by Tal Tovy
Download the Full Article: Airborne Troops as a Tactical and Operative Military Revolution
In 1898, Jan Bloch published six volumes dealing with future warfare entitled The Future of War in its Technical, Economic and Political Relations. The book examines military technological developments and the techno-tactics at the end of the 19th century. As we know from history, about 15 years after the publication of the book the First World War broke out and Bloch's predictions about future warfare were almost exactly realized. But his perceptions regarding this were not accepted by his contemporaries, especially not by the senior military officers in Germany and France.
The character and range of the war surprised the higher military command of all the countries that participated in the war, which led especially on the Western front to a state of immobility.
Bloch was not the only one who foresaw the changes in the future battlefield. For example, already in the 1880s, General Sheridan, the commander of the American Army, envisioned the new character of war operations that would constitute the main methods of warfare on the Western front in Europe during the course of the First World War. From an analysis of the American Civil War (1861-1865) in which he had participated, and of the Franco-German War (1870-1871) in which he served as an observer, Sheridan claimed that the rival armies would protect themselves in dugouts and that any side that tried to go out on a direct frontal attack against enemy lines would be destroyed. Sheridan's estimate was derived from the understanding that improvements in firepower, in the rate and precision of firing, made war far more lethal and destructive.
As said before, most of the senior officer rank in Europe failed to understand the changing nature of warfare as a result of technological developments at the techno-tactical level. The immediate intellectual challenge was to comprehend the future aspects of warfare in connection with the rapid technological changes. Today the commonly accepted term for this process is Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).
Research in military history has proved that in many cases it was these new technologies that changed the nature of warfare. Whichever side was wise enough to develop new technologies and to integrate them into new warfare doctrines had a decisive advantage. This article attempts to claim that the operation of airborne forces during the Second World War was a military revolution at the tactical and operational level. The basis for this claim is that the activation of airborne forces led to an essential change in the perception of the concept Line of Communication (LOC). The article will first examine the sources for the use of the concept RMA and the classical aspect of the concept LOC. This is in order to provide a theoretical dimension for the examination of historical test cases. Following this, through a discussion of a number of airborne campaigns that were conducted during the Second World War, the article will exemplify these tactical and operational changes in the LOC concept.
The geophysical nature of the LOC concept constituted a paradigm for thousands of years. From the middle of the 18th century extensive theoretical literature on the subject began to be written. By an analysis of paratroop operations during the Second World War we shall try to determine whether this new operational perception was able to undermine the basic foundations of the classical LOC paradigm.
During the war, a number of airborne campaigns were carried out in all the war arenas and in the various forces. A study of geographical distribution shows that most of the campaigns including the largest ones (at the division level and above) were carried out in the arena of Western Europe first by Germany and later by the United States and Britain, and therefore the article will be focused on an analysis of the campaigns in this arena.
Historiography concerning the operation of paratroop forces during the Second World War deals mainly with the military dimension. This means their practical activation in the various battlefields and an analysis of the success or failure of this or that operation. Therefore one may divide the research literature on paratroop forces into two main groups. The first group consists of discussions about those operations in the framework of a general discussion about the military history of the Second World War. The second group consists of studies that deal only with a discussion and analysis of operations in books that are focused only on paratroop operations. This literature does not take into account the activation of paratroops during the Second World War as a tactical revolution. An additional group is the memoirs of paratroopers at all levels of command. In this literature one can find in greater detail the training techniques and battle tactics of the paratroop forces and are therefore of great value in understanding the operational nature of those units.
Download the Full Article: Airborne Troops as a Tactical and Operative Military Revolution
Dr. Tal Tovy is an assistant professor at the history department of Bar Ilan University, Israel.
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Guess I've never understood why the Marines don't jump on the airborne bandwagon other than MARSOC. They already fly KC-130 so regular ones would be easy for the same procurement cost as a MV-22, half the flying hour cost, more speed and range, four times the PAX per load, and many times more payload of supplies/equipment. There are few places you can realistically operate/maintain MV-22 where you cannot operate C-130J, using helicopters for the vertical landings.
The downside is that with modern radar air defense like S-300, etc., both a MV-22 and C-130J are toast in forcible entry against a capable foe. Stealthy C-130 replacements would be too costly. An unmanned version that was smaller might fly, but would you put Marines or Army airborne troops in an unmanned aircraft?
That seems to relegate airborne operations to just lesser threats. Most real threats can be beat by simply flying low (easier in a slower helicopter) and landing airlifters farther from the radar air defenses in an allied nation. After all, if bad guys are invading your neighbor, you will always wonder if you are next...giving you an incentive to provide an airfield for U.S./allied protectors.
