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True Civil Affairs Integration: From Three Tribes to One

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True Civil Affairs Integration: From Three Tribes to One

Assad A. Raza

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Photo 1: Matt Schofield, Manager of Historic Trades and Agriculture at Genesee Country Village and Museum discusses health and wellness identifiers for a shot horn ox on September 7, 2019 with members of B Co., 401st Civil Affairs Battalion during their Veterinary Civic Action Program training. (Photo by 1st Lt. Victoria Schafer, 353rd Civil Affairs Command)

Introduction

In August of 1998, former Chief of Staff GEN Dennis Reimer published his white paper, One Team, One Fight, One Future, describing the importance for achieving Total Army integration by merging the Army’s three components into one fully integrated service.1 In 2008, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued DoD Directive 1200.17 establishing policies to integrate active component (AC) and reserve component (RC). These policies included cross-component assignments linking both components as a total force.2 Four years later in 2012, then–Secretary of the Army John McHugh issued Army Directive 2012-08 with additional policies for the integration of the Army’s AC and RC.3 By 2016, the Army implemented a pilot program, the Associated Units Pilot Program (AUPP), pairing units from all three components with a goal of a more integrated force.4 The program consisted of mostly brigade combat teams from the Army National Guard paired with active-duty divisions or vice versa. There are few sustainment units participating in the program. To date there are no Civil Affairs (CA) units participating in the AUPP and perhaps this change can deliver better integration across the CA Regiment.

To meet the Department of Defense’s (DoD) total force concept and the Army Total Force Policy (ATFP), the CA proponent should develop a Civil Affairs Total Force Policy (CATFP). A CATFP would include organizational concepts to assist with the integration of AC and RC CA units to provide the Army a more interoperable and capable force. This policy would consist of different organizational structures that include a mixture of multi-component units, associate units, and fully integrated CA units across special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces (CF). This effort could integrate the three tribes, AC (SOF/Conventional) and RC, to make the whole greater than the sum of its parts. In turn, it can help strengthen the Civil Affairs brand, narrative, and value for the Joint Force.

This paper used a literature review of relevant articles, doctrine, policies, and reports on military services’ organizational concepts for AC and RC integration for its findings. References include lessons learned by other services on organizational integration and how to best implement them for CA units. Findings will consist of case studies for each type of organizational structure to gain a better understanding for each: multi-component, associate units, and fully integrated units. Recommendations will address recommended changes across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLP-F) factors. Overall, this paper contends that the integration of CA forces would improve readiness and appropriate resources to meet future operational requirements.

Background

All the military services within DoD have identified innovative ways to integrate active and reserve components. Each service combined AC and RC units differently to meet their unique challenges. For example, the Air Force established multi-component units to retain human capital and minimize overhead cost by shared use of aircrafts between components. The Coast Guard fully integrated their reservist under one AC commander to provide active units an appropriate mix of personnel to meet real-world missions. The Marines assign AC Marines to reserve units as Inspectors-Instructors (I&I) to assist with their training. The Army has associated or paired reserve/guard units with active-duty forces. When done successfully, the integration of AC and RC forces can increase readiness, reduce costs, and retain human capital across components.5   

In 2004, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Force Plans and Programs, LTG Duncan McNabb, presented three compelling reasons for AC and RC integration before the Armed Services Committee:

  • Integration allows balancing personnel tempo appropriately among the components.
  • Integration plays to the strengths of each component.
  • Integration provides a continuum of service, an expansion of institutional knowledge, and preservation of human capital.6

These compelling reasons can apply to the reorganization of CA forces. For example, the integration of AC and RC CA forces under a multi-component command would allow commanders to balance forces to meet operational requirements. Consequently, this would improve readiness, training, and share the burden of deployments among component members. Moreover, the integration would facilitate a continuum of service for CA forces and the development of a shared identity and culture among AC and RC components. An example of this model would be the 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) organizational architecture that includes five AC Special Forces (SF) groups and two Army National Guard (ARNG) SF groups. Additionally, regardless of component, all SF soldiers attend the Special Forces Qualification Course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina to meet their common qualification standards.

In January 2016, The National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) published its final report. The NCFA report provided 63 recommendations on how the Army can restructure the AC an RC to meet the ATFP. Although both documents focus more on combat units, for example, Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB), the recommended findings below could support the development of a Civil Affairs Total Force Policy:  

  • Recommendation 27: The Secretary of the Army should review and assess officer and NCO positions from all components for potential designation as integrated positions that would allow individuals from all components to fill positions to foster an Army Total Force culture and expand knowledge about other components.
  • Recommendation 28: The Secretary of the Army should develop selection and promotion policies that incentivize Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve assignments across components and within multi-component units.
  • Recommendation 32: The Army should continue using multicomponent units and training partnerships to improve Total Force integration and overall Army effectiveness.
  • Recommendation 36: The Army should develop and implement a pilot program to assign Regular Army officers and enlisted soldiers to Army Reserve full-time support positions within one year of publication of this report and evaluated in two years to determine the effectiveness of such a program.
  • Recommendation 38: Congress should authorize and direct the Secretary of the Army to establish a substantial multiyear pilot program in which recruiters from all three components are authorized to recruit individuals into any of the components and receive credit for an enlistee regardless of the component.7

Although published in 2016, these findings still provide CA a framework to develop its pilot program to meet the long-term goal of a Total Army. The greatest challenge with the implementation of this pilot program will be the deep organizational cultures and mistrust between both components. The only way for this program to be successful is to convince all stakeholders of the advantages to enhance readiness and provide the Army with a more capable CA force that maximizes the benefit and uniqueness of each component.

