The Washington Face of Islamic Extremism: Saudi Arabian and Iranian Use of U.S. Lobbyists and Other Proxies to Disrupt Decisive U.S. Decision-Making

The Washington Face of Islamic Extremism: Saudi Arabian and Iranian Use of U.S. Lobbyists and Other Proxies to Disrupt Decisive U.S. Decision-Making

Darren E. Tromblay

Iran and Saudi Arabia are both exporters of extremism that fuels kinetic terrorist attacks. These countries are uniquely dangerous: the former represents the primary source of Shiite terrorism while the latter is a notorious purveyor of Sunni-sponsored violence. Although these states exploit significantly different ideologies for their own purposes, they share a common characteristic – both Riyadh and Tehran attempt to manipulate U.S. policymaking through lobbying that sows confusion about culpability, even as activities sponsored by both countries degrade the interests of the United States and its adversaries. Identifying how the influence apparatuses of both of these countries disrupt confident U.S. decision-making will bring the United States one step closer to reaching consensus about and implementing measures that decisively counter these governments’ perpetuation of hate.

Iran

The Iranian government has provided support to a variety of external terrorist organizations. The United States designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism. Iran uses its own Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), according to the U.S. Department of State, to implement foreign policy goals, provide cover for intelligence operations, and create instability in the Middle East.[1] The IRGC-QF is Iran’s “primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad”.[2] Tehran also supports terrorist proxies including Hizballah, Palestinian terrorist groups including Hamas, and Iraqi Shia terrorist groups.[3]

Despite the Iranian regime’s heinous history, multiple individuals have agreed to conduct public affairs activities on behalf of Tehran. Bijay A. Sepasy, starting in 1991, monitored developments in U.S. foreign policy as it pertained to the interests of Iran’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations.[4] In his 1992 Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) filing, Sepasy indicated that he would focus on issues including lifting U.S. trade restrictions on Iran and that his work would include interactions with U.S. government officials.[5] In 2005, Iran’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations obtained the services of Mark Edmond Clark. According to Clark’s filings between 2005 and 2008, he consistently helped Iran to collect and analyze information by providing “occasional reports on US – Iran relations in coordination with Mission staff for the Mission’s sole and exclusive use” and furnishing “written and oral reports on US – Iran relations based on discussions with US foreign and defense policy experts”.[6] When contacted by the publication Politico, Clark claimed claimed that he was not a “lobbyist” for Iran but instead provided research for his client.[7] Clark, as of 2008, also indicated that he would help the Iranian mission to formulate policy options.[8] Interestingly, Clark’s public writing was consistent with a pro-Iran perspective. The well-respected publisher, Routledge, released the book Terrornomics, which featured a chapter by Clark titled “An Analysis of the Iranian Diaspora in the Financial Support System of the Mujahedin e-Khalq”.

The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) filings indicate that Iranian engagement of registered public affairs professionals has been sporadic. There are indications that Iran may operate through culturally-oriented organizations, rather than traditional Washington, DC, lobbyists, in furtherance of influence objectives. In mid-1992, the Forum on American-Iranian Relations (FAIR) Foundation registered as a representative of the Government of Iran.[9] This group was to receive USD 120,000 from the Government of Iran over a period of six months and planned to sponsor a variety of functions including studies, seminars, lectures, and public discussions of matters pertaining to Iranian and American relations.[10] This was not Iran’s first attempt to use an ostensibly cultural organization as a proxy for intelligence activities in the United States. A 1984 FBI analysis identified the Muslim Student Association’s Persian Speaking Group (MSA-PSG) as an extension of the Iranian regime which received funding through Iran’s Interests Section (the Iranian presence in lieu of a formal embassy) in Washington, DC. Furthermore, a group known as Anjoman Islamie, which operated primarily under the auspices of the MSA-PSG, fulfilled various intelligence functions – including the spread of propaganda including magazines and brochures – on behalf of the Iranian government.[11] Anjoman Islamie received funds from the Iranian government through either the Iranian Interests Section or the Mostazafin Foundation – an Iranian government front company – in New York City.[12]

