News & commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and published by Duncan Moore.
1. Ministries embark on reforming Korea-U.S. working group on N. Korea policy: lawmaker
2. China's 'unforeseen' retaliation against S. Korea a driver for regional alliance: Sbragia
3. Translation of UFD letter to South Korea
4. Discussions on U.S. intermediate missile deployment in S. Korea premature: U.S. envoy
5. ROK government restricts civil society’s human rights investigations with North Korean defectors
6. [Editorial] Improper response
7. Washington, Seoul discussed ‘creative ideas’ regarding Pyongyang: Biegun
8. North Korea flouting nuclear sanctions: UN report
9. President Moon and PM Suga reconcile for Madame Yoo
10. N. Korean spy chief 'demoted' for quarantine failure
11. U.S. warns S. Korea of China's military buildup
12. North Korea and China strike agreement on border security
13. S. Korean ruling party tries to please N. Korea by declaring end of Korean War
14. Pres. Moon says Kim’s apology is meaningful
15. Defense ministry denies real-time eavesdropping of N. Korea's shoot-to-kill order
16. New virus cases smallest since early August, upcoming holiday crucial for virus fight
17. How North Korea built a fleet of ghost ships
1. Ministries embark on reforming Korea-U.S. working group on N. Korea policy: lawmaker
Yonhap News Agency · by pbr@yna.co.kr · September 29, 2020
This is why the ROK needs to disband the MOU and fold its functions into a Unification Planning Directorate under MOFA.
2. China's 'unforeseen' retaliation against S. Korea a driver for regional alliance: Sbragia
Yonhap News Agency · by Byun Duk-Kun · September 29, 2020
Mr. Sbragia's comments on THADD and the QUAD are in response to the question I asked him today at the Institute of Corean American Studies (ICAS) conference today.
3. Translation of UFD Letter to South Korea
NK Hidden Gulag · by Rosa Park & Jeune Kim · September 28, 2020
Thank you to the great team at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK).
This is the non-apology apology. Here is an excerpt from an op-ed my colleague Matt Ha and I have submitted for publication.
“Kim Jong Un issued a rare apology to the South Korean government September 25th after North Korean soldiers killed and then burned the corpse of a South Korean government official, which sparked outrage in Seoul. While Kim’s sudden apology has seemingly defused the Seoul leadership’s initial anger, the Moon Jae-in administration should not be so quick to formally accept Kim’s apology as it is most likely just part of his regime’s ongoing political warfare strategy in which act will likely include a charm offensive and demands for concessions. In reality Kim’s message to Seoul is a ‘non-apology apology’ and, as Professor Sung Yoon Lee describes, a ‘great leader mind-trick’ that is actually a rebuke of Seoul.”
...
“Some experts from Seoul’s Korean Institute for National Unification (KINU) suggest that Kim’s apology signifies Pyongyang’s intent to prevent the deterioration of inter-Korean relations. This assessment, however, overlooks the Kim regime’s track record of conducting political warfare against the South, which seeks to influence Seoul’s decision-making through a balance of coercion and deception. As retired Lieutenant General In Bum Chun has written, ‘the DPRK is a leading practitioner of political warfare, and this tool is a central, indeed definitive, feature of the North Korean regime’s power abroad and at home.’”
...
The killing of the South Korean fisheries official could not have come at a better time for North Korean efforts to re-engage South Korea with a charm offensive. One of the well-known North Korean political warfare tactics is to cause tension or conduct provocations and then follow-up with offers to defuse a situation it created. Throughout this year, North Korea has experienced multiple crises affecting its economy and government. First, the COVID-19 pandemic has forced the regime to impose draconian population and resource control measures such as cutting off all cross-border trade activity, both licit and illicit, to prevent infections. Others’ measures include restricting internal movement and attempting to halt the use of foreign currency.
4. Discussions on U.S. intermediate missile deployment in S. Korea premature: U.S. envoy
Yonhap News Agency · by graceoh@yna.co.kr · September 28, 2020
When we do have these discussions (when they are no longer premature), we are likely to see a firestorm of opposition in South Korean and in other Asian countries unless we conduct effective preparation of the information environment.
5. ROK government restricts civil society’s human rights investigations with North Korean defectors
Database Center for North Korean Human Rights · September 25, 2020
A very critical statement on South Korea and human rights.