Potential Challenges

The integration of AC and RC CA forces will create challenges as seen with similar initiatives throughout DoD. Although most obstacles seem obvious, they will impact the total CA force across the DOTLMP-F framework. Therefore, the implementation of a pilot program must be monitored carefully to ensure these challenges do not hurt those units participating. Below are some recommended considerations:

  • Command relationship between components
  • Operational availability of RC forces
  • Component specific funding
  • Geographical location between AC and RC forces  
  • Training availability of RC forces
  • Equipment compatibility
  • Property accountability
  • Promotion and command opportunities
  • Administration and evaluations
  • Organizational culture and identity

Both funding constraints and geographical locations will be a significant contributor to the challenges for integrating AC and RC CA forces. CA can learn from some of the difficulties associated with the initial implementation of the AUPP.  For example, the commander of the 173rd BCT in Vicenza, Italy, was dependent on the Texas National Guard to fund the 1/143rd Infantry battalion to participate in an integrated training exercise which sufficient funds were not allocated. Thus, negatively impacting training and the commander’s responsibility to validate the unit.8

Another example was the division level multi-component pilot unit which partnered the 25th Infantry Division (ID) with the Hawaii National Guard. However, the Guard could not support the Main Command Post Operational Detachment (MCP-OD) associated with the 25th ID headquarters. Subsequently, the responsibility was passed to the reserve component which U.S Army Indo-Pacific was hesitant to support due to its ability to fill billets on account of geographic limitations. Distance between units is a critical factor with the integration of RC units with AC. Moreover, location will impact everything from funding for travel to increased training days for RC to meet mission requirements.

Additionally, readiness differences between AC and RC units can impact the implementation of CATFP. Generally, RC is constrained by funding and training days compared to their AC counterparts. During LTG Charles D. Luckey’s, 33rd Chief of the Army Reserve and 8th Commanding General, U.S. Army Reserve Command, hearing to the Senate Appropriation Committee in 2018, he stated “if sequestration budget caps return in FY 2020, the Army Reserve will incur significant risk in training, facility restoration and modernization, and equipping and modernization programs vital to winning the Nation’s wars.”9 Hence, personnel and equipment may not be fully prepared or compatible when integrating with AC units.

The Army’s shift toward lethality and great power competition may also negatively impact CA readiness. According to a RAND study, current processes for resourcing and training tend to focus on BCTs and lethality. Hence, putting RC units at a disadvantage because they are mostly made up of sustainment units.10 However, the integration of both components can provide RC CA forces access to modernized equipment and contribute to a long-term effort to achieve a more sustainable readiness of the total CA force.

Another major challenge is the enduring identity and cultural differences between AC and RC CA forces. Major Shafi Saiduddin and Sergeant First Class (Retired) Robert Schafer suggested that the difference in capabilities and training under one career field is central to CA’s identity issue.11 Additionally, they stated that identity within CA forces is based on component and command relationship; for example, “AC vs. RC” and “SOF vs. Conventional.”12 While these identity issues are not exclusively a CA problem, it can impact any attempt to AC and RC CA integration.

Knowing the cultural differences between AC and RC forces, in 1997, then–Secretary of Defense William Cohen issued a memorandum reinforcing the need for component integration to address cultural barriers to the total force:

“I ask each of you to create an environment that eliminates all residual barriers—structural and cultural—for effective integration within our Total Force. By integration, I mean the conditions of readiness and trust needed for the leadership at all levels to have well-justified confidence that Reserve Component units are trained and equipped to serve as an effective part of the joint and combined force within whatever timelines are ser [sic] for the unit—in peace and war . . . Our goal, as we move into the 21st century, must be a seamless Total Force that provides the National Command Authorities the flexibility and interoperability necessary for the full range of military operations. We cannot achieve this as separate components.” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, 1997, p. 3).13

However, two decades later, the U.S. Army continues to address the cultural issues between components. The 2016 NCFA stated that the biases among components continue to work against the total force initiative.14 These cultural differences drastically impact the effectiveness of the total force to meet emerging requirements. Therefore, the CATFP should focus on how to optimize the CA capability while putting these cultural biases into consideration for future integration efforts.

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Photo 2: Civil Affairs Team assigned to the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) conducted a handover ceremony of a series of deep tube wells that will provide local citizens of Pokhara, Nepal, access to clean drinking water during times of crisis. Ceremony took place at the Armed Police Force, Nepal Kalika Battalion in Malepatan, Nepal. August 26, 2019 (Photo by U.S. Embassy, Nepal)

Recommendations

Now is the time to change the organizational structure for CA to increase effectiveness, efficiency, and strengthen the Regiment by bringing all the tribes together. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) states that “department leaders will adapt their organizational structures to best support the Joint Force. If current structures hinder substantial increases in lethality or performance, it is expected that Service Secretaries and Agency heads will consolidate, eliminate, or restructure as needed.”15 Thus, the NDS, the NCFA, and the ATFP provide leaders the organizational frameworks to put a Civil Affairs Total Force into action. The integration of AC and RC CA forces will not only support the NDS and ATFP but also increase performance and illuminate many of the unique capabilities found only within Civil Affairs forces.  This section includes recommendations in each of the DOTMLP-F factors and other potential areas.

