Rethinking Our Strategy in Iraq and Syria

I read your article and I am dismayed by the fact that you use the Vietnam Experience as an example of how to not conduct an armed intervention, and then turn right around and advocate the same strategy, in affect, to describe the correct approach to our uninvited armed intervention in Syria! A country that has NOT requested our assistance and would not. In addition, you completely do not mention the Russina influence and relationship with Syria, which will not be altered, because Putin will not give up Assad. Further, you seem to totally not understand the relationship and the linkage between these two countries, particularly, given the recent successes that Russia and the Syrian State have made aganist ISIL. Moreover, you obviously have not paid little if any attention to what other countries are saying about US intervention in Syria, as well as the Middle East in general, and how they feel about US involvement. Based on my limited discussions with those same people, the continued presence of US "advisors" and support of the so called rebellion has done nothing to rectify the situation in light of an astonishing lack of an organized effort against ISIL that should have been initiated in the first place. The only thing the Current administration, with your blessing it would appear, has managed to do is get more of our guys killed in both Iraq and Syria, largely as a result of the current token force associated with an incompetent foreign policy that has NO logical end-game. Minimumly what we should be doing is getting the hell out of Syria and let The Syrian government solve its own problems along with invited allies, AND working cooperatively with Russia to get rid of ISIL. But NO we keep fiddle-farting around with NATO in the Black Sea wasting money and risking a further screwup with Russia. And you also never mention China. For example, what is your end game if China were to throw in with Syria and Russia in resolving the ISIL issue in Syria - an overdue possibility. Additionally, your Phase III is not only unrealistic but naive. The recent comments by the Military (Army) and the Secretary of State only server to reiterate the idiotic policy that this administration is following in its inefficient, ineffective, logically unsound, dangerous, and naive foregoing policy, for which the military brass, or at least what is left of them, has totally gone along with. Your statement "Earned their Spurs in the region" (are you kidding me!) is about as arrogant a statement as I have read in a longtime, and not respectful of the rank you earned or the soldiers you led.

Six North Caucasus Insurgency Commanders Transfer Allegiance To Islamic State

http://www.rferl.org/content/islamic-state-north-caucasus-insurgency-co… …

This comment seems to support a lot of what Robert and Bill M often mention:

Westerners talking about the IS group and Islam is a mistake

http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/12/29/john-kerry-i… …

IS will ultimately be defined by Muslims themselves

There can only be a Shia political solution to IS but instead of a compromise we get the following--so have the Shia reached the level of an altered state of reality?

Supplying 100,000 Sunni's with arms--and they will not be turned on the Shia--and why should the US arm them?--Iraq has oil and can afford it themselves---but wait was it not Bush 2 that stated we would be repaid for our efforts with Iraqi oil?

Iraq calls on US to arm 100,000 Sunni tribes against IS http://bit.ly/1HOOtGV

I would agree that before this country's leadership ever decides to again engage in an extended land campaign on the continent of Asia (which includes the Middle East) it truly understood why this country was defeated in Vietnam -- else we are again bound to suffer another strategic failure on that continent.

One of the most strenuous intellectual exercises, and perhaps most emotionally difficult, is to admit one's country and military not only lost a war, politically they were on the wrong side of history. That failing to admit such truths often leads to the time honored assertion by the losers that although they were tactically successful, the nation lost due to a failure of its leaders or people’s political will to sustain the situation through to its deserved victory.

In essence, that is the argument so many continue to make concerning this country's defeat in Vietnam. An unfortunate flawed vision that precludes it's adherents from realizing that this nation’s opponent in that conflict, the North Vietnamese, successfully conducted a war on a totally different cultural and strategic plain aimed at defeating the far stronger foreign military forces occupying their land. A cultural and strategic approach to conflict which (as intended) over time (in Vietnam) rendered null the effectiveness of the vastly superior fire power employed by U.S. military forces and the efforts of the (lesser equipped) ARVN units operating alongside them.

