The Fires Next Time: The ISIS Terrorist Threat in the West

The Fires Next Time: The ISIS Terrorist Threat in the West

Thomas R. McCabe

The Fires Next Time…

Of the recent ISIS-related attacks in the West, the November 2015 Paris and March 2016 Brussels attacks must be considered the worst. They were massive intelligence failures, in many ways far worse than 9/11, and demonstrated dangerous Western vulnerability.[1] They were large multinational plots, planned by ISIS Central, which took place without detection by any major intelligence service. Further, ISIS plans for the attacks were far more ambitious than the attacks actually carried out, and only luck avoided much heavier casualties.[2] While Belgium had what was widely regarded as a mediocre security service,[3] France was noted for having a very hard-nosed one that was much less handicapped by political correctness than that of the United States. Further, the target countries did not have the 9/11 American excuses of peacetime rules and mentality. In spite of this, and in spite of disrupted precursor attacks by people involved in the network,[4] nobody saw the attacks coming. ISIS was able to get people in and out of Europe without much difficulty.[5] In the aftermath, despite strenuous efforts, the network continued to function in the aftermath, with additional attacks planned for June and November 2016.[6]

Unfortunately, things don’t end there—ISIS has ambitious plans for continuing to stage attacks around the world.[7] As part of this, we must consider the danger that ISIS is attempting to organize a terrorist underground in the West, especially in Europe.

To assess the danger, this analysis will evaluate two factors:

• ISIS’s efforts to organize a terrorist underground in the West
• The potential recruiting pool for such an organization.

The Threat: An Organized Terrorist Underground?

The West has not yet really faced an organized jihadi terrorist underground on our home ground. Al Qaeda has never really tried to establish major underground networks in the West, preferring to exploit previously existing networks and sometimes establishing small support cells for individual acts of terror. So far, according to EUROPOL, ISIS’s main tactic has also been to send teams to Europe to stage attacks.[8] In the United States, at least so far, there have been no solid indications of a widespread organized jihadi terrorist underground connected to foreign jihadis. Jihadi attacks here have been either individuals or local cells and have generally been ISIS-inspired rather than ISIS-directed. Evidently the Muslim Community in the U.S. has been reasonably cooperative in identifying would-be jihadis.[9] However, ISIS obviously has a base of support in the U.S.,[10] and knowledgeable sources have warned that we really don’t know the extent of the jihadi underground in America.[11]

Unfortunately this comparatively good fortune may not continue. While matters are bad enough if ISIS infiltrators sent into the West intend to stage actual terrorist attacks, an even worse prospect is if those infiltrators are intended to serve as cadres around which an organization (most likely a network of networks) will be built to recruit, train and lead other jihadis to wage an ongoing campaign of terrorism, or even guerilla warfare.[12]

This threat has at least two major dimensions: 1) building an organized terrorist underground for operations in the West; and 2) attempting to organize free-lance jihadis.[13]

Organizing a Terrorist Underground in the West

With some major exceptions, such as the Brussels and November 2015 Paris attacks, most recent ISIS-related attacks in the US and Europe are widely considered to have been self-initiated. However, ISIS has attempted to pursue more organized and systematic mayhem, and has been building an organization, the Amn al-Kharji,[14] (Arabic name “Emni”[15]) for that purpose. The organization’s operational head is reportedly a Moroccan-born French national named Abdelilah Himich[16] (nom de guerre Abu Sulayman al-Faransi[17]) with organizational theater/regional commanders, responsible for planning attacks in their regions,[18] reporting to him.[19] Regional branches have been reported for Asia, Europe, the Arab world,[20] and an English-speaking branch, the “Anwar al-Awlaki Brigade,” whose tasking includes planning operations in North America.[21] The English-speaking unit may have a female component, led by a British woman convert.[22]

ISIS has tried to recruit foreign fighters for foreign attacks and has been sending fighters abroad for at least two years,[23] [24] including establishing sleeper cells for later activation, which means it is willing to think, plan, and build long-term.[25] In early 2016, security officials warned ISIS claimed to have trained and sent to Europe at least 400 fighters to stage more attacks there.[26] (In November 2015, an ISIS operative claimed that ISIS had infiltrated 4000 jihadists into Europe among the refugees.[27]) ISIS may have established camps to train fighters for such attacks,[28] and has evidently established support networks--along with making arrangements with criminal networks[29]--in Europe.[30]

Attempting to Organize Free-Lance (A.K.A. “Lone Wolf”) Jihadis--Crowd-Sourcing Terrorism

As mentioned, most recent attacks in the US and Europe are widely considered to have been self-initiated rather than ISIS-directed. However, while they may be self-initiated, they may also be ISIS-orchestrated.[31] A 2016 defector from ISIS claimed that many supposedly individual attacks were actually coordinated and directed by ISIS, using recently converted “clean” Muslims as cutouts to contact the actual perpetrators.[32] This was done by a cadre of the Amn al-Kharji, “virtual planners,” who have identified a pool of ISIS adherents willing to undertake such attacks.[33] One of the most noted of these planners, Rachid Kassim, was implicated in more than 10 plots in France before being killed by a drone strike on 8 February 2017.[34] Further, Kassim used the internet to remotely form operational cells,[35] such as the Notre Dame bomb plot.[36] Another cell has targeted the United States.[37]

The Recruiting Pool

Unfortunately, ISIS has several potential recruiting pools to draw upon, especially in Europe. These include five potential sources of recruits: ISIS returnees; migrants and refugees; radical Islamic strata; the Muslim and nonMuslim alienated; and the criminal underclass.

