Operating in an Era of Persistent Unmanned Aerial Surveillance
In the year 2000, the United States military used Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) strictly for surveillance purposes and the global commercial UAS market was nascent. Today, the combination of countries exporting complex UAS technologies and an expanding commercial UAS market advances the spread of UAS technologies outside of U.S. government control. The propagation of this technology from both the commercial and military sectors will increase the risk of sophisticated UASs becoming available to any individual or group, regardless of their intent or financial resources. Current and future adversaries, including non-state actors, are likely to acquire and integrate UASs into their operations against U.S. forces. However, U.S. forces can reduce the advantages of abundant UAS capability by limiting the massing of resources and by conducting distributed operations with smaller maneuver elements.
Leveraging the Growth in the Commercial UAS Market
While armed UAS operations are only associated with the U.S., UK, and Israel, other countries with less restrictive export controls are independently developing their own armed UAS systems.[i] Chinese companies continue to develop reconnaissance and armed UASs for export to emerging foreign markets.[ii],[iii] Earlier this year, social media reports identified a Chinese CH-3 after it crashed in Nigeria.[iv] Reports indicate China sold the system to the Nigerian government for use against Boko Haram.[v] Other countries including Pakistan and Iran organically developed armed UAS capabilities, with claims of varying levels of credibility.[vi],[vii] In an effort to capitalize on the international UAS market and to build relationships with allies, the U.S. eased UAS export restrictions in early 2015 while announcing the sale of armed UASs to the Netherlands.[viii],[ix] Military UAS development is expected to be relatively limited, with less than 0.5 percent of expected future global defense spending slated to buying or developing military drones.[x] For now, long range surveillance and attack UASs are likely to remain restricted to the few wealthy and technologically advanced countries that can afford the research costs, training, and logistical support associated with such systems.[xi] However, short range military or civilian UASs are likely to be acquired by non-state actors primarily for surveillance purposes.
Still captured from an ISIS documentary with footage shot from a UAS over the Iraqi city of Falluja (nytimes.com)
Hamas, Hezbollah, Libyan militants, and ISIS are reportedly using commercial UASs to provide surveillance support for their military operations.[xii],[xiii],[xiv],[xv],[xvi],[xvii],[xviii] Current models contain onboard GPS receivers for autonomous navigation and a video transmission or recording system that allows the operators to collect live video for a few thousand dollars or less. Small UASs, similar in size to the U.S. military’s Group 1 UASs, appeal to non-state actors for several reasons. Namely, they are inexpensive to acquire, can be easily purchased in the civilian market, and are simple to maintain. Some systems can be operated with very little assembly or training, which reduces the need for substantial technical knowledge and enables non-state actors to immediately integrate them into daily operations. These UASs are capable of targeting restricted areas as evidenced by the recent UAS activity near the White House, French nuclear power plants, and the Japanese Prime Minister’s roof.[xix],[xx],[xxi],[xxii] The small size and agility of these UASs allow them to evade traditional air defense systems yet specific counter UAS systems are beginning to show progress beyond the prototype phase.[xxiii],[xxiv]
Economic forecasters may dispute commercial UAS sales predictions, but most agree that this market is likely to see larger growth than the military market.[xxv],[xxvi] Countries are currently attempting to attract emerging UAS businesses by developing UAS regulations that will integrate commercial UASs into their national airspace.[xxvii] The increase of hobby and commercial UAS use is likely to lead to significant investments in both hardware and software for these systems. Ultimately, this will result in a wider number of platforms with an increased number of capabilities available for purchase at a lower cost. Future systems are expected to come with obstacle avoidance systems, a wider variety of modular payloads, and extensive training support systems provided by a growing user community. Hybrid systems will address the payload, range, and endurance limitations of the current platforms by combining aspects of rotor and fixed wing aerial vehicles. The dual-use nature of these commercial systems will continue to be an issue. Google and Amazon are researching package delivery systems that can potentially be repurposed to carry hazardous materials.[xxviii],[xxix] Thermal, infrared, and multispectral cameras used for precision agriculture can also provide non-state actors night-time surveillance and the ability to peer through limited camouflage. However, non-state actors will likely primarily use hobby and commercial grade platforms in an aerial surveillance role, since current payload limitations prevent the platforms from carrying a significant amount of hazardous material.
