of as sustainable input energy. If the system is running at 25%, one should try to seek sustainable gains. It is running at 25% for many reasons, and often this is simply chalked up to incompetence, lack of equipment, lack of training, lack of discipline, lack of courage, lack of this or that. Some of these factors may be true, but as a result of deeper underlying conditions (the tracks rather than the train). Do not come barging in with 90% as the objective (or 100 MPH), this is totally unsustainable and counter-productive. Work the 25% system to a sustainable 30%. Allow the time for the tracks (supporting material and immaterial structures within the systems) to adjust themselves without over taxation. Minimalism (described below and part of the “means triad” in the Resilience Temple) is often a perfect tool for forcing sustainable processes of support. In essence, work with less, work with more dependencies on people or things native to the system you are trying to affect.

I visited a Western military training team in north-west Niger and discussed the program of instruction with the instructors. These programs were intentionally designed to be employed by local cadres for instruction to their own troops (see case studies). Instruction from Western partner forces was meant to be as transitory as possible. The training team mentioned that they did not have enough instructors to follow the 6-week program. I asked why they didn’t use the Nigerien cadres as assistant instructors. They responded that the courses wouldn’t be given to a level they considered satisfactory. They added that it would also mean that local cadres would be doing their work. Fair enough, but both of these responses represent a problem in understanding. They wanted a result with the platoons that the cadres themselves would be incapable of maintaining. Instead of bringing down the expected level (set with foreign measures), working to increase the sustainability potential with small sustainable gains, the local capacities were ignored so that a final exercise at the end of the training program could impress the higher command for what then is truly “just a show”. I have often said to instructors in Niger to try to work themselves out of their jobs as soon as they arrive. But we as instructors need to also learn to understand that sometimes 35% (from our limited perspective) is okay, and will have more enduring “organic” results. When the input energy does not carefully consider sustainable inputs (in capacity development) it can result in demotivation, loss of confidence, and delegitimizing and/or disempowering the leadership responsible for maintaining a speed the tracks (system) cannot support. 

Principle:

You work yourself out of a job. All efforts - training, equipping, and partnering - should be designed with self-sustainability (and resilience) in mind.

Example from Niger – Operation New Nero (ONN)^[xxiii]:

A 20-week program of instruction (see case study below) was arranged from the beginning to be self-teachable. The 23 course manuals explain in detail – using images and videos – every tactics, technique and procedure necessary to be an effective combat company in the Nigerien context (based terrain and threats). Every Nigerien cadre, regardless of experience or speciality, should be able to give decent training with only the program of instruction as an aid.   

Theory:

Working towards non-dependency partnerships can be politically sensitive. Dependency converts rapidly to leverage, making it an attractive age-old political instrument.^[xxiv] This can create difficulties as nations often work with or beside each other while having different revealed or unrevealed interests. More on this later as in Niger – for example – smaller Western states (with less interests) are working alongside larger states with more prominent interests in the region (resulting in more political incentive to increase dependency). Differences are immediately noticed when it comes to equipping partner forces. There are nations like Belgium that cannot provide equipment and attempt to find alternatives as illustrated in the case-studies. There are also nations that can provide non-lethal equipment, but it must come from the providing nation. Finally, there are nations that can supply all kinds of material – lethal and non-lethal – but again, it must primarily come from the providing nation. This form of equipping, in the long term, does not align with the Localization Strategy as it ultimately increases and maintains a need for support. However, not all equipment can be provided in a sustainable manner^[xxv] due to insufficient industrialization or simply disinterest of the host nation; and sometimes pressing operational conditions make this approach too protracted. Nevertheless, Western armed forces should be looking at what can be produced and sustained locally such as medical kits, combat vests, combat pouches, weapon slings, uniforms, knee/elbow pads, etc. The case studies below will give several illustrations.

In security force assistance operations, non-dependency partnerships have direct implications for equipping, training, and assisting.^[xxvi] How does one equip without creating dependencies? How does one train without creating dependencies? As previously discussed, using local logic and energy has ramifications that must be grasped by all defense, diplomatic, and development actors. Often, time is of the essence, but programs and processes must slow down to a sustainable pace. Non-dependency means making sure that performance and capability increases do not rely, in the long term, on foreign presence and support.

