News & commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and published by Duncan Moore.
1. Trump says he will make deals with N.K. very quickly if reelected
2. Don't use U.S. troops as bargaining chips
3. Around 10 countries yet to submit final report on N.K. workers to U.N.: document
4. Washington: GSOMIA is critical to U.S. security interest
5. North Korea crypto hackers: UN revelation
6. North Korea reportedly using altcoins to convert $1.5B in stolen funds to cash
7. Moon's chief of staff, five senior aides offer to resign
8. N.K. artillery attack on S. Korea could cause more than 200,000 casualties: U.S. think tank
9. North Korea publicly executes six for sex trafficking, including four officials
10. Kim Jong Un rolls up to village devastated by floods in luxury SUV
11. North Koreans scavenge in remains of blown-up Liaison Office
12. North Korea threat: satellite footage of Kim Jong-un's secretive base sparks nuclear panic
13. Un embarrassing failure: Trump's threat-followed-by-love-letter diplomacy with North Korea has been disastrous
1. Trump says he will make deals with N.K. very quickly if reelected
Yonhap News Agency · by Lee Haye-ah · August 8, 2020
Let me give you my worst-case analysis.
Based on President Trump's anti-alliance worldview (unless there is a positive transactional relationship for the US), I can see him trying to solve the Korea problem in the US favor once and for all: I can see him willing to make the deal to trade US troops in Korea for ICBMs and some level of nuclear weapons. Given the confluence of events - the SMA negotiation stalemate, the President 's belief the US is getting ripped off for defending South Korea, his stated desire to bring home US troops - he could offer up this concession to protect the US homeland by removing the ICBM threat. In addition, given President Moon's unwavering commitment to engagement with North Korea to implement his peace vision, I can see the President lifting sanctions (or trying to do so, as the UN and US Congress have the say in that), saying that it is time to let Koreans solve the Korean problem, that he supports President Moon's peace strategy, and that he will get out of the way to let him try to achieve it. This could be the basis of a "very quick deal."
Of course, making such a deal would be a victory for Kim Jong-Un and his long con. He will have achieved major objectives of his strategy: sanctions relief while keeping his nuclear weapons and removal of US troops from the peninsula. If this series of events were to happen, we can expect conflict in the very near future after the withdrawal of US troops, which of course will have global impact, with at least a severe economic impact on all Americans.
I know the President's national security advisers will do everything to prevent this outcome (as will some of our Korean allies - though there will be some Koreans who will support this path even though the existential threat to Korea will remain) and will continue to advise against this course of action. But, we must consider the President's words and actions as well as our interpretation of his worldview (I hope to be proven wrong in this analysis).
2. Don't Use U.S. Troops as Bargaining Chips
Bloomberg · by Editorial Board · August 7, 2020
Yes, our force posture must be based on how to optimize our forces, their capabilities, and their locations to support our National Defense Strategy, which includes support to our alliance commitments (our national security and defense strategy acknowledges how important our alliance structure is to US national security).
We should acknowledge that South Korea has given the US a huge gift for US strategic flexibility and agility with construction of the largest US military base outside of the US (South Korea funded 93% of the $10.7 billion cost) – not only through a state-of-the-art base, but through a strategic base sitting in a location between a seaport of embarkation (SPOE – the Port of Pyeongtaek) and an air port of embarkation (APOE – Osan Air Base). While the consolidation of most of US ground forces in a single location may not be tactically sound in the face of missile threats from North Korea, it makes great sense in terms of a strategic force projection platform and an intermediate staging base for forces from CONUS to deploy throughout the Indo-Pacific for contingency operations. Of course, this base poses political issues with our Korean allies who think it could be used for war with China, but we should instead think about strategic deployment capabilities in support of other contingencies as well as training and engagement with other allies in the INDOPACFIC.
But. the bottom line is we should not use US troops as a bargaining chip. We need to think about how the location of US troops supports the US national defense strategies. And it would also be good if we could correct a major strategic error by re-joining the Transpacific Partnership (though I fear that ship has already sailed).
3. Around 10 countries yet to submit final report on N.K. workers to U.N.: document
Yonhap News Agency · by hague@yna.co.kr · August 8, 2020
It seems like the leaked UN report has been making the rounds. It would be useful if the UN just released it to the public rather than leak it to a few media outlets, causing us to have to read the media’s interpretations of it. It is difficult to tell what is circular reporting and what is based on an actual reading of the report.
4. Washington: GSOMIA is critical to U.S. security interest
Dong-A Ilbo · by Ji-Sun Choi · August 8, 2020
GSOMIA is critical to the security of the ROK, Japan, and the US – both through direct implementation and execution as well as the broader trilateral relationship, which is critical to address both the North Korean threat and other challenges in Northeast Asia, e.g. China. Recall that China demanded a concession from South Korea that not only would it not allow any more THAAD deployments but also not participate in an integrated missile defense system or a trilateral alliance of the ROK, Japan, and US. Why do we think that is? Because a trilateral alliance will hinder the ability of China to wield dominating influence in the region. The question for the ROK and US: will historical issues (which are tragic) take precedence of economic and national security?