6. [Editorial] Improper response
Korea Herald · by the Korea Herald · September 28, 2020
Yes, they do. More than hollow. We have to understand the nature of the Kim family regime as it really is and not as we would wish it to be. The North does not share the same vision for peace.
7. Washington, Seoul discussed ‘creative ideas’ regarding Pyongyang: Biegun
Korea Herald · by Ahn Sung-Mi · September 29, 2020
And this is the fundamental problem. All the creative ideas mean nothing if the regime will not engage. The ROK and US are ready to creatively engage without sacrificing their national security, national prosperity, and values and principles. The onus is on Kim Jong-un to allow engagement.
8. North Korea flouting nuclear sanctions: UN report
Barron's · by Agence France Presse · September 29, 2020
The 211-page UN Panel of Experts report can be accessed here.
There is a lot to parse in this report and a lot of smart analysts are pouring over it, so I know there will be more reporting on it. I have heard from one expert that it is rumored the Chinese are blocking inclusion of more information on North Korea's illicit procurement activities. China and Russia can be expected to block any further designation of entireties for violations. China and Russia are "barely" implementing UN sanctions.
But my favorite part of the report is this information in Annex 49 on pages 178-183 about North Korean professional football (soccer) player Han Kwang Song, who is being paid some 4 million euros.
Can we believe his "pledge?" What happens to his family when he does not transfer funds to the regime?
9. President Moon and PM Suga reconcile for Madame Yoo
Jakarta Post · by Kornelius Purba · September 29, 2020
10. N. Korean spy chief 'demoted' for quarantine failure
Chosun Ilbo · by Kim Myong-Song · September 29, 2020
What is amazing in North Korea is that it appears that demoted generals continue to serve. But the important point is that it appears that the North could not completely shut down the border with China.
11. U.S. warns S. Korea of China's military buildup
Chosun Ilbo · by Yu Yong-Weon · September 29, 2020
I am pretty sure South Korea is well aware of the Chinese military build-up. The key question is how does South Korea assess the build-up? Is it a threat to South Korea?
It may be the most dangerous, but I think the most likely threat is Chinese subversion of the ROK (from growing China towns and Confucius Institutes to building a new virus lab near Pusan, modeled on the one in Wuhan).
12. North Korea and China strike agreement on border security
North Korea Economy Watch · by Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein · September 29, 2020
13. S. Korean ruling party tries to please N. Korea by declaring end of Korean War
Dong-A Ilbo · September 29, 2020
A question I have is what do we think an end of war declaration is going to do for security on the Korean peninsula? How will it reduce the threat to the South? What do we expect the North to do when we declare an end to the Korean war?
Do we believe that Kim Jong-Un will ever abandon the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia-like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?
In support of that strategy, do we believe that Kim Jong-Un will abandon the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide-to-conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?
14. Pres. Moon says Kim’s apology is meaningful
Dong-A Ilbo · by Hyung-Jun Hwang & Ji-Hyun Kim · September 29, 2020
Really? The non-apology apology was meaningful? I think we may not really understand the nature of the Kim family regime and its political warfare strategy.
15. Defense ministry denies real-time eavesdropping of N. Korea's shoot-to-kill order
Yonhap News Agency · by prb@yna.co.kr & graceoh@yna.co.kr · September 29, 2020
A double-edged sword. If it reveals intelligence capabilities, it compromises them, but also then results in criticism of inaction.
16. New virus cases smallest since early August, upcoming holiday crucial for virus fight
Yonhap News Agency · by khj@yna.co.kr · September 29, 2020
Hopefully this pattern can continue after the holiday this week.
17. How North Korea built a fleet of ghost ships
Hakai Magazine · by Andrea Valentino · September 29, 2020
Just another effect of the regime's rule of the North.
“Just because you do not take an interest in politics doesn't mean politics won't take an interest in you!"
- Pericles
"Virtue is a state of war, and to live in it we have always to combat with ourselves.”
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau
"The door for intelligence work opened for me when I undertook my first secret mission while on my honeymoon in Japan in 1919. The United States Government asked me to take a two-month trip to Siberia to report on the anti-Bolshevik movement in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution. Well, it wasn't your usual honeymoon, but Mrs. Donovan was very understanding. The mission was successful and opened doors to many more missions for the government. I was heading down the intelligence path and I was loving it”
- Wild Bill Donovan