In Niger, the term “Nigerienization” is often used by the Belgian Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (SOFLE) to remind colleagues to work with local energy and logic. As mentioned before with the train and track metaphor, too often security forces put energy into a bucket that cannot structurally sustain it. There are holes and cracks, but oftentimes the solution is still to add more energy. When the bucket is almost full, pictures are rapidly taken, reports are adjoined, backs are patted, and attention is shifted to the next opportunity. With such a bucket, time, effort, and money are wasted. Self-sustainability has to permeate all lines of effort in military operations whenever possible.

Principle:

Nobody likes intrusive assistance, especially not from foreigners.

Examples from Niger:

1. The term Nigerienization has been used for all support efforts towards the Nigerien Special Operations Command (SOCOM). The team has adapted to Niger. All programming, equipping and training, is cross checked and validated by members of the Nigerien SOCOM.
2. Belgian instructors, upon their arrival in Niger, participate in two lectures by local school teachers who introduce the Nigerien education system. Their lectures cover cultural norms as far as communication and social hierarchies. They also explain effective teaching methods such as repetition and visualization techniques. Having participated in several of these lectures myself, I have found that there is little use in “breaking down” (explicitly over-powering with action and words) Nigerien soldiers as one would do in the West. This is done in the West to presumably build entitled soldiers back up with the right mentally and a “better sense of collectivity”. In Niger, collectivity is the norm, social hierarchies are highly respected, and very few individuals are individualistic enough to require breaking down for the sake of the collective good. In fact, it is precisely the opposite (building up, reinforcing, encouraging, yet discipline and rigour) that is needed. These presentations by local teachers re-direct Belgian instructors in “their ways'' and provide a necessary cultural context for effective and respectful instructorship

Theory:

Non-intrusive or rather calculated intrusiveness is another key principle in the Localization Strategy. Any intervention is intrusive; this is the nature of intervention and can at times be necessary when host nation security forces have lost control. Nassim Taleb warns that the vast majority of things ‘that will have “intervention” will have iatrogenics’ – that is, causing harm while trying to help.^[xxxv] This is certainly worth keeping in mind for all military operations (from direct to indirect actions) regardless of how studied the plans appear to be. However, non-intrusiveness in the Localization Strategy is an attitude above all else. Fortunately, as military education does not sufficiently recognize the importance of philosophy, this principle requires delving abruptly and briefly into basic philosophical matters and touching on concepts of subjectivism^[xxxvi] (interpretivist paradigm) and objectivism^[xxxvii] (logico-scientific paradigm).

‘Socially constructed objectifications’^[xxxviii] is a clever paradoxical notion that highlights the central role of consensus and perception in making claims about reality.^[xxxix] Neither perception nor consensus are fixed or static concepts, both contingent on trending societal inclinations, impulses, and sometimes fantasies. And yet “objectifications” means the absence of a subjective lens. This notion calls attention to the point that individuals and societies believe that their understanding of the world is objective, factual, and measurable. Technologically advanced societies are prone to replace ‘priests in white robes’ with ‘scientists in white coats’^[xl] without recognizing that belief still precedes understanding.^[xli] This may seem like a string of “expensive words” to simply say that reality (how people interpret events, ideas, truth, history, and morality) is largely a compilation of collective (cultural) perceptions. As Ben Zweibelson writes in his article ‘Designing Through Complexity and Human Conflict’:

Everyone walks through this world with a frame, often a collectively shared one that is maintained with shared language, the metaphors behind that language and shared concepts. There are shared logics, and at deeper philosophical levels within collective paradigms, core beliefs on what reality is (ontology) as well as how one knows reality functions (epistemology) so that people can construct and share knowledge productively.^[xlii]

Essentially, intervening forces should fully grasp the often-quoted Anais Nin: ‘We don’t see things as they are, but as we are’. Philosophers have argued over this ontological spectrum for a very long time and it is worth “zooming out” and engaging with foreign cultures and ideas with psychological and sociological modesty and curiosity. All people, regardless of background and education, are prone to illusions of understanding (human history is and continues to be paved with what we have in abundance according to Bertrand Russel: ignorance). The non-intrusive mindset in the Localization Strategy requires persevering characters with honesty, humility, and curiosity.

