US Unsettled by China's 'Three Warfares' Strategy: Pentagon Report by John Garnaut, Sydney Morning Herald
The US and its military partners are reaching for new tools to counter an unconventional ''three warfares'' strategy that China is using to advance aggressive territorial claims, according to a Pentagon report.
It says the People's Liberation Army is using what it calls ''legal warfare'', ''media warfare'' and ''psychological warfare'' to augment its arsenal of military hardware to weaken the resolve of the US and its regional partners to defend islands and oceans in the East and South China seas.
''They have introduced a military technology which has not previously been considered as such in the West,'' says the report, China: The Three Warfares, which was commissioned by the Pentagon's most senior strategist, Andrew Marshall, and circulated to the US Pacific Fleet. This technology has ''sidestepped the coda of American military science,'' it says.
The report's warnings of China's use of ''coercive economic inducements'' and other non-traditional methods underscores Prime Minister Tony Abbott's challenge in balancing economic and security interests, as he prepares to meet China's President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People on Friday night. This week Mr Abbott signed a landmark agreement to develop military technology with China's arch-rival, Japan, while Australian business leaders joined a forum at Bo'ao that was initiated by representatives of a PLA ''influence'' platform, as revealed last year by Fairfax Media…
Comments
I needed to review again after a similar comment on another article and post. I realize the reason it didn't stick is there nothing insightful about this. Comments below indicate I'm not the only one with that view. This is not warfare, it is political and economic competition/ confrontation. These tools can be used to pursue objectives alone, or they can be used to set conditions for warfare. We have used media, psyop, and economic elements of power for decades. If a country can achieve its objectives without warfare, that generally is the wisest choice, so why the surprise that other nations use statecraft?
This comment in a similar article I reviewed just leaves me dumbfounded.
"The Pentagon study urged the development of effective countermeasures to Beijing’s psychological, legal, and media warfare efforts."
Of course one can argue the military doesn't always get it right, but it already counters adversary psychological and media efforts. Other element of the U.S. government use economic power as soft and coercive power, so the claim that the Pentagon must develop a capability that already exists is perplexing. Competition in the information domain is not new. As Dayuhan points out below, China's use of these three warfares is backfiring on them. If anything, we have either proven to be superior in these efforts, assuming we are countering them, or China is just inept and we don't need to do anything in the case of China. Russia is another story, but this article resurfaces the myth of the Asian unconventional warfare intellectual dominating the dumb Westerners with these secret oriental weapons.
Saw another recent article referring to China's use of cyber intrusions as part of their "unrestricted warfare doctrine." This is so called doctrine is a white paper proposing China written by a couple of sharp Chinese officers. A white paper is not doctrine, it is a think piece. Consider how many white papers and theses are generated in the U.S. each year (or month) on what the U.S. should do in regards to strategy? They are not strategy, they are part of a debate intended to influence strategy.
Most countries use cyber to conduct espionage, China does it on a larger scale than anyone else. That hardly means it is unrestricted warfare. Another state, or an advanced non-state actor, used a virus or worm to disrupt Iran's nuclear weapon program. Was it unrestricted warfare, or the opposite? The opposite being a very restricted disruption that limited damage to a specific facility.
The media loves the hype, and claiming the sky is falling generates sales. The bottom line is that warfare is violent, but non-violent means can be used to support warfare. In some cases the non-violent means are decisive, and violent means is the enabler. If it does not include the use of violence, then it is probably just non-violent statecraft to pursue objectives.
We should always seek to evolve and get better, so if our adversary actually advances the art we need to keep pace, but it seems the case may be overstated for the three warfares.
The three warfares is nothing new, so I am puzzled by the fanfare about it in the US--as if China has this secretive and nasty weapon that it is unfairly unleashing. US does the same thing.
Is pot calling the kettle black? Or as the Chinese saying goes, the thief yelling thief?
It is simply the application of Sun Tzu's The Art of War, open and available to anyone, no secret.
