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Calibrating Civil Affairs Forces for Lethality in Large Scale Combat Operations

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Calibrating Civil Affairs Forces for Lethality in Large Scale Combat Operations

 

Jay Liddick, Thurman “Scott” Dickerson and Linda K. Chung

 

SWJ Editor’s Note: The Army’s CA Proponent is deliberately pursuing a Force Modernization Assessment (FMA) under the newly established Army Futures Command that will identify required capabilities for the future operating environment, capability gaps, and the right solutions to eliminate the identified gaps.  While Civil Affairs Forces will continue to have a significant role in competition, this essay is intentionally scoped to focus on CA's role in Large Scale Combat Operations.

“The Army must be manned, equipped, and trained to operate across the range of military operations, starting with the most lethal conditions first - large-scale combat against a regional peer”1                                 

-- Field Manual 3-0, Operations

If you think Civil Affairs (CA) has no role in lethality, you may be a part of the problem. As the reality of armed conflict against a near-peer adversary becomes increasingly plausible, the Army is rapidly modernizing its force to succeed in Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). In these critical times, CA must change to fulfill an essential role in the multi-domain solution. With responsibilities throughout the Competition Continuum2, the total CA force must prepare itself for the worst-case scenario Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). Competition-centric approaches are insufficient in armed conflict against a near-peer adversary willing and capable of employing hybrid warfare.3 To remain relevant in the future operational environment, CA must counter enemy hybrid warfare in the expanded battlefield, specifically in operational and tactical support areas, 4 as part of an integrated security team through civil reconnaissance, civil network analysis, and civil network development.

 

1

 

Figure 1. Hybrid Warfare.5

 

(Graphic from eARMOR, accessed 21 February 2019, https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/content/issues/2016/JUL_SEP/3Fox-Russia16.pdf)

 

Why Land Component Commanders Need CA in Their MDO Formations

 

During the last two decades, near-peer adversaries recognized that investing in offensive air and sea capabilities would be insufficient to achieve overmatch against the U.S. in LSCO.  As a result, they invested heavily in hybrid warfare and anti-access and area denial system capabilities to gain competitive advantages against U.S. vulnerabilities.6 Civil Affairs capabilities equip them to be the Army’s weapon of choice to counter hybrid warfare threats in support areas. Today’s near-peer adversaries possess the will and ability to weaponize civil capabilities. The effects of hybrid warfare are often misperceived as force protection threats, obstacles, and political challenges. However, hybrid warfare’s efficacy lies in the combination of multiple layers of irregular, economic, information, socio-political, and cyber warfare. As the Army’s only soldiers specially trained to shape human geography, CA capabilities enable them to detect, understand, and counter hybrid warfare threats.

Human Geography: The study of the interrelationships between people, place, and environment, and how these vary spatially and temporally across and between locations.7

When Russia invaded Crimea in 2014, it exploited Ukraine’s civil vulnerabilities by conducting unconventional and information warfare in the physical, virtual, and cognitive spaces. Russia’s military invasion in the physical space was enhanced by economic aid, employment of criminal networks, and arming of special purpose forces (SPF). In the virtual and cognitive spaces, maneuvers were elusive. Political proxies, propaganda, recruiting campaigns enabled by social media, diplomatic pressure, and diaspora movements were employed to advance Moscow’s objectives. Russia’s execution of hybrid warfare set the conditions for its consolidation of gains by destabilizing the critical capabilities of the Ukrainian government and military to secure ground, air, and sea lines of communication (LOCs). U.S. forces should expect to see a continuation of these threat activities as they execute MDO.

 

Friendly forces responsible for operational and tactical support areas must be capable of defeating hybrid warfare threats. In an effort to maintain the initiative, divisions, corps, and field armies have to bypass significant population centers and pockets of enemy forces as they concentrate combat power on their highest priority conventional threats. With the enemy using civilization for cover and concealment, CA not only reduces a significant blind spot for future multi-domain formations, but provides a capability to fully consolidate gains and secure victory in those areas.