North Vietnam’s political and military leaders understood they had little probability of winning battlefield victories against the vastly stronger fire power of the far more mobile American military forces in "their" land. Their strategic goal was to cause the American military forces to depart from Vietnam, not to merely defeat them in battle, and they were willing to pay the human and economic price needed to achieve that result. Accordingly, the North Vietnamese opted to conduct a war of attrition and aimed their efforts not at (the almost impossible) defeating of U.S. forces on the battlefield, but instead on steadily driving up the human, material, and financial costs being incurred by this country in its attempt to sustain South Vietnam as an independent country -- accurately believing that at some point in time those costs would prove to politically burdensome for this country's government, after which point they would find a way to withdraw American forces from Vietnam to cease the hemorrhaging.

North Vietnam's leaders correctly matched the costs their nation’s people could carry with a military strategy that could under the circumstances of that time bring them political success -- and that is the reason for a nation engaging in a war.

This country on the other hand did not match it's military approach with either the costs it could politically endure to sustain the lifespan of a morally weaker and less capable South Vietnamese government and military. In fact, given their costs and the fact that the U.S. Army's tactical victories in Vietnam failed to provide a path to strategic success for this country, they were simply a liability to this country and helped further North Vietnam's achievement of its war aims. A strategic assessment too many fail to grasp.

General Westmoreland, when he commanded MACV in South Vietnam, decided to implement a strategy of attrition believing that the superior mobility and firepower of his forces would enable them to kill sufficient numbers of lighter armed North Vietnamese and Viet Cong such that those loss levels would politically force them to withdraw their forces from South Vietnam. The foolishness of believing that a Western Army could kill enough Asians in their homeland was culturally absurd beyond belief and simply indicates that neither Westmoreland nor any other American military or political leader supporting his approach had bothered to study the Viet Minh’s sinning campaign against the French.

General Creighton Abrams approach of systematically pacifying South Vietnam using both American and South Vietnamese forces was similarly bound to fail in the long run. The VC and the NVA simply withdrew their forces knowing that after the Americans withdrew their forces could return and overrun and defeat the remaining ARVN units operating without U.S. support. It was simply part of the the NVA strategy not to engage the U.S. forces in open battle – and this country had already made it clear that American forces were going to be withdrawn from South Vietnam. Add to that the obvious fact that by scattering their forces across their land, the ARVN was not positioned to successfully combat a Northern invasion of their land – which they should have known was forthcoming.

Whether one likes the political philosophies of the North Vietnamese government or not, theirs was a post-World War II anti-colonialist / anti-imperialist struggle. The government that the U.S., through the political machinations of its Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, brought to power in South Vietnam was led by men most of whom had either fought for or supported the previous (hated and defeated) French colonial rulers of that land or was led by men who had avoided the anti-French struggle. It survived in power only because Dulles and the South Vietnamese government officials refused to hold the nationwide elections scheduled for 1955 in which the people of South Vietnam were to decide whether or not to unify themselves with the North. The only reason for preventing that election being held was because Dulles and other State Department Officials and the South Vietnamese political leadership knew that the majority of people in South Vietnam would have voted to unify their portion of Indochina with North Vietnam.

The above is the reason the U.S. lost in Vietnam. In sum, it had created and supported an inept government it had played a major role in installing in the South of that Country, and thus insuring its independence would have required the U.S. expanding the costs associated with a permanent presence in that land of American forces continually engaged in combat and suffering non-stop casualties. The American public simply would not have stood for the costs of that type of effort.

President Obama's strategy in Iraq is the correct one. He appears to understand that the battle between the Sunni and Shiite components of that region is between those parties and that its outcome will have little or no impact on the future of this nation. It is simply fallacious to believe they are coming here next.

