Why Russia's Seizure of Ukrainian Vessels Matters to the U.S.
- Read more about Why Russia's Seizure of Ukrainian Vessels Matters to the U.S.
- Log in or register to post comments
Gray is Here to Stay: Principles from the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance on Competing in the Gray Zone - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · by Kevin Bilms · March 25, 2021
An important essay today.America must embrace its irregular warfare capabilities and be able to compete in Great Power Competition where dominant ' 'fight" is best described as political warfare. Irregular warfare is the military contribution to political warfare (and by DODD 3000.7 and the IW annex to the NDS consists of CT, FID, UW, COIN< and stability operations).
Although I am heartened by the author citing some of Bob Jones important work on unconventional deterrence I am disappointed he did not point out one of the most important sentences in the interim guidance: "We will maintain the proficiency of special operations forces to focus on crisis response and priority counterterrorism and unconventional warfare missions." Unconventional warfare is the foundation of irregular warfare and conventional warfare is at the root of the two SOF trinities: irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, and support to political warfare and the second being the comparative advantages of SOF: influence, governance, and support to indefgeigenous forces and population.
UW thinking informs everything SF/SOF should do.
UW is fundamentally problem solving; using unique, non-doctrinal and non-conventional methods, techniques, people, equipment to solve (or assist in solving) un.
UW is fundamentally about influencing behavior of target audiences (which can include a population, a segment of a population, a political structure, or a military force); therefore, it is an integral action arm of IO/PSYOP.
I am heartened to see the Biden administration use unconventional warfare when there are so many antibodies out there against it.
But I also commend Congress for providing the best description of irregular warfare that will never be adopted by the doctrine gatekeepers on the Joint Staff. In the 2018 NDAA it wrote: Irregular Warfare is conducted “in support of predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals participating in competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional armed conflict.”
While the concept and terminology of the Gray Zone is new, the geo-political situation it described is not, and the US military does have experience operating within them.
The biggest changes to the character of war seem to be ahead of us as the 21st century opens what looks like Pandora’s Box.
SOCAFRICA must understand and operate in the space between war and peace in a complex, volatile, uncertain and ambiguous environment - an environment of adversarial competition.
Why a label and its use obfuscates the most critical variable of social and cultural reality necessary for mission success.
The Gray Zone is becoming less opaque, less undefined because emerging analytical frameworks are finding their footing in the Department of Defense.
The United States has failed to appropriately respond to the gray zone so far, so what should the new administration strive for?