By John J. Kruzel
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, Feb. 19, 2010 -- The only thing worse than obsolete weapons in war is obsolete thinking, a top U.S. commander cautioned in remarks on revitalizing America's military officer corps.
Marine Gen. James N. Mattis, commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, yesterday emphasized the role education plays in enabling military officers to adapt quickly to strategic and tactical changes they encounter.
"It's opening the aperture," he said, describing the value afforded through education. "Once you stretch the mind open, it's hard for it to go back to how it was before."
Mattis delivered his remarks at an event hosted by the Center for a New American Security, a policy think tank, in conjunction with a study by the center on improving the way military officers are trained, evaluated and promoted.
"The U.S. military must develop a model that trains and educates officers for the complex interactions of the current threat environment while being agile and versatile enough to adapt to a swiftly changing world beyond," contributors John Nagl and Brian Burton wrote in the CNAS study published ahead of yesterday's panel discussion. Mattis underscored the importance of complementing experience operating as part of a coalition on a battlefield with study of history and wars of the past.
"Through education built on an understanding of history and through experience gained on joint coalition operations, and probably commencing earlier in officers' careers," he said, "we can create an officer corps at ease with complex joint and coalition operations."
Mattis stressed the need for a new "strategic reawakening" among military officers, making an apparent reference to the design in place before the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
"By setting the problem first and spending a lot of time up front getting it right, you don't invade a country, pull the statue down and say, 'Now what do I do?'" he said, in an allusion to the iconic image of deposed dictator Saddam Hussein's likeness being pulled down by a U.S. military recovery vehicle.
Focusing on the culture of the senior military officer corps, Mattis bemoaned that senior-ranking military members aren't allowed ample time to reflect critically on important issues.
"I believe the single primary deficiency among senior U.S. officers today is the lack of opportunity for reflective thought," he said. "We need disciplined and unregimented thinking officers who think critically when the chips are down and the veneer of civilization is rubbed off -- seeing the world for what it is, comfortable with uncertainty and life's inherent contradictions and able to reconcile war's grim realities with human aspirations."
Comments
Mike,
I understand your intent, but a degree will not make one a better warrior. I think it is important to distinguish between an education and wisdom, which in our line of work is the result of dedicated study and hard earned experience (which should result in much reflection). Simply getting ILE and ANCOC accredited to issue a degree at the end of course at best will only result in a minor improvement in the education. We need a create a learning culture in the services, and really focus on leader facilitated discussions (leader professional development sessions) on mandatory white papers, books, etc. This should be a give and take (not just listen to what I say) discussion, and hopefully that openness will further translate into a more open command climate when the unit is on point where young Soldiers can respectfully tell the boss what they think is ground truth. Perhaps this way we'll fix what is really broken, and not get into situations where the troops are afraid to the tell the old man he isn't wearing any clothes. I know you heard the saying "we don't need no stinking badges", well the same applies to diplomas. We simply need to facilitate the culture of learning.
Bill M.
PhilR stated,
"The other option is to really look at what we are doing now and decide what training and education we can drop to replace it with more relevant subjects or more effective approaches."
Here's two solutions.
1. ILE. Have it accredited and extended so every major graduates with a masters of science in defense analysis or national security affairs.
2. ANCOC. Have it accredited and extended so that every E7 has the opportunity to graduate with a BS in Military Studies.
v/r
Mike
In reading through the CNAS report, it's hard to find fault with their suggestions. Yes, we need more broadly capable and competent officers; yes, we ought to be more effective at selecting and promoting leaders.
The problem comes when we have to implement. Its not just bureacracy, but real resource constraints. More officers taking resident PME or civilian education means more officers out of operating forces. Either we increase the number of officers, reduce the amount needed in the operating forces, or reduce the operating forces themselves.
The other option is to really look at what we are doing now and decide what training and education we can drop to replace it with more relevant subjects or more effective approaches. While everyone has an opinion, and there is alot of low hanging fruit, every training or educational requirement that exists was put there because of either a real or perceived need for that skill or that knowledge. When those requirements are changed, then the training and education will also follow along.
