News & commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and published by Daniel Riggs.
1. DOD Directive 5111.10 Assistant Secretary Of Defense For Special Operations And Low-Intensity Conflict Charter
2. Time for Cognitive Warfare Against China?
3. Strategic Predictability: Landpower in the Indo-Pacific
4. FDD | How China Responded to President Biden’s Address to Congress
5. Don’t Let China Hijack the UN Security Council
6. Russian Spy Team Left Traces That Bolstered C.I.A.’s Bounty Judgment
7. Why a Filipino Official Just Flipped Out at Chinese Aggression
8. Top general: US considering training Afghan forces in other countries
9. DoD Investigating Former Army Officer Who Used Arlington Cemetery Footage in Campaign Ad
10. Diving Off the Platform-Centric Mind-set
11. Have the DoD’s special hiring practices hurt more than helped?
12. FDD | Time for Biden to Oppose Gulf Monarchies’ Outreach to Assad
13. Shadow Warriors Pursuing Next-Gen Surveillance Tech
14. Pentagon Struggles to Wean Afghan Military Off American Air Support
15. China’s State-Backed Messengers See Opportunity in India’s Coronavirus Woes
16. How China turned a prize-winning iPhone hack against the Uyghurs
17. The origin of COVID: Did people or nature open Pandora’s box at Wuhan?
18. Were those Navy SEALs spotted just off Capistrano Beach near Dana Point Harbor?
19. Nation challenges west's human rights claims on Xinjiang
20. Can Biden imbue foreign policy realism with moral values?
1. DOD Directive 5111.10 Assistant Secretary Of Defense For Special Operations And Low-Intensity Conflict Charter
The 28 page document can be downloaded at this link.
A lot to parse here. My sense is ASD SO/LIC has a lot of responsibilities that go well beyond the SOF ADCON chain of command responsibilities and civilian oversight of SOF. A question is whether the ASD SO/LIC is sufficiently resource with personnel to execute all these responsibilities.
I am heartened to see this responsibility under the IW section:
(b) Lead DoD efforts to establish and sustain processes and authorities to assess and
analyze the viability of unconventional warfare as a strategic policy option, and incorporate
relevant concepts into strategic planning documents.
On the other hand direct action stands alone:
f. Direct Action.
Coordinates with the USD(P) to oversee planning and resourcing of capabilities for SO
forces to conduct direct action, and monitors SO actions during planning and execution.
The entire Irregular Warfare section is worth highlighting (but I am at a loss to understand why Direct Action stands alone as an apparent co-equal to IW. I am happy to read the references to FID and UW as strategic policy options. This is the verbiage in my syllabus for my course on UW and SOF for Policy makers and Strategists: "We need Strategists and Policy Makers who have a deep (or at least sufficient) understanding of and value the strategic options offered by UW and Counter-UW."
h. IW.
(1) In their role as a PSA to the Secretary of Defense, assists the USD(P) to:
(a) Develop and oversee policies for IW as it pertains to DoD IW-related activities
either independently or in support of other U.S. Government departments and agencies, foreign
security partners, or other select organizations, in accordance with DoDD 3000.07.
(b) Lead DoD efforts to establish and sustain processes and authorities to assess and
analyze the viability of unconventional warfare as a strategic policy option, and incorporate
relevant concepts into strategic planning documents.
(c) Develop policy in coordination with other U.S. Government departments and
agencies, and provide advice to senior DoD officials regarding the use of U.S. Government
resources in stabilization, in accordance with DoDD 3000.05.
(d) Develop policy and provide advice and guidance to senior DoD officials
regarding the use of U.S. Government resources to conduct foreign internal defense as a strategic
policy option, and incorporate relevant concepts into strategic planning documents to defend
against and impose costs on malign internal security threats.
(e) Develop, coordinate, and oversee implementation of counterterrorism policy
consistent with national strategies and DoD policy and objectives.
(2) In their role as a PSA to the Secretary of Defense, assists the USD(P) and, in
coordination with the USD(I&S):
(a) Develops policy and provides advice to senior DoD officials regarding the use of
U.S. Government resources in counterinsurgency.
(b) Develops policy in coordination with other U.S. Government departments and
agencies, and provides advice to senior DoD officials regarding the use of U.S. Government
resources in counterterrorism consistent with national strategies, DoD policy, and objectives.
(3) In coordination with the CJCS, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the OSD
PSAs (as applicable), and the CCDRs, determines the optimal organizational structure and
decision processes for the DoD to ensure the uninterrupted oversight, management, direction,
and accountability over the development and maintenance of required forces and capabilities to
conduct or support IW missions.