Doctrine. The first draft of the CATFP could start by implementing a pilot program to integrate AC and RC CA forces. However, CA proponent should continue to monitor updates as the Army continues to change doctrine to meet ATFP requirements. For example, the ATFP recommended changes with Army Regulation (AR) 500-5, Army Mobilization, to streamline the mobilization process for RC forces to meet mission requirements.16 The recommended ATFP changes for Army Regulations is intended to move the Army towards a total force which would support the implementation of a CATFP.  Additionally, CA proponent should conduct an independent assessment of Army Regulations and Policies to determine recommended changes and request exceptions to expedite the integration of AC and RC CA forces.  

Organization. The current CA force structure is spread across two commands, United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and Forces Command (FORSCOM), and two components (AC/RC). To better capitalize on the CA capabilities across both components and commands, the CA proponent should implement a combination of associated units, multi-component, and fully integrated units’ approaches. For example, associate (or pair) a RC CA Battalion (Airborne) with the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne). This partnership would allow the 95th to approve training and assess the readiness of a RC battalion. Additionally, provide the associated RC battalion an opportunity to train with AC partners with SOF and participate in integrated training exercises. Over time, this integration would evolve to improved readiness for that RC battalion and the cross-leveling of deployments to increase AC dwell times.  

Another example can be the development of a multi-component Civil Affairs Command, commanded by a reserve CA Brigadier General. This command would include a staff mixture of AC and RC personnel at all echelons. Additionally, moving administrative control of the 83rd CA Battalion (AC) from FORSCOM to this multi-component command. This structure would be one step forward to fully integrating AC and RC units under a single command with the goal of cross-leveling experiences and validating compatibility of AC and RC units.

For all the other RC CA units, CA should follow the Marine’s Inspectors-Instructors (I&I) duty model by assigning AC Soldiers to RC units as mentors to assist with their unit training.17 This AC staff would be a mixture of officers and enlisted, and work alongside the unit leadership focused on training and readiness. These AC forces would also deploy with their assigned unit to continue to support the command team by advising and assisting RC units.   

Training. CA forces, dependent on component, have different levels of training and experience. Moreover, RC has different levels of training within their ranks as several individuals are unqualified, attended a 30-day expedited training (equivalent to AC), or transitioned from AC with the almost year-long active duty training pipe-line. To close the gap with training and readiness between components, CA should assign AC instructors to USCAPOC’s 1st Training Brigade. The assignment of AC instructors could assist RC with developing and implementing a continuous training program to level the training between components. Over time, this could increase progress towards qualification and closing the gap of qualified personnel between AC and RC. This program would not include specific SOF training and language qualification.

Regarding collective training, the cross-pollination of AC and RC across multi-component units can increase unit readiness. Either associated or a fully integrated multi-component command, the partnership will force AC and RC to identify areas to train together. Just like the units participating in the AUPP, the controlling headquarters (either AC or RC) would be responsible for:

  • Approving the training program of the associated unit.
  • Reviewing readiness reports.
  • Assessing resource requirements.
  • Validating compatibility; this is the authority that moves farthest from the established concept of AC commanders simply assessing readiness and resourcing, as it specifies that compatibility will be assessed using “integrated training exercises” (Acting Secretary of the Army Patrick Murphy’s 2016 memorandum).18

Therefore, the higher CA unit, either AC or RC, is overall responsible for the training and readiness for the other component’s units.  

For CA units not associated with another component, there are opportunities for AC and RC units to train together as opposing forces. For example, in 2015, First Army designed an exercise that included a Virginia Army National Guard (ANG) BCT, a Vermont ANG BCT, and the New York ANG 42 Infantry Division Headquarters as the training unit, while 1st BCT, 10th Mountain Division served as the opposing force.19 An exercise at this scale would provide both components to train together and to increase interoperability between components. Additionally, this type of multi-component exercises would be another way to meet the ATFP requirements.

Material. One of the benefits with the integration of AC and RC CA forces is the access to modernized equipment. Historically there has always been a modernization gap between AC and RC forces. In the FY 2017 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report (NGRER) it states: “Due to the impacts of the Budget Control Act of 2011, the Department is witnessing a decline in RC equipment procurement funding, in some cases falling back to pre-9-11 levels or even lower.”20 Therefore, the sharing of equipment between components can close the interoperability and training gap between AC and RC units.

For example, the Oshkosh-built Joint Light Tactical Vehicle will be fielded across the Army for over twenty years.21 Throughout the fielding period, the sharing of equipment for training between components would provide those units not yet fielded access to modernized equipment. Units participating in the AUPP have done it before, for example, “the 1st Cavalry Division loaned M1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles to the Mississippi National Guard for its Multi-Echelon Integrated Brigade Training exercise on Fort Hood.”22 Although the sharing of equipment will not expedite the fielding process, it will provide CA forces access to modernized equipment and ensure standardization in training across the CA regiment.