“By, with and through” is a phrase often used to describe working indirectly with indigenous populations. I would suggest adding the word “for” to the list grammatically furthering the emphasis on non-intrusiveness and local logic. Of course, this must be within reason, or in military parlance, must be in accordance with the rules of engagement and the commander’s intent.

Principle:

Power is not a possession, but a relationship (Michel Foucault).

Example from Niger:

The SOFLE spends a tremendous amount of time and effort building and maintaining contacts averaging 10 meetings (formal and informal) a week. These relationships continue even when the SOFLE is back in Belgium.

Theory:

Influencing without authority requires connection (rapport), trust, respect, kindness, honesty, loyalty, and especially empathy; all attributes of “relational power” (see graphic below). This principle connects intimately with local ownership and arguably with sovereignty as any developments must go through processes of acceptance and compromise.

Reconceptualising the idea of power is at the heart of the Localization Strategy. Strategy, as described in David Betz’s book Carnage and Chaos, is ‘the art of unleashing power to produce intended effects’^[xliii] guided, of course, by political objectives. Lawrence Freedman affirms in his most recent book on strategy that questions of power are central to strategic studies.^[xliv] It seems rather evident that the use of power, or the ‘art of unleashing power’ appropriately, should be fundamental in strategic and tactical thinking.

The Localization Strategy draws out a conceptual ‘spectrum of force’ from sympathy to the use of force in order to emphasize Foucault’s dictum that power is a relationship, not a possession^[xlv]. The purpose of breaking down notions of relational and command power based on this dictum is to challenge and broaden existing frames of reference concerning force (the ways in which power expresses itself) in military operations and education. Influencing without authority is an indirect application of force which takes more time, but results in deeper and longer lasting effects. The Localization Strategy does not limit or specify the type of force necessary to accomplish a mission^[xlvi]; this is important, it simply reinforces the notion that the right kind of force must be applied at the right moment. It goes without saying that the use of force or the threat of force (command power) has immediate results, but these short-term effects must be used appropriately and cautiously. Otherwise “10-2 equals 12” to use General Stanley McChrystal’s famous counterinsurgency dictum.^[xlvii] 

1.5 First Strategic Sense

Principle:

Do not prioritize looking for a particular effect in a complex and unpredictable environment, it is like swinging in the dark. Look to apply sense to actions or purpose to every effort, with more focus on how things are done and less focus on what is ultimately an assumed result that in time may in fact not be desired.

Examples from Niger:

Again, the enhance, channel, assist, and refine (ECARe) Cycle is an excellent example of this principle applied in Niger (See CTX article in footnote).

Theory:

It is very difficult to know short and mid-term effects of actions^[xlviii] - any, but especially military - in a human (read complex) environment and it is just about impossible to know long-term effects, regardless of how well the social and political is understood. Three years in Niger has brought this point home many times. Conditions are constantly changing due to local and international events, social media, changes in narrative as political parties vie for public support, approaching election dates, shifting personnel, other nations communicating at diplomatic levels, and non-government/international organizations providing emergency support in unforeseen domains. Looking for a particular strategic effect in such a volatile environment has the features of linear thinking in a non-linear environment.

Re-emphasizing the importance of words, strategic sense has the propensity of being more general, as offering more of a vision around which actions should orient themselves. As Colin Gray says, ‘the idea of strategic sense, though admittedly and undeniably subjective, does have the virtue that it directs attention upon the purpose of an effort, a distinction that the idea of strategic effect does not convey with such conviction’.^[xlix] The word sense (rather than effect) conveys a certain rationality based on shared values. As Simon Simek remarks, ‘all decisions must go through our values, not our interests’. The Localization Strategy has a clear end-state – reflecting clear values – that does not attempt to describe what adaptive resilience will look like. The end state itself is a relationship with the volatile and unpredictable human system. Accordingly, the Localization Strategy provides strategic sense in the form of stimulating adaptive resilience at a tactical and strategic level (3D+) by employing local logic and energy. The strategic effect desired at any given moment may not be relevant as time progresses and facts change. Effects are always dependent on countless conditions, and often in military operations, assessed conditions are ambiguous or at best incomplete.