It seems that the Chinese (and the Japanese) lend more credence to and embrace the treatise more so. US could learn from Sun Tzu, and if one reflects upon what Sun Tzu stated, US is violating and has violated many of the principles present therein, i.e., peace is best, war must be just, occupation of other countries ruins one's own economy, etc.
The Japanese violated Sun Tzu also, in many ways in the past. War must be just, not to occupy the lands of others, defenders will fight to the death, and very notably, be kind to captured enemies--treat them well.
The wisdom of the ancients are in plain sight, it is up to us to accept, reflect and embrace. Violate at your own peril.
Thoughtful piece, as always.
It would have been interesting to examine the <strong>political warfare by the US/EU toward the Ukraine</strong> which has been a missing element in quite a few of the papers I've read here at SWJ and elsewhere.
A curious oversight. All of this reminds me of the problems in Afghanistan and the focus on tactics/COIN and ignoring a variety of useful narratives while focusing on the narrative most comfortable for the American military and Washington Consensus.
Dave---would actually be willing to say now after watching the US/NATO/EU responses to both unconventional and political warfare that anything we touch in Asia is doomed to fail as we the US simply do not get it.
Really do not think there is even a US/NATO/EU strategy for the Ukrainian/Russian conflict--so if there is no strategy there why believe the current WH will have one for Asia?
Personally do not believe the term "soft power" based on the ongoing Ukrainian issues is even any longer a "valid" term as it has failed badly in the Ukraine.
David---thought you might like this.
One of the Kremlin’s key tactics is to obscure the origins of those forces spearheading its operation in east Ukraine, and one of the ways it’s doing that is to promote what might be called insurrectional tourism.
“Russian Spring,” as it turns out, is not only a revanchist motto out of Moscow, which we started hearing before the Crimea annexation, it’s a website, too. Adventure seekers who dream about reviving the U.S.S.R. can go online to share information about how to travel to Ukraine and, well, make a terrible mess there. Before their departure soldiers of fortune are advised to familiarize themselves with the slogan, “Leave for the front! Glory to Russia!” along with rules of behavior for a Russian tourist who wishes to get to “the territory of brotherly Ukraine”:
“From the beginning of the Crimea events on March 2 until the present time Ukraine has refused entry to more than 10,000 Russians and the figure is growing every day,” cautions the advisory. “The situation is created artificially to reduce the quantity of people who could be involved in the conflict on the side of Russian-speaking Ukrainians.”
So, as the “Russian Spring” site recommends, “you should comply with certain rules” and know certain facts. Here is a somewhat abbreviated but informative checklist that suggests, among other things, the kinds of “tourists” likely to be crossing the border:
1. Ukrainian border guards are loyal to Kiev, which has given them the order to look for any reason to refuse entry to people with Russian passports.
2. “Even if you have just one camouflaged T-shirt, some pepper spray or a knife you could be deported back to Russia as a commando. So if you need these things you can purchase them in Ukrainian shops: the prices are not higher than Russians ones.”
3. “We advise you not to publish anti-Bandera [that is, anti-Ukrainian] propaganda on your social network accounts.”
4. “Remember that your mobiles can have undesirable photos such as military patriotic events with your participation. Don't save SMS texts like, ‘Left for front, glory to Russia!’ and similar ones.
Among the most often cited reasons for refusing Russians entry into Ukraine, according to the web site’s checklist, are:
1. Lack of the required $600 in cash guaranteeing financial support.
2. Inability to confirm the purpose of the visit to Ukraine or the precise destination.
3. Subject has military bearing, short haircut, brought a military uniform or wears the Cossack chevron insignia.
4. Subject has the certificate of a combat veteran.
5. Subject has athletic build, calloused knuckles, broken nose – characteristics of martial arts practitioners.
6. Subject has “Airborne Troops” tattoo or similar.
7. Border guards discover that subject is a reserve officer of the Russian Federation navy.
8. There is a message on subject’s mobile such as, “Left for Crimea, from there to the front to fight, if something comes up, say I am ill.”