Leadership. The integration of AC and RC units would also increase opportunities for leaders to fill critical positions across components and potential promotions. The cross-pollination of leaders, both officers, and non-commission officers, will increase understanding and close the cultural gap between components. For example, the Marines place their AC Inspectors-Instructors (I&I) in key positions: “I&I personnel normally occupy key staff leadership positions, such as the training chief of a battalion or as the S-3/S-4. I&I staff provide leadership continuity when selected reservist (SELRES) leadership is not drilling, and they assist in planning training and unit development.”23 Additionally, AC can fill an agreed-upon percentage of hard to fill RC command and senior enlisted slots within the CACOMs. The placement of leaders across the CA force will not only contribute to unit readiness but close the cultural gap and provide CA a more unified voice with the Army.

Personnel. Cross component assignments are not new to the Army. The Army in the ‘90s assigned AC to RC as advisers and in FY17 started assigning AC, RC, and ARNG to multi-component units as part of the AUPP. However, according to a RAND report, AC officers assigned to reserve had lower promotion rates than those who stayed in a traditional AC career path.24 Hence, to properly implement a CATFP, CA proponent must work closely with the Army and Human Resources Command (HRC) to develop policies to incentivize cross-component assignments. Developing a policy would also fulfill the NCFA recommendation #28, stating: “The Secretary of the Army should develop selection and promotion policies that incentivize Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve assignments across components and within multicomponent units.”25

Once fully functional, the Army’s new Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army (IPPS-A) will provide personnel and pay services across all three components.26 The IPPS-A will provide AC and RC personnel an opportunity to transition between components and preserve human capital. Moreover, this would give the CA regiment a way to retain experienced and trained forces. Another initiative would be to develop a program, where CA forces can move between components within the multi-component units they are associated with or assigned. According to an official Army article written in 2011: “The basic concept of Continuum of Service, or COS, said an Army Reserve senior leader, is to allow Soldiers to move between different statuses while preserving the Army's investment in training and education. It also aims to preserve the Soldiers' accumulated benefits.”27 The ability to move between components will provide commanders the option to identify personnel across the force to take part in training or fill any other operational requirements. Additionally, this would provide soldiers the opportunity to temporarily get off active duty to continue education or pursue other personal goals with the options of continue service within the regiment.

Facilities. Facilities and locations can be a challenge for implementing a CATFP. Majority of the RC units are spread across the United States as compared to all of the AC units that are principally all located at Fort Bragg, NC.  Therefore, more analysis of facilities and geographic locations must be researched to determine unit associations and minimize challenges with AC and RC integration. Collocating active duty CA at some of these RC locations could present opportunities for education or other career-enhancing activities. For instance, the 351st CACOM in Mountain View, California, is near large tech companies like Facebook and LinkedIn, and universities like Stanford.  Key locations like this can provide the CA Regiment an excellent opportunity to increase community pairing and push towards more military-civilian integration with high-tech firms.

Conclusion

The Army published its Army Total Force Policy in 2012 to define steps and guidance to integrate all components to meet DoD’s goal for a total force. U.S. Army Civil Affairs should take the NCFA recommendations and the lessons learned by other services and from those Army units participating in the AUPP to develop a Civil Affairs Total Force Policy. Due to the ratio of AC vs. RC CA units, a CATFP would include different type of organizational structures to integrate components. For example, multi-component units led by either component or embedding fellow AC CA mentors and leaders to RC units who are not associated with an AC unit. However, more research is necessary to identify constraints within administrative and operational duties that could cause any unintended issues with AC and RC integration. Once implemented, the combination of AC and RC CA forces will create opportunities for CA force to train together and maintain the lines of communication between components. Over time, it will lessen the cultural differences, improve readiness, and retain human capital to meet future operational requirements.

End Notes

1 Reimer, Dennis J. GEN USA, One Team, One Fight, One Future, Total Army Integration, (DTIC-OCA, 21 Aug 1998). https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a351468.pdf

2 Pint, Ellen; Schnaubelt, Christopher; Dalzell, Stephen; Hastings, Jaime; Speed, Penelope; Shanley, Michael, Review of Army Total Force Policy Implementation, (RAND Corporation 2017), pg 11. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1057218.pdf

3 Ibid., pg 11.

4 Ibid., pg 33.

5 Thie, Harry; Yardley, Roland; Schrimer, Peter, Ehrenberg, Rudolph; Speed, Penelope, Factors to Consider in Blending Active and Reserve Manpower Within Military Units, (RAND Corporation 2007), pg 6-7. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG527.pdf

6 U.S. House of Representatives, Testimony of Lieutenant General Duncan J. Mcnabb Deputy Chief of Staff For Air Force Plans and Programs Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Total Force Regarding Adequacy of The Total Force. 10 March 2001.  https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2004_hr/040310-mcnabb.htm

7 National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA): Report to the President and the Congress of the United States, January 28, 2016. pgs 65-73. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=789780

8 Pint et al., 2017, pg 36.

9 U.S. Senate Appropriation Committee, Defense Hearing of Lieutenant General Charles D. Luckey, 33d Chief of Army Reserve and 8th Commanding General, U.S. Army Reserve Command, 17 April 2018.  https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/041718%20-%20FY19%20CAR%20Luckey%20Testimony.pdf

10 Pint et al., pg 53.

11 Salduddin, Shafi; Schafer, Robert, Optimizing Civil Affairs through Branding and Narrative Strategies, Civil Affairs Issue Papers, Volume 5, 2018-19, The Civil Affairs Association/ Association of the United States Army, pg 27.

