The Lay-Out of Westgate Mall and its Significance in the Westgate Mall Attack in Kenya
Herman Rujumba Butime
The attack on Westgate Mall in Kenya in 2013 by operatives of Al Shabaab, an affiliate of Al Qaeda, reinforced East Africa’s profile as a critical battleground in the Global War on Terror. This incident occurred at the tail-end of related attacks that have not only showcased the nature of the terrorist threat facing the region but also its under-preparedness to deal with this security problem. Against this backdrop, this article examines how the lay-out of Westgate Mall shaped the Westgate Mall attack and the response to it. The central argument is that the plan of the building presented an ideal theatre for an asymmetric confrontation between Al Shabaab operatives and the Kenyan security apparatus. However, while offering the attackers opportunities to strike at unarmed civilians, the lay-out of the mall at the same time provided the people and security forces some avenues for hiding and conducting rescue operations respectively. The principle implication of this analysis is that in order to effectively reverse an operational imbalance in military capabilities hitherto disfavouring it, an insurgent group needs to select a target—and by extension constitute a theatre of armed confrontation—that accords the state security apparatus limited or no leverage to operate in an asymmetric duel.
On 21st September, 2013, gunmen stormed the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital. The upscale shopping centre was a favourite destination for the country’s wealthy and the expatriate community. After neutralizing initial resistance from under equipped guards, the attackers embarked on a killing spree. They targeted shoppers and people working at the mall. There were conflicting reports that the gunmen may have taken some of their victims hostage. Also, as part of their operations, the attackers barricaded themselves in some of the shops in the mall. Over the next three days, the Kenyan security apparatus comprising the police, special forces and the army battled with the assailants, eventually overwhelming them and bringing the stand-off to a close on 24th, September, 2013.
Whereas the casualty count was 67, the four day siege may well have claimed up to 94 people. The conflicting figures spring from the premises that a number of people remained unaccounted for and right up to the end of the stand-off, charred remains were still being retrieved from the scene of the attack. Although contested by some sources, all four attackers were reported to have died during the siege. In the aftermath of the attack, their suspected accomplices were apprehended by security forces and arraigned before courts of law.
Al Shabaab, a Somali Islamist insurgent group claimed responsibility for the attack. On its Twitter account, the group linked the attack to Kenya’s intervention in the conflict in Somalia: “The attack at Westgate Mall is just a very tiny fraction of what Muslims in Somalia experience at the hands of Kenyan invaders. For long, we have waged war against the Kenyans in our land. Now it is time to shift the battleground and take the war to their land.”
In October, 2011, Kenya sent 4,000 troops to Somalia to shore up the government in the face of a sustained insurgency spear headed by Al Shabaab. As a result, the group lost control of Kismayu, a strategic port that was acting as a source of revenue for the insurgents. The attack on Westgate was therefore Al Shabaab’s way of retaliating against Kenya for altering the course of its insurgent campaign.
The attack on Westgate raises critical issues in relation to the nature of the terrorist threat facing Kenya and the country’s preparedness to deal with the problem. A preliminary assessment of the incident shows that some of the attackers were drawn from the Somali community in the diaspora. Also, prior to the siege, the attackers may have rented a shop in the mall and stockpiled weapons. These developments point to the transnational nature of the security threat facing Kenya and the sophistication in planning that preceded the execution of the attack.
The response to the siege exposed Kenya’s counterterrorism under-preparedness. The state was torn between employing police and special forces to conduct a surgical attack and deploying the army in conventional warfare duels with the assailants. Imprecision in the choice of strategy and tactics partly led to the high casualty count and colossal collateral damage. Also, allegations that some soldiers looted items in the mall point to flaws in the professional standing of sections of Kenya’s security apparatus. If valid, these pitfalls question the country’s capacity to deal with future terrorist attacks.
This article examines how the lay-out of Westgate Mall shaped Al Shabaab’s attack on Westgate Mall in Kenya. The central argument is that the plan of the building presented an ideal theatre for an asymmetric confrontation between the group’s operatives and the Kenyan security apparatus. However, while offering the attackers opportunities to strike at unarmed civilians, the lay-out of the mall at the same time provided the people and security forces some avenues for hiding and conducting rescue operations respectively.