Clearly, despite any interpretation of his rhetoric otherwise, the President has committed sufficient U.S. military power to insure that the areas with large oil reserves are secure from ISIS / ISIL forces. That is the only areas in which this country and Western Europe have a strategic interest in preventing ISIL from controlling. That is a defensive goal and can (in that topographical environment) be secured by the presence of U.S. air power aiding Kurdish or Iraqi Shiite forces. Beyond that effort -- the contest between the various groups -- perhaps called pro-ISIL, anti-ISIL, and Shiites are their business. Let them kill each other off and keep that conflict going. It is not this country's concern.

As President Obama has wisely noted, given this country's long term record of strategic defeats in Asia and our consistent failure to politically shape the environment in that region, we 1) need a new definition of victory, 2) the era of large foot print occupations of foreign lands is over, and 3) while the struggle against ISIL will be a long one, its costs will be borne by Arab ground forces and not those of this country.

In my humble opinion, President Obama is strategically wiser than many of the Generals in the U.S. military advocating for the insertion of U.S. ground troops into that conflict. He clearly has learned the lessons of America's history of failed interventions in that region of the world.

For those who believe that an insertion of U.S. ground forces combat units into that conflict could defeat the ISIL forces in four or six months or so -- those of us who were military officers in the 1960's remember General Westmoreland having made the same claim about defeating the poorly armed VC / NVA. That is a lesson from America's involvement in Vietnam worth remembering.

For those that like "war definitions" --concerning the Russian UW strategy ie hybrid warfare.

This came out of the newly released new Russian military doctrine from today that should nudge right in behind their UW strategy doctrine.

Russian military doctrine has helpful definition of modern warfare: "Complex application of military, political, economic, information …… and other non-military means, realised using the protest potential of populations and the power of special operations" "… applying indirect and asymmetric means of action … "

Notice how is nicely fits the current strategy of the IS--have we seen a merging of a common UW strategy across different environments.

Outlaw, below and elsewhere, helps us understand something that we may not, as yet, have fully realized.

This being that the conflicts in Iraq/Syria -- and the conflicts in the Ukraine and elsewhere -- these are all intimately related; this, because they can all be seen, essentially, as parts of the same great war.

This great war being: The West against all the Rest.

Thus:

a. The West's "project" to transform outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines.

b. This is met by other states, societies and civilizations standing up on their hind legs and saying: "Not only no but hell no." And: "Just where do you get off telling us how we must think, believe and live our lives?"

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/513860.html (This, link courtesy of Outlaw below.)

And in this battle, much as in the Vietnam War that Outlaw portrays:

a. "They" seem to be willing to give much more to retain their autonomy, their honor, their self-esteem and their way of life.

b. Than "we" are willing to give to take and replace same.

Thus, the strategy, plan, etc., that Outlaw calls for below?

This would seem to need to (1) embrace the idea of a single great war (the West against the Rest), (2) formally throw out the recent ideas of "universal values," etc., and, in the place of these, (3) embrace the stark realities outlined at my "a" and "b" above.

This, unless we are to forget, for example, what "Vietnam is for the Vietnamese" actually meant to those Vietnamese who stood against China, Japan, and the West in earlier times.

Can it get any worse with our current civilian leadership in the IS question?

Well worth the reading and why some still think we have a strategy for the IS s beyond me---maybe it is in fact time to talk to the Is directly?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-us-slow-to-suppor…?

From my previous comment to RC.

RC---this sums up why the US has been and is now failing in both the IS and the Ukrainian issues--and the military is not responsible for them---it is clearly and solely the responsibility of the civilian leadership to design and implement the six points--only then and only then can the military truly engage.

1. Clear objectives
2. Workable strategy
3. Engaged allies
4. A plan
5. Credibility
6. Commitment

And believe me even Europe is not sure just what the US views are towards the six points as we have wondered all over the place since 2008.

Just a side comment on the VN war from one that faced the VC and NVA daily out of a US SF camp on the Cambodian border camp and via MACV SOG for over 18 months from 1969 into 1970.