Minimizing the Advantages of Non-State Actor’s UAS Surveillance
As these systems proliferate, even the most resource-limited adversaries are expected to have access to an aerial surveillance platform. Therefore, friendly operations must adapt in an environment of perceived ubiquitous surveillance. Despite the limited range and endurance of these small UASs, they are difficult to detect and track reliably. Therefore, one must assume the adversary is operating these systems if reporting indicates they possess them. Force protection measures and tactical level concepts of operations can be modified to limit the advantages of ever-present and multi-dimensional surveillance by the adversary. At the tactical level, utilizing smoke and terrain to mask movement and the use of camouflage nets or vegetation for concealment can be effective countermeasures.[xxx]The principles of deception, stealth, and ambiguity will take on increasing importance as achieving any element of surprise will become far more difficult.
The upcoming 3DR Solo UAS will feature autonomous flight and camera control with real time video streaming for $1,000 (3drobotics.com)
At static locations such as forward operating bases or patrol bases, a high frequency of operations, including deception operations, can saturate the adversary’s intelligence collection and processing capabilities and disguise the intent of friendly movements. Additionally, massing strategic resources at static locations will incur increasing risk. In 2007 for example, insurgents used Google Earth imagery of British bases in Basra to improve the accuracy of mortar fire.[xxxi] The adversary will now have near real time geo-referenced video available which can be combined with GPS guided rockets, artillery, mortars and missiles to conduct rapid and accurate attacks.[xxxii] These attacks can be conducted with limited planning and resources, yet produce results similar to the 2012 attack at Camp Bastion which caused over $100 million in damages and resulted in the combat ineffectiveness of the AV-8B squadron. [xxxiii],[xxxiv]
In environments without the need for an enduring ground presence, distributed operations with smaller maneuver elements will reduce the chance of strategic losses while concurrently making it harder for the adversary to identify and track friendly forces. Interestingly, operational concepts developed by several of the services to assure access in the face of sophisticated anti-access/area denial threats can also minimalize the impact of the UAS surveillance capabilities of non-state actors. The Navy has the “Distributed Lethality” concept, the Air Force is testing the “Rapid Raptor” concept, and the Army’s is developing its “Pacific Pathways” concept. [xxxv],[xxxvi],[xxxvii],[xxxviii]. The Marine Corps is implementing its response, Expeditionary Force 21 (EF21), through several Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces.
The EF21 concept focuses on using high-speed aerial transport, such as the MV-22, to conduct dispersed operations with Company Landing Teams that are self-sufficient for up to a week. In December 2013, 160 Marines flew over 3,400 miles in KC-130s and MV-22s from their base in Spain to Uganda in order to support the embassy evacuation in South Sudan, demonstrating the EF21 concept.[xxxix] Utilizing high speed and long-range transport allows friendly forces to stage outside of the adversary’s ground and aerial surveillance range. This prevents the adversary from observing any patterns that could allude to the mission of the friendly force and also limits exposure to UAS surveillance. Advances in digital communications, including VTCs and mesh-networks, can reduce the footprint of the command center making these smaller forces more flexible without reducing capabilities. The small size of these units also reduces their observable signatures and limits the ability of the adversary to target massed forces and resources.
