by Bing West
Download the full article: Korengal Valley Observations
In 2007, Alissa Rubin of The New York Times described a "new counterinsurgency doctrine" that consisted of small outposts in the Korengal and elsewhere, in order to patrol among the people. Four years later, the Korengal was abandoned to pursue yet another new counterinsurgency strategy -- small outposts in more heavily populated areas.
The scale of the fighting was not the reason for withdrawing. One American soldier was killed in the Korengal in the last ten months, a loss rate less than in an average rifle company. The strongest technical rationale for the withdrawal was economy of force. The troop-to-population ratio and the logistics for air support were too onerous, regardless of the level of fighting.
More problematic was the strategic rationale. "We're not living in their homes, but we're living in their valley," General McChrystal said, explaining that American soldiers were "an irritant to the people...There was probably much more fighting than there would have been (if US troops had never come.)"
This was true beginning in 2006, leaving a gap of four years in our strategic thinking. Our military strategy made no sense, if US troops were the reason for the fighting in the first place. Hence a political thesis emerged: the xenophobic Korengalis were ungovernable by anyone - except the Taliban. Even that was disputed by the commander of the US battalion responsible for the Korengal. "I don't believe there are any hard-core Taliban in the valley," LtCol Brian Pearl said.
Download the full article: Korengal Valley Observations
Bing West, a former assistant secretary of defense and combat marine, has made two dozen extended trips to Iraq and Afghanistan. The author of The Village and The Strongest Tribe, he is currently writing a book about the war in Afghanistan.