The incriminating items most often founded by Ukrainian border guards, according to “Russian Spring,” are: military belts, blackjacks, binoculars, Russian flags, combat knives, military certificate of a squad leader of airborne troops or other special units.
But, obviously, Kiev’s border security policy isn’t working all that well.
A journalist from Russia’s Moskva FM Radio broadcasting from Donetsk asked a local rebel commander, "Can you tell me your name?" He answered: "Of course, I am Paramonov Pavel Vladimirovytch.”
"Are you from Donetsk?"
"Of course not. I am from Yefremov, Tula region [Russia]."
"What are you doing in Donetsk?"
“I am helping brotherly people to defend their rights, do you have another questions?"
Outlaw 09. I am with you on UW and political warfare by Russia in Ukraine. That is why I wrote this article a couple of weeks ago: "Taking a Spoon to a Gunfight." http://warontherocks.com/2014/04/taking-a-spoon-to-a-gunfight/
David---if we step back from the authors' China example are we not in fact seeing a combination of unconventional warfare being practiced by the Russian spatnaz together with FSB/GRU on the ground agents and proRussian supporters in eastern Ukraine coupled with political warfare being practiced by Russia directly against the Ukraine in order to achieve it's stated aims of holding a country inside it's self defined "sphere of influence".
Seems that if we analyze the Crimea/Russia and the Ukrainian events from the last year we would have an excellent case study in how unconventional warfare and political warfare have in fact succeeded in blunting "soft power" driven by diplomacy.
But when we do one has to see a US strategy for the Ukraine and for that matter a NATO and EU strategy---which I cannot currently see and that is causing if we look deeper confusion on the part of the Russians as they fine tune their unconventional/political warfare---they are already by Plan E as they adapt to the changing events almost daily.
Speaking of adaptation of strategy---we the US seem at least in the Ukraine to not be able to expound our strategy in a coherent way that the Russians can fully understand and we seem to not be able to anticipate the next changes on the ground with a forward thinking explainable strategy that adapts as the situation adapts---in the public it seems as if the US is ten dollars short and a week late in the game.
Would also bet that if took the time the Putin Doctrine or strategy has been evolving publicly since about 2008 for all to see.
In fact if we take the next step there is not even a China strategy other than a "pivot declaration" that can been seen or at least be seen/understood by the Chinese.
Looking at the current state of affairs in the ECS and SCS, I'd have to say that China's use of these methods has been unproductive, likely counterproductive: if anything, they've enhanced the unity and will to fight of their rivals. Capacity to fight, of course, is another question. Looking at China's 3 most likely antagonists, will remains strong and rising in all of them. Capacity in the case of Japan is high, in Vietnam significant, in the Philippines practically nonexistent. Any guesses on where the Chinese will push hardest?
And just to be clear, I am not hard over on creating new terms per se (and political and unconventional warfare are actually pretty old). What I want to focus on is developing strategies and I think unconventional warfare (which often does involve fighting) and political warfare might help us to think differently about the strategies our opponents are applying and the ones we might need to develop.
I have just provided some military definitions of subversion (one from the current 1-02) and one from the obsolete Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia. (I will have to do some more historical research) I do not know of a definition of counter-subversion (just as even though I push counter-unconventional warfare there is no definition for that). But I think counter-subversion and counter unconventional warfare and counter political warfare are useful in that they help us to think about our opponents' strategies and thus can help us to develop the strategies (with balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means) to counter them.