By late 1969, the VC mainline guerrilla units had been virtually decimated via TET, the Phoenix Program and more importantly the Choi Hoi line crosser program--- the fight had become a really full blown conventional fight starting early 1969 inside the South. By the way we often under estimate the overall effect on the NVA in early 1970 by the line crosser program--NVA Commander field reports that have now been declassed by VN often reflected that they were just hanging on.

In that conventional fight ground unit by the way and many will not want to hear this--many of the infantry line units from all the major divisions were way way undermanned---the famous 7th Cav of the 1st Cav had line companies running at the 60-70 men per line company where 125 was suppose to be the end strength.

In every major fight if the US had not the overwhelming fire power via jets, gunships, copters, and artillery many of those units would have been overrun---why---regardless of what we think most of the NVA units were running at full strength--they were able to sustain the constant losses---when I got to VN the average age of a NVA soldier was running 21/22 when I left is was at 19/20---we had shot our way through two complete Northern generations and yet they were still in the field and fighting. And again many will not like to hear it---they fought extremely well and were well led. We on the US SF side had a deep respect for their ability to fight and live on virtually next to nothing if compared to the US Army.

Yes we can and should state we won most of the ground fighting and hurt the NVA repeatedly BUT we tend to forget the North's long term strategy---who is standing at the end is the winner regardless of losses and the North had losses we would ourselves would have never accepted as a country--if one thinks 57K KIA is really bad think what 2.3M would have looked like.

Yes we built a capable SVN Army-- but we the US need to fully understand that once out of VN the civilian political decision makers of the US and our Congress simply stopped all military aid to the SVN.

So as a former VN veteran--the military in the end did what we could but it was the civilian political decision makers that "lost" the war using the standard terms win and or lost.

Carry the thinking forward---the military did what it could in both Iraq and AFG---but limitations and serious mistakes were made again by the civilian political decision makers of both parties and Congress.

The serious mistake made then 2003 and is being made now 2014--the total lack of some form of a strategic strategy that makes sense for the populations of the ME---not what we think we need for ourselves.

We are at a point that it seems the US civilian decision makers think that the military can bale them out again and again ---but it cannot--and the civilian decision makers are repeating again virtually the same mistakes made by Bush 2 when he entered Iraq and triggered the creation of the now IS.

Notice the US media is not willing to go down that rabbit hole---was/is in fact Bush 2 responsible for IS?

Ever wonder why and that is my question as one who was also in Iraq.

Why do I ask that question--as one who fought in VN, then on to Son Tay, then on to Jordan September 1970, then on to Beirut getting shot at by all sides, then on to engaging the German RAF all across Germany-some of whom I had studied with at the Berlin Free University, then the PKK/Turkish war in the streets of Germany and Berlin, then on to the bombing of the La Belle here in Berlin by Gadhafi, then dealing along the way with the KGB/MfS games, then onto losing two really great SF officer friends (should have been on that plane but I took a later flight) on Dec 21 1989 which by the way got no recent mention in the US press, then onto Desert Storm, then onto Iraq and now having a really great Ukrainian SF officer friend who is deep in a guerrilla war that we have decided to call "an incursion" ---AND along the way having to deny ever being a member of an elite SF unit even to my son in Berlin until it finally was 30 years later declassified on Jan 2014 and still we cannot mention much of that period as that is still classified and that some 40 years after I left the unit.

I am so tired-- really tired of seeing virtually the same mistakes made by US civilian decision makers over and over and over since 1964.

Ever wonder why we Americans seem to be unable to learn from history---we really do have a distinct lack of honesty with ourselves or at least at the civilian decision maker levels.

The inability to "see" and then to "understand" is killing us as a nation.

COL Anderson said:

"It will take local political solutions to stabilize Syria and Iraq, but those political solutions will not happen until the conventional military power of the Islamic State is destroyed; that can be done in 3-4 months if we apply US-led western military forces in an overwhelming punitive campaign, to include ground forces, to crush the Islamic State’s army."