This essay progresses as follows: The next section offers a theoretical perspective on the roots of asymmetric warfare. It explains imbalances in military capabilities inherent in internal/domestic conflicts and strategies that Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) may adopt to gradually reverse this condition hitherto tilted in favour of states. This overview is important given that in its campaign, Al Shabaab is an insurgent group with a conventional military capability that is weaker than that of the Kenyan security apparatus. In this direction, this discussion offers the reader the roots of the probable logic that may have influenced the group to attack the shopping centre. The theoretical section is followed by an assessment on how the lay-out of the mall affected the activities of the operatives on the day of the attack. The last section concludes the article with a brief discussion of the implications of the siege.
The Roots of Asymmetric Warfare
Since the dawn of mankind, societies have grappled with the challenge of governance. In basic terms, governance is a mechanism by which those in control of the reigns of power exert their will or the collective will of a polity in pursuit of a given policy framework. The realization of governance is not always a bed of roses. Often, at any given time, there are different policy alternatives competing for space on the governance scene. Politics emerges as the art that actors employ to gain for themselves a foothold on this circuit or even dominate it.
Where a given political dispensation is devoid of an effective mechanism for accommodating alternative policy frameworks, armed conflict or war may occur. In their instructive dicta, Mao Tse Tung and Carl von Clausewitz capture this argument: Mao observes that “politics is war without bloodshed.” Conversely, he notes that “war is politics with bloodshed.” In similar vein, Clausewitz asserts that “war is politics by other means.” 
The above dicta are indicative of the range of options that actors may exploit to achieve their political objectives. Where political ends are potentially attainable without confrontation, actors may opt to peacefully compete for the control of a polity. And where competing policy alternatives cannot be harmonized peacefully, they may choose to pursue the path of violence. But the latter option is wrought with a challenge: Those seeking to violently upset the status quo require confrontational capabilities comparable to or even greater than for those controlling the reigns of power.
The above dilemma is the mainstay of internal/domestic armed conflicts in most countries. Usually there is an imbalance in confrontational capabilities between a state that commands a conventional military capacity and an NSAG that is initially short on this advantage. In order to contend with this asymmetrical situation, an NSAG has to initially avoid direct confrontation with the more superior state security apparatus and only pick a fight when victory is assured. Otherwise dubbed guerrilla warfare, this strategy allows NSAGs to preserve their forces while they are weak, systematically build their capability and in the long run, wear down the morale of the enemy.
For most asymmetric warfare theorists, popular support is a prerequisite for the success of this strategy. To this effect, NSAGs should command the sympathy of the population. Emphasizing this point, Mao asserts that “the populace is for revolutionaries what water is for fish.” Without popular support in an insurgency, Geoffrey Fairburn notes that a rebel group would among others struggle to marshal supplies, intelligence and the initiative to expand its activities. However, this role would ideally be rooted in reciprocity. That is: civilians would support insurgents because insurgents treat them well. In the event the insurgents started targeting civilians, then popular support for their cause would be expected to dwindle.
On the basis of the above rationale, pre-meditated attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure would be a counter productive approach for rebels engaged in an asymmetric duel with the state. Yet, also known as terrorism, this strategy brings some benefits to an insurgent campaign. According to Walter Laqueur, “Terror is used as a deliberate strategy to demoralize the government by disrupting its control, to demonstrate one’s own strength and to frighten collaborators.” 
From this perspective, attacks on the population would appear to be helpful in situations where the balance of confrontational capabilities is tilted in favour of the state. This would explain why insurgents would need to do something to undermine the government’s grip on the nation; show that the combatant-to-combatant setbacks that the insurgents are facing have not affected their capacity to operate; and lower the propensity for individuals and groups to support the state.
However, when used singly, the challenge with the above approach is that it would not easily facilitate the insurgents to seize the reigns of power. The rebels would be concentrating their attacks on civilians while avoiding outright confrontation with government soldiers. And yet, in order to effect regime change, the insurgents would have to occupy territory and seize key government installations, which objectives are difficult to achieve without a head-on confrontation with the army. 
Since terrorism hardly erodes the military capability of enemy forces, its function is psychological. Initially commanding a weak military capability, insurgents will attack the population to demonstrate that as long as civilians are insecure, the start-up military superiority of the state counts for nothing. 
