Ambassador J.R. Bullington, once a foreign service officer serving in the CORDS program in Vietnam, argues that we won the counterinsurgency war in Vietnam. Harry Summers, where are you?
Grant Martin offers his thoughts on the rewrite of FM 3-24 and more realistic and sustainable COIN efforts.
SWJ-regular Gian Gentile reviews Lewis Sorley's Westmoreland at The National Interest, attacking Sorely's support of the "better war thesis."
Did General Westmoreland lose Vietnam? The answer is no. But he did lose the war over the memory of the Vietnam War. He lost it to military historian Lewis Sorley, among others. In his recent biography of William C. Westmoreland, Sorley posits what might be called “the better-war thesis”—that a better war leading to American victory was available to the United States if only the right general had been in charge. The problem, however, is that this so-called better war exists mostly in the minds of misguided historians and agenda-driven pundits. ...
Westmoreland’s failure, like so many others during that tragic war, was his inability to see that the war could not be won at a cost that was acceptable to the American people. Just like the American generals of today’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Westmoreland in the end put too much faith in the efficacy of American military power when he should have discerned its limits.
Sergio Miller offers and important and interesting look at armed nation building in Vietnam and Afghanistan; a look that does not leave one with much optimism.
In a blast from the past, Kennedy and Johnson staffer turned Harvard professor James C. Thompson looks at how the tragedy that was the Vietnam War unfolded. This Atlantic article was originally published in April 1968. He opens with a straightforward inquiry. "One question that will certainly be asked: How did men of superior ability, sound training, and high ideals—American policy-makers of the 1960s—create such costly and divisive policy?" He goes into a lengthy and illuminating look at the institutional and historical factors that crippled the national security decision-making apparatus. This is a fascinating read in and of itself. But if you are to do nothing else, read the below excerpt with which he closed his essay and ask yourself if we will ever learn.
Long before I went into government, I was told a story about Henry L. Stimson that seemed to me pertinent during the years that I watched the Vietnam tragedy unfold—and participated in that tragedy. It seems to me more pertinent than ever as we move toward the election of 1968.
In his waning years Stimson was asked by an anxious questioner, "Mr. Secretary, how on earth can we ever bring peace to the world?" Stimson is said to have answered: "You begin by bringing to Washington a small handful of able men who believe that the achievement of peace is possible.
"You work them to the bone until they no longer believe that it is possible.
"And then you throw them out—and bring in a new bunch who believe that it is possible."