ISIS Returnees

As of July 2016, an estimated 1500-1800 ISIS fighters had returned to Europe,[38] and undoubtedly more have returned since then. Reportedly only a small portion are disillusioned with ISIS’s ideology, and about half remain committed to it.[39] At least until recently, Europe as a whole has evidently had trouble with information-sharing, and in the past individual countries evidently have had trouble with identifying and tracking them and often made minimal efforts to detain and prosecute them.[40]

Migrants and Refugees[41]

These now number millions, including many who are unregistered or using false identity papers (up to 500,000 in Germany alone.[42]) While the vast majority are undoubtedly either genuine refugees or are actually economic migrants, they present four potential major dangers.

• First, there is the obvious danger of ISIS sending infiltrators disguised as refugees. ISIS has done this,[43]and intends to do it again--in August 2016, EUROPOL found a cache of fake documents in a Greek refugee camp apparently intended for foreign fighters coming to Europe,[44] and ISIS reportedly has a stock of blank genuine Syrian passports.[45]
• Next, there is a danger of a diaspora of ISIS sympathizers within the refugees. Representatives of the Iraqi Government (the Governor of Ninevah Province) has announced the intention of locking up ISIS members and expelling the rest of their families from Iraq.[46]Since ISIS has been a substantial force with a substantial bureaucracy (in the Mosul campaign alone the Iraqi Government had over 30,000 names on its list of suspects[47]) if this is actual Iraqi Government policy it could lead to a further large diaspora of ISIS supporters even if the Iraqi Government somehow manages to only target actual ISIS members. In addition to this is the likely fallout from the collapse of the Arab Spring in the Middle East. There the political failures and increasing repression of many “moderate” (in relative terms only) Islamist movements, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, means that portions of it--possibly much of it--are all too likely to conclude that their generation-long gamble on nonviolent revolution from below has failed, and they will turn to jihadism or at least to violence.[48] While this is obviously of most relevance to states in the region, it will be of relevance to the West if those new would-be jihadis seek sanctuary in the West.
• Finally, a longer term danger is ISIS recruiting refuges after they arrive. Syrian refugees in particular are likely to be Sunni Muslims who undoubtedly view themselves as having been driven from their homes by a murderously sectarian Shia Muslim Government backed by Iran. This may make them vulnerable to the ISIS narrative of defending Sunnis against such attacks and seeking revenge against the Shia and other supposed enemies, like the West and the Jews. The German Government has reported 340 cases where Islamic extremists have infiltrated refugee camps looking for recruits.[49]

Radical Islamic Strata

As most recently demonstrated by the ability of ISIS to draw recruits from around the world, jihadism is now a worldwide phenomenon, and at the very least the jihadis have continued to retain a significant core of support in both the Muslim world and among Muslims worldwide.[50] (For example, past polling has indicated at least a small percentage of Muslims in the United States admitted to at least a degree of sympathy for al Qaeda.[51])  Even murderously violent ISIS continues to maintain considerable popular support, or at least sympathy,[52] in parts of the Muslim world today (even small percentages of support may still leave a potential support base of millions).[53] Also, the support may be broader than the polls indicate—how many ISIS supporters were unwilling to admit their support?[54]

Beyond the jihadis is the ambiguous situation presented by militant but not necessarily jihadi Islam. While Islam, like Christianity, is a diverse faith with many interpretations, many of those interpretations must be considered functionally radical. This radicalism can vary from individuals who just want to live what they consider a properly Islamic lifestyle, through the organized if generally (at present) nonviolent militant movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Dawah and Tabligh,[55]  who want to Islamicize their societies and governments from below, to those who sympathize with or support the murderous jihadis like ISIS without crossing the line into violence or illegality. Militant Islam, overall, shares much of the same narrative and psychology as the jihadis--a toxic mix of victimization, frustrated ambitions (frequently combined with delusions of grandeur[56]), virulent anti-Semitism, deeply illiberal views of society (especially about the role of women)[57], and a conspiratorial view of the world.[58] All too often, they are, are, functionally speaking, enemies of democracy.[59] In particular they share with the jihadis the beliefs that Western influence on the Muslim world is malign and frequently if not generally view the West as being at war with Islam. Of most concern here, they have often served as transmission belts for jihadi ideas and platforms for facilitators for jihadi recruitment.[60]

The Muslim and nonMuslim alienated

This includes economically and socially marginalized Muslims, and those Muslims and, for that matter, non-Muslims alienated enough to be willing to support ISIS,