In the face of attacks mounted by an elusive enemy, the state security apparatus has to change its approach to the conflict. It has to realize that deploying its conventional military might against insurgents is tantamount to using a sledge hammer to kill a fly. This then calls for an approach that employs only a fraction of the state’s military might in a fight that uses the very strategy of insurgency against insurgents. In this connection, preparing to engage in a long drawn-out fight (protracted war) and winning the support of the population evolve as key components of the state’s response to an asymmetric security threat.
In sum, the strategies that NSAGs employ in asymmetric duels are principally dictated by prevailing balances in confrontational capabilities. Where insurgents command a limited capability to take on government soldiers, they will employ guerrilla warfare. Whereas largely based on a combatant-to-combatant confrontation, this strategy will aim at serializing the fight by gradually wearing the strength of the state security apparatus while preserving and building that of the insurgent group. Where a rebel group is grossly constrained in engaging the state security apparatus head-on, it may choose to change the facet of the confrontation by attacking non-combatants to show that the prevailing balance of military capabilities counts for nothing.
The Mall as a Theatre of the Siege
This section describes the lay-out of Westgate Mall. In addition, it discusses probable considerations in the attackers selecting the shopping centre as a target; the relationship between the plan of the building and the manner in which the assailants, victims (targets of the attack) and security forces behaved during the siege. Ultimately, it shows how Westgate constituted a theatre in which Al Shabaab with a comparatively weaker military capability was able to conduct an attack on a soft target and later hold-out against a much stronger Kenyan security apparatus thereby registering a psychological ‘victory’ in its insurgent campaign.
According to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “The multi-storey mall—owned by an Israeli businessman—has restaurants, cafes, banks, a supermarket and a cinema. The centre has six levels—a basement, three levels devoted to shopping, eating and leisure and two more containing offices and a dental practice.” Westgate also has an underground car park and a parking structure attached to the building. At the time of the attack, more than 1,000 people were inside the shopping centre.
The above features constituted the mall into an ideal target of a terrorist attack: In light of the fact that it was filled with unarmed civilians, the shopping centre was a ‘soft’ target. That it was not a security installation meant that the attackers would not initially encounter stiff resistance; due to the fact that it was a large, one-stop centre for multiple work and leisure activities, prospects for killing a large number of people inside the building were also high; while it is not possible to ascertain whether the attackers knew the nationality of the mall’s owner, there is a possibility that if they did, their calculation was that an attack on Israeli interests in the region would resonate well in the global, radical Islamist community, part of whose ideology is championing the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation in the Middle East. In this sense, an attack on Westgate would play a psychological role.
Aside from the broad overview of the mall’s lay-out, Westgate had some specific attributes that facilitated the attack. The shopping centre had three entry/exit points: One leading to the ground floor; another connecting the second floor to a parking terrace attached to the rear of the building; and a third one in the basement area. By accessing the mall through these points, the attackers were in a position to trap the highest number of people in the building at the time. That is: those on the ground, first and second floors who were shopping, eating out and engaging in other leisure activities. The assumption here is that the offices and medical practice on the fifth and sixth levels would have had fewer people than the open spaces where the leisure activities were taking place.
By extension, the ground, first and second floors turned out to be the scene of the fiercest battles between the attackers and security forces. During a tour of the scene of the incident by court officials, Olive Burrows captures this fact: “We are standing outside what used to be the Safaricom shop at the Westgate Mall and other than Nakumatt that lies one floor below us, this seems to have been one of the hardest hit areas.” Nakumatt was a supermarket that occupied part of the ground and first floors while Safaricom was situated on the first floor. The second floor was a hot spot because attackers who were coming under intense pressure from security forces inside the building, at one point, tried to use this level as a spring board to escape via the rear of the mall. From this exposition, it can be asserted that the above floors were flash points because the attackers selected them as areas for meeting their principle operational objective (killing as many people as possible) and also disengaging from the theatre of operations. Expectedly, in responding to the attack, security forces had to concentrate most of their efforts on securing these areas hence the intensity of the fighting there.
Having zeroed on the above three floors as the principle battleground during the siege, it is imperative to show further how this area facilitated the attack. Prior to the siege, the gunmen are believed to have hired a store on the first floor and used the mall’s lifts to ferry and stockpile weapons which accorded them the capability to put up stiff resistance against the security forces. On this basis, it could be asserted that facilities installed to ease movement in the mall were used by the attackers to ease the imbalance in confrontational capabilities that would be tilted in favour of security forces responding to the attack.