What we must come to understand today is that "stabilization" -- of Syria, Iraq, etc. -- is not our "desired strategic end state." (If such were the case, then we would, one might suggest, have stood with Saddam and Assad.)

Rather, our desired strategic end state -- for these states and societies and others today -- is to see them transformed more along modern western political, economic and social lines. (In these circumstances, to understand why Saddam had to then -- and Assad now must -- "go.")

Given that not "stability" but, rather, "transformation" is our desired strategic end state, then the proper questions seem to be:

a. Will "local political solutions" cause Syria and Iraq to become transformed more along modern western political, economic and social lines? And

b. Will the destruction of the conventional military power of the Islamic State (via the application of US-led military forces as per COL Andersons suggestion above) cause Syria and Iraq to become transformed more along modern western political, economic and social lines?

If the answers to questions "a" and "b" above are "no,"

Then does this not suggest that we must look to other ways and other means to achieve our desired strategic end state (to wit: the transformation of Iraq and Syria, etc., etc., etc., more along modern western lines)?

HEREIN, to:

a. Understand President Obama's decisions re: the limited use of US-led military force in Iraq, Syria, etc.? And, possibly, to

b. Understand President Johnson's decision re: the limited use of US-led military force in Vietnam?

(In both instance, the greater application of US-led military force being seen as not a viable means/method to achieve their common desired strategic end state, to wit: the transformation of Iraq, Syria [and Vietnam] more along modern western political, economic and social lines.)

Col. Anderson:

Concur; and thanks for a thought-provoking article.

Re: the Vietnam analogy: As you are no doubt aware (though some readers may not be), Lt. Gen. McMaster wrote a widely acclaimed, meticulously researched book, Dereliction of Duty, in which he scathingly indicts President Johnson for refusing the level of commitment to the VN enterprise deemed necessary to achieve the stated goals...Reason, according to McMaster: He feared a more robust commitment would derail his ambitious domestic agenda (Great Society). While the scale then deemed "necessary" far exceeded today's requirements, conceptually the analogy certainly rings a bell...

Cheers, and Merry Christmas to all,
Mike.

Consider this observation from Hans Morgenthau during the Cold War:

"The United States and the Soviet Union face each other not only as two great powers which in the traditional ways compete for advantage. They also face each other as the fountainheads of two hostile and incompatible ideologies, systems of government and ways of life, each trying to expand the reach of its respective political values and institutions and to prevent the expansion of the other. ... Here is the dynamic force which has led the two superpowers to intervene all over the globe, sometimes surreptitiously, sometimes openly, sometimes with the accepted methods of diplomatic pressure and propaganda, sometimes with the frowned-upon instruments of covert subversion and open force."

Today Islamism seems to have replaced communism as the "hostile and incompatible ideology, system of government and way of life" that the United States/the West seeks to prevent/overcome.

This, as the United States/the West strives, post-the Cold War, to further "expand the reach of its political values and institutions."

Look no further than the explanation provided above to understand our -- and our enemies -- "desired strategic end states;" this, whether:

a. Pursued by the United States/the West -- and the Soviet Union/China -- during the Cold War (in such places as Vietnam).

b. Or pursued by the United States/the West -- and the Islamists et al -- presently (in such places as Iraq and Syria).

So:

Q: What did/do we and our enemies (then as now) "want the world to look like" after all our/their efforts (to include "fighting") had been brought forward?

A:

a. A world in which the enemies' incompatible ideology, system of government and way of life has largely been eliminated.

b. And a world in which one's own political values, institutions, way of life and way of governance have largely achieved universal acceptance.

Now, with this essential "what we -- and they -- want the world to look like" information standing tall before us, now to consider such things as our strategy, re: Iraq, Syria, etc.

Hope we have a follow up article discussing the need to break up these 2 failed states. The creations of WWI French and British Diplomats need to end with a breakup of both of these countries. Otherwise grand kids will be talking about this in the next 100 years.

