If, as President Obama asserted, “ideologies are not defeated by guns,” but by “better ideas,” then how should the U.S. military be used to help achieve strategic success.
This essay examines the Executive Order on protection from foreign terrorist entry into the U.S. from a broader counterinsurgency perspective.
The key thesis of this book is to analyze the theory that it is possible to use irregular warfare as a national military strategy to adopt a ‘professional irregular defense force’.
The US can enable novel gains in the information environment by collecting on, operating in, and collaborating through indigenously produced economic media.
Through the use of conventional and irregular forces, Gen Nathaniel Greene brought Cornwallis' forces to a culminating point and precipitated the surrender at Yorktown.
Though discredited, the phased framework of shape-clear-hold-build remains applicable over time when adapted to local circumstances by harmonized independent stakeholders.
The US Army is finding itself in the difficult position of attempting to redefine itself in a climate of reduced resources. It shouldn't pin its future to peer-to-peer battle.
Understanding the great paradox of the U.S. military: the better our conventional capabilities, the more likely we are to face increasingly irregular and asymmetric threats.
Implementing a provocative idea.