There are other aspects of the assault that appear to have been dictated by the plan of the building. When the two gunmen who entered the shopping centre through the main entrance reached the central atrium on the ground floor, they attempted to make their way to the first floor using the escalators. Ali Miraj, an administrative police officer who was inside the mall on the day of the attack recounts that “When they tried to go up the escalators, we shot at them and they went back.”
Since, prior to the attack, the gunmen had stockpiled weapons in one of the stores on the first floor, the attempt to get to the first floor may not only have been aimed at reaching more targets (people to be killed) but also accessing the store that was intended to be an operational base. When they were frustrated in their efforts, the pair are suspected to have barricaded themselves in Nakumatt supermarket which occupies part of the ground and first floors. Technically, this meant that the attackers could still have accessed the first floor via Nakumatt without using the escalators. This option was plausible given the ‘favourable’ lay out of the mall that accorded them a route to the first floor via the supermarket located on two floors.
Although Al Shabaab appeared to have planned a simultaneous attack through the three entry/exit points of the mall, there was a slight time lag in between one pair of operatives accessing the ground floor and the other, the second floor. This observation is supported by the account of security guards who were inside the mall when the attack got underway. Just after Miraj and Wilfred Kavati had prevented two of the group’s operatives from using the escalators to access the first floor, the pair that accessed the second floor via the basement, lobed a grenade at the security guards which narrowly missed them, bouncing off a pillar and exploding downstairs.
Without sufficient ammunition to contend with what appeared to be an increasing number of attackers, Miraj and Kavati made their way out of the building. Although Al Shabaab had not achieved complete simultaneity in attack, its operatives were initially able to take control of the mall by using multiple entry points to surround under-equipped guards who presented the first line of resistance to the attack. This observation underscores the significance of the lay-out of the mall in facilitating the siege.
The lay-out of the mall was also instrumental in the attackers’ neutralization of the first line of resistance to the attack. According to James Verini, “the interior (of the mall) is shaped like a ‘d,’ with stores and restaurants surrounding a central atrium.” This description fits in with an eye witness’ account of how she survived the siege. When two gunmen stormed the main entrance leading to the ground floor, Janet Mulonzia and her co-worker, Rosa, hid below the counter of the African Lady Leather kiosk situated on the same level. From this vantage point, Rosa could see the atrium and the second floor. This set-up meant that when the attackers made their way to the ground floor, people on the floors above would have had a clear view of the attack. Equally, the gunmen would also have had a good view of some of their targets.
While Miraj and Kavati had been quick to exploit this set-up to confront the attackers, this lay-out facilitated the gunmen to neutralize other security guards. When the first burst of gunfire bellowed, Khadija Adam who was in Safaricom on the first floor dashed to the entrance of this store. According to Verini, “She saw a Kenyan policeman crouching by a pillar, aiming across the atrium. There was another deafening volley and bullets tore into the policeman.” That Adam could have openly seen what was going on in the environs of the atrium meant that the attackers equally had a good view that could have allowed them to fire at whoever was on the first floor where the Safaricom store was located. In this regard, each level presented the gunmen with a good vantage point to strike at some of the targets on the other levels of the building.
Whereas the open space in the atrium accorded the attackers a clear view to kill and injure as many people as possible, some of the enclosed areas in the mall presented the gunmen with the opportunity to barricade themselves and regroup and in other instances, take some of the people hostage. Miraj and Kavati testified that after preventing two gunmen from accessing the first floor using the escalators, they disappeared into Nakumatt. As already noted, the ‘two-level’ set-up of this supermarket gave the assailants the avenue to access their pre-prepared base on the first floor without using the escalators.
With regard to using enclosed areas to recuperate, an investigation by the New York Police Department (NYPD) reveals that after executing the attack, the assailants hid in a store room where they prayed and treated a wounded colleague. It would have been difficult to conduct these activities in an open area like the central atrium or the parking terrace from where security forces were launching an assault on the building. In this connection, it could be asserted that the lay-out of Westgate facilitated the gunmen’s recuperation.
Enclosed areas also aided the assailants in taking hostages. When the attack took place, the attackers reportedly held some people in a cinema and casino on the second floor and in the basement hostage. Given that the cinema and casino were enclosed areas with points of entry and exit, it was possible to shut the access doors and make it difficult for security forces to enter. In more open areas like the central atrium and the parking terrace, the hostage-takers would have been exposed to sniper fire. The notion that the basement was also used as a hostage-taking theatre would seem to contradict the above argument.