There is some good history of the discussion of subversion in Al Paddock's seminal work on Special Warfare some excerpts from the website "Instruments of Statecraft: US Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism from 1940-1990," http://www.statecraft.org/
QUOTE The United States' venture into the field of unconventional warfare generally defined in terms of "guerrilla" and assorted covert operations in enemy-occupied or influenced territory, began with President Franklin Roosevelt's creation, in duly 1941, of the first autonomous American intelligence agency. The Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) later to become the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), held an expanding brief that by 1945 ranged from espionage and intelligence to behind-the-lines operations with indigenous guerrilla resistance forces. To an extraordinary extent the path taken by the COI-OSS (and later by its successor the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]) can be attributed to its director, World War I veteran Colonel William J. Donovan. Donovan, in turn, drew on his own familiarity with the British system, and his admiration for the coordination by the British of "intelligence activities with psychological warfare and special operations." The British successfully combined "propaganda efforts with the 'unorthodox' operations of sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla warfare"—through the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) and Special Operations Executive (SOE)—in coordination with the Secret Intelligence Service's intelligence and counterintelligence activities.6
Donovan had proposed in 1941 to match or excel the British in their covert management of political skulduggery overseas, but to combine into one central agency the intelligence, psychological warfare, and special operations functions. Army historian Alfred H. Paddock summarizes Donovan's broad approach to psychological warfare: "Intelligence penetration" provides a basis for strategic planning and propaganda, to be followed by special operations, "in the form of sabotage and subversion, followed by commando-like raids, guerrilla actions, and behind-the-lines resistance movements." The combined effort was to prepare for allied invasion; the unified operation thus representing "a new instrument of war."7
...
A broader mandate for a standing covert action apparatus and permanent program followed in dune 1948. NSC 10/2 established a CIA covert action arm—obscurely called the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC)—and ordered it to respond in kind to the "vicious covert activities of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups."24 NSC 10/2 of 18 June 1948 was the CIA's covert action charter, citing as its tasks:
Any covert activities related to propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, antisabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to under ground resistance groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.25
With the shift in the ClA's orientation toward covert operations, NSC 10/2 stimulated a recruitment drive to bring into the fold many of the OSS people with special operations experience, with a growing influx of personnel with "guerrilla" warfare expertise from late 1948, and after the outbreak of war in Korea in 1950.26
The drafters of NSC 10/2 clearly envisioned the new sphere of activity as falling outside the scope of international law, its objectively military aspects blind the laws and usages of war. The limits of covert action were defined by NSC 10/2 in terms of appearances, not substance, with the enunciation of the now-familiar yardstick of "plausible deniability. " Covert action was to be "so planned and conducted that any U. S. government responsibility for them was not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered, the U. S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them."27 Thus, by June 1948, the CIA had both the organization and the mandate for the broad range of activities of which the public would only begin to be aware in the aftermath of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion.
...
Brigadier McClure moved rapidly to organize his "agency" into separate propaganda, unconventional warfare, and support divisions—and to obtain a charter authorizing a special operations role through which to wage unconventional warfare. Army Special Regulation 10-250-1 (22 May 1951) provided the latter, defining a mission to "formulate and develop psychological and special operations plans for the Army in consonance with established policies for and supervise the execution of Department of the Army programs in these fields."55 "Propaganda planning" was undertaken by Psychological Operations, while administrative, personnel, training, logistics, and research matters were handled by a Requirements Division. Activities concerning special operations were fully compartmentalized: "All planning in connection with covert operations, in view of its particular sensitivity, is segregated in a Special Operations Division..."56 The definition of special operations, in turn, was much as it is in the 1990s:
[T]hose conducted within or behind enemy lines for a military purpose, with the primary objective of organizing indigenous resistance potential and exploiting this potential to serve our military objectives. Such operations include: organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare; covert political, economic, and psychological warfare; subversion and sabotage; the infiltration of agents into the enemy's sphere of influence; anti-guerrilla warfare and escape and evasion activities carried on by Special Operations units and agencies.57
In May 1952, OCPW chief McClure presided over the opening of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The center provided the institutional foundation for rebuilding a psy-war propaganda capability—and provided the home base for what became the Army Special Forces. Colonel Charles Karlstad was named the first commander of the center and of the adjoining Psychological Warfare School.58 END QUOTE
END QUOTE
As an aside a new term I read (or at least new to me) in a draft of an article by a JAG officer named Dru Wall is the term unconventional statecraft which may be a better description for the conduct of overt foreign policy combined with covert action.