Confronting the Approaching UAS Free-Rider Dilemma
Non-state actors capitalize on the ability to rapidly acquire and implement sophisticated technologies without having to invest directly in their development. These organizations did not pay to develop the Internet or reconnaissance satellites, yet they have Internet access to high-resolution images of the entire globe.[xl] It took years for the U.S. to develop the ability to live stream video from the Predator UAS but now anyone can purchase a hobby UAS that comes with the ability to live stream HD video to YouTube for immediate world-wide distribution.[xli] As the commercial market expands, so will the capabilities of these small UAS systems, democratizing UAS technology. Systems that cannot easily be imported, such as advanced communications relays, robust training pipelines, and sophisticated logistics infrastructure can now be automated and outsourced. This process will erode the air dominance that the U.S. enjoyed since WWII, now that commercial investments allow near peers to acquire key UAS technologies that approach U.S. UAS capabilities.
The next generation of advanced fighters may be the sophisticated unmanned vehicles envisioned by Navy Secretary Ray Maybus. [xlii] However, other countries could choose a different route by sacrificing survivability for cheaper, smaller, and smarter UAS swarms that will directly benefit from commercial UAS investments.[xliii] Regardless of the strategic direction military UASs take, commercial and hobby systems operating in an aerial surveillance role will remain an inexpensive force multiplier for non-state actors. Fortunately, the strategic concepts developed and implemented by the services to counter the proliferation of advanced anti-air and coastal defense systems can be leveraged to minimalize the impact of unmanned aerial surveillance by the adversary. Distributed operations limit the massing of resources vulnerable to UAS assisted targeting while long-range insertions of small maneuver elements reduces the exposure of friendly forces to UAS surveillance. Nation states and non-state actors will continue to benefit from technological advances without investing resources in their development, pushing U.S. forces to continually update operational concepts to limit the increasing capabilities of the adversary.
[i] P.W. Singer, “The Global Swarm,” Foreign Policy, March 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/11/the-global-swarm/
[ii] Lily Kuo and Tim Fernholz, “China’s Latest Discount Product: Drones,” The Atlantic, June 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/chinas-latest-discount-product-drones/276997/
[iii] Xu Tianran, “Orders taken for Chinese drone,” Global Times (Shanghai), November 2012, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/744417.shtml
[iv] Adam Rawnsley, “It Seems a Chinese Missile Drone Just Crashed in Nigeria,” War is Boring, January 2015, https://medium.com/war-is-boring/whose-drone-just-crashed-in-nigeria-c8c55bdf3476
[v] Beth Stevenson, “Study shows armed UAV exports limited despite demand,” Flightglobal, March 2015, http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/study-shows-armed-uav-exports-limited-despite-demand-410358/
[vi] Jamshed Baghwan, “Drone war: ‘Burraq’ turned the tide in Tirah battle, say officials,” The Tribune, March 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/859152/drone-war-burraq-turned-the-tide-in-tirah-battle-say-officials/
[vii] Adam Rawnsley, “Iran Has a Dogfighting Drone,” War is Boring, September 2014, https://medium.com/war-is-boring/iran-has-a-dogfighting-drone-e083c57440a8
[viii] Paul McLeary and Aaron Mehta, “New Armed UAV Export Rules Help US Firms,” DefenseNews, February 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/strike/2015/02/21/us-uav-policy-nato-armed-drones/23683861/
[ix] Micah Zenko, “The Great Drone Contradiction,” Foreign Policy, February 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/19/the-great-drone-contradiction-unmanned-aircraft-systems/
[xi] Lynn E. Davis, Michael J. McNerney, James Chow, Thomas Hamilton, Sarah Harting, and Daniel Byman, “Armed and Dangerous? UAVs and U.S. Security,” RAND Corporation, 2014, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR449.html
[xii] Wim Zwijnenburg, “Drone-tocracy? Mapping the Proliferation of Unmanned Systems,” The International Relations and Security Network, October 2014, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=184503
[xiii] Adam Rawnsley, “A Bunch of Iranian Drones Have Crashed in Iraq,” War is Boring, February 2015, https://medium.com/war-is-boring/a-bunch-of-iranian-drones-have-crashed-in-iraq-a7610cdb815b
[xiv] Michael Shmulovich, “Hezbollah drone reportedly manufactured in Germany,” The Times of Israel, October 2012, http://www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollahs-drone-reportedly-manufactured-in-germany-and-sold-to-iran-lebanese-paper-reports/
[xv] Peter Bergen and Emily Schneider, “Hezbollah armed drone? Militants’ new weapon,” CNN, September 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/22/opinion/bergen-schneider-armed-drone-hezbollah/