However, when compared to the central atrium and the parking terrace where security forces would have had a clearer view of the hostage-holding theatre, while not as ‘favourable’ as the cinema and casino, the basement was still a relatively ‘favourable’ place to hold hostages. Without prospects of being fired on from above, the attackers would have had to anticipate an attack by security forces emanating mainly from two directions—the ramp leading to the basement and the door leading to the mall. The ramp leading to the basement was the very direction from which some of the operatives had gone to the basement. The door leading to the mall was the assailants’ prospective point of entry into the main theatre of operations on the ground floor.
In order for the security forces to have made confrontational contact with the attackers, they would have had to access the basement through these points hence the need for the attackers to prepare to defend their positions by keeping an eye on these spots. In a situation where the attackers were holding the hostages in a relatively open area, they would have had to contend with possible attacks coming from multiple directions. In this connection, the lay-out of Westgate (in some respects) was conducive for the assailants to create hostage-holding areas and defend them.
While supporting the attack in some respects, the lay out of the mall also aided some victims’ escape. Eye witness accounts of people on the first and second floors reinforce this observation: After witnessing the attackers shooting the policeman, Adam was able to run back into Safaricom and hide; Simon Kinyanjui who was in Ashleys salon on the second floor was also able to see the attackers killing the policeman in the atrium. He too had the time to lock himself in the salon before the assailants reached the second floor. The above witnesses’ escape materialized largely because the set-up of the mall accorded people on the first and second floors a clear view of the assailants’ first line of attack.
However, it is important to acknowledge the role of time in their narrow escape. The pair of assailants that accessed the second floor by way of the basement struck almost immediately after Miraj and Kavati had blocked the advance of the two attackers who entered the shopping centre through the main entrance. Had Adam and Kinyanjui slightly delayed in running back to their respective stores, they might have been caught by the pair that attacked via the second floor.
The lay-out of the mall also allowed the state’s emergency agencies to assemble more than one reception centre to receive surviving victims of the attack. Survivors of the siege either made their way to a reception centre outside the main entrance or to the parking terrace. When Mulonzia emerged from her hide-out on the ground floor, she went straight to the area outside the main entrance where she found medical personnel, journalists and soldiers assembled; when their ordeal ended, Adam and Kinyanjui were led to the parking terrace where they could see ambulances, policemen and soldiers. Whereas the area outside the main entrance mainly acted as a reception centre for survivors on the ground floor, the terrace catered mainly for those who had been trapped on the upper floors. This rescue arrangement would not have been possible without a parking structure attached to the rear of the building.
In this article, the author set out to assess how the lay-out of Westgate Mall shaped the Westgate Mall attack in Kenya. From the discussion in the foregoing section, it can be asserted that the plan of the building played a dual role in the siege. It not only facilitated the attack but also the response to it. In terms of aiding the attack, it dictated the tactical movements of the operatives inside the building; the neutralization of part of the first line of resistance to the attack; encircling and holding of some of the targets of the attack; and the assailants commanding a good view of the theatre of the siege. As far as the response to the attack was concerned, the plan of the building accorded some of the intended targets a clear view of the first line of attack which allowed them time to hide. On another score, the lay-out of Westgate aided the state’s emergency agencies in setting up multiple reception centres for people trapped in the building.
Acknowledging that due to its command of a comparatively weaker conventional military capability, Al Shabaab had not been able to prevent Kenyan forces from capturing the port of Kismayu, by conducting a brazen attack in Nairobi, the insurgent group demonstrated that the set-backs it was experiencing in Somalia had not ended its capacity to operate. While not eroding the capacity of the enemy (Kenyan security forces), the attack on Westgate ‘embarrassed’ the Kenyan state, which for all its superior military capability, it had not been able to fulfil its cardinal obligation—guaranteeing the security of person and property of its citizens. In many ways, this amounted to a psychological ‘victory’ for a rebel group that was on the back-foot on the actual frontline in Somalia.
However, in selecting Westgate Mall as a target, the lay-out of the building not only accorded the insurgents tactical opportunities to operate but it also opened up avenues for the state to limit this leverage during the attack. It can then be concluded that in order to effectively reverse an imbalance in confrontational capabilities hitherto tilted in its disfavour, an insurgent group ought to select a target (and by extension constitute a theatre of operations) that gives the state security apparatus limited or no avenues for effectively operating.
