Limits to U.S.-China Mil-to-Mil Engagements Under the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act

Limits to U.S.-China Mil-to-Mil Engagements Under the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)

Scott A. Carpenter

Introduction

On May 26 2015, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense published their ninth Defense white paper titled "China’s Military Strategy.”[i] The 2015 white paper reflects a much broader vision in Chinese foreign policy and strategic thinking than previous releases. In particular, it outlines China’s national security thinking in three areas: a holistic understanding of the political-military framework, expanding security partnerships, and global power projection capabilities for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Additionally, the white paper declares as a strategic task, "to safeguard the security of China's overseas interests."

China’s national strength is increasing largely due to a shift in the world’s economic center of gravity to the Asia-Pacific region. It is not surprising, then, that as China’s economic might has grown, so has its ability and inclination to use national power and influence to advance its geopolitical ends. While China forecasts that “the international situation will remain generally peaceful,” they also predict profound changes in the security environment caused by intensifying international competition for the redistribution of power, rights, and interests and the threat of local wars due to regional conflicts.

China’s military developments and global ambitions are cause for concern. Today, Beijing is rapidly establishing strategic partnerships: relationships that enable them to advance their national interests. It is conceivable that Beijing’s military strategy is meant to signal increased resolve towards the U.S., that it is a clear response to the perception of the United States’ continued effort to contain China. On the other hand, China pledges to “shoulder more international responsibilities and obligations” by employing their armed forces to conduct: major humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), contested non-combatant evacuation operations, protection of critical resources and sea lanes, counterterrorism, and limited stability operations.

Within the Asia-Pacific region, Beijing is actively promoting a security cooperation framework that rejects U.S. alliances; insists that Asian security be managed by Asians alone; and privileges China as the regional security provider of choice under the banner of ‘development is the greatest form of security.’ Beijing’s holistic concept of national security emphasizes both traditional and non-traditional means, and China boldly states its intention to safeguard its sovereignty, security, and developmental interests well beyond its borders. Should we conclude from this that Chinese national interests could now potentially override longstanding principles of noninterference and peaceful coexistence –defense of China’s interests through the use of force?

One concerning signpost from the white paper is China’s explicit statement that it will “advance its military exchanges with the Russian military under a comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination between China and Russia.” Second place to this, is China’s willingness to “develop a new model of military relations with the U.S. to improve notification procedures and rules of behavior during encounters,” which in simplistic terms, mimics our own limited objective. Finally, in a neighborly spirit, China’s armed forces will further develop cooperative relations with those in the region. Clearly China recognizes itself as a major-country on par with U.S., Russia, and European counterparts that promote security cooperation across the globe.

More of the Same

In the short time since the white paper was published many U.S. political and military scholars, think tanks, and expert analysts proclaim that aside from China’s interest in deepening mil-to-mil dialogue there is little room to doubt their ambition of challenging the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific theater and elsewhere. Most claim this is further evidence for the need to hasten development of U.S. military capacity and new technologies to counter China’s expanding military capabilities. Unfortunately, entrenched competition, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, elevates the risk of a U.S.-China standoff, which reinforces the position to engage only where and when necessary to mitigate misperception and unintended escalation.

Under this line of thinking, is there any real prospect of building a U.S.-China security partnership or a new type of major country relations? Or, are we entrapped in a fear spiral where the most that can be hoped for is restrained predictability, as intense U.S.-China strategic competition becomes the new normal?

An Alternative Framework

There is a strong case to broaden our engagement framework, to come up with a more imaginative approach than episodic mil-to-mil engagement. It is time for Washington to change from the minimalist opt-in approach to an opt-out strategy that leverages our mil-to-mil engagements with the PLA as a way to hedge against China’s rise. To enable this strategy, Congress should either repeal or relax the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), section 1201[ii] regarding limitations on mil-to-mil exchanges with the PLA based on the following:

1)  As is, the 2000 NDAA is an obstacle to mil-to-mil relationship development. Lifting the legal restriction shifts mil-to-mil engagement to the diplomacy arena where our engagement activities can be leveraged to achieve U.S. objectives. For all intents and purposes, the current approach is essentially a Hobson’s choice of one (limited to HA/DR) or none. The legal limitation offers no incentives to deepen our mil-to-mil relations in a cooperative manner while the “none” option signals total disengagement. Indeed, Washington’s one or none engagement formula is self-defeating, it generates no leverage and is of limited value since very little is invested by either side.

2)  Shifting mil-to-mil engagements to the diplomacy realm promotes the development of strategies and active management of the situation. Case in point, past administrations have continued to implement policies of little substance towards deepening mil-to-mil cooperation with China that predictably have not generated any meaningful outcomes. Indeed, it is preferable to actively manage incremental development based on strategic planning, cooperative interests, and long-term goals than to fall to crisis management in the moment. 

3)  Change the stated purpose of mil-to-mil engagement from the prevention of misunderstanding and miscalculation to developing a cooperative relationship that promotes joint military actions to advance common security interests.  Prevention of miscalculation and misunderstanding is a byproduct of effective mil-to-mil engagement, not the purpose.

4)  By primarily concentrating on HA/DR engagements we enable the PLA’s capabilities to rapidly respond to and deliver critical relief effects across the region, which over the long term, strengthens China’s influence within Southeast Asia and plays directly into Beijing’s narrative of, ‘Asian’s solving Asian security issues.’

5)  Expanding engagements to include both traditional and non-traditional military activities enables the PLA forces to be more deployable and more experienced and therefore contribute to major powers’ efforts to counter international disorder—including terrorism. While this appears counter-intuitive, it challenges China to live up to their responsibilities and aspirations by contributing their share of resources to insure international security and stability.

6)  Finally, the do nothing option essentially means we choose to remain on the sidelines while China potentially strengthens its military cooperation and interoperability with Russia and others across the globe.

Conclusion

China’s 2015 Military Strategy white paper reflects strategic thinking on Beijing’s part to develop military capabilities that support their global interests. Never the less, the U.S. needs to make an obvious move to create the opportunity for a more cooperative security relationship with China. Revision to the 2000 NDAA affords executive policymakers the maneuver space to leverage mil-to-mil engagements to shape and balance China’s security activism. Strategic planning and active management of mil-to-mil engagements represents a better alternative than the current approach. Without a clear shift, Beijing will remain convinced that Washington is intent on maintaining a policy of containment

End Notes