This report does a good job of stating what we should start to do. I find less information on what we should stop doing. The implications of the language in this and other similar reports is that we have a large advantage in tactical proficiency that we can afford to lessen training in that regard for other purposes. If that's the case, then we can move smartly forward. I'd like to see someone openly state that, however, as they propose changes
I think if you want to know what it takes to develop X then you have to have a solid understanding of what it is X does. With respect to leaders perhaps it is that we failed to reconcile all that war entails with what we thought war would be.
Certainly there are the leader functions that we trained and educated for, most of those I think are valid - it is the ones our training and education failed to account for that are in question. Who would have suspected that war is such a political and people oriented undertaking? Who would have thought it would take place somewhere else where the people who lived there might not agree with our perspective? Who would have thought that we could not just kill or sideline all of those folks, and that they might just become combatants? Who would have thought they might act on their own behalf, and randomly generate friction? Who would have thought that leaders might have to be multi-dimensional, and do more than direct fires or issue an Operations order?
The key issue as I see it is not instituting a Leader Development and Education overhaul just to address the gaps we think we have, but rather it requires us to align our LD&E (and other DOTMLPF ideas) to better address what war is vs. what we wanted it or resourced it to be.
I would say this is true for every leader position where authority and responsibility are vested. The question of what does war (and the waging of war) require of a leader at a given rank and position is the question I think we need to consider. It should be the basis of how we recruit, assess, train, educate, promote, assign and retain all leaders.
I think we have identified some key points in the last 7-9 years. A few that come to mind are:
1) just because we wrote the functions of a leader or organization one way does not mean that is the way they will be required to operate or be the level they will have the luxury to perform at
2) the leadership positions and organizations we thought were the most important may not be the ones that matter most all of the time - but they may be critical at certain times
3) not every one has the same potential, and our basis for identifying potential may not be aligned with requirements.
I think once we identify what we require of a leader in a given position and rank we can do a better job of training, developing and educating them to assume and perform those responsibilities. Until we do that, I think we'll just be guessing - and while guessing is easier and serves as a kind of comfort food, it is not good for much else and sooner or later you have to deal with the consequences. And finally, just remember, no matter what "this" is - it is the hardest thing anybody has ever done - well maybe the hardest thing since yesterday, or the most hard until tomorrow.
Best, Rob
I am an junior army officer who had the fortune of completing a graduate level course in Strategic Studies prior to being commissioned.
From what I've seen so far, the problem is not education of junior officers. To the degree that low level leaders need to understand geopolitics, they do. The problem is selection of officers at the highest levels and education won't solve this.
The problem is there's often a trade off. The policy wonk officer spends a lot of time staying current on geopolitics and writing commentaries on various military journals' websites when he should instead be focused more on day to day relationships and leadership. Is the wonk the best person for the higher job when the selection becomes very competitive? Many times the answer is no.
There are some things we can learn from the Army leadership's ability to turn Iraq around. There were really two reasons Gen. Petraeus and Co. were so successful. One was a unique and better understanding of the battlefield from Petraeus on down (and on up through think tanks and senators to President Bush), but the other was probably the unique energy of Gen. Petraeus himself.
My take away from the past 3 years is that above all we need more energetic officers, not necessarily better educated ones.
How do you breed a better culture of charisma and energy in the army? It hurts to say it, but I think the army could take some lessons from the Marines.
Bluntly gentlemen, and ladies, if one organization is screwed-up, the other is the preverbial Hogan's Goat. As an observer this time around, both the Army and Marines have much to be proud of - predominantly at the junior officer and NCO level.
The top leadership from both organizations frankly, had many of us retirees shaking our heads in wonder - wondering what they were thinking!
It is time to give the issue of who does it best a rest, and go back to the original thrust of LtGen Mattis' (and other speakers)remarks - it's obvious there is much both services need to learn (or is that relearn?). : )
I think anyone would be hard pressed to make an actual case that "the Marines get it." As I have pointed out on these pages before, the places in Anbar the Marines talk about pacifying were Army AoRs, like Ramadi, where I was a platoon leader and company commander (Army).
I could similarly give more examples currently in Afghanistan of the Marines' not getting it than I would be given column inches here to write them all. The Marines definitely have a better PR machine than other services.