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 Gettleman Jeffrey 2013, ‘Ominous Signs, Then a Cruel Attack: Making Sense of Kenya’s Westgate Mall Massacre,’ The New York Times, 27th September, Nairobi, Kenya. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/sunday-review/making-sense-of-kenyas-westgate-mall-massacre.html?_r=0. Accessed on 04/02/2014.
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 BBC 2013, ‘Nairobi siege, Op cit
 Ibid; according to the New York Police Department, after the attack, the assailants hid in a store room. See: News.com.au 2013, ‘NYPD investigation into Kenya’s Westgate Mall terror attacks reveals the truth behind the massacre of more than 60 civilians,’ News.com.au, 11th December. Available at: http://www.news.com.au/world/nypd-investigation-into-kenyas-westgate-mall-terror-attacks-reveals-the-truth-behind-the-massacre-of-more-than-60-civilians/story-fndir2ev-1226780483902. Accessed on 28/01/2014; CBS News 2013, ‘NYPD report: Just 4 Al-Shabaab gunmen with AK-47s staged Kenya Westgate mall attack,’ CBS News, 11th December. New York. Available at: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nypd-4-al-shabab-gunmen-ak-47s-kenya-westgate-mall-attack/. Accessed on 04/02/2014.
 BBC 2013, ‘Nairobi siege, Op cit; Burrows Olive 2014, ‘Kenya: Cops Recount Events At Westgate On Sep 21,’ Capital FM, 17th January, AllAfrica.com, Nairobi, Kenya. Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201401200094.html. Accessed on 03/02/2014; Wambua Faith 2013, ‘Al-Shabaab gunmen attack Nairobi’s Westgate mall,’ The Guardian, The Observer, 29th December. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/2013-eyewitness-accounts-westgate-mall-attack. Accessed on 21/01/2014; Shephard Michelle 2014, ‘Kenya mall attackers had simple plan, sources say,’ The Star.com, 10th January. Available at: http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/01/10/kenya_mall_attackers_had_simple_plan_sources_say.html. Accessed on 23/01/2014; Makana Fred 2014, ‘Officers recount shoot-out with mall attackers,’ Standard Digital, 17th January. Available at: http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/thecounties/article/2000102591/officers-recount-shoot-out-with-mall-attackers. Accessed on 03/02/2014; Sky News 2014, ‘Kenya Mall Attack: Westgate Guard Speaks Out,’ Sky News, 15th January. Available at: http://news.sky.com/story/1195609/kenya-mall-attack-westgate-guard-speaks-out. Accessed on 04/02/2014.
 Crossan Andrea 2013, ‘Three months after the Westgate Mall siege, Kenyans have some answers—and more questions,’ Public Radio International, Conflict & Justice, 27th December. Available at: http://www.pri.org/stories/2013-12-27/three-months-after-westgate-mall-siege-kenyans-have-some-answers-and-more. Accessed on 23/01/2014; CBS News 2013, Op cit; BBC 2013, ‘Kenya military names Westgate mall attack suspects,’ BBC News Africa, 5th October. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24412315. Accessed on 04/02/2014; Kaberia Judie 2014, ‘Rachel down but not out after brutal Westgate attack,’ Capital News, 10th January, Nairobi, Kenya. Available at: http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2014/01/rachael-down-but-not-out-after-brutal-westgate-attack/. Accessed on 23/01/2014; Shephard Michelle 2014, Op cit; The Sydney Morning Herald 2014, ‘Kenya ignored warnings of attack on Westgate shopping mall: Report,’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 26th January. Available at: http://www.smh.com.au/world/kenya-ignored-warnings-of-attack-on-westgate-shopping-mall-report-20140126-hv9ya.html. Accessed on 28/01/2014.
 Allen Ron 2013, ‘What actually happened in the Nairobi mall attack,’ World News, NBCNEWS.com, 13th October. Available at: http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/11/20922818-what-actually-happened-in-the-nairobi-mall-attack?lite. Accessed on 04/02/2013; Wabala Dominic 2014, ‘KDF Makes Westgate Report,’ The Star, 7th January. Available at: http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-149554/kdf-makes-westgate-report. Accessed on 28/01/2014; BBC 2013, ‘Kenya military names Westgate mall attack suspects,’ Op cit; BBC 2013, ‘Nairobi siege, Op cit.
