President Obama's decision to escalate U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan earned him at most two muted cheers from Washington's warrior-pundits. Sure, the president had acceded to Gen. Stanley McChrystal's request for more troops. Already in its ninth year, Operation Enduring Freedom was therefore guaranteed to endure for years to come. The Long War begun on George W. Bush's watch with expectations of transforming the Greater Middle East gained a new lease on life, its purpose reduced to the generic one of "keeping America safe."
Yet the Long War's most ardent supporters found fault with Obama's words and demeanor. The president had failed to convey the requisite enthusiasm for sending young Americans to fight and die on the far side of the world while simultaneously increasing by several hundred billion dollars the debt imposed on future generations here at home. "Has there ever been a call to arms more dispiriting, a trumpet more uncertain?" asked a querulous Charles Krauthammer. Obama ought to have demonstrated some of the old "bring 'em on" spirit that served the previous administration so well. "We cannot prevail without a commander in chief committed to success," wrote Krauthammer.
Other observers made it clear that merely prevailing was nowhere near good enough. They took Obama to task for failing to use the V-word. Where was the explicit call for victory? "'Win' is a word that Obama avoided," noted Max Boot with disapproval. The president "spoke of wanting to 'end this war successfully' but said nothing of winning the war." Fred Barnes of the Weekly Standard read off the same talking points. "The personal commitment of the president to pursue the war against the Taliban and al Qaeda until they are defeated was not there," he lamented. "...To have rallied the country and the world, Obama needed to indicate he would lead a fight to win in Afghanistan, with the help of allies if possible, but with the armed forces of the U.S. alone if necessary. He didn't say anything like that. He didn't come close." ...
More at The American Conservative.
Comments
Col. Bacevich wrote:
<b>"Since 1945, the United States military has devoted itself to the proposition that, Hiroshima notwithstanding, war still works--that, despite the advent of nuclear weapons, organized violence directed by a professional military elite remains politically purposeful"</b>
Hmmm...out of all the wars fought from 1946 to 2009, what percentage of them involved combat troops from the United States?
Seems to me that the political value of "organized violence led by a professional military elite" might have been a consensus opinion in that time period and not something peculair to the United States.
For that matter, our record in warfare here looks bad compared to whom? Are we supposed to win every time? That's somewhat improbable on a historical timescale.
I'd also like to ask Professor Bacevich, in his expert opinion, if insurgencies led by a professional revolutionary elite (used to be called a "vanguard" back in the day) remains "politically purposeful" today?
One would suggest that the broad foreign policy goals of the United States post-the Cold War -- as discussed by the most recent Bush Administration -- remain much the same today. These are:
To provide for the exponentialy expanding needs of the strong and rising powers (the "stakeholders") in the new international order. This to be achieved by:
a. Supporting the development of weak and poorly governed states (i.e., by "transforming" these states -- such that they might better provide for the needs of the strong and rising powers) and by
b. Dealing effectively with those elements (individuals, groups and/or nations) who would seek to hinder, preclude or otherwise get in the way of this vital process.
It is within the framework noted above, one would suggest, that the "political utility of force" should be discussed. Yes?
Shouldnt we also try to figure out if the various interventions have been "cost-effective" or not? and how does one figure that out?
And what is the mechanism throught which thousands of professionals in various agencies are coordinated if they dont all know WHAT the foreign policy aims actually are? It seems to me that even on this kind of blog, no two people seem to be able to agree on what the goals really are.
Is there some hidden level at which such agreement exists? and if not (i personally think not), then does it matter? or are the institutions of the state so organized that everyone functions on "need to know" and somehow the invisible hand makes it all work?
(my own opinion, entirely non-expert, is that it is indeed the invisible hand that does the work in the long run..that if you step back far enough, the more productive, more creative society, which uses more of the talents of more of its people, will always come out on top...which makes me wonder how the invisible hand will fare when and if this advantage moves to China? or are we really post-national now? in a truly globalized world, the elite is transnational and so on?)
"For that matter, our record in warfare here looks bad compared to whom? Are we supposed to win every time? That's somewhat improbable on a historical timescale."
Perhaps a better way to phrase that question is to ask how successful as the United States been in advancing its foreign policy interests using military force since 1945?