A High Price, But More to Do in Afghanistan
Richard Lee-Smith
One of my most vivid memories from my time in Afghanistan in 2011 is the thud of a helicopter urgently approaching overhead. As a child I was fascinated by the mesmerizing flying machines. But in the dusty desert of southern Afghanistan they were often an ominous sign. The noise of a helicopter coming in to land far from the usual landing strips could only mean one thing: that another serviceman or woman had life threatening injuries and was being brought in for urgent surgery. The hospital nearby was amongst the best trauma centres in the world. Countless lives were saved there. But hundreds were left with severe injuries – physical and emotional scars. Sadly too many were so badly injured they could not be saved. They paid the ultimate price for our efforts in Afghanistan.
Thankfully we have made great strides in improving the way we care for our veterans. We are now more aware than ever of the struggles they face when they come home and are better at providing support. Celebrations of their strength with such events as the Invictus Games held in London earlier this year would never have happened in the UK several years ago.
Our soldiers, diplomats and aid workers have paid a high cost. We should make sure that their lives have not been lost in vain. And that means persisting in our engagement with Afghanistan - albeit in a different way than before.
After 13 years of a military campaign in Afghanistan, some legitimately question what more can be achieved. Despite our investments, Afghans still do not have the country they deserve. But progress has been made. We went into Afghanistan in collective defence of our freedom from terror. Terror plots such as Sept. 11 can no longer be planned freely from the mountains east of Kabul. Osama Bin Laden was killed. Al Qaida is a shadow of its former self in that country. The US and UK will continue to work together to target terrorists in the region and elsewhere.
Having been trained by NATO, Afghan forces are now capable of taking responsibility for security. So it is right that the UK, the US, and our NATO allies will scale back our fight against the Taliban in the next few weeks. We will still support the Afghan armed forces: for example, the UK has established an officer training academy for the Afghan army just outside Kabul. But over time, Afghans will need to find a way to talk to the Taliban and bring the violence to an end. Only once there is peace will the country really be able to flourish and stand on its own.
We must continue to help improve the lives of the people of Afghanistan. If the economy grows, people will find profitable alternatives to producing the opium that blights our streets in the form of heroin. On some fronts, we have made undeniable progress. Our aid has helped more than 2.5 million Afghan girls to now attend school. A decade ago there were almost none. Access to primary healthcare has increased from 9% to cover over half the Afghan population. Cell phone service where I worked in Kabul is now better than at my apartment in London!
We have a role to play in helping Afghanistan on this course. So our soldiers, diplomats and aid workers will stay to help - albeit in smaller numbers than at the height of the war. The British Prime Minister and new Afghan President will host international talks in London this week to discuss how we can continue to help Afghanistan stand on its own in the future. At the London Conference on Afghanistan, we will be listening to how President Ghani wants to reform the country. He will need to cut back spending. Corruption will not end overnight, but with less money to go around, what there is must not be stolen.
Afghanistan can be a sustainable success. But this will take time. Afghanistan remains for now one of the poorest countries in the world. It will need financial support for several years to come. So the UK rightly gives more aid to Afghanistan than almost any other country in the world. In return for that aid, we should press for reforms that will help the country’s economy grow.
The best way we can honour the high price we’ve paid is to make sure our hard-won gains do not go to waste. I now work on Afghanistan from the British Embassy in Washington. We are right next to the Vice President’s residence. As Marine 2 comes in to land next door, it reminds me of the helicopters in Afghanistan and those that gave so much. The reminder makes me more determined than ever that we make sure that they did not do so in vain.
Comments
I do wish our diplomats actually spoke the truth, rather than using "spin" to describe and explain the British role in Afghanistan, in our latest intervention alongside others, notably the USA.
There is in my opinion NO public appetite in the UK to continue to have such an extensive and expernsive role in Afghanistan. Given our economic and fiscal position, with 20-30% cuts in public spending, sending money to a country that remains corrupt and has already had trillions - more than the enture Marshall Plan - is simply crazy.