 AFP 2014, ‘Kenya security Westgate attack warnings ignored: Report,’ The Times of India, 26th January. Nairobi, Kenya. Available at: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2014-01-26/rest-of-world/46636100_1_westgate-siege-kenyan-security-forces-nairobi. Accessed on 28/01/2014; Wabala Dominic 2014, Op cit; Elbagir Nima 2013, ‘Kenya mall attack: Four accused of having role in bloody siege,’ CNN 4th November, Nairobi, Kenya. Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/04/world/africa/kenya-mall-attack/. Accessed on 03/02/2014.
 Makana Fred 2014, ‘Court visits Westgate mall as terror case continues,’ Standard Digital, 21st January, Nairobi, Kenya. Available at: http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/thecounties/article/2000102881/court-visits-westgate-mall-as-terror-case-continues. Accessed on 21/01/2014; Straziuso Jason 2014, ‘4 Suspects in Nairobi Attack Tour Damaged Mall,’ Associated Press, ABC News, 21st January, Nairobi, Kenya. Available at: http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/suspects-nairobi-attack-tour-damaged-mall-21608573. Accessed on 21/01/2014; Burrows Olive 2014, ‘Court tours Westgate, suspects to seek bail,’ Capital News, 21st January, Nairobi, Kenya. Available at: http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2014/01/court-tours-westgate-suspects-to-seek-bail/. Accessed on 21/01/2014; Burrows Olive 2014, ‘Court to visit Westgate attack scene Tuesday,’ Capital News, 17th January, Nairobi, Kenya. Available at: http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2014/01/court-to-visit-westgate-attack-scene-tuesday/. Accessed on 21/01/2014.
 Associated Press 2014, ‘FBI says all attackers probably died in Westgate mall siege in Nairobi,’ The Guardian, 11th January, Nairobi, Kenya. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/11/fbi-westgate-mall-attack-nairobi. Accessed on 21/01/2014; Crossan Andrea 2013, Op cit; BBC News 2013, ‘Nairobi attack: Kenya forces ‘clearing’ Westgate centre,’ BBC News Africa, 23rd September. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24206913. Accessed on 04/02/2014.
 Shephard Michelle 2014, Op cit.
 BBC 2013, ‘Kenya military names Westgate mall attack suspects,’ Op cit
 Mudi Maureen 2014, Op cit; Straziuso Jason and Odula Tom 2013, ‘Westgate Mall attacker lived in Kenya refugee camp,’ Associated Press, USA Today, 11th November. Nairobi, Kenya. Available at: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/11/11/westgate-mall-kenya-refugee-camp/3495183/. Accessed on 04/02/2014;
 BBC 2013, Nairobi siege, Op cit
 The Sydney Morning Herald 2014, Op cit; News.com.au 2013, ‘NYPD investigation into Kenya’s Westgate Mall terror attacks reveals the truth behind the massacre of more than 60 civilians,’ News.com.au, 11th December. Available at: http://www.news.com.au/world/nypd-investigation-into-kenyas-westgate-mall-terror-attacks-reveals-the-truth-behind-the-massacre-of-more-than-60-civilians/story-fndir2ev-1226780483902. Accessed on 28/01/2014.
 Elbagir Nima 2013, Op cit; Allen Ron 2013, Op cit
Zedong, Mao 1963, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse Tung, 1893-1976, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, p 230
 Clausewitz, Carl von 1976, On War, Princeton University Press, Princeton, p 127
 On asymmetric warfare see: Grange, David 2000, Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern, National Strategy Forum Review, Winter 2000. Available at: http://blackboard.jfsc.ndu.edu/html/jfscpublications/assets/docs/cam_grange.pdf. Accessed on 27/02/2011; J Anker III, Clinton and Burke D, Michael 2003, Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare, Military Review, July-August 2003. Available at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/ancker.pdf. Accessed on 27/02/2011; Thornton, Rod 2007, Asymmetric Warfare, Polity Press, Cambridge, pp 1-21; Norton-Taylor, Richard 2001, ‘Asymmetric Warfare,’ The Guardian, 3rd October. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/03/afghanistan.socialsciences. Accessed on 27/02/2011; Laqueur, Walter 1977, Guerrilla. A Historical and Critical Study, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, pp 382-409
 Che Guevara 1985, Guerrilla Warfare, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, pp 1-10
 Zedong Mao 1963, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse Tung 1893-1976, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, pp 259-261; Desai, Raj and Eckstein, Harry 1990, ‘Insurgency: The Transformation of Peasant Rebellion,’ World Politics, XLII/4, Princeton University Press, Princeton, p 443
 Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: The Countryside Version, Penguin Books, pp 302-305
 Laqueur, Walter 1977, Op cit, 382-409
 In a related issue, where terrorism is conducted in urban areas, Laqueur observes that an urban guerrilla group can not expand without risk of being detected by the state security apparatus. See Ibid
 This is why Laqueur observes that terrorism aims to “demoralize the government…” See ibid. Demoralization is a psychological phenomenon.