Developments since 2001 suggest that Iran may continue to rely on such culturally oriented organizations as proxies (even if those organizations are unwitting that they are viewed in this light). For instance, in 2006, Javad Zarif – now Iran’s Foreign Minister – referred to welcoming help from Trita Parsi, who helped found the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) in 2001.[13] NIAC formed its own, dedicated lobbying arm – NIAC Action – in 2015.[14] However, the agenda that NIAC has propounded over the years indicates that it shares the interests of the Iranian regime, even if it is not working strictly at the behest of Tehran. For instance, it opposes designating the IRGC as a terrorist entity.[15] Furthermore, as of 2009, NIAC wanted the U.S. Congress to cut off funding for democracy promotion in Iran.[16] Tehran may perceive it easier, more effective, and less expensive simply to ride the coattails of well-connected organizations such as NIAC – which promote agendas that align with Iranian viewpoints - rather than hiring U.S. public affairs professionals.   

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia’s devotion of significant resources to shaping U.S. policymaking cannot exculpate it from its role as the Sunni extremist counterpart to Iran’s fueling of Shia militancy. One of Riyadh’s most prominent legacies is having provided 15 of the 19 hijackers who perpetrated the September 11 attacks. The ugliness of the propaganda material that Saudi Arabia has continued to produce is indicated by the Islamic State’s adoption of official Saudi textbooks for its schools until the terrorist group could produce its own material.[17] Saudi Arabia’s government is notorious for exporting the extremist Wahhabi strain of Islam internationally. The Cultural Department of the Saudi embassy in Washington, DC, advised Muslims not to take U.S. citizenship, because, according to the Cultural Department publication, the United States was governed by infidels.[18] Furthermore, the Saudi government has attempted to sow division with American society, encouraging the maintenance of a “wall of resentment” between Muslims and non-Muslims, as this will facilitate jihad.[19]

This has directly impacted the United States. In 1998, the King Fahd Mosque – the first Islamic center in North America to be fully funded by the Saudi royal family - opened in Los Angeles, California.[20] (Saudi money has helped to finance 16 American mosques.[21]) It is possible that this location functioned as a platform for terrorist activities. Fahad al Thumairy, who was an accredited diplomat at the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles, was also employed as an imam at the mosque and, according to the 9/11 Commission report, may have played a role in helping the 9/11 hijackers to establish themselves once they arrived in California.[22] The United States deported al-Thumairy in 2003.[23] Then, in 2004, the United States revoked the diplomatic visas of more than a dozen staff members who worked for the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in Falls Church, Virginia.[24] The Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, was the chairman of the school’s Board of Trustees and the school was further linked to the Saudi state by virtue of its affiliation with the Saudi state-run university system and funding from the Saudi Ministry of Higher Education.[25] Extremism was no stranger to the Institute – its curriculum referred to the “ruinous” effect of Christian beliefs and among its lecturers was an individual who provided two of the September 11 hijackers with spiritual direction.[26]

Despite Saudi support for extremist activities on U.S. soil, Riyadh expects a favorable reception from U.S. policymakers for the agenda that its public affairs proxies peddle. One of the most recent Saudi lobbying initiatives focused on disrupting passage of the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) – which would have made Saudi Arabia liable for terrorist attacks conducted by its citizens. The law was originally passed by Congress and presented to President Obama on September 12, 2016, vetoed by Obama on September 23, 2016, and overridden by legislators on September 28, 2016.  The clear focus on interfering with this piece of legislation was apparent in FARA filings. On September 25, 2016, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs enlisted Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck LLP to “[c]ommunicate with Members of Congress and members of the executive branch regarding the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) and JASTA’s passage into law”.[27] The firm of King & Spalding registered, on September 26, 2016, on behalf of the Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Investment to provide the Ministry with “advocacy and legal services related to the veto override of S. 2040, the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act”.[28] In addition to these firms, which explicitly stated their complicity in disrupting policy on behalf of a foreign client, several other firms provided services, under more generalized descriptions, to the Saudis. For instance, a lobbyist working for DLA Piper, a firm which Saudi Arabia employed since at least 2015, arranged meetings for the Saudis with Congressional leadership.[29] The timing of other hires, including Squire Patton Boggs and the Glover Park Group was consistent with Saudi push to disrupt JASTA.[30]