[xvi] John Hall, “ISIS propaganda, Call of Duty-style: Latest footage shows drone's view of battle-ravaged streets of Kobane before swooping in to show gun battles on the ground,” DailyMail, December 2014, http://linkis.com/Yj34K
[xvii] Ian Austen, “Libyan Rebels Reportedly Use Tiny Canadian Surveillance Drone,” The New York Times, August 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/world/africa/25canada.html
[xviii] Caleb Weiss, “Islamic State uses drones to coordinate fighting in Baiji,” The Long War Journal, April 2015, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/04/islamic-state-uses-drones-to-coordinate-fighting-in-baiji.php
[xix] Michael Schmidt and Michael Shear, “A Drone, Too Small for Radar to Detect, Rattles the White House,” The New York Times, January 2015,
[xx] Michael Schmidt, “Secret Service Arrests Man After Drone Flies Near White House,” The New York Times, May 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/15/us/white-house-drone-secret-service.html?_r=0
[xxi] Chine Labbe and Michel Rose, “France investigates mystery drone activity over nuclear plants,” Reuters, October 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/30/us-edf-drones-idUSKBN0IJ0ZI20141030
[xxii] Will Ripley, “Drone with radioactive material found on Japanese Prime Minister's roof,” CNN, April 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/22/asia/japan-prime-minister-rooftop-drone/
[xxiii] Kelsey Atherton, “Company To Make Anti-Drone Tech Available To The Masses,” Popular Science, March 2013, http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2013-03/company-to-make-antidrone-tech-available-to-the-masses
[xxiv] Michael Peck, “UK firms unveil anti-UAV defense system,” C4ISR & Networks, May 2015, http://www.c4isrnet.com/story/military-tech/uas-isr/2015/05/28/british-anti-uav-defense/28072465/
[xxv] Marcelo Ballve, “The Drones Report: Market forecasts, regulatory barriers, top vendors, and leading commercial applications,” Business Insider, May 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/uav-or-commercial-drone-market-forecast-2015-2
[xxvi] Daedal Research, “Global Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Market- Focus on Commercial UAVs: Trends and Opportunities (2015-2019), PR Newswire, March 2015, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/global-unmanned-aerial-vehicle-uav-market---focus-on-commercial-uavs-2015-2019-497253591.html
[xxvii] Elana Margrina, “The global race for drone regulation,” Inline, June 2014, http://inlinepolicy.com/2014/the-global-race-for-drone-regulation/
[xxviii] Alexis Madrigal, “Inside Google’s Secret Drone-Delivery Program,” The Atlantic, August 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/inside-googles-secret-drone-delivery-program/379306/
[xxix] Kelsey Atherton, “Amazon drone patent means you may never have to leave your house again,” Popular Science, May 2015, http://www.popsci.com/amazons-drone-delivery-patent-revealed
[xxx] D.B. Mirkarimi and C. Pericak, “Countering the Tactical UAV Threat,” 2003,
[xxxi]Thomas Harding, “Terrorists ‘use Google maps to hit UK troops,’” The Telegraph, January 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/01/13/wgoogle13.xml
[xxxii] Bob Work, “Army War College Strategy Conference,” U.S. Army War College, April 2015, http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1930
[xxxiii] Bill Roggio, “6 Harrier jets destroyed, 2 damaged in Taliban assault on Camp Bastion,” The Long War Journal, September 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/09/6_harrier_jets_destr.php
[xxxiv] John Gresham, Attack on Camp Bastion: The Destruction of VMA-211,” Defense Media Network, September 2012, http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/attack-on-camp-bastion-the-destruction-of-vma-211/
[xxxv] Thomas Rowden, Peter Gumataotao, Peter Fanta, “Distributed Lethality,” USNI Proceedings, January 2015, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-01/distributed-lethality
[xxxvi] “UASF airmen evaluate Rapid Raptor concept in Guam,” Airforce Technolgy, December 2014, http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsusaf-airmen-evaluate-rapid-raptor-concept-in-guam-4460735
[xxxvii] Watt Olson, “Pacific Pathways: Army prepares new tack for deploying forces in Pacific,” Stripes, http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/pacific-pathways-army-prepares-new-tack-for-deploying-forces-in-pacific-1.280623
[xxxviii] Benjamin Jensen, “Distributed Maritime Operations: Back To The Future?” War On The Rocks, April 2015, http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/distributed-maritime-operations-an-emerging-paradigm/
[xxxix] Murielle Delaporte, “Lessons From Marines’ Special Africa Force: Juba, The Anti-Bengahzi,” Breaking Defense, February 2015, http://breakingdefense.com/2014/02/lessons-from-marines-special-africa-force-juba-the-anti-bengahzi/
[xl] P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Penguin Press, 2009.