 For insights on a de-conventionalized approach to countering insurgencies, see: Galula, David 2006, Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California
 Che Guevara 1985, Op cit, pp 1-10
 Laqueur, Walter 1977, Op cit, 382-409
 BBC 2013, Nairobi siege, Op cit
 Brady Dennis 2014, Op cit
 BBC 2013, Nairobi attack, Op cit
In a fatwa issued by Usama bin Laden, the former leader of Al Qaeda and leaders of other Islamist militant groups, the Jewish state and its citizens are designated as a legitimate target of Islamists groups. See: Lewis Bernard 1998, License to Kill: Usama bin Laden’s Declaration of Jihad,’ Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, November/December. Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/54594/bernard-lewis/license-to-kill-usama-bin-ladins-declaration-of-jihad. Accessed on 26/03/2014
 BBC 2013, Nairobi siege, Op cit
 Burrows Olive 2014, ‘Court tours Westgate, suspects to seek bail,’ Op cit
 How the author deduces that Safaricom and Nakumatt were on the first and ground floors respectively: Rachel Muraya, a beautician and victim of the attack worked at Ashleys Beauty Salon on the second floor. See: Kaberia Judie 2014, Op cit; Khadija Adam, another eye witness was at Safaricom when the attack got underway. According to James Verini, Ashleys Salon is a level above where Adam was (Safaricom). See: Verini James 2013, ‘Letter From Kenya: Surviving Westgate,’ The New Yorker, 27th September. Available at: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/09/surviving-westgate.html. Accessed on 04/02/2014. Since Ashleys was on the second floor, Safaricom was on the first floor; Olive Burrows reports that Nakumatt was a floor below Safaricom. See: Burrows Olive 2014, ‘Court tours Westgate, suspects to seek bail,’ Op cit; since Safaricom was on the first floor, the part of Nakumatt that Burrows alludes to was on the ground floor. Nakumatt was situated on two levels. See: BBC 2013, Nairobi siege, Op cit. The other part of Nakumatt was on the first floor. See: Wabala Dominic 2014, Op cit
 Wabala Dominic 2014, Op cit
BBC 2013, Nairobi siege, Op cit
 Straziuso Jason 2014, Op cit; Burrows Olive 2014, ‘Court tours Westgate, suspects to seek bail,’ Op cit
 On the assailants stockpiling weapons prior to the attack, see: BBC 2013, Nairobi siege, Op cit
 Burrows Olive 2014, ‘Kenya: Cops Recount Events At Westgate On Sep 21,’ Capital FM, 17th January, AllAfrica.com, Nairobi, Kenya. Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201401200094.html. Accessed on 03/02/2014; on the lay-out of Nakumatt, see: Foot Note 38
 On the simultaneity of the attack, see: BBC 2013, Nairobi siege, Op cit
 Burrows Olive 2014, ‘Kenya: Cops Recount Events At Westgate On Sep 21,’ Op cit
 Verini James 2013, Op cit
 Burrows Olive 2014, ‘Kenya: Cops Recount Events At Westgate On Sep 21,’ Op cit; on the lay-out of Nakumatt, see: Foot Note 38
 CBS News 2013, Op cit
 BBC 2013, Nairobi siege, Op cit
 According to the BBC, a third group of assailants entered the mall through the basement area. See: Ibid
 Verini James 2013, Op cit
 Burrows Olive 2014, ‘Kenya: Cops Recount Events At Westgate On Sep 21, Op cit
Verini James 2013, Op cit