 

Securing Support Areas Through Integrated Security

“Planning and execution to consolidate gains must account for all potential means of enemy resistance and be approached as a form of exploitation and pursuit if we want to create enduring outcomes. It is critical to avoid giving enemies the time to reorganize for a different kind of fight.”8                                                                                                                                             

-- LTG Mike Lundy and COL Rich Creed

Integrated security is the best approach to safeguard support areas and consolidate gains. Failing to disassemble, dismember, and neutralize hybrid warfare threats against support areas provides the enemy time and space to regain the initiative. The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Maneuver Support: 2020-2040 introduces the concept of integrated security as, “the synchronization and employment of capabilities at echelon in all domains to develop situational understanding continually, protect the force, and create a secure environment.”9

 

Creatively combining CA activities with the commander’s integrated security portfolio maximizes the Army’s limited protection capabilities to produce lethal outcomes. Planners generally consider direct fires or technologically-enabled protection capabilities in space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum when thinking about employing integrated security assets to disrupt and counter threats. However, employing the civil component’s protection capabilities will enhance a commander’s ability to penetrate the local security environment, detect emerging threats, and coordinate effective responses.

 

Civil Affairs as an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Platform

 

Civil Affairs is the Land Component Commander’s premier capability for tactical reconnaissance of the civil component of the battlefield. Even the most technologically advanced ISR platforms have limitations. While they excel at gathering data of the physical terrain against conventional enemy threats, they are not designed to detect things like human relationships, power dynamics, cultural factors, populace support, and motivations. FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, describes civil reconnaissance (CR) as “a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment.”10Correctly planned and executed, CR can provide significant insight to illuminate civil elements of a hybrid warfare threat network. In 2010-2011, a CA team, which was deployed to Yemen to conduct CR against specific civil information requirements, identified precursors to the overthrow of the Yemeni Government. Using face-to-face and social media engagements with networks it had developed on the ground and cyberspace, the team tracked the mobilization of anti-government militants, confirmed its estimates, and provided situational understanding to Special Operations Command Central-Forward.11Future CA forces must leverage new technologies to conduct CR and surveillance in dense urban terrain, hostile environments, and cyberspace. Through CR, CA teams provide evaluated civil data that enable commanders to achieve situational understanding, to include the enemy’s manipulation of civil capabilities.

 

Civil Network Analysis

 

Future CA forces must improve their ability to provide commanders with civil network analysis. TP 525-3-1 MDO 2028 identifies the required capability to “analyze operational environment and civil networks” in the future operating environment.12 Civil network analysis is more an art than a science. While the generating force is behind in incorporating civil network analysis into CA doctrine and training, many operational CA units provide varying levels of analysis to fulfill operational requirements. Civil network analysis investigates aspects of human geography to characterize trends, relationships, and networks with relation to time and space. Using multiple analytical tools, it filters civil data obtained through CR, civil engagement, intelligence sources, open-source data mining, and information shared by other members of the civil network to geospatially, temporally, and relationally map the human geography relevant to the battlespace.

 

Ultimately, the outputs of civil network analysis are products that help the commander and staff visualize the operational environment. Example products of civil network analysis include civil preparation of the battlefield, link analysis, decision trees, decision hierarchies, influence diagrams, timelines, and running estimates. CA staff at every echelon must integrate civil network analysis into the ground force commander’s staff processes. Developing actionable targets that disrupt, degrade, neutralize, and destroy hybrid warfare threat networks demands that all warfighters actively participate in intelligence, targeting, and planning processes.

 

Countering Enemy Hybrid Threat Networks with Civil Networks

“It takes networks to fight networks, much as in previous wars it has taken tanks to fight tanks.”13                                                                                                                              

__ Dr. John Arquilla, Ph.D

Naval Postgraduate School Distinguished Professor and Department of Defense Analysis Graduate School of Operational and Information Sciences Chair, Dr. John Arquilla, asserts that “a network is empowered by the adherence of its members to a shared goal.14 Civil Affairs’ unique role on the integrated security team is to develop and network local partners. Through civil engagement, CA forces strengthen local public-private partnerships, create local security partnerships, and develop tailored security postures.