5. North Korea crypto hackers: UN revelation
Asia Times · by AT Contributor · August 7, 2020
It appears like this leaked report is covering a lot of ground based on the information that the media is reporting.
6. North Korea reportedly using altcoins to convert $1.5B in stolen funds to cash
Coin Telegraph · by Mohammad Musharraf · August 7, 2020
For the cyber and crypto currency experts: is there a way to block, interdict, or somehow exploit these actions?
7. Moon's chief of staff, five senior aides offer to resign
Korea Herald · by Yonhap · August 7, 2020
8. N.K. artillery attack on S. Korea could cause more than 200,000 casualties: U.S. think tank
Yonhap News Agency · by Lee Haye-ah · August 8, 2020
I think this is the report to which Yonhap is referring.
9. North Korea publicly executes six for sex trafficking, including four officials
Radio Free Asia · by Eugene Whong · August 6, 2020
More examples of the evil nature of the Kim family regime. And think about the hypocrisy of Kim Jong-Un (like his father and grandfather), who is "allowed" (by his own authority) to have his "pleasure squads.”
10. Kim Jong Un rolls up to village devastated by floods in luxury SUV
New York Post · by Lia Eustachewich · August 7, 2020
11. North Koreans scavenge in remains of blown-up Liaison Office
Daily Mail · by Julian Ryall · August 7, 2020
12. North Korea threat: satellite footage of Kim Jong-un's secretive base sparks nuclear panic
Express · by Oli Smith · August 7, 2020
There is no doubt the regime continues to develop nuclear weapons and its nuclear infrastructure continues to operate. But there is no need for panic.
13. Un embarrassing failure: Trump's threat-followed-by-love-letter diplomacy with North Korea has been disastrous
Daily News · by Daily News Editorial Board · August 8, 2020
Cute title.
Yes, President Trump has practiced unconventional, experimental, top-down, pen-pal diplomacy. Of course, there is only one measure of effectiveness - denuclearization of the North. So there has been no denuclearization, but we should have learned some very useful lessons from the past two years that can help with the way ahead. Second (and most important), we have created an environment of tremendous pressure on Kim Jong-Un inside Pyongyang (of course, he has helped by raising expectations that he could play Moon and Trump). Kim's failure to effectively play both Presidents has made him vulnerable inside Pyongyang. In addition, our steadfast refusal to give concessions in the form of sanctions relief is helping chip away at the effectiveness of the regime's blackmail diplomacy strategy. In time, Kim is going to be put in a position where he will have to change his strategy or be subject to increasing internal pressure. So, yes – we have not successfully denuclearized the North. But Kim Jong-Un has been the real failure, and this fact will either have devastating consequences for him or will force him to change his policy and strategy.
We need to continue to counter his long con by playing our long game.
"Nonviolent action involves opposing the opponent's power, including his police and military capacity, not with the weapons chosen by him but by quite different means. Repression by the opponent is used against his own power position in a kind of political "ju-jitsu" and the very sources of his power thus reduced or removed, with the result that his political and military position is seriously weakened or destroyed."
- Gene Sharp
'If [people] cannot think well, others will do their thinking for them.'
- George Orwell
"OLD SF"
"Yep, it was a simpler time in many ways. No computers, no risk assessment process, team sergeants wrote training schedules and ran teams for many years (not just two), no interpreters, no velcro, no gortex, no optics on guns, no body armor or high speed helmets, no CONOPs, no Powerpoint, no warrant officers (LTs were there to carry the generator and learn before they took a team as a CPT), no career path, no officer or NCO branch to hide people in, we had our own flight det in the Groups, we wore no-shit LBE with butt packs, and we just made shit happen. Now there were some differences too that folks now wouldn't like. We did formations...PT, morning at 0900 often, sometimes at 1300. We occasionally did Company, Bn, and Group runs. We wore berets in garrison and either patrol caps or boonie hats in the woods (or a drive on rag while patrolling if appropriate). We did isolation. We did a lot of SL night CE jumps, and under some commanders that's all we did, but we were good at it. We had field pants and cold weather gear made of wool, and sleeping bags made of down. We didn't have the ammo they have today, but we used what we had wisely. We did SQT tests and certification. There was only jump pay...$55, then $83, then $110 I think, and MFF/SCUBA pay. No SDAP, Lang pay, demo pay, or huge bonuses. We had no specialized gear...when I got to an ODA I think they issued ma a VS-17 panel, strobe light, snap link, sling rope, and a compass, and a couple of more things like a GP net from PBO. Damn, those were some great times....We were expected to do anything, anytime, anyplace with nothing other than our wits, creativity, and drive. And we did. And we did it with great NCO leadership from the Vietnam era guys who did the exact same thing before we stepped in."
-Chris Zets
(some of us grew up in this era)