The other important aspect of this paragraph is the recognition that IW (and FID, UW, Stabilization, CT, and COIN are inherently interagency and require resources well beyond DOD.. My question is in what documents among other government agencies does it state that such agencies have a responsibility for contributing to IW strategy and execution. I wish the drafters had included this description of the "concept of irregular warfare operations'' (from the 2018 NDAA): '' Irregular warfare is conducted “in support of predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals participating in competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional armed conflict.” Inclusion of this would have furthered the understanding of the whole of government nature of IW. But unless this is recognized and prioritized by other agencies of the US government this concept will be stuck in ASD SO/LIC.
I have highlighted just a few points. As I said there is a lot to parse (e.g., note the guidance and authorities for legislative affairs)
2. Time for Cognitive Warfare Against China?
19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · May 6, 2021
Or PSYOP.
Have the USS Mustin's actions created desired effects in China? If so, then let's do more.
Excerpts: “Or as the Bard might put it, the American crew showed slight regard for China’s navy.
Apparently, Washington didn’t get the memo that cognitive warfare is something China does. Beijing makes a practice of using naval and military implements to overawe outmatched neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam. It wages what Chinese officialdom calls “three warfares” against opponents on a 24/7/365 basis, executing legal, media, and yes, psychological operations to shape opinion in the Chinese Communist Party’s favor. The narrative: China is big, bad, and unbeatable.
A ship on a routine errand accompanied by a simple photograph helps give the lie to China’s narrative—and deface the image of itself Beijing has so artfully painted in recent years. Trolling is an underappreciated part of great-power strategic competition at sea. The U.S. Navy needs to do it more. Seize the initiative.
Well played.
3. Strategic Predictability: Landpower in the Indo-Pacific
warontherocks.com · by Lt. Gen. Charles Flynn · May 6, 2021
Perhaps this forms the foundation of the new USARPAC Commander's strategic guidance to the force.
Conclusion: “As the president has noted, the United States will “take on directly the challenges posed [to] our prosperity, security, and democratic values by our most serious competitor, China.” The Department of Defense needs to marshal all elements of American military power — air, cyber, land, sea, and space — in response. Given the stakes involved and Beijing’s continued ability to translate economic growth into military might, the United States cannot afford to discount landpower in its regional strategy.
The United States could just buy more technological platforms and say that this is our competitive advantage. But, if America did that, a quick look at military history would prove it wrong. From Great Britain in the American Revolution to France in World War II to America’s own experience in Vietnam, what a country fights with is nowhere near as important as how it fights. The United States can and should develop new platforms with better technology and enhanced intelligence capabilities, but it should also be clear-eyed about where and how it intends to employ those platforms to create enduring effects. U.S. air-, cyber-, sea-, and spacepower are essential to securing American interests in the Indo-Pacific, but we are unaware of any historical example where a war ended at sea or in the air — or in space or cyberspace space for that matter. Does the United States compete in those domains? Absolutely. However, war is won, and peace is preserved, on land. Army landpower needs to be in position to help decide the outcome.
4. FDD | How China Responded to President Biden’s Address to Congress
fdd.org · by Thomas Joscelyn · May 6, 2021
Excerpts: “The omission of any reference to Taiwan is even more noteworthy when one considers what President Biden said he told Xi. “I told him what I’ve said to many world leaders: that America will not back away from our commitments—our commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms and to our alliances,” Biden claimed. The president continued:
And I pointed out to him: No responsible American president could remain silent when basic human rights are being so blatantly violated. An American president has to represent the essence of what our country stands for. America is an idea—the most unique idea in history: We are created, all of us, equal. It’s who we are, and we cannot walk away from that principle and, in fact, say we’re dealing with the American idea.
That idea is being challenged at home by actors across the political spectrum. And the CCP is all too happy to challenge it abroad.
5. Don’t Let China Hijack the UN Security Council
The National Interest · by Morgan Lorraine Vina · May 7, 2021
My assessment of China: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, and displace democratic institutions.
Excerpts: “The Biden administration should not take lightly China’s use of the Security Council as a propaganda platform. As China takes the gavel, the United States should denounce any attempt by Beijing to use the body as a platform to manipulate the agenda to shield dictators and undermine democracy. The United States should also look to its other P-5 members, specifically the United Kingdom and France, as well as like-minded, elected Council members, such as Norway and Estonia, to call out China’s grandstanding.
The security council is a soft target for Beijing. As a deliberative body, it can be easily hijacked by its members and used as a political platform. The United States and other P-5 members should protect the integrity of the council and expose China’s deceptions.