 

Once enemy threat networks are illuminated and targets are prioritized, CA leaders must advise commanders on how to employ CA forces and civil networks as part of the integrated security team. The civil component’s protection capabilities are force multipliers. Host nation civil defense forces, national police forces, local security forces, border police, or militias can assist with securing LOCs. The same partner forces can help secure critical infrastructure such as key roads, bridges, ports, railroads, and airports. Information sharing with foreign intelligence agencies and cybersecurity agencies can assist in developing situational understanding of the cognitive and virtual environments. Defeating hybrid threat networks will likely require multi-faceted strategies that attack targets cognitively, physically, and virtually. Civil Affairs forces can leverage the decentralized nature of networks to agilely counter hybrid warfare threats.

 

In order to win in in a fluid operational environment, future CA forces must be tactically lethal against enemy hybrid warfare targets. They must be fully prepared to plan, participate in, or conduct operations such as patrols, cordon and searches, raids, or other engagements against enemy SOF or SPF. They must be able to maneuver technically within cyberspace and the information environment to provide ground force commanders with civil network analysis and employment options.

 

2

 

Lithuanian National Defence Volunteer Forces (KASP) soldiers assault a compound during a raid as part of exercise Saber Junction at the Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, Sept. 27, 2018. Special Operations Forces worked alongside the KASP during Saber Junction 18 to conduct irregular warfare in enemy occupied territory to support the U.S. Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade as they executed land operations in a multinational joint environment. (U.S. Army photo by 1st Lt. Benjamin Haulenbeek)15

 

Can Civil Affairs Deliver? The Way Ahead

 

To meet the challenges of LSCO, the total CA force must modernize its force. Based on past experiences with CA, naysayers may argue, with some accuracy, that the current CA force has neither the capability nor the capacity to counter the hybrid warfare threat in LSCO. In reality, the current CA force would give its best effort to adapt and overcome with mixed results. The calibration of the CA force’s technical and tactical potential makes a lethal CA capability for Land Component Commanders attainable.

 

Current CA structure, doctrine, equipment, and training are inadequate to combat future near-peer threats. The current CA force was designed and rapidly reorganized to support the Army’s modularity concept of the early 2000s. Civil Affairs grew to meet the increasing requirements of counterinsurgency and stability operations. Wargames and training exercises continue to prevent CA participants from demonstrating their capabilities in LSCO. As the likelihood of armed conflict in dense urban terrain increases,16 wargames must stop “assuming away” the civil component. This only perpetuates the Army’s challenge to fully understand how near-peer adversaries will use hybrid warfare at the operational and tactical levels and to develop the requisite capabilities to defeat them.

 

The CA Proponent is deliberately pursuing a Force Modernization Assessment (FMA) under the newly established Army Futures Command that will identify required capabilities for the future operating environment, capability gaps, and the right solutions to eliminate the identified gaps. Critical to success in the upcoming FMA will be to maintain unity of effort among all the stakeholders. Simultaneously, the CA Proponent will actively engage with the U.S. Army Centers of Excellence for the integration of CA capabilities into the Army’s warfighting functions. Meanwhile, CA forces must embrace their required role in LSCO, continue to sharpen their capabilities as the Army’s masters of human geography, and begin to lead the effort of countering the hybrid warfare threat that will be central to the adversary’s strategic approach. Beginning with an honest assessment of current CA capabilities, the CA force must transform its “soccer balls and projects” identity to rectify external misperceptions, while pursuing deliberate force modernization to produce lethal Soldiers —ready for the future fight.

 

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

 

End Notes

 

1. FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2017).

2. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, (Fort Eustis, VA: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 6 December 2018) vi.

3. “Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond White Paper Version 1.0” (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence Civil Affairs Proponent, 6 November 2018)

4. TP 525-3-5,8.

5. Amos C. Fox, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and the Re-emergence of Conventional Armored Warfare: Implications for the U.S. Army’s Armored Force.” eARMOR, July-September 2016, accessed 21 February 2019, https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/content/issues/2016/JUL_SEP/3Fox-Russia16.pdf

6. TP 525-3-5,7.

7. Alisdair Rogers, Noel Castree, and Rob Kitchin, “Human geography,” In A Dictionary of Human Geography (Oxford University Press, 2013).