12 Ibid., pg 29.

13 Pint, et al., pg 8.

14 NCFA., pgs 59-60: A cultural divide exists between the components, as well: Some of that is good, healthy unit pride and esprit de corps; unfortunately, some of that is the result of a long-standing—and, the Commission contends, outdated— prejudice regarding the skills and dedication of one component over the others. These differences among the components continue to be manifested in a wide range of administrative policies and traditional practices, from promotion standards and training opportunities to personnel management and human resources stove piping. These work against developing one Army.

15 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, pg 10. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=789780

16 Pint, et al., pg 26.

17 Martens, Melissa, Working Together to Accomplish the Mission: Inspector-Instructor duty, Marines Official Website, 20 August 2019. https://www.marforres.marines.mil/Marine-Reserve-News-Photos/Marine-Reserve-News/Article/910927/working-together-to-accomplish-the-mission-inspector-instructor-duty/

18 Ibid., pg 33.

19 Marlow, W. Wayne, First Army-Designed Exercise Replicates Combat Training Center Rotation, press release, Fort Drum, N.Y., 23 June 2015.  https://www.army.mil/article/151005/First_Army_designed_exercise_replicates_combat_training_center_rotation

20 Pint, et al., pg 63.

21 Villasanta, Arthur J, New JLTV Combat Trucks to Enter U.S. Army Service in Jan. 2019, Wall Street News, 3 January 2019. http://wallst-news.com/new-jltv-combat-trucks-to-enter-u-s-army-service-in-jan-2019/

22 Pint, et al., pg66.

23 Thie, et a., pg68.

24 Pint, et al., pg79.

25 NCFA., pg 65.

26 https://ipps-a.army.mil/about-2/

27 McLLvaine, Rob, Army Planning 'Continuum of Service' Between Components, 15 November 2011, U.S Army, https://www.army.mil/article/69397/army_planning_continuum_of_service_between_components

Categories: US Army - civil affairs

About the Author(s)

Major Assad Raza is an Active Duty Civil Affairs Officer in the United States Army. He holds a B.A. in Psychology from The University of Tampa, a M.A. in Diplomacy w/concentration in International Conflict Management from Norwich University, and is a graduate of The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation Command and General Staff Officer Course at Fort Benning, Georgia. Follow him on Twitter: @assadraza12

Comments

My argument below stated a somewhat different way:

MAJ Raza, in his Tue, 10/08/2019 - 6:51pm comment below -- discusses the "lack of consolidation of gains"/"no strategic success" problem/reality of such conflicts as Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, etc.:

"History has proven that CA is necessary to consolidate gains in LSCO, and when it becomes an afterthought, we see tactical gains with no strategic success as witnessed in Vietnam, Iraq, Afg, etc…. Its better to be prepared and invest in a capability."

The problem, of course, with MAJ Raza's such referencing of Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc., is that such things as "consolidating gains" and "strategic success" -- IN THOSE DAYS -- were defined as:

a.  Transforming the outlying states and societies of the world more along modern western political, economic, social and value lines and

b.  Incorporating these states and societies more into the U.S./Western sphere of power, influence and control.    

(If you don't understand that such was the "consolidating gains"/"strategic success" goals of the U.S. -- in places such as Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc., in those recent days -- then please review the information provided by Sir Adam Roberts and Hans Morgenthau in my earlier comment below.)

From this such "consolidation of gains"/"strategic success" perspective, of course (which is based on our previous strategic goal of comprehensive and complete transformation of outlying states and societies more along modern western lines);

From this such (now obsolete) perspective, IT MAKES PERFECT SENSE, as MAJ Raza notes above, to "better prepare and invest" in the capabilities needed to achieve our such "transformative" goals; for example, by better preparing and investing in CA.

The problem of this such thinking today, however, is that President Trump -- with his emphasis now on "stability" -- has effectively:

a.  Abandoned our such long-standing "transformative" definition of "consolidating gains"/"strategic success," and, in the place of same, has: 

b.  Embraced the requirements of "stability," to wit: respecting such things as self-determination, sovereignty and diversity/differences of others. 

(From this such "strategic goal" perspective, of course, attempting such things as political, economic, social and value "transformation;" this must be avoided at all costs.  This because, as the Thirty Years War seemed to have confirmed, such "transformative" efforts routinely lead to "endless wars."  Thus, the Treaty of Westphalia, and the adoption of the post-war requirement to "restore things they way they were before" principles" of international law?)  

From this new such "stability" strategic goal perspective, of course, "better preparing and investing" in capabilities needed to achieve our former "transformative" goals -- for example, by better preparing and investing in CA -- these such ideas SEEM TO MAKE NO SENSE AT ALL?

Bottom Line Thought -- Based on the Above:

MAJ Raza's thoughts and recommendations above seem to be based on an "transformative" era which has now passed.  Thus, his ideas re: integration "From Three Tribes to One" may need to be, accordingly, considered as non-applicable to today's "stability" requirements?  

President Trump seems to believe -- much as those that wrote the Treaty of Westphalia all those years ago(?) -- that "endless wars," yesterday as today, these are the product of:

a.  One set of states and societies (for example the Soviets/the communists or the U.S./the West) -- with one set of individual and unique beliefs, values, institutions and norms, etc. -- attempting to "transform," convert or kill the people of "differently" organized, ordered and oriented states and societies.  