The Iraq Bashur airdrop and airland did show that a mix of heavy and light forces can work...and realistically both could have airlanded probably more effectively than the airdrop that put troops scattered in the mud away from the airfield.
I've personally always wondered why with today's unmanned technology and GPS, why we don't build gliders that double as ready brigade supply/equipment stores sitting on the side of Pope, Hawaii, Guam, Diego Garcia, and other expeditionary runways ready to be towed by modified C-17/C-130J to altitude, to theater, and then to an austere airfield.
I've personally always wondered why with today's unmanned technology and GPS, why we don't build gliders that double as ready brigade supply/equipment stores sitting on the side of Pope, Hawaii, Guam, Diego Garcia, and other expeditionary runways ready to be towed by modified C-17/C-130J to altitude, to theater, and then to an austere airfield.
Posted by Cole
Interesting idea, gliders were always undervalued IMO.
I always wondered why the Corps don't have an airborne element. Its not their mission, they also have said they wanna get back to their "roots" that is an amphib entry force. Landing on a contested beach is costly. The Corps uses air-assault as much as the Army. The Bashur drop proves the value of the Paratrooper. Rangers jumped into Helmand province early on, establishing Camp Rhino. The Marines then sought out the enemy. The problem as stated above is radar and SAM sites. You knock them out, the enemy is blind. If we were to have a confrontation with Iran, vertical envelopment could be used. Following the drop with an armored spearhead is a thought. Eventually the Israeli's will bomb the reactor sites, touching off wat I hope will be a short, violent confrontation that wiull topple the psychotic rulers of a suppressed people. Its not a question of IF, but WHEN.
"get back to their "roots" that is an amphibious entry force"
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Roots change. History is often a poor teacher when clung to too long as threats and technologies change. Ask the cavalry that went from horses, to tanks, to helicopters/tanks/Bradleys, to now reconnaissance squadrons with Bradleys/HMMWV LRAS3. Things will change again, probably favoring a mix of manned and unmanned assets.
Amphibious roots?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:LSTs_unloading_at_Inchon.jpg
That doesn't look like an EFV to me. Alligators were in the Pacific to be sure. But neither Inchons nor Normandys success were based primarily on landing craft that could drive up onto the beach and fight the rest of the war on land. Those LSTs look more like LCACs to me.
MV-22 are not very amphibious, either. They are great in reasonable numbers but why not exploit their long legs and have them link up with ships that instead carry many more cheaper to buy-and-operate X2-like joint multi-role helicopters with shorter legs that need to base on ships. MV-22 does not, you could argue, when instead it could simply link up to allow fewer to be purchased.
But as we look to anti-ship ballistic missiles as a threat to CVN carriers, why do we think LHA, LPDs etc will not be targeted. Again, old ways clung to too long may get Marines/Soldiers/Sailors/Airmen killed.
Could either Normandy, Inchon, or Desert Storm have had successful amphibious assaults if tanks had been nearby or it was more than a bluff that might work once? Could Normandy's airborne attack have survived against today's air defenses? The enemy does not have to turn on their radars until the last minute making finding and suppressing them difficult.
The other favorite historian reference is air combat in Vietnam...claiming radar missiles didn't work then so won't work now. Did the 1970 mainframe computers that sent us to the moon have more power than your 2010 laptop? Why would you think AESA and AMRAAM are synonymous with F-4 Phantom radars and Sparrows?
History too often is an excuse not to look ahead. The past is easily misinterpreted, yet retains creedance because it happened, memories are short, and we take the word of the historian if he can credibly twist the message.
IMHO, history too often obstructs new ideas and adjustment of old ideas. Instead, we adapt old history to fit entirely different METT-TC conditions to claim lessons about current and future conflicts that barely apply. Lessons of the 1960s Korean war are distorted when nuclear weapons are involved, as is any notion of a movement to contact into Pakistan, or Iran to seize such weapons.
""Guess I've never understood why the Marines don't jump on the airborne bandwagon""
W/in their Primary role Marines are Strategically placed w/a defined corridor of Operations; 200mi fr/the Sea for an optimal range of missions & 400+ miles for narrowly defined missions like Raids, HA, Crisis Response, etc.
When Strategically (Forward) Based on Naval shipping & Operating in that narrow Corridor, being Heli-borne not Airborne gives you far more bang for buck.
Take a MEU for ex: It can land 500-1500 Marines w/in a matter of hrs. Once landed it can conduct Offensive Ops in a 400mi radius for 15 days.
Compare that w/an Airborne force 3x that size, it's limited in Offensive capabilities & range in comparison, & would have to be reinforced w/in 2 days.
Inside the Marine's Littoral Corridor Airborne's not the best option.