I'm not a big fan of the term "end state". It's not really an end, it's a change in the discourse. I wonder if taking the approach of "what type of political situation would be acceptable"? I think the answer may be more than one situation, and that would provide both military and political leaders with a range of options, or if we want to be fancy, a spectrum of success (if I see that phrase in a PowerPoint I will know I have succeeded). I think it is an important point to note that the political affairs occurring in these countries probably don't directly threaten the interests of the U.S.bor many of its allies. So, as Uncle Carl notes, the objectives must be tempered. If spontaneous freedom and democracy broke out across the Levant, that is an acceptable outcome. But so would a power sharing deal where minorities aren't massacred. Whatever the "end state" is, it should also be seen as Phase Zero.

And the US Plan B is again what?

The Iranians need badly a barrel price at the 105-110 range and they fully understand the KSA has pointed the price to 20-60 and it is directed against Iran and Russia. At roughly 2 USD for a production cost the Sunni producers can hold out for a long while--the Shia producer cannot.

Iran just as Russia cannot afford to maintain a war outside their national boundaries if their economy is crashing around them nor in the case of Assad keep supporting him. Russia was warned many times by the KSA to not deliver weapons to Assad--the US could not stop it but the KSA has. Example current estimates of Russia's war costs in the Ukraine are running at 20M USD per day.

#BreakingNews #IRGC threatens to attack KSA and topple al-Saud regime in reaction to its oil war against Iran

Now we see the Sunni Shia divide exploding and it was the US that triggered it.

Two comments before heading off to pre Xmas eve dinner with German friends here in Berlin.

1. We were in such a hurry when we were after AQ in AFG and did not take the time to really listen to the Taliban statements in response to the G. Bush demands being placed on them--we were asking them to ditch their own value system for ours and we wanted immediate answers from them.

Their Taliban Foreign Minister at the time kept alluding to a compromise and yet we did not take the time to "listen". If one really takes the time--go back and reread all of his statements made to the press at that period--years later they did really make sense.

2. The IS has reached out to the West in particular the US twice in the last two weeks and yet do we "hear" any pundit responses or governmental responses--no. Why because they are brutal and crazy fundamentalists in our eyes ie "terrorists" and as "terrorists" they cannot possibly have some sort of solution.

We have utterly no patience with the concept of "time"---we are always in a hurry---to paraphrase the Taliban leader--"you Americans look at your watches all the time --we have the gains of sand of time on our side and will be here long after you have left".

IS will be there as well long after we have finally figured it out--that it is not our fight nor was it ever our fight as Saddam was never "our enemy".

Regardless of what many think---Saddam did manage for a long time to balance the Sunni Shia divide-- when we eliminated him that "divide" then hit us full in the face and that is a fact no one seems to want to remember.

Let's remember one thing in this discussion and as bad as it sounds--IS is our own creation and no one else's--

I never seem to hear that in discussions on Iraq and Syria.

We need as a country to finally look at the world through the lens of those that physically live in areas that we are interested in- not through the lens of what we perceive what we want it to look like--"seeing and understanding" is a complex problem that we have not yet mastered and probably never will in my lifetime.

I can count on one hand the number of military and or civilian leaders that were able to "see and understand" in the last 40 years.

Have a great and safe Xmas---

I think the myth here is that the military's necessities (clear objectives, strategic guidance, etc) should trump domestic politics. The military exists for political purposes- if domestic politics trump clear objectives and strategic guidance- then we won't get them. We have to be honest with ourselves and we have to be honest with our political masters. Of course- with the intertwining of resource advocation and military advice, we are caught in a web of our own doing: we say we can do things that are opposite of our nature- and then we attempt to gather metrics that justify more resources.

Another myth is that military action can lead to political objectives. It might- but many times it won't- especially in these actions that are best described as "military operations other than war"- an old term, but something that clearly delineates between "war" - and other things. When we are involved in war there is a mandate to win and a clear link between military action and explicit political objectives. When we are involved in other things- then things aren't so clear. So- "good strategy" is both impossible and not going to happen.