Thus, President Trump, by embracing "stability" as our strategic goal today -- and its requirements of respecting such things as sovereignty, self-determination and diversity -- hopes to (a) avoid new endless wars and (b) disentangle us from our current endless wars?

(From this such perspective, does CA -- consolidated in to one tribe or not -- really have much of a role today?)

Thanks for reading it! I agree, the cross-pollination would improve overall efficiency of the capability, a continuum of service from AC to RC or vice-versa, and the overall preservation of human capital. Currently, most active CA guys that get out do not join the reserves, maybe this would be an incentive. #Civility 

czechpivo

Wed, 10/09/2019 - 1:26pm

Raz, well done.  I applaud the fact you provide an "a la carte" menu of feasible options to drive integration. Accepting and recognizing differences is not a bad thing, in fact its a strength.  While the core competencies of CA remain the same, the tactical enabling tasks differ between SOF and CF based on the end-user supported.  That is no different than other capabilities in the Army's inventory (Infantry, Aviation, Sustainment) and should not cloud broader integration of the "three tribes."  The cross-pollination of strengths between the "three tribes" can broaden everyone's collective knowledge and understanding.  It also might drive a degree of, dare I say civility, into the Civil Affairs branch. 

a.raza:  Below you said:

"... CA plays a major piece in conflict prevention early on, to the consolidation of gains post-hostilities. These are key tools for our JFCs to set the conditions for a strategic win. LTG Lundy, TRADOC CDR, in the AUG-SEP 2019 Military Review wrote: Regardless of debate, and whether the military does or does not want to execute governance operations during large-scale combat, the military finds itself governing out of necessity both during and after conflicts even if it is rarely, if ever labeled as such.” History has proven that CA is necessary to consolidate gains in LSCO, and when it becomes an afterthought, we see tactical gains with no strategic success as witnessed in Vietnam, Iraq, Afg, etc…. Its better to be prepared and invest in a capability. Thanks for your comments."

Observation:

As I note in my comments here on SWJ generally, for the past 70 or so years (and maybe for the entire past century and until 2017) "the consolidation of gains post-hostilities"/"a strategic win"/"strategic success" for the U.S. was defined as the opponent states and their societies being transformed more along modern western political, economic, social and value lines.  This, after all, is what:

a.  Sir Adam Roberts discusses in this "Transformative Occupations ... " piece below and which

b.  He and Hans Morgenthau (also below) suggest are violations of "traditional" international law.

From this such "transformative" perspective, CA had a clear, and indeed very long-standing and important "raison d'etre" and mission; this being to -- before, during and after war -- help cause these such desired "transformations" to be realized. 

Since 2017 and the election of President Trump however -- and due to the President's determination to (a) abandon our such "transformative" missions and to (b) embrace such things as sovereignty, self-determination and diversity instead -- "the consolidation of gains"/"a strategic win"/"strategic success" for the U.S., these are now defined as per the "hands-off"/"leave things as they were/"return things to the way the were" criteria that is (a) understood more from the standpoint of "stability" and which, thus and accordingly, (b) is favored by our most dangerous opponents and by "traditional" international law.

Thus, it is:

a.  From this exact such -- radically changed in 2017 -- "STABILITY" (the exact opposite of "transformation") point of view that

b.  "A strategic win"/"strategic success" is defined today.

This being the case then:

a.  The roles, missions and raison d'etre of CA -- and countless numbers of other organizations, policies and the rationale supporting same which were developed in the earlier "transformative" century -- 

b.  ALL OF THESE NOW, in both peace and in war and thereafter, seem to have much less (if any) utility today.

Example:  Based on the "make no changes"/"return things to the way they were"/"stability = strategic success" criteria noted above:  

a.  After LSCO now

b.  The idea of "consolidating gains" simply would not seem to apply.

Thus, everything, it would seem today, must justify/re-justify its existence:

a.  Not on "strategic success" defined as "consolidating gains" from the perspective of transforming the outlying state and its societies more along modern western political, economic, social and/or value lines.  But, rather, 

b.  On "strategic success" defined as "not rocking the boat"/"no real or substantial political, economic, social and/or value change." (Which, it is believed, will [a] immediately achieve post-conflict "legitimacy" and, thus, [b] help reestablish desired "stability.")

(Here, of course, the young people of the world believing that this is the most stupid and ridiculous notion that they have ever heard of and, indeed, that they, and their aspirations for freedom, democracy and a better way of life, these have now been abandoned by their old champion the United States -- who now only wants to "look backward," go home and rest?)

I appreciate everyone’s comments.

- X61624, I agree coordinating across commands will continue to pay dividends for all stakeholders, however we must ensure systems are in place to maintain those coordination’s after those who initiated are gone. Thanks for taking time to read it and providing feedback.

Bill- NDS 2018 was developed from NNS 2017, which has influenced all the new Army concepts and MDO 2028. As the DoD & Army move toward great power competition, CA is just another tool for Joint Force Commanders to use throughout the continuum of conflict. CA plays a major piece in conflict prevention early on, to the consolidation of gains post-hostilities. These are key tools for our JFCs to set the conditions for a strategic win. LTG Lundy, TRADOC CDR, in the AUG-SEP 2019 Military Review wrote: Regardless of debate, and whether the military does or does not want to execute governance operations during large-scale combat, the military finds itself governing out of necessity both during and after conflicts even if it is rarely, if ever labeled as such.” History has proven that CA is necessary to consolidate gains in LSCO, and when it becomes an afterthought, we see tactical gains with no strategic success as witnessed in Vietnam, Iraq, Afg, etc…. Its better to be prepared and invest in a capability. Thanks for your comments.