[xli] Leo Kelion, “DJI Phantom 3 drones stream live video to YouTube,” BBC, April 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-32221363
[xlii] Kris Osborn, “Navy Secretary Says Future Navy Fighter Planes Will Be Unmanned,” Military.com, April 2015, http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/04/16/navy-secretary-says-future-navy-fighter-planes-will-be-unmanned.html
[xliii] Robert Newson, “The US Navy Doesn’t Need an Expensive Aircraft Carrier Drone,” Defenseone, March 2015, http://www.defenseone.com/management/2015/03/us-navy-doesnt-need-expensive-aircraft-carrier-drone/108979/
About the Author(s)
Russian Drones in Service of Donetsk Militants: https://en.informnapalm.org/russian-...tsk-militants/ … pic.twitter.com/vn4xm8AfgU
The US military wants to find out if it can still fight in a conventional war. We'll be livestreaming the experiment https://news.vice.com/article/can-the-us-army-still-fight-as-a-heavywei… …
On August 5 and 6, a whole mess of senior Pentagon leadership and military brass will convene in California's Mojave Desert to witness something both spectacular and confusing. In the middle of the night, under a bright desert moon, US soldiers bristling with high-tech weaponry and other assorted killamajigs will gently parachute from the sky, then capture and secure an objective. Sort of.
Hate to say it the author is way behind the current curve in the combat use of UAVs.
If one pays close attention to the EUCOM Commander's comments from this week and many of those from Breedlove SACEUR we are so out of date it is crazy when it comes to the use of UAVs in the combined arms warfare being seen in eastern Ukraine.
Not only are we behind the times with UAVs we are massively behind in EW as we have nothing to match what the Russians are currently using in combat and the earliest we will be deploying anything is planned for 2020.
Electronic Warfare: What US Army Can Learn From Ukraine http://defnews.ly/1N22oNA
The Russians have fielded complete EW Bns and we have what about 600 EW types in the entire Army and they were for CIED.
We need to urgently get back to the basics and forget totally COIN.
We use to in the Army have strong EW and CEWI abilities but we packed it away in favor of COIN.
Absolutely no Army unit in 2015 has ever expreienced full combat with no comms and under full surveillence of UAVs.
AND right now the Russians have complete air superiority with their newest AD sýstems that we have no match for thus our UAVs would not survive anyway.
Heck none of our AF pilots have even flown SEAD missions since say Vietnam.
Seems to me a good bet would also be to develop UAS countermeasures like ultra-light MANPADs, EMP direct fire weapons, jammers, hunter/killer UASs, etc. We all know deep inside those things are coming. As soon as two parties with UASs go toe to toe one of them will kick off the arms race. Might as well get ahead of the curve. A UAS is a platform, which means like any other platform it can be degraded, defeated, or improved. Ducking behind terrain features and doing fancing backtracking should be last resort measures or at the most insurance policy measures rather than primary techniques.