Small Wars Journal

Hard Choices for Ground Forces

Tue, 10/18/2011 - 3:27am

Hard Choices for Ground Forces by David W. Barno, Nora Bensahel and Travis Sharp at Defense News.

Given today's fiscal constraints, together with a shift of emphasis to the Indo-Pacific Rim, the United States should make plans to reduce the Army and Marine Corps to roughly pre-9/11 levels. We believe that cutting below these levels would jeopardize the ability of the United States to prevail against determined adversaries in unexpected ground-force contingencies without potentially incurring heavy casualties…

Comments

Just Asking

Wed, 10/19/2011 - 10:11am

If you lose the capability to contest control of the ground was does that say about your commitment? Does this affect your credibility?

Yesterday as I read this I thought about the differences between doing the analysis that support strategic choices and making decisions that have strategic consequences. As rational as reduction of ground forces to support investments in sea and air forces may seem this line of thinking does not always produce logical choices with respect to where or how we use military force, and historically it has not always worked out for us.

Former DEF SEC Rumsfeld may have been blunt, but he did speak a basic truth when he said "you go to war with the Army (military) you have" - at least we do. We seldom follow the advice to the statesman of "first determine the nature of the war you are about to undertake" (paraphrased).

Cutting ground forces capability on the premise of maintaining other capabilities becuase of the time required to generate them is a factor that should be considered, but I'm not sure its the one we should bet the farm on.

Move Forward

Tue, 10/18/2011 - 7:46pm

This one boggles my mind. With all the complaining about COIN and Afghanistan, this alternate reality has been building for some time.

Where are all the complaining Colonels when it comes time to look for new roles in the Pacific? Figure out a way to use it...or lose it. There ARE multiple ways to effectively employ the land component as a forward deployed deterrent and warfighting tool in that area.

Anti-access and area denial is a myth when it comes to ground forces that simply disperse or sit in their armored vehicle or fighting position until the adversary quickly runs out of big missiles. Air assault, airborne, JHSV/LCS, C-17 air landing, LCAC/LCU...the list goes on.

Until PRC controls all of Taiwan which will take time, plenty of opportunities exist for uncontested landing on the east side of Taiwan as soon as it becomes obvious an invasion is commencing.