This is not to say the Army does any better. At some things, yes, at others, certainly not. Having served with them and lived on a Marine base, I have always said the USMC is a far more professional organization, to be sure. But mostly I agree that the service vs. service thing is not particularly relevant.
Except when it comes to education. Take a look at any US PRT in Afghanistan, and you are likely to find a USAF E6 or E7 engineer with an advanced degree paid for by the USAF, and an Army O4 or O5 civil affairs officer with no advanced education at all, or any qualification for his/her job aside from being an insurance salesman or a laborer on a road crew somewhere (real jobs of real CA BN commanders). The Army simply has to take this much more seriously. The opportunities for advanced education for Army officers are pathetically few.
In the case of civil affairs, the field is 98% or some absurdly huge percentage Reservists. These are people who can go to school without taking time away from the strength of the active component. Yet they are deployed as much or more than their active counterparts, and we have read volumes about how civil affairs forces are being increasingly counted on for the skills they supposedly bring to the fight.
Instead of offering a $20,000 critical skills retention bonus, where the Army pays $20,000 and the soldier sees $12,000 - $14,000, why not spend the $20k on a masters degree?
The Army has to do a much better job with officer education. It is disgraceful.
Perhaps this illuminates the need for folks at the GO level to be fluent in not only strategy, but grand strategy within a geopolitical context.
I would argue that our officers are effective practitioners at the tactical level, but that effectiveness diminishes as we move to the operational, and again to strategic levels. As far as grand strategy, we leave that to the civilian leadership. However, we should be have effective advisers at the 3 and 4 star level that help guide our civilian leaders in the formulation and execution of grand strategy.
For example, what is our grand strategy in terms of the Muslim world? We don't have one.
Related to this is the need to get more of our officers in positions to influence Congress and the Executive branch so that they can provide expert input to civilian decision makers. In contrast to past generations, the number of members of congress and other influential policy-makers (and hence grand strategy makers) is very low. This disconnect between civilian and military has become dangerous. I don't think many of our civilian leaders have a sense of what the military can and cannot do - what problems the military may solve and what problems it is likely to create.
One last note: Hardly deserving of a reply, but "The Marines get it and the Army doesn't" is such an over-generalized intellectually lazy argument that I am compelled to reply as follows: Please leave the thinking to the adults and take your inter-service posturing where it would be more useful. Perhaps as a cheerleader at the Army-Navy game?
Speaking as a Marine, as well as the son and grandson of Marines with service dating back to 1918 (so I think I pass the cultural immersion test), I've think that service vs. service discussions are only useful in trying to move us forward as a whole by understanding/analyzing different cultures and approaches.
The "better vs. worse" argument gets us nowhere. We all have strengths, weaknesses, "shining lights," and idiots alike throughout our mutual histories.
Semper Fi
While I have been critical of previous CNAS reports, based on the executive summary I think this report is value added to the community at large. I have argued previously that leadership is decisive (all professional Soldiers know that, so pardon the blinding flash of the obvious), and the set backs we experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan were largely due to failures of leadership (poor decision making), and not a failure in Soldier performance or technology. It should be obvious that the most important national defense investment is the professional development of our officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers. Relevant to this argument is BG Flynns comments in another article where noted that some Soldiers claim that were fighting guys in Afghanistan who wear flip flops and pajamas. He said that may be true, but how are they beating numerous western nations? Why is 80% of our intelligence focused on IED networks (a tactical issue), instead of understanding the strategic/operational context of war? These are great points, we can roll up IED networks everyday (and should), but it wont get us across the finish line. We need leaders that understand the broader context, so they can more effectively employ their war fighting expertise to achieve strategic objectives. Military capability is what we bring to the fight and must remain expert in, but the underlying argument of the CNAS paper (IMO) is you must understand the context youre operating in to apply it correctly.
While it is beyond the scope of report, our military leaders take their orders from our civilian leaders through the secretary of defense, and I think arguments can be made that throughout history good military advise was disregarded by civilian leaders who thought they knew better in Vietnam, Somalia, Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan (as recent examples). We had military leaders who understood the strategic context of Iraq, Vietnam etc., but their voices were marginalized by civilian leaders. The take away from this second blinding flash of the obvious is that we still have many success stories with our professional development process, but they are not always listened to or empowered to excel at the task at hand.