Even after Congress had passed JASTA, over the President’s veto, Saudi Arabia continued to employ public affairs firms to overturn the legislation. Measures included hiring the CGCN Group – an all-Republican firm – to “provide consulting and government relations counsel and support to the foreign principal in connection with foreign policy, legislative and public policy matters of interest”.[31] The inside-the-Beltway publication Politico characterized this addition as “a key addition to [the Saudi] lobbying blitz” against JASTA.[32] Saudi Arabia also appeared determined to create pressure on Congressmen and Senators from their home districts. Flywheel Government Solutions and Qorvis / MSL agreed, in October 2016, to represent the Saudi embassy in educating officials at the state level on JASTA, with the objective of creating greater awareness of the legislation, impacts, and potential consequences.[33] (This was not the first time that Saudi Arabia attempted to make their interests a local issue. Shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, in which their nationals featured prominently, Qorvis advised its Saudi client to “[b]roaden reach of media campaign outside of Washington in order to reach average Americans” and “[b]uild allies in key states and Congressional districts”.[34]) Demands from constituents are a visceral concern to elected officials’ livelihood in comparison to the more remote problems of international relations.

Fighting JASTA was not the first time that Saudi Arabia waged a high-profile public affairs campaign to dispel perceptions that it sponsored terrorism. In October 2001, the Saudis signed a contract with Qorvis Communications, paying the firm USD 200,000 per month for advertising expenses, public affairs, and research.[35] (Qorvis was founded in 2000 and acquired, as of 2014, by the Publicis Groupe, a French firm, which planned to fold Qorvis into MSLGROUP.[36]) Through Qorvis, the Saudis also obtained the services of Patton Boggs.[37] The public affairs campaign – which ran television and radio spots in nearly every major U.S. media market – was meant to counter the anger and skepticism toward the country which had provided 15 of the 19 September 11 hijackers.[38] However, in an apparent rebuke to their client, three of Qorvis’ founding partners quit the firm in December 2002, prompted, according to associates, by a deep discomfort with defending the Saudi government against facilitating terrorism.[39]

Qorvis’ activities on behalf of Saudi Arabia have drawn federal authorities’ scrutiny. The firm allegedly helped the Saudis to deceptively finance a 2002 media campaign – ostensibly the work of a group known as the Alliance for Peace and Justice – promoting Crown Prince Abdullah’s Middle East peace plan.[40] In late 2004, the FBI searched three of Qorvis’ offices in connection with a FARA inquiry, which was likely in reference to the 2002 Alliance for Peace and Justice ploy.[41] The Department of Justice did not ultimately file charges. Also in 2002, Qorvis received additional bad publicity in connection with its Saudi account when it refused to turn over documents to the House of Representatives’ government affairs committee inquiry regarding missing American children in Saudi Arabia.[42] According to the Wall Street Journal, Qorvis managing partner, Michael Petruzzello, spent several days “dodging federal marshals”, before finally turning over the requested documents.[43]

Conclusion

Shutting foreign government voices out from the halls of power is not a remotely realistic possibility. However, the particularly pernicious impacts of foreign-sponsored lobbying can be disrupted through a two-pronged approach. The first is ensuring that registrations under FARA (and to a lesser extent the Lobbying Disclosure Act) are both thorough and well-publicized. It is one thing for documentation to be filed away – whether in dusty physicality or via bits and bytes – and another for it to become an element of public discourse on a policy issue. Second, the U.S. government needs to carefully scrutinize voices, such as NIAC, that although independent, promote interests which align with those of hostile governments. This is not simply to protect the integrity of the policymaking environment but also to protect organizations themselves since, historically, opportunistic foreign intelligence services have attempted – repeatedly – to co-opt and exploit the credibility of respected organizations engaged in activities ranging from academia to advocacy.  

Saudi and Iranian influence operations against U.S. decision-makers – whether conducted via professional lobbyists or on the backs of ostensibly independent cultural organizations –impede the formulation of policies to effectively combat the brushfires of extremist Sunni and Shiite ideology that are so calculatingly fanned by Riyadh and Tehran. Influence operations by these countries do nothing less than aid and abet terrorism, as they make it more difficult for the United States to formulate and implement strategies that will prevent the emergence of violence from virulent rhetoric. Regardless of how legal and well-documented they might be, influence operations nonetheless confuse, confound, and even misdirect audiences – often turning the expertise of (well-compensated) U.S. public affairs professionals mercenarily against their own country’s interest.

End Notes