8. Mike Lundy and Rich Creed, “The Return of U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations”. Military Review, November-December 2017, accessed 20 January 2019, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2017/The-Return-of-US-Army-Field-Manual-3-0-Operations/.

9. TP 525-3-5, U.S. Army Functional Concept for Maneuver Support: 2020-2040, (Fort Eustis, VA: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], February 2017), 12.

10. FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), 2-1.

11. Interviewee Geisinger, Thomas. “Interview with Civil Military Support Element-Yemen Team Leader.” Interview by LTC Thurman “Scott” Dickerson. February 1, 2019.

12. TP 525-3-5,28.

13. John Arquilla. “It Takes a Network,” 25 August 2002, accessed on 28 January 2019, https://www.rand.org/blog/2002/08/it-takes-a-network.html.

14. TP 525-3-1, D-4-D-6.

15. Benjamin Haulenbeek, “Saber Junction 2018 Integrates NATO, Partner SOF with Conventional Forces.” DVIDS, 27 Sept. 2018, accessed 21 February 2019, www.dvidshub.net/image/4857073/saber-junction-2018-integrates-nato-partner-sof-with-conventional-forces .

16. TP 525-3-5, D-4-D-6.

 

Categories: civil affairs

About the Author(s)

Captain (P) Linda K. Chung, U.S. Army, currently serves as a Concept Development Officer at Civil Affairs Proponent. She received her commission as an Engineer Officer and B.S. in Economics from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 2008. Since 2013, Chung has served as a CA team leader, Battalion Plans Officer, HHC Commander, and Training with Industry Fellow at the Research Triangle Institute-International Development Group. She has deployed to Afghanistan and Nepal, in addition to supporting multiple Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises in Korea. 

Lieutenant Colonel Thurman “Scott” Dickerson, U.S. Army, currently serves as the Chief of Concept Development at CA Proponent. He began his career as an armor crewman in 1996 and was commissioned as a Medical Service Corps officer in 2000 from Radford University.   He holds a M.S. in Criminal Justice from Radford University and a M.A. in Strategic Security Studies from National Defense University. Since 2008, Dickerson has served in diverse conventional and special operations command and staff positions within CA, to include ARCENT CMO Officer Forward, Brigade Executive Officer, and XVIII Airborne Corps Deputy G9. He has deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan multiple times, Qatar, Yemen, and served a one year hardship tour in Kuwait.

Colonel Jay Liddick, U.S. Army, currently serves as the Civil Affairs Commandant.  He received his commission as an Engineer Officer from Indiana University of Pennsylvania in 1995, and holds a Masters of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College and a M.A. degree in International Relations from Webster University.  Since 2004, Liddick has served in diverse command and staff positions within CA, to include Human Resources Command CA Branch Chief, Deputy Brigade Commander, and the CA Advisor/Irregular Warfare Integrator at the U.S. Army Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute.  He has deployed to the Dominican Republic, Bosnia, Iraq, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Indonesia, in addition to a one year tour in Honduras.

Comments

Bill C.

Thu, 03/21/2019 - 12:56pm

Perhaps this (a discussion of the efficacy of such things hybrid warfare and civil affairs) is a good place to address our new "conflict environment," to wit: the acceptance by President Trump, and by his administration, of such ideas as: 

a.  "Sovereignty" (as, once again, the legitimate and universal right of the states and societies of the world).  And:

b.  "Spheres of influence" (as, once again, the recognized and legitimate extrapolation/extension of a nation's such "sovereignty").  

Note that this a stark reversal/a complete "about face" in the way that the U.S./the West saw the world -- and our "conflict environment" -- (a) after our winning of the Old Cold War and (b) until Trump. 

Back then, the U.S./the West saw such things as "sovereignty" only through the lens of states and societies who were (a) organized, ordered and oriented more along modern western political, economic, social and value lines and/or who were (b) moving out smartly to achieve these exact such objectives. 