Principle:

Even the smallest tactical actions should align with the strategic vision of the mission (adaptive resilience).

Examples from Niger:

All courses and interactions are planned and executed with the following questions: how can I give this course, how can I communicate with words and actions, and how will this demonstration of techniques and tactics increase the resilience^[li] of my partner forces?

Theory:

The Localization Strategy encourages “strategic-tactics” where the tactical and the strategic are pressed tightly together. This means that the smallest tactical act must align with and strengthen the strategic purpose of any military operation; the Localization Strategy in this case (adaptive resilience of the social system). If tactical actions cannot be converted to the “coin of strategy”^[lii] then they must be re-evaluated and assessed as wasteful energy. This “currency conversion” concept must be at the heart of tactical decision-making. Training techniques and approaches, communication and didactical methods, general projects associated with the mission; every action and interaction must be analyzed through this “currency conversion” prism.

Tactics are the bricks from which strategies are constructed. A strategy’s resulting shape (and strength) is entirely dependent on the clever and crafty placement of these tactical “bricks”. Tactical and strategic compression is necessary in a hyper-connected digital age where emergence (seemingly low-level tactical acts with potentially enormous strategic repercussions) is commonplace. Whenever a decision is being taken in theatre, even on a teaching technique, or a tactical demonstration, the underlying questions should be: how is this going to strengthen the adaptive resilience of the training audience or partner force, or how can we adjust the approach so that partner forces are reinforced and encouraged to overcome an agile and motivated enemy, or how can this effort be performed in a way that increasingly works towards self-sustainability and autonomy? Every action with a clear purpose of generating strategic coin. 

Principle:

In complex environments, everything and everybody is connected.

Example from Niger:

In 2018, various NGOs and diplomats were invited to the Special Forces Group team-house in Niamey to present their organization, their projects, their difficulties, their successes, and their understandings of the problem. This provided everyone in the team with insight from alternative perspectives, inevitably expanding our capacities for imagination (through gaining understanding). In return, due to the non-covert nature of our mission in Niger, the SOFLE would respond in turn with “presence and purpose” presentations to non-government organizations (NGO), International organizations (IO), government organizations (GO), and diplomats of many nations. They were consistently surprised by the Localization Strategy and regularly mentioned that this did not sound “very military” (on occasion using the term revolutionary^[liii]).

A constant on-the-ground coordination and communication (which later “trickled up”) with the ministry of foreign affairs and national development agency (ENABEL) led to what is often only read about in articles and books: mutual support and understanding between ministries (initially at a ground level), working with a shared purpose and understanding, and finally being able to speak (and think) using a similar grammar (resilience, sustainability, primacy of human factors, etc.).

Theory:

The fourth point on the list of weaknesses in military intervention mentioned in the introduction is a lack of coordination and synchronization – one of the major shortfalls of military operations in the information age.^[liv] Present-day theatres of war have many defence, diplomatic, development, and humanitarian actors all affecting the conflict ecosystem in various but relevant ways. Coordination and synchronization of actions and words (while being reasonable about operational security) is key to deep impact in the human system.^[lv] Before my experience in Niger, the LS emphasized the 3D (defense, diplomacy, and development) approach as a more strategic way of understanding and affecting a complex social environment.

It has been mentioned many times that the Localization Strategy is designed for complexity, and that with complexity nothing is in isolation. Everything is connected in some way or another, and those with a good 7^th sense^[lvi] have a talent for seeing how connections change the balance of things. Coordination is an absolute necessity for maximizing efficiency (aligning efforts), and increasing understanding. When purpose and language is shared, the ease of acceptance and the will to support with information, advice, and words of caution greatly increases. The fact that the Localization Strategy speaks to the wider conflict management sectors is invaluable. They see the sense in what we are trying to accomplish and that our principles are largely in alignment – as they should be.