Hopefully our elected, national politicians realise the British public have had enough of Afghanistan. Should we continue as the USA is still there, to maintain the much vaunted 'Special Relationship'? Sadly few in Whitehall-Westminster seem to have noticed the USA is profoundly sceptical that we are now a reliable, capable ally when the "crunch" comes.
The end of the UK military campaign in Afghanistan, principally in Helmand Province, has not left that country at peace. If you look hard the Taliban have been successful in returning to control towns already in Helmand's "Green Zone" (alongside gains elsewhere). Often in towns and villages where ISAF took casualties and expended a lot of gold. In the last week the Taliban have attacked the former UK base, Camp Bastion.
It is far too early to judge whether our nation's sacrifices in Helmand are only very temporary gains FOR the government and people of Afghanistan. Perhaps next year we shall look back and see that the Taliban have been kept at bay.
Writing about the role of helicopters struck me as stange, given the well known and documented lack of helicopters for UK forces. Just how senior leaders set a task and failed to provide the required resources is a political matter officialdom wants to avoid answering. As many veterans remarked all they did was "mowing the lawn" and being unable to patrol far from their patrol bases - surrounded by belts of IEDs.
Citing one sentence: 'If the economy grows, people will find profitable alternatives to producing the opium that blights our streets in the form of heroin'.
Total "spin". Since our intervention, principally in Helmand Province, opium poppy cultivation, then heroin production, has gone UP! Sadly the UK was IIRC the 'lead' nation for drug eradication, what a joke. Tactically the UK military decided not to confront "24/7/365" opimum cultivation, to do so would have aroused even more local opposition - from the people and within local and national Afghan government.
The last paragraph starts with: 'The best way we can honour the high price we’ve paid is to make sure our hard-won gains do not go to waste'. There are many ways we can honour the high price at home. How about offering safety here for the Afghan interpreters who served alongside those who faced the enemy?
The 'best way' is to honour them is to let Afghans decide their own future, even pay for it themselves and given our history with Afghanistan there is reason to suggest Afghans would welcome our exit.
Mr. Lee-Smith writes "Afghanistan can be a sustainable success", which can only be true at a greater cost than most in the West are willing to bear, and/or with a new definition of success. The over-optimistic goals first enunciated by our leaders have already been replaced by much more modest aspiraions.
Realizing those goals, in common with stated goals in many other international adventures, will be greatly dependent on the support of those who live there.
Having served in Viet Nam during our war there (first as an intel officer, subsequently as a District Senior Advisor) I was not alone in seeing that without the removal of the corrupt and inefficient senior leadership, popular support was unlikely, and without the popular support the effort was doomed.
I strongly disagree with Mr. Lee-Smith's final comment, that we should persevere in Afghanistan so that the sacrifices already made will not have been in vain. Nice words, but thoughtless. I still carry warm thoughts of friends and colleagues killed in Viet Nam, and recognize that I could well have joined them in an early death. Still, by the time I closed that chapter of my life I was certainly supportive of the withdrawal of U.S. military forces -- although not as percipitiously and awkwardly as was done. For us to have done better would require winding the clock back to the '40's or early '50's.
Surely there is a more fitting memorial to the war dead than heaping more bodies on the pile.
The ghosts of Vietnam still visit me, including on a number of post-war visits to that country and my further adventures in Afghanistan, the Middle East and the Balkans. The sina qua non for successful massive involvement still require broad support of the people, the political will to stay through the long term, and our leadership's gaining the ability to listen to and utilize those with deep understanding of the area. Are we there yet?
Instead of focusing on everything that has gone wrong in Afghanistan, the international community should recognize the things that have gone right with its programs. For example, recently a mullah from Kunduz was sentenced to 20 years of jail for raping a child. Likewise in September, several men were sentenced to death for the gang rape and robbery of a group of women in Paghman. These are just some of the indicators that something is happening for the better in its criminal justice system, even if we do not agree with the speed and the outcomes. More Afghan women are learning job skills than ever before and many more Afghan girls are able to attend school. Yet we need to recognize that what we envisioned originally for the Afghans may never be and that perhaps the most we can do now is to help them achieve a kind of government that is best for them. This may result in a more hands-off approach where we are limiting ourselves to an advisory capacity.