In world such as this, such concepts of "sovereignty" (along other than modern western lines) -- and indeed "spheres of influence" (see my quoted item immediately below) were considered to be outdated, obsolete, illegitimate and, generally, "in the way of progress" concepts.   

BEGIN QUOTE FROM OBAMA ERA SCTY OF STATE: 

"We will not agree with Russia on everything," Biden said. "For example, the United States will not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. We will not recognize a sphere of influence. It will remain our view that sovereign states have the right to make their own decisions and choose their own alliances."

END QUOTE

https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/europe/07iht-07munich.20001384.html )

With the coming to power of President Trump, however, all this that had been gained in relation to the U.S./the West's winning of the Old Cold War (see the new concept of "sovereignty" and the delegitimization of the  related concept of "spheres of influence" noted above); all this was formally "shit-canned" by President Trump.  As his Secretary of State, John Bolton, and in this case re: "spheres of influence," recently seems to have made clear:

BEGIN QUOTE FROM TRUMP ERA SCTY OF STATE: 

Pressed on why he has chosen to pressure Venezuela under Nicolas Maduro more aggressively than other brutal regimes around the world, Bolton said the White House would be more involved in the affairs of its own hemisphere

"No, I think it's separate [comparing Venezuela to Saudi Arabia]. In this administration, we're not afraid to use the word Monroe Doctrine. This is a country in our hemisphere. It's been the objective of American presidents going back to [President] Ronald Reagan to have a completely democratic hemisphere," Bolton told CNN's Jake Tapper

END QUOTE 

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/john-bolton-were-not-afraid-to-use-the-word-monroe-doctrine.

Bottom Line Thought -- Based on the Above:

Thus, when we are talking about (a) our "conflict environment" today and (b) the efficacy and use (by ourselves and/or others) of such things as hybrid warfare and civil affairs in relation to same, I believe that we must do this with an understanding that the United States today, under President Trump, appears to recognize that the other nations world, for example Russia, are: 

a.  Sovereign. 

b.  That this idea of "sovereignty" extends (much as with our Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere) to their near abroad, to their back yards and to their "spheres of influence."  And that, accordingly,

c.  These such nations (Russia, etc.) have a legitimate right to defend same; this, against the states, societies and civilizations (such as the U.S./the West) that may seek to "transform" them; for example, more along modern western political, economic, social and value lines.

Question:  In this light -- of the U.S. abandoning our position and rationale re: winning the Old Cold War -- and returning to a "defeatist" position and rationale -- as exemplified by our embrace of such things as "sovereignty" and "spheres of influence;" in this such light, in what instances, do we believe, will LSCO (by ourselves and/or by our enemies) be needed?  And/or such things as civil affairs, and/or hybrid warfare; in concert with, and/or in the service of same?  

Bottom Line Up Front:  

Much as the U.S./the West "weaponized" the civil populations of Latin America and elsewhere -- in our "containment of communism" cause during the Old Cold War -- likewise the Russians, the Afghans, etc., today have "weaponized" the civil populations of their spheres of influence/their backyards/their necks of the wood; in this case, in their "contain the U.S./the West" cause.  This, it appears, is an important way to avoid LSCO and, indeed, an important way to avoid nuclear war.

Explanation:

First, from our article above:

"During the last two decades, near-peer adversaries recognized that investing in offensive air and sea capabilities would be insufficient to achieve overmatch against the U.S. in LSCO.  As a result, they invested heavily in hybrid warfare and anti-access and area denial system capabilities to gain competitive advantages against U.S. vulnerabilities. Civil Affairs capabilities equip them to be the Army’s weapon of choice to counter hybrid warfare threats in support areas. Today’s near-peer adversaries possess the will and ability to weaponize civil capabilities. The effects of hybrid warfare are often misperceived as force protection threats, obstacles, and political challenges. However, hybrid warfare’s efficacy lies in the combination of multiple layers of irregular, economic, information, socio-political, and cyber warfare."

Next, from the War on the Rocks (WOTR) article entitled "America Did Hybrid Warfare Too:"

"The last time Russia and the United States grappled indirectly as adversaries in “the gray areas” during the final phase of the Cold War, it was the United States that put a hybrid “blend of military, economic, diplomatic, criminal, and informational means” to effective use, notably in Central America. ...