The constant call for a "clear endstate" is hilarious- it presupposes that we can take a deterministic stance towards something that is anything but "war"- our own stance is that we don't see a clear U.S. interest and thus will not deploy troops to engage in combat. When things seem bad- but less than an existential threat- then we will continue to lack a clear "endstate" and military action will lead to ... not much. And that is by design...

George Kennan was convinced that the US government was “woefully deficient at grand strategy, if by that term one meant the ability to coordinate all available means with fundamental policy ends." (John Lewis Gaddis "George F. Kennan: An American Life" p. 169)

This was true then and remains true today. We don't even know what our fundamental policy ends are. Again the question is What is our place and role in a multi-polar world?

I think a more pertinent question to ask is WTF are we doing there in the first place? In order to answer this question, we must ask: What is our place / role in a multi-polar world?

The fact is that regardless of the nobility of our motives, or of ghastly pictures shown each night on television, we must be extremely wary of becoming involved militarily in conflicts where the hatreds run deep, in societies where, traditionally, political accommodation is non-existent. This is not to say that we should ignore conflict, but we must be prepared to use the other instruments of national power, i.e., the political, economic, and diplomatic to help to terminate it. However we should keep in mind what the eminent political philosopher, Hans Morgenthau, has observed:

Good motives give assurance against deliberately bad policies;
they do not guarantee the moral goodness and political success
of the policies they inspire. What is important to know, is not
the motives of the statesman, but his intellectual ability to
comprehend the essentials of foreign policy, as well as his po-
litical ability to translate what he has comprehended into suc-
cessful political action.[i]

Clausewitz observes: Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made of it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow. (Book One, Chapter Two, p. 92).

BOTTOM LINE: What is our role in a multi-polar world?

Most Americans don't know we are doing anything in Iraq or Syria. We could continue our current level of effort indefinitely without any concern for domestic politics. You could properly do something larger, as long as the timeframe was short and one should sell the results (kill high level people, free westerners, etc) to the public.

"I personally think Americans have a great deal of strategic patience."

This is crucial. I personally disagree. Americans set the clock running and if it runs too long like in Vietnam they will begin to rebel against the war. The Pentagon knows this. Time, then, is not on our side, but our opponents side. The battlefield is where they live and American clocks run faster. If US troops start dying in Iraq, there will be serious problems with the current strategy which will take at least many years.

COL Anderson said:

"A strategic end state is what we want the world to look like AFTER THE FIGHTING STOPS." (Emphasis added.)

This would seem to be incorrect.

A strategic end state is what we want the world to look like (or, on a smaller scale, what we want Syria and Iraq to look like) AFTER OUR OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED -- via fighting and/or via some other method.

Thus:

a. Much as with the Cold War and our problems with certain states and societies then,

b. Likewise with the current period and our problems with certain states and societies today,

c. The strategic end state that we strive for is to see such problem states and societies (1) transformed more along modern western political, economic and social lines and (2) better incorporated into the global economy and international community.

This strategic end state to be realized -- then in the Cold War and now presently -- when the "rulers" of these problem states and societies (whether the current rulers, subsequent rulers and/or the general population):

1. Decide that such a transformation and incorporation -- as we desire -- is the necessary and proper course of action. AND

2. When such successful transformation and integration has been -- actually and enduringly -- achieved.

This approach to defining the strategic end state causing us to understand that:

a. Fighting, at any given time, may or may not be a/the proper course of action -- to help achieve our desired strategic end state (described at my item "c" above). And that

b. If fighting is considered appropriate, then when, where and how it might be applied -- to help achieve this strategic end state.

Thus, the problems presented by ISIS -- and, indeed, by Africa, Russia, China, etc., etc., etc. -- to be viewed, considered and addressed in this "what we want the world to look like" light.

The application of our instruments of power and persuasion -- if, when, where and how -- to be applied accordingly.