I would offer that even before delving into a multi-compo CACOM, simply coordinating across commands will continue to pay dividends for CA and the Joint Force. In the INDO-PACOM AOR, AC, RC, and SOF Commanders routinely cross coordinate and find ways to support each others operations. When Commanders understand the strengths and weaknesses of each flavor of CA, the strengths of each can be leveraged to achieve significant effects in support of the joint force.

x61624:

Below you said:  

"Having read your recent comments with a focus on NSS 2017 and its implication for CA, I believe your assumptions about the role of CA forces are misinformed. Civil Affairs Activities are not conducted exclusively to build and maintain a democracy or materially change a foreign system of government."

I do not believe that I suggested that (a) Civil Affairs activities are conducted (b) EXCLUSIVELY to build and maintain a democracy or materially change a foreign system of government. 

However, I do believe that:

a.  If Civil Affairs was and is aligned with the primary goals and missions of the United States, then

b.  For the last 70 or so years, and until 2017, "build and maintain a democracy or materially change a foreign system of government" HAD to be, one might suggest, Civil Affairs PRIMARY mission?

Potential evidence to support this position:  

Part I:  The transformative purpose of war generally:

Nadia Schadlow:  " I hope to offer a better understanding of the recurring challenges associated with war, whereby, "every war must be conceived of as a single whole, and that with his first move, the general must already have a clear idea of the goal on which all lines converge.  That goal has always been a political outcome that determines who rules what territory with what type of institutions."

https://www.amazon.com/War-Art-Governance-Consolidating-Political/dp/162616410X (See Page 3 of the Introduction.)

Part II:  The transformative purpose of wars involving the U.S. for the past 70 or so years:

a.  An over all view of this period:  Sir Adam Roberts:  "Within the existing framework of international law, is it legitimate for an occupying power, in the name of creating the conditions for a more democratic and peaceful state, to introduce fundamental changes in the constitutional, social, economic, and legal order within an occupied territory? ... These questions have arisen in various conflicts and occupations since 1945 -- including the tragic situation in Iraq since the United States–led invasion of March–April 2003. They have arisen because of the cautious, even restrictive assumption in the laws of war (also called international humanitarian law or, traditionally, jus in bello) that occupying powers should respect the existing laws and economic arrangements within the occupied territory, and should therefore, by implication, make as few changes as possible.

https://weblearn.ox.ac.uk/access/content/user/1044/ajil_-_roberts_on_tr…

b.  The transformative purpose of the U.S. during the Old Cold War:  Hans Morgenthau:  "The United States and the Soviet Union face each other not only as two great powers which in the traditional ways compete for advantage. They also face each other as the fountainheads of two hostile and incompatible ideologies, systems of government and ways of life, each trying to expand the reach of its respective political values and institutions and to prevent the expansion of the other. Thus the cold war has not only been a conflict between two world powers but also a contest between two secular religions. And like the religious wars of the seventeenth century, the war between communism and democracy does not respect national boundaries. It finds enemies and allies in all countries, opposing the one and supporting the other regardless of the niceties of international law. Here is the dynamic force which has led the two superpowers to intervene all over the globe, sometimes surreptitiously, sometimes openly, sometimes with the accepted methods of diplomatic pressure and propaganda, sometimes with the frowned-upon instruments of covert subversion and open force."

https://www.jstor.org/stable/20039247?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

c.  The transformative purpose of the U.S. post-the Old Cold War and until 2017: 

David Kilcullen: "Politically, in many cases today, the counter-insurgent (the U.S. and its coalition allies) represents revolutionary change, while the insurgent fights to preserve the status quo of ungoverned spaces, or to repel an occupier – a political relationship opposite to that envisaged in classical counter-insurgency. Pakistan's campaign in Waziristan since 2003 exemplifies this. The enemy includes al-Qaeda-linked extremists and Taliban, but also local tribesmen fighting to preserve their traditional culture against twenty-first-century encroachment.  The problem of weaning these fighters away from extremist sponsors, while simultaneously supporting modernization, does somewhat resemble pacification in traditional counter-insurgency. But it also echoes colonial campaigns, and includes entirely new elements arising from the effects of globalization."

(Item in parenthesis above are mine.)

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396330601062790 (See the paragraph beginning with "Similarly, in classical insurgency, the insurgent initiates.")

Gian Gentile:  "The new American way of war commits the US military to campaigns of counterinsurgency and nation-building in the world’s troubled spots. In essence it is total war—how else can one understand it any differently when COIN experts talk about American power “changing entire societies”—but it is a total war without the commensurate total support of will and resources from the American people. This strategic mismatch might prove catastrophic in the years ahead if the United States cannot figure out how to align means with ends in a successful strategy. The new American way of war perverts and thus prevents us from doing so."

https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/articles/09autumn/gentile.pdf (See the Conclusion.)

Bottom Line Thought -- Based on the Above:

As of 2017, and for the first time in 70 or so years, the PRIMARY purpose of war (and thus the PRIMARY purpose of CA?); this would seem to have changed.