Employed as part of a broader strategy, what hybrid warfare did was allow the United States to carry out open-ended competition and signal certain confidence that the value of protecting the U.S. sphere of interest was greater than any opponent’s interest in upsetting it. After all, it would have served little purpose to test the escalation dominance the United States enjoyed in the hemisphere, say by threatening direct action against Cuba or rattling nuclear sabers. Instead, the method was a low-fear, low-cost, economy-of-force way to manage superpower confrontation that remained well below the threshold that might have provoked a more energetic response."

Question: 

If hybrid warfare, etc. -- undertaken by our adversaires today -- is best understood in the "containment" terms noted in the WOTR article item I provide above, to wit:   

a.  As a means of, in this case, countering the U.S./the West's "revolutionary warfare" efforts (destroy an existing society and its institutions and replace same with a completely new structure) in our adversaires' own backyards/their own spheres of influence.  (As to our such "revolutionary warfare" efforts of late, think Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.?).  And:

b.  As a means of doing this (again think "containment") in such a way as to AVOID large scale combat operations.  (And, thus, in such a way as to AVOID nuclear war?), 

Then, what does this such alternative understanding of our adversaries rationale -- for "investing heavily in hybrid warfare and anti-access and area denial system capabilities today (again, think "containment") -- what does this such alternative understanding of our adversaries rationale do: 

a.  To the arguements of the authors of this SWJ article above? And, this,  

b.  As per their suggestion of "CALIBRATING CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCES FOR LETHALITY IN LARGE SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS?"

 

Vicrasta

Mon, 03/18/2019 - 6:16pm

I'd argue CA units are equally positioned for operations to consolidate gains in tactical and operational Consolidation areas as well.  These areas are adjacent to the Close and Deep areas of the battlefield where large-scale combat operations are occurring.

Effective gains consolidation requires a clear understanding of both the purpose of the operation and potential enemy capabilities to resist. This requires purposefully task-organized units to consolidate gains based on force protection, enemy activity, lines of communications security, support area security, and minimal essential stability tasks. This “Task Force” may include civil affairs, engineers, military police (MP), explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units, or additional maneuver forces to conduct area security tasks (modified from FM 3-0). 

A consolidation area requires additional combat power and is not intended to draw forces from the close or deep area. Theater armies, in coordination with corps, must plan for and request forces for the consolidation area (Army Field Manual 3-0, 2017). 

Bottom Line Question Up Front:

If the goal of our adversaries (for example: Russia, China, Iran, N. Korea, the Islamists, etc.), has been and is, to contain and roll back U.S./Western power, influence and control (a) throughout the world but (b) especially in our adversaries' own backyards/their own spheres of influence,

And if the U.S./the West has decided, now under President Trump, et al., to no longer seriously work to maintain and/or to spread U.S./Western power, influence and control throughout the world (and certainly not to do so in our adversaries' own backyards/their own spheres of influence),

Then, based on this such "victory has already achieved by our opponents" -- and this "defeat is already the fate of the U.S./the West" understanding of our world today -- in what circumstances is it likely that the U.S./the West, and/or indeed our adversaires, will NEED to become involved in such things as "large scale combat operations" (LSCO)? 

Note:  Without engaging in "large scale combat operations" -- and, indeed, without firing very many lethal "shots" at all -- our opponents today have caused the U.S./the West to abandon (in the favor of such things as "stability," "sovereignty," etc.; see such things as the Trump 2017 NSS) -- the political objective that we have pursued since at least the end of World War II:

"Since the end of World War II, the United States has pursued a strategy aimed at overturning the status quo by spreading liberalism, free markets, and U.S. influence around the world. Just as Chinese revisionism alarms Washington, the United States’ posture stokes fear in Beijing and beyond. 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2017-02-13/asias-other-rev…

This being the case (we have now abandoned our such political objective; this, in favor of "stability," "sovereignty," etc.), how is it that "civil affairs" (etc., etc., etc.?) will be needed; this, in either a LSCO -- and/or indeed some other -- confrontational role?