From the current JP 1-02
QUOTE subversion — Actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or
political strength or morale of a governing authority. See also unconventional
warfare. (JP 3-24) END QUOTE
What I think is interesting is that the reference for subversion goes to the Joint COIN manual (and thus the Army and Marine Corps 3-24) which is of course the doctrine for counterinsurgency. I would submit that subversion is much broader and used more than simply in an insurgency.
From the 1997 Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia (which has not been published again since then):
QUOTE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long
duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are
organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an
external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low
visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of
subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also
called UW. JP 1-02
Unconventional warfare (UW) includes guerrilla warfare (GW) and other low visibility,
covert, or clandestine operations, as well as subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, and
evasion and escape (E&E). (See figure below.) GW consists of military and paramilitary
operations conducted by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces in enemy-held or hostile
territory. It is the overt military aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement.
Guerrilla forces primarily employ raid and ambush tactics against enemy vulnerabilities. In
the latter stages of a successful insurgency, guerrilla forces may directly oppose selected,
vulnerable enemy forces while avoiding enemy concentrations of strength.
Subversion is an activity designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or
political strength or morale of a regime or nation. All elements of the resistance organization
contribute to the subversive effort, but the clandestine nature of subversion dictates that the
underground elements perform the bulk of the activity.
Sabotage is conducted from within the enemy’s infrastructure in areas presumed to be safe
from attack. It is designed to degrade or obstruct the warmaking capability of a country by
damaging, destroying, or diverting war material, facilities, utilities, and resources. Sabotage
may be the most effective or only means of attacking specific targets that lie beyond the
capabilities of conventional weapon systems. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or
neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and materiel. Once
accomplished, these incursions can further result in the enemy spending excessive resources
to guard against future attack. END QUOTE
This could perhaps be described as unconventional and political warfare with Chinese characteristics.
For those that missed it I do think it is worth reviewing George Kennan's #269 Policy Staff Planning Memo from 1948. The entire memo can be accessed here: http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm Excerpts from Kennan's memo:
QUOTE 1. Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition,
political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national
objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP--the Marshall Plan), and "white" propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.
...
3. This Government has, of course, in part consciously and in part unconsciously, been conducting political
warfare. Aggressive Soviet political warfare has driven us overtly first to the Truman Doctrine, next to ERP, then to sponsorship of Western Union [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. This was all political warfare
and should be recognized as such.
4. Understanding the concept of political warfare, we should also recognize that there are two major types of
political warfare--one overt and the other covert. Both, from their basic nature, should be directed and
coordinated by the Department of State. Overt operations are, of course, the traditional policy activities of any
foreign office enjoying positive leadership, whether or not they are recognized as political warfare. Covert
operations are traditional in many European chancelleries but are relatively unfamiliar to this Government. END QUOTE
I am very cognizant of Frank Hoffman's warning to consider "Colin Gray's definitions of warfare as the physical act of fighting, which invalidates both words in "political warfare." The actual definition, if one accepts Gray, makes the definition problematic since it entails everything short of going to war--and thus NOT warfare. "
My purpose is not so much to introduce new terms, definitions and doctrine but to try to push us to think more strategically by trying to understand that everything is not terrorism and insurgency and by understanding that our opponents are executing forms of unconventional and political warfare for which we must develop strategies to counter.
And just to counter slightly Frank and Colin Gary, unconventional warfare does include the physical act of fighting. But if political warfare does not involve the physical act of fighting perhaps a better term would be unconventional statecraft which is a term I believed coined by a JAG officer named Dru Wall (I read it in a draft of an article that he is writing.)
Maybe what we need to do is to have two concepts: unconventional warfare and unconventional statecraft.