6. Russian Spy Team Left Traces That Bolstered C.I.A.’s Bounty Judgment
The New York Times · by Michael Schwirtz · May 7, 2021
Excerpts: “Michael J. Morell, a former acting director of the C.I.A., said another factor had fostered confusion. When analysts assess something with low confidence, he said, that does not mean they think the conclusion is wrong. Rather, they are expressing greater concerns about the sourcing limitations, while still judging that the assessment is the best explanation of the available facts.
“A judgment at any confidence level is a judgment that the analysts believe to be true,” he said. “Even when you have a judgment that is low confidence, the analysts believe that judgment is correct. So in this case, the analysts believe that the Russians were offering bounties.”
7. Why a Filipino Official Just Flipped Out at Chinese Aggression
The National Interest · by Tory Rich · May 7, 2021
It was a helluva tweet. But it turns out his error was in usurping Duterte's prerogative for the use of profanity.
8. Top general: US considering training Afghan forces in other countries
The Hill · by Rebecca Kheel · May 6, 2021
Excerpts: “The Afghan Air Force is also heavily reliant on U.S. contractors for maintenance. All U.S. contractors also are slated to leave the country in conjunction with the troop withdrawal, but Milley said talks are ongoing about whether any can be transferred to the control of the Afghan military to stay.
“That's one of the key questions and I will tell you that the final crossing of Ts and dotting the Is of that plan is not yet settled,” Milley said. “But maintaining logistic support to the Afghan Air Force is a key task that we have to sort out doing it over the horizon, but also in country. It could be done by contractors.
"A lot of that's going to be dependent on the security conditions on the ground," he continued. "But the intent is to keep the Afghan Air Force in the air and to provide them with continued maintenance support.”
9. DoD Investigating Former Army Officer Who Used Arlington Cemetery Footage in Campaign Ad
military.com · by Steve Beynon · May 6, 2021
What is it with these former officers and military personnel? Do they not recall the briefings they received?
But this NCO undermines the legitimacy of the former officer and gives his opponent a simple message to discredit him:
Another NCO who served with Earls said he is confused why the ad leans so heavily on his military service, or why it is relevant to his district, given he has never deployed overseas and got out of the service relatively quickly. Evidence is mixed on any advantages former service members might have in election.
10. Diving Off the Platform-Centric Mind-set
usni.org · May 1, 2021
Algorithmic warfare. Did Al Gore invent that too? (My apologies, my daughter will counsel me for an attempted "dad joke.")
Conclusion: Carl von Clausewitz characterized war as a Zweikampf, or two-sided duel, between hostile, sentient wills facing off amid disorder, uncertainty, and nonlinearity.28 The most recent 30-year shipbuilding plan maps vessel procurement out to 2051, but by that point, varying forms of machine-based sentience will drive the blinding pace of combat, and the force with the most hardened, resilient, cooperative, and adaptable algorithms will possess the decisive advantage. The total number and types of ships in the Navy’s fleet will matter much less than whether those ships can rapidly update their software and supporting data. It is time for the Navy to look up from counting ships and instead focus on driving down the days, hours, and even minutes required to send its latest software to sailors at the tactical edge.
11. Have the DoD’s special hiring practices hurt more than helped?
federaltimes.com · by Jessie Bur · May 6, 2021
Excerpts: “Sometimes this results in each military department creating separate developmental paths and certification requirements for similar sets of skills, a practice that creates significant barriers for promotion for internal candidates or lateral entry for external candidates. Moreover, management practices and culture more often than not erect barriers to hiring more than the lack of authorities. A prime example is the department’s reported failure by the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence to recognize experience as a substitute for educational credentials when determining appropriate compensation for persons with cyber skills.”
This isn’t the first time that “flexibility” has been labeled the enemy of improved hiring, with HR professionals from several agencies testifying in a 2019 hearing that the myriad special authorities with different titles for certain job types have made the job of hiring managers that much more cumbersome. And that burden gets translated into longer hiring times.
AFGE called on the DoD to cut back on hiring caps, siloing of positions, extended probationary periods and unnecessary degree requirements, while expanding on existing incentive programs like the three-year Cyber Scholarship program to attract and keep talent.
12. FDD | Time for Biden to Oppose Gulf Monarchies’ Outreach to Assad
fdd.org · by David Adesnik · May 6, 2021
Excerpts: “Furthermore, there will be a need for constant vigilance. David Schenker, the State Department’s top official for Middle Eastern affairs under President Donald Trump, has urged the new administration to fill the open position of special envoy for Syria with an individual of sufficient stature to maintain and deepen the allied front against Assad.