Now -- in a move made by President Trump -- U.S. foreign and national security policy WOULD NOT seem to have such a transformative purpose. 

Herein, President Trump embracing, instead, the diversity, sovereignty and self-determination principles that:

a.  Are favored by our most dangerous enemies (talk about appeasement!) and which

b.  Better comply with international law. 

From this perspective, of course, the PRIMARY purpose of CA (and indeed the PRIMARY purpose of many other organizations and their roles and missions, if they, like CA, are largely "transformative"-based?); these would seem to have largely "left the building?"

Thus to ask:

a.  If the goal of war is no longer (as per Nadia Schadlow above) to "determine who rules what territory with what type of institutions" (Herein, this being determined, now under the Trump Doctrine and international law, as those rulers and those institutions which were present when we first intervened; such things as "legitimacy" after the conflict, thereby, being assured?),

b.  Then what role do U.S./Western governance and institutions experts -- with their PRIMARY expertise in U.S./Western concepts of the rule of law, governance, public health and welfare, and infrastructure -- what role do these folks really have now? 

Little or none?

(Thus, with regard to ALL our concepts, forces and the rational supporting same -- which were developed during the last 70 or so years largely to comply with the "goal of war" noted by Nadia Schadlow above -- ALL of these must, now under the Trump Doctrine, be re-evaluated for current utility and usefulness.  Yes?)  

Don't worry -- Bill's special talent is interpreting any U.S. military action through the lens of a global conspiracy to remake the world in the image of Wall Street.  Contact with reality isn't a requirement.

Having read your recent comments with a focus on NSS 2017 and its implication for CA, I believe your assumptions about the role of CA forces are misinformed. Civil Affairs Activities are not conducted exclusively to build and maintain a democracy or materially change a foreign system of government.

In layman's terms the mission of civil affairs is to analyze and shape the civil component of the operating environment in line with the Commander's objectives and intent. Civil Affairs activities can manifest in many different forms, many of which have nothing to do with changing a system government or challenging a host nation's sovereignty. Civil Affairs Activities can and currently do easily adapt to the parameters of NSS 2017 on a daily basis and with a global scale.

Bill C.

Mon, 10/07/2019 - 11:28am

From our article above:

"Conclusion

The Army published its Army Total Force Policy in 2012 to define steps and guidance to integrate all components to meet DoD’s goal for a total force. U.S. Army Civil Affairs should take the NCFA (National Council for the Future of the Army) recommendations and the lessons learned by other services and from those Army units participating in the AUPP (Associated Units Pilot Program)  (AUPPto develop a Civil Affairs Total Force Policy. Due to the ratio of AC vs. RC CA units, a CATFP would include different type of organizational structures to integrate components. For example, multi-component units led by either component or embedding fellow AC CA mentors and leaders to RC units who are not associated with an AC unit. However, more research is necessary to identify constraints within administrative and operational duties that could cause any unintended issues with AC and RC integration. Once implemented, the combination of AC and RC CA forces will create opportunities for CA force to train together and maintain the lines of communication between components. Over time, it will lessen the cultural differences, improve readiness, and retain human capital to meet future operational requirements."

Question:

Given that our foreign policy and national security strategy -- under President Trump -- changed dramatically in 2017; this, with his:

a.  Abandonment of our former "making the world safe for democracy and our way of life"/"transforming the outlying states and societies of the world more along modern western lines" imperative.  And with, in the place of same, his:

b.  Adoption of the "hands-off"/"sovereignty, self-determination and diversity rule" imperative that (a) is favored by our most dangerous opponents and which (b) conforms more with international law.

(From Page ii [introductory letter] of the Trump National Security Strategy:

"... We will pursue this beautiful vision -- a world of strong, sovereign, and independent nations, each with its own cultures and dreams, thriving side-by-side in prosperity, freedom, and peace -- throughout the upcoming year.  ... "  

From Page 4 [Introduction] of the Trump National Security Strategy:

" ... We are also realistic and understand that the American way of life cannot be imposed on others, nor is it the inevitable culmination of progress. ... ")

Given this such dramatic turn-of-events/this such 180 degree about-face/this such "sea-change" re: our (century-old?) foreign and national security policies,

Then -- from this exact such perspective -- are not the concepts (pick any one that you wish to discuss -- for example the Army Total Force Policy of 2012) -- that have their origin and basis in pre-2017 times and ideas -- are not ALL OF THESE SUCH POLICIES (and indeed the rationale upon which they were based): 

a.  Now subject to being considered obsolete/OBE/anachronisms; this because:

b.  They are relics, and indeed throw-backs, to a former time?

(And, thus, can no longer be used as a basis for our ideas and recommendations, for example, "True Civil Affairs Integration:  From Three Tribes to One?")

Bottom Line Thought -- Based on the Above: 

Thus, such things as the Army's Total Force Policy (etc., etc., etc., ad infinitum)  -- which were (a) developed in earlier times and which were, accordingly, (b) based on earlier and now outdated and obsolete ideas and guidance -- ALL OF THESE SUCH ITEMS, in fact now, having to be

a.  Re-thought.  And this:

b.  Based specifically, and indeed most carefully, on the new 2017 -- "comply with the sovereignty and self-determination wishes of our most dangerous opponents and with international law" -- Trump national security strategy and U.S. foreign policy "sea change" -- that I identify above?