Many European countries had substantial minorities of Muslim extraction even before the current refugee surges.  These are often demographically concentrated, poorly educated and unemployed or underemployed and poorly assimilated into the larger society, problems that are likely to be compounded by the arrival of large numbers of refuges from the Middle East. Even if not especially religious, they are likely to look at the greater society around them with a profound sense of grievance which ISIS recruiters could potentially exploit. Beyond this, there are also what we might call the fashionably alienated of ‘jihadi cool’ and ‘gangster Islam,’ who either overlap heavily with criminal strata or aspire to act like those who do.[61]

While Muslims in the United States tend to be rather well assimilated, this has not necessarily translated into American patriotism, and we clearly are not dealing with the ferocious loyalty of the Japanese-Americans of World War II.[62] The great future unknown here are the ultimate policies of the Trump Administration--if they are or can be portrayed as hostile to Islam--“Islamophobic”--they can be expected to increase Muslim alienation in the US, which may potentially increase the recruiting pool for ISIS and for radical Islam in general.

Beyond that are people who have any number of grievances and grudges. A potential example from the United States:

“I’m looking for 10,000 in the midst of a million. Ten thousand fearless men who say death is sweeter than continued life under tyranny. Death is sweeter than continuing to live and bury our children while the white folks give our killers hamburgers. Death is sweeter than watching us slaughter each other to the joy of a 400-year-old enemy. Death is sweeter. The Quran teaches persecution is worse than slaughter. Then it says retaliation is prescribed in matters of the slain. Retaliation is a prescription from God to calm the breasts of those whose children have been slain. So if the federal government won’t intercede in our affairs, then we must rise up and kill those who kill us; stalk them and kill them and let them feel the pain of death that we are feeling!”

-- Louis Farrakhan, July 2016. [63]

We should note that these alienated people need not necessarily be Muslim—they just need to be alienated enough to be willing to consider the enemy of their enemy to be at least an ally of convenience, even if they don’t necessarily agree with ISIS.  We should not be surprised if some of the more extreme anti-Trump people are willing to take this approach. [64]

Finally, There is the Criminal Underclass

This is especially the case where much of that underclass is of Muslim extraction. (For example, some estimates place the percentage of such prisoners in French prisons as high as 60-70%.[65]) ISIS has had considerable success in radicalizing and recruiting criminals[66]--six of ten Paris attackers had criminal records, as did all six of the Brussels attackers,[67] and in the past Hamas and al Qaeda had considerable success in recruiting in both European and American prisons.[68] Criminals joining radical political groups is hardly new. An obvious example was the Black Panther Party for Defense in the United States during the late 1960s, which included many members who either had criminal records or were street gang members.[69]  For those with a criminal background, jihadi Islam offers the practical appeal of an identity that confirms and justifies their hostility to Western society and offers a community and a mechanism for carrying out that hostility. Unlike conversion to, say, Christianity, which generally requires repudiating past criminal actions and the criminal identity that so often goes along with them, jihadi Islam doesn’t necessarily require criminals to change their violent lifestyle. In fact, it can provide a narrative justifying both their alienation and their crimes. Instead of robbing a bank because that’s where the money is they are now robbing it in the name of Allah[70]--“stealing for jihad,[71]” and any money they get is considered spoils of war. For ISIS, recruits from criminal backgrounds may also be useful since they are experienced at operating under the police radar and are probably used to violence,[72] and ISIS returnees with criminal background may have both improved skills and enhanced credibility on the street.[73] Ominously, Western Europe in particular evidently has a largely unadmitted crime wave with recent immigrants,[74] which could provide a base for recruiting.

Conclusions and Implications

We cannot expect ISIS to go away anytime soon, and its efforts to attack the West are ongoing. Even if the anti-ISIS campaign in Iraq is successful, the civil war in Syria in particular is likely to go on for a considerable or extended period.[75] This means we must expect that ISIS will have the time to continue to mature its foreign terrorist efforts. Further, ISIS is not the only threat we face; Al Qaeda remains out there. We should remember that even if/when the ISIS statelet is finally eradicated, at least some of the survivors and whatever nets they have built might join or be annexed by al Qaeda,[76] giving it a reach and capability it has never had before.

Although we should fervently hope that the reports that ISIS foreign fighters are being identified and ISIS networks are being rolled up are correct,[77] we cannot assume that they are.[78] The jihadi terrorist and foreign fighter threats did not begin with ISIS and we should not expect them to end even if ISIS is somehow eliminated.  Aside from Iraq, Yemen, and especially Syria being proxy wars between various regional powers, it is all too likely that the Middle East is in the opening round of multiple civil wars within Islam, both among the jihadis and between Shia and Sunni Islam. These wars are likely to be very bloody, will further increase the religious polarization (and bloody-mindedness) within the region and within Islam, and will further devastate much of the Middle East. We must expect the fighting to be exported to the rest of the world. There is every reason to believe far worse is yet to come.

The author would like to thank Chief Warrant Officer James L. Fuller, US Army Special Forces (Ret) for his contributions.

End Notes