Another major lesson learned in Niger was adapting the 3D approach (diplomatic, development, and defense) to the 3D+ approach. The plus represents local businesses managed by nationals and expats. It may not come as a surprise, but it is this group that is most connected to the local environment. Through producing local equipment (the LSK and the GAN in the case studies above) the team developed relationships with many local artisans and entrepreneurs. These particular relationships were very unique as these people are far more dependent on local policies and socio-economic circumstances. The problems they encounter daily opened our eyes to a whole other perception of reality. They were concerned that the government would take over the moment things became lucrative. They were concerned about trade routes from Benin and Nigeria as fabric would run out in the market places. Costs increased and decreased based on rumours circulating amongst fabric providers. Street level bargaining techniques revealed cultural nuances we had not noticed before. Certain local ethnicities were known to be better barterers and we would receive history lessons as to why this was the case. Perceptions of themselves and their situation became apparent in discussions brought about through engagement at a micro-economic level. These networks have helped us understand matters at a different level. We are always able to bounce information off of them to see how they interpret and connect it to their world.^[lvii] Again, this has been a revelation worthy of being represented by a plus sign.

The theoretical explanation of minimalism (along with complexity and adaptive resilience) in the LS has been detailed in the previous publication in the Small Wars Journal. Minimalism is very much related to Nassim Taleb’s concept of antifragility and hormesis^[lviii] where low-level stressors enhance strategic acumen and Lawrence Freedman’s remark that the fertile context of strategy is when there are “pressing problems”.^[lix] We think more when we have less. We maximize what we do have, and begin to be creative with what we don’t have. As the aforementioned paper proposes, the resulting ramifications of restricted means (imagination, creativity, resourcefulness etc.) can generate this critical “ether” of adaptive resilience within a social system or organization. Below are a few examples of what minimalism (as defined in the Localization Strategy as an increased reliance – due to restricted resources – on local means and energy) can lead to and stimulate.

Examples from Niger:

1. 1. 1. 1. The inability to acquire equipment for our partner forces pushed us into developing locally made equipment with locally available fabric, skills, and equipment (see case studies). Finding solutions with less resources always results in more “organic/local” solutions.^[lx]
         2. Being that Belgium is unable to provide equipment – which often feels like a great handicap compared to our Western partners – we must rely on Nigerien processes to deliver the weapons, ammo, vehicles, optics, drones, etc. Though these processes take more time, it is only by using them that they will improve; not by bypassing them for the sake of expediency.
         3. Having used a single instructor for training 60 officer cadets at the Ecole de Formation des Officiers des Forces Armées Nigériennes^[lxi] (EFOFAN), required the cadets themselves to prepare and present the courses. They were given the Nigerienized POI and a lesson sheet and went to work reading and preparing to give instruction the following day. The second in command of the school was very pleased with this approach and said that the cadets will learn more this way even if the courses may not be given as precisely.

This paper began with 6 enduring issues facing western expeditionary forces and military and political decision-makers. The Localization Strategy and its application in Niger has forced a confrontation with many of these difficulties over the years. We had to constantly rethink not what we were doing, but how we were doing it. We had to abandon the idea of quick gains and rapid solutions, as these have no depth and therefore wash away with the first rain. And in order to truly stimulate adaptive resilience, we had to go deeper, look at affecting holistically and at an institutional level. We had to stop looking at things separately focusing on single points as though the whole was not “our job”. Local logic and energy had to guide our efforts and oftentimes reset our biased ideas on how “things ought to be”. From day one, we had to plan and maneuver in a way that would make our presence eventually dispensable – at every level. It was a delicate engagement where our influence had to bring results while simultaneously avoiding structural or organizational dependencies.

It goes without saying that fragile ecosystems are sensitive to input in unpredictable ways, therefore it is safer to channel existing energy – native to the socio-politico-economic environment –  than to bring energy (ends, ways and means) alien to the socio-politico-economic environment. In the end, we must get better at thinking locally, thinking long-term, thinking in terms of complex connections, and finally understanding the application of power as a spectrum with short and long term consequences and advantages. The local logic and energy of any given environment (home and away), in any kind of operation (military assistance and direct action), should be our most consequential tactical and strategic guide.^[lxii] It will result in a healthy dose of humility and adaptability, it will sharpen our senses, and it may be a partial remedy for our institutional shortsightedness when it comes to winning not just the war, but also the peace.