Finally, if Riyadh wants to repair the extensive damage that human rights violations have done to its reputation on the Hill, it should not embrace the bloodiest regime in the region.
13. Shadow Warriors Pursuing Next-Gen Surveillance Tech
nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Jon Harper · May 7, 2021
Excerpts: “Desired program “deliverables” include: image matching at long range (100 to 1,000 meters); matching at severe pitch views (20 to 50 degrees); atmospheric turbulence mitigation; multi-image templates from video; body and face localization in moving video; cross-view whole body matching both indoors and outdoors; robustness against incomplete or occluded views; and multi-modal fusion, according to Ericson’s slides.
Solutions must be agnostic to sensor platforms and optics; adapt to edge processing and real-time streaming; accurate across diverse demographics and body shapes; invariant to pose, illumination, expression and clothing changes; and adapt or transfer solutions to be used in different platform-specific environments.
“The [technology] evaluation is going to be conducted on the aggregated evaluation sets that have images of subjects across a wide range of sensors and platforms,” Ericson said. “That’s how we’re going to fundamentally evaluate the statistical performance of these algorithms.
And so they need to be agnostic or at least robust to the kinds of sensor platforms and optics” that will be used during testing.
The four-year program is expected to kick off in the third or fourth quarter of fiscal year 2021. IARPA hopes to transfer the technology to other government agencies after the project is completed. Its customers include the CIA and other intelligence agencies, the U.S. military and the Department of Homeland Security.
Historically, about 70 percent of IARPA’s completed research successfully transitions to government partners, according to the agency.
14. Pentagon Struggles to Wean Afghan Military Off American Air Support
The New York Times · by Eric Schmitt · May 6, 2021
Excerpts: “Rules of engagement of American air power are extremely restrictive, according to a U.S. official, meaning that in some cases approval to strike could take longer than some jets can stay airborne. Many targets need to be preplanned and watched for hours, if not days, by drones and other surveillance aircraft, meaning immediate support for Afghan forces under siege is increasingly difficult.
U.S. officials have noted the gains made by the Afghan air force in recent years. Their fleet of small helicopters and armed propeller planes — that look more at home in a World War II movie — have become increasingly capable, though civilian casualties caused by their attacks have spiked.
But with about 17,000 military contractors also leaving with U.S. and NATO troops, the Afghan government is panicking on how to continue to maintain their aircraft. Almost the entire air force, minus some aging Soviet-era helicopters, is nearly completely dependent on contractor support for maintenance. The contractors even control the supply of fuel, one Afghan pilot said, because it has been siphoned and sold off by Afghan troops in the past.
Addressing the contractor issue, General Milley said that much would be determined by the security conditions on the ground. “The intent,” he said, “is to provide them with continued support.”
15. China’s State-Backed Messengers See Opportunity in India’s Coronavirus Woes
securingdemocracy.gmfus.org · by Bryce Barros · May 4, 2021
Excerpts: “When Chinese and Indian soldiers clashed at the border between both countries in June 2020, Chinese diplomats and state-backed media reacted belligerently. The Indian government has since moved to severely curtail the operation of Chinese tech giants in India and has deepened its engagement with other democracies. As India fights to get its most recent coronavirus outbreak in check, Chinese government officials and state-backed media have deployed a more conciliatory tone. However, the expressions of friendship relayed by Chinese government officials and state-backed media barely conceal Beijing’s ambition to pull India away from a group of countries that threatens to effectively challenge the Chinese Communist Party’s hegemonic ambition in Asia.
But, as Dr. Garima Mohan, a fellow in GMF’s Asia program, told us, the propaganda push has not shifted the geopolitical soil. Though China’s offers of assistance and conciliatory tone were welcomed in India, she noted that “media outlets in India started reporting about China blocking flights and shipments to India.” In addition, “the perception in the strategic community that China used the COVID crisis last year to escalate military tensions on the border with India will cloud all offers of help from China.” China’s offers of assistance and messaging have not changed the structural tensions in Sino-Indian relations. These tensions were exacerbated by the “breadth and scope” of U.S. assistance and “messages of solidarity across the Biden administration,” which, Mohan said ultimately checked China’s narrative.
As India deepens its relationships and partnerships with regional and extra-regional democratic countries like Japan, Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, China will continue to search for narratives and messages that weaken those bonds and ties. The coronavirus pandemic continues to provide instances where China can use carrots like assistance with case numbers to sticks like saber-rattling on the Sino-Indian border. In turn, this provides ample opportunities for Chinese government officials and state-backed media to opportunistically try their messaging on the world’s largest democracy: India.
16. How China turned a prize-winning iPhone hack against the Uyghurs
Technology Review · by Patrick Howell O'Neill
Excerpts: “Tianfu’s links to Uyghur surveillance and genocide show that getting early access to bugs can be a powerful weapon. In fact, the “reckless” hacking spree that Chinese groups launched against Microsoft Exchange in early 2021 bears some striking similarities.
In that case, a Taiwanese researcher uncovered the security flaws and passed them to Microsoft, which then privately shared them with security partners. But before a fix could be released, Chinese hacking groups started exploiting the flaw all around the world. Microsoft, which was forced to rush out a fix two weeks earlier than planned, is investigating the potential that the bug was leaked.
These bugs are incredibly valuable, not just in financial terms, but in their capacity to create an open window for espionage and oppression.
Google researcher Ian Beer said as much in the original report detailing the exploit chain. “I shan’t get into a discussion of whether these exploits cost $1 million, $2 million, or $20 million,” he wrote. “I will instead suggest that all of those price tags seem low for the capability to target and monitor the private activities of entire populations in real time.”
17. The origin of COVID: Did people or nature open Pandora’s box at Wuhan?
thebulletin.org · by Matt Field · May 5, 2021
Well beyond my level of knowledge on this but I did learn something. A long read.
Excerpts: “In what follows I will sort through the available scientific facts, which hold many clues as to what happened, and provide readers with the evidence to make their own judgments. I will then try to assess the complex issue of blame, which starts with, but extends far beyond, the government of China.
By the end of this article, you may have learned a lot about the molecular biology of viruses. I will try to keep this process as painless as possible. But the science cannot be avoided because for now, and probably for a long time hence, it offers the only sure thread through the maze.
...
The virologists’ omertà is one reason. Science reporters, unlike political reporters, have little innate skepticism of their sources’ motives; most see their role largely as purveying the wisdom of scientists to the unwashed masses. So when their sources won’t help, these journalists are at a loss.
Another reason, perhaps, is the migration of much of the media toward the left of the political spectrum. Because President Trump said the virus had escaped from a Wuhan lab, editors gave the idea little credence. They joined the virologists in regarding lab escape as a dismissible conspiracy theory. During the Trump administration, they had no trouble in rejecting the position of the intelligence services that lab escape could not be ruled out. But when Avril Haines, President Biden’s director of national intelligence, said the same thing, she too was largely ignored. This is not to argue that editors should have endorsed the lab escape scenario, merely that they should have explored the possibility fully and fairly.
People round the world who have been pretty much confined to their homes for the last year might like a better answer than their media are giving them. Perhaps one will emerge in time. After all, the more months pass without the natural emergence theory gaining a shred of supporting evidence, the less plausible it may seem. Perhaps the international community of virologists will come to be seen as a false and self-interested guide. The common sense perception that a pandemic breaking out in Wuhan might have something to do with a Wuhan lab cooking up novel viruses of maximal danger in unsafe conditions could eventually displace the ideological insistence that whatever Trump said can’t be true.
18. Were those Navy SEALs spotted just off Capistrano Beach near Dana Point Harbor?
Stars and Stripes · by Erika I. Ritchie · May 6, 2021
19. Nation challenges west's human rights claims on Xinjiang
chinadaily.com.cn · by 张洁
Push back from a propaganda mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party.
Interesting excerpt: “In 2019, a letter hailing China's "remarkable achievements in the field of human rights" and calling for work to be carried out "in an objective and impartial manner" based on "true and genuinely credible information" was signed by ambassadors from 37 countries to the UN in Geneva.
The envoys came from Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar as well as Russia, Pakistan, Egypt, Cuba, Algeria, Tajikistan and the Philippines.
The letter was sent to the president of the UN Human Rights Council and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
In the letter, the ambassadors said they "appreciate China's commitment to openness and transparency". They added,"China has undertaken a series of counterterrorism and deradicalization measures in Xinjiang, including setting up vocational education and training centers."
20. Can Biden imbue foreign policy realism with moral values?
The Christian Science Monitor · by The Christian Science Monitor · May 6, 2021
It takes good statecraft to protect both interests and values.
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"First tell yourself what kind of person you want to be, then do what you have to do. For in nearly every pursuit we see this to be the case. Those in athletic pursuit first choose the sport they want and then do the work."
-Epictetus
“An ounce of action is worth a ton of theory.”
- Ralph Waldo Emerson
“Dare to know! Have the courage to use your own